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Preface (Brigadier General Raymond A. Thomas III) 
If there are any key insights resulting from renewed study of the causes and potential 
solutions for terrorism, it is that there is no simple formula for either the individual or group 
radicalization phenomenon.  While epidemiology and law enforcement provide useful insights 
on terrorism, they fall short in recognizing the inherent complexity of what is fundamentally a 
system-of-systems problem. That is, stopping or abating the terrorism phenomenon is not merely 
an issue of identifying and intercepting the perpetrators of terrorist violence. To be truly 
effective, strategies and tactics must also be focused far to the left, to address the factors that lead 
to radicalization in the first place.  These efforts should span the perpetrators, the instigators, and 
the population that both actively and passively supports terrorism (the oft referenced "green 
layer").  These dynamics occur and inter-relate across many levels.  For example, terrorist groups 
can in some cases gain the support of others by providing public services (e.g., water, medical 
care), often filling critical gaps where the government is failing to fulfill basic needs. Any 
strategies to decrease terrorism-related violence need to be tailored to address all the elements of 
this system-of-systems. Successful counter-radicalization strategies include programs that target 
entire communities, especially targeting the vulnerable segments -- the unemployed, the 
disenfranchised, and the youth (especially under 25 year old males). Social connectedness is a 
powerful factor, even if one is connected to another's struggle.  Successful de-
radicalization/rehabilitation programs generally include the family of the perpetrator, enlisting 
them to ensure compliance as well as including them in financial compensation, etc.  In short, 
addressing a complex and multi-faceted problem requires a multi-faceted solution. 
In addition, counter-terrorism strategies must address the entire continuum of 
radicalization, including the fundamental reasons that people are drawn to participate, in 
whatever form, in terrorism.  That is, strategies need to be devised to counter the simple, popular 
messages that resonate with people (e.g., focusing on social injustice issues or collective 
grievance like the state of occupation by a foreign power – deprivation creates breeding grounds 
for terrorism) including a powerful and captivating image based on innovation, empowerment, 
and dramatic action and, in the cases of transnational organizations, the global (inherently 
inclusive) character. These strategies could focus on inconsistencies and weaknesses, such as 
sources of internal dissent within the organization (e.g.,  lack of consensus on tactics that target 
civilians) or the legitimacy of the organization as a governing body and lack of validity of  
political vision (i.e., if the current government is inadequate, what will take its place?).  
Ideology may not be the key driver in motivating terrorism; nonetheless, it cannot be 
ignored.  While some current research points to ideology as more of a framing device or tool 
with which to explain or rationalize violence or a rallying point, nevertheless ideology must be 
addressed in any counter-terrorism collection of strategies.  Religious ideologies are difficult to 
distinguish from political ideologies as a motivating factor.  Both are based on socially shared 
beliefs about reality and the basic nature of being human, and both are often convolved (i.e., a 
group purporting to act based on a religious ideology may actually be acting based on long 
standing perceived political or socio-economic grievances).  Some scholars actually espouse the 
view that, in some cases, a group's ideology (e.g., Marxist) rides on top of the religious beliefs, 
allowing the religion to reinforce, justify, and in essence become the ideology.  Religious 
ideologies can and are used to serve a number of social functions that have nothing to do with 
religion itself (e.g., basis for class or ethnic identity, justification for racial oppression, civil 
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rights movements, engagement, or escape from the world). Behaviors are often attributed to 
ideological motives, both peaceful and violent. However, because of the convoluted relationship 
between religious and political ideology, religious and former movement leaders can and should 
be part of the solution.  This is particularly true where the opposition to the local government is 
strong; that is, the legitimacy of the government is in question.   
Achieving any success in diminishing the global terrorism phenomenon will require a 
new understanding of the inherent differences and complexities in what is a system-of-systems 
and requires an approach that addresses all its key elements.  Particular attention needs to be paid 
to the key frames (and underlying environmental conditions) that make individuals attracted to 
these groups/movements, with comprehensive approaches across the continuum of radicalization 
and violence.  In addition, recognizing that ideology (whether religious and/or political) matters 
and understanding the sources of legitimacy are critical in developing effective, lasting solutions. 
 
 
 
Raymond A. Thomas III 
Brigadier General, USA 
Deputy Director for Special Operations & Counterterrorism, J-37 
The Joint Staff 
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Executive Summary:  The Global Terrorism Phenomenon – What Do We 
Know, How Do We Know It, and What Do We Not Know - But Need to? 
(Editorial Board) 
It would be comforting to be able to find some constants, some footholds in our 
understanding of terrorism.  It is, in fact, the element of mystery as to what drives people to 
collective violence that makes us uncomfortable -- that fills us with terror.  Researchers, policy 
makers, those who must combat terrorism, and the public hope for some simple formula for 
radicalization, a program or set of programs that will prevent groups of people from deliberately 
targeting other people in order to meet their needs (political, economic, social, etc).  There is no 
magic formula within this paper collection, but there are a variety of perspectives that, either in 
isolation or when integrated, provide new ways to think about terrorism and potentially to inform 
decisions that will abate this global phenomenon, not exacerbate it. 
This paper collection entitled, ―Protecting the Homeland from International and Domestic 
Terrorism Threats: Current Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives on Root Causes, the Role of 
Ideology, and Programs for Counter-radicalization and Disengagement,‖ seeks to add insights 
without needlessly repeating what has been heard and read elsewhere.  What separates this paper 
collection from the many others on this topic is the multiplicity of perspectives represented, both 
domestic and international, that span the spectrum of social sciences.  To do this, over forty 
authors were asked to provide perspectives on various aspects of terrorism:  root causes, 
dynamics of Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs), the role of ideology in terrorism, and potential 
solutions for counter-radicalization, deradicalization, and disengagement from terrorism. 
This paper collection builds on and substantially augments the recent RAND publication 
entitled, ―Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together.‖  The RAND report 
looked at root causes, why people become terrorists, support for terrorism, how terrorism ends, 
disengagement and deradicalization, and strategic communications using the approach of 
surveying relevant literatures and then synthesizing the information – in many cases in very 
helpful factor trees that distill and show interrelationships between key factors.  This collection 
has a few survey papers bolstered by numerous empirical analyses as well as comprehensive 
papers on select topics (e.g., Pakistan) and papers by international authors expressing essentially 
―first person‖ perspectives on key terrorism issues, particularly ideology and counterterrorism 
solutions.  This allows for greater ―drill down‖ in some areas as well as an understanding on 
what current empirical research shows us about terrorism.   
The viewpoint throughout is that terrorism, and indeed what we know about terrorism, is 
DYNAMIC.  There is no formula (condition a + grievance b + group dynamic c + ideology d = 
collective violence) that applies.  Terrorism is the result of interactions between human beings – 
who live in an environment with other individuals and groups, with a government that does or 
does not meet their needs and expectations, who interact on a daily basis with others, who they 
may increasingly identify with radicals based on a variety of reasons, who may have experienced 
trauma and/or perceived discrimination either first hand or indirectly (e.g., Internet videos), who 
may meet a charismatic leader and/or hear a resonant message that meshes with their 
psychological vulnerabilities.  The message may frame their grievance in terms of an all-
encompassing worldview that fosters a sense of a conflict they are currently experiencing as a 
―cosmic war‖ in which they can (and indeed must) participate in a noble fight against a 
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demonized enemy.
1
  It can start in a variety of ways and it can also end, as the recent RAND 
report outlined, in a variety of ways: the actors can change their minds about the ideology that 
justified their actions, give up or be arrested or killed or appeased by the government, or lose so 
many group members that it is no longer feasible or worth carrying on the fight.  It is a (non-
linear, complex, or even chaotic) fluid dance with many moving parts; thus, it cannot be 
expressed in simple ―if-then‖ statements or simple causal diagrams.  This paper collection also 
boldly steps into the deafening silence on the topic of ―do ideology and/or religion motivate 
terrorism?‖ and provides some surprising thoughts on this controversial topic.   
To frame the topic being addressed, we start with a definition of terrorism and an 
assessment of the current threat posed by terrorism, both internationally and domestically.  There 
is a plethora of definitions for terrorism – a 1988 study by the U.S. Army counted 109.2 The two 
offered here are consistent with the key elements found in most definitions.  Terrorism is defined 
by U.S. Law (U.S. Code Title 22, Ch.38, Para. 2656f(d)) as the ―premeditated, politically 
motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or 
clandestine agents‖ and by the Oxford English Dictionary as ―a policy intended to strike with 
terror those against whom it is adopted; the employment of methods of intimidation; the fact of 
terrorising or condition of being terrorised.‖  Fundamentally, terrorism occurs when non-state 
organizations employ violence for political purposes and when the target of that violence is 
civilian (or military in non-combat settings), and the immediate purpose is to instill fear in a 
population. 
―Bumper sticker‖ insights from the overall paper include... 
• No ―one size fits all‖ in terms of a terrorist profile, radicalization trajectory, level of 
extremism, motivations, organization characteristics, and counter-terrorism responses or 
solutions  
• Our understanding of terrorism can and should be based on empirical data, as well as case 
studies, to best inform strategy and policy 
• Terrorism is not new, but new technology is a ―game changer‖ in terms of motivation 
(e.g., Internet videos provoke experience of trauma, like in conflict zones), recruiting, 
training, potential lethality, and even tactics selection 
• Root causes are necessary in terms of the susceptibility for the emergence of individuals 
or groups likely to use terrorism as a tactic, but not sufficient 
• Group dynamics are necessary as are charismatic leaders or instigators, but not sufficient 
• Credible messages and leaders/counselors are necessary for 
deradicalization/disengagement, but not sufficient 
• Ideology is important at least as a way to frame issues and justify actions 
                                                 
1
 Juergensmeyer, M. (2000). Terror in the mind of God. University of California Press, 163. 
2
 Schmid, A. P., Jongman, A. J., et al. (1988). Political terrorism: A new guide to actors, authors, 
concepts, data bases, theories, and literature. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 5-6.  
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• Individual solutions exist but must be tailored to the level of extremism and role 
(instigator, perpetrator, and supporter) and be combined to truly combat radicalization 
and terrorism 
This collection is organized in five sections, each of which contains papers that address key 
aspects of the contemporary terrorist phenomenon and what is known about those that engage in 
terrorism: instigators, perpetrators, and supporters. The collection begins with an overview that 
sets the stage for where threats exist and are emerging. The next section reviews research on the 
root causes of terrorism and provides diverse views concerning the economic and political 
conditions and new information environments that foster terrorism. The next section on 
dynamics of violent non-state actors (VNSA) considers social networking and group dynamics 
that foster and support terrorism. Ideology is increasingly implicated in terrorism, and the section 
on Ideology and VNSAs covers diverse viewpoints on the role of ideology as a cause or 
consequence of terrorism. The final section provides several information and perspectives on the 
effectiveness of various counter-radicalization, deradicalization and disengagement programs 
and research on their likely effectiveness in combating or de-escalating violent activity. The first 
three sections provide important updates to the established literature on terrorism.  
Prologue – Global Terrorism Overview 
How serious is the current global terrorism phenomenon?  Rik Legault‘s (P.1) review 
informs us that while terrorist attacks since the turn of the century have become progressively 
more dangerous worldwide, with an increasing likelihood of death and injury in a terrorist attack, 
they are still very rare – 100 times rarer than homicides in the U.S.  Attacks on the U.S. are more 
likely to be on foreign soil and target selection is primarily a function of proximity.   
According to James Lutz (P.2), the greatest domestic (U.S.) threat is from extreme right 
wing groups, including radical environmental groups.  He points out that the underlying issues 
that motivate white supremacist, anti-abortion, tax resistor, and animal rights groups have not 
gone away, nor have the groups. Furthermore, the election of an African-American president 
may fuel the grievances and fears of white supremacist organizations. While there have been a 
few homegrown militant Islamist terrorist cells spawned in the U.S., in New York, Virginia, 
New Jersey, and Florida, the groups that were serious and capable enough to plan and execute 
attacks appear to be the exceptions.   
At the time of this writing, the situation in Pakistan is rapidly evolving.  Bokhari‘s paper 
(P.3) relates that the current conflicts in Pakistan are based on a central issue: the relationship 
between the state and religion and debate about the role Islam should play in society.  Jihad, in 
Pakistan, initially focused on fighting the Indian army and the Hindu nation over the territory of 
Kashmir and shifted to focus sequentially on the Soviet enemy, freeing Muslim lands (including 
Palestine and Chechnya), and removing the ―infidels‖ from Afghanistan.  However, the current 
focus has switched to fighting the ―apostate‖ Pakistani government and its institutions, directly 
questioning state legitimacy.   
A number of disparate VNSA groups, with different leadership and different views on 
local and international issues, banded together in 2007 under the umbrella of the Tehrik e 
Taliban Pakistan (TTP).  This coalition emerged over time as groups began to network together, 
resulting in better coordination and more effective targeting of key military and intelligence 
installations.  The constituent groups in the TTP share a common enemy, the U.S., and are pro al 
Qaeda (AQ), but their tribal differences and disagreement on issues present fault lines and 
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potential vulnerabilities.  Bokhari provides valuable background for understanding the varied 
faces of the Pakistani Taliban, and their often-competing allegiances. She describes key actors in 
the Pakistani Taliban movement - and details the successful creation of a nexus of cooperating 
VNSA organizations capable of challenging the central state authority of Pakistan.  
In terms of the threat posed by AQ, Schweitzer (P.4) chronicles recent shifts in AQ 
activity from a decrease in violence in Iraq to escalating actions in Pakistan and Afghanistan.  Al 
Qaeda is still viewed as the leader of the global militant jihad movement and the role model for 
affiliates.  They focus on showcase attacks, using terrorism as ―propaganda in action‖ as part of a 
global propaganda system that also effectively uses Internet and video production.  Iraq has 
provided a useful distraction for AQ, diverting attention from post 9-11 pressure and stoking 
propaganda efforts centered on Iraq as an arena for the ―war on Islam‖ and providing a training 
ground for the global jihad. 
Afghanistan and Pakistan provide a base for joint planning between al Qaeda and the 
Taliban for attacks on Pakistani forces.  Al Qaeda‘s influence is notable in the increase in suicide 
bombings (e.g., Danish embassy bombing in Islamabad). Schweitzer notes as trends: the post 9-
11 shift from a more centralized to a more distributed organization, the inspiration of loosely 
affiliated organizations to act, AQ activity in areas where the central government lacks full 
control and effective enforcement, the undermining of central Muslim states and the replacement 
of ―heretical‖ regimes (e.g., Pakistan), and the continued use of dramatic mass-casualty attacks 
to establish preeminence.  Schweitzer also details the anti-Israeli propaganda boost resulting 
from the latest Israeli incursion into Gaza (Operation Cast Lead) and increased efforts to 
penetrate the Israeli border with Lebanon as a likely launching point for an attack on Israel. 
Invited Perspective Paper: LGen Honoré 
Lieutenant General (Ret) Russel L. Honoré‘s paper frames many of the issues in this 
collection. Based on his 37 years experience as a military commander, he has dealt first-hand 
with issues of inequality and political oppression, the conflicts these create, and how a transition 
to civilian government can mitigate social instability. Gen. Honoré first notes that terrorists 
themselves are not necessarily impoverished, marginalized, or driven by religious dogma. 
Especially with regard to beliefs, Gen. Honoré notes that ―ideology doesn‘t create extremists, it 
supports them.‖ Therefore, ideas, poverty, and social marginalization are not direct causes of 
terrorism. Islamic radicals come from societies where Western power and influence threatens 
those who have traditionally dominated. Their radicalized response is to justify the killing of 
innocents through the use of terrorist tactics.  
Gen. Honoré explains that the antidote to radical terrorism is to provide the security and 
basic opportunity that people worldwide desire. Precision bombs kill innocents and play into 
terrorist rhetoric. Counter-ideologies often play into the hands of terrorists by giving the 
impression that outsiders are attempting to colonize and dominate. While U.S. actions may be 
necessary to initiate the transition to a sustainable civil society, such a transition must ultimately 
occur through the people themselves. If the U.S. and others are to be successful in security, 
stabilization, and reconstruction operations, then personnel must be fluent in the language of 
cultures in which they operate. Otherwise, setbacks and failures will occur.  
In summary, Gen. Honoré argues that the way to combat terrorism successfully is to deny 
those who use terrorist tactics what they need: a population vulnerable to terrorist recruitment. 
This is done by realizing how people in other societies can provide for their own security and 
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political and economic opportunities in culturally appropriate ways, helping them to achieve this 
stability, and by leaving when the job is done.  
Invited Perspective Paper – Captain Wayne Porter 
 Captain Wayne Porter (USN) argues that the United States is not fighting the war of ideas 
against militant jihadis effectively. He notes that the al Qaeda ideology is the focal point for like-
minded extremists with a shared vision of establishing a caliphate that would be antithetical "to 
human rights, modern rule of law, freedom of expression and self-determination." He argues that 
combating this spreading ideology requires addressing the legitimate grievances of many 
Muslims around the world. He points out that to be effective, this cannot be done by Westerners 
acting alone, but must be done in partnership with moderate Muslims.   
Section 1 – Root Causes of Terrorism 
Researchers have long sought the root causes underlying terrorism, and this section 
presents new developments including empirical analyses and recent research highlighting 
findings from a variety of disciplines including political science, psychology, and neuroscience.   
The recent RAND counterterrorism report mentioned above covered this quite thoroughly and 
concluded that a systems approach that considers a multitude of factors operating in a context-
sensitive manner is required for an understanding of the broad array of phenomena we classify as 
terrorism. This section offers restatement of previous findings, but takes a closer look at types of 
radicals, including a discussion of the key distinction between those that perpetrate (execute) 
violence and those that instigate it, types of radicalization mechanisms, and psychological 
factors. This section also identifies new factors that underlie the propensity for people to employ 
terrorist tactics, including the role of emotion in escalating violence and the relationship between 
neurobiology, crime, and violence.  
Rieger‘s paper (1.1) describing the ―Anatomy of a Swamp‖ documents the results of 
empirical analyses based on Gallup World Poll data from 140 countries.  The survey data on 
attitudes, beliefs, and opinions was used to develop a model to classify radicals and non-radicals.  
Two types of radicals were identified. Type One Radicals tended to be ―intolerant‖ individuals 
with political grievance who lack confidence in national and local leaders due to unmet 
expectations for basic services, elections, and judicial systems who had also experienced 
hardship and tended to live in areas where fears about personal safety were common.  Type Two 
Radicals tended to be victims of intolerance, downscale in terms of income, leader and ideology 
seeking, and espoused a willingness to sacrifice their lives for a cause.  Countries with Type One 
or Type Two radicalism levels of at least three percent experience three times the amount of 
violent activity of those with lower levels of radicalism.   
The next paper, by McCauley and Moskalenko (1.2), outlines a series of mechanisms for 
individual and group radicalization.  Individual mechanisms, enabling an understanding of how 
individuals join a radicalized group, include radicalization through personal grievance (harm to 
self or loved ones), political grievance (strong identity with victimized group), the ―slippery 
slope‖ resulting from increased identification with ―in-group,‖ relationships (a family or loved 
one is radical), status or thrill-seeking, and ―unfreezing‖ (the elimination of prior commitments 
that triggers the need for connection).  Group level mechanisms, those that move a group to 
political radicalization and collective violence, include group polarization (the tendency for 
likeminded individuals to become more polarized (―us‖ versus ―them‖); radicalization resulting 
from competition either with the state, other groups, or within a group; and radicalization based 
 11 
UNCLASSIFIED 
on the social reality power of isolation.  McCauley and Moskalenko conclude, like the RAND 
study editors, that there is no one path to political radicalization and that graduation to illegal 
political violence depends, among other things, on culture, time, and place.   
Lemieux‘ paper (1.3) on psychological factors states that, although there are several 
psychology factors including trauma, humiliation, narcissism, and altruism that predispose them 
to violence and/or terrorism, it is the integration of individual level psyche, and that of small 
groups, that informs the ―how‖ of terrorism.  He emphasizes the importance of understanding the 
triggers that operate at an individual level in the appropriate intergroup and environmental (e.g., 
poverty and inequities) context and posits that identity (social, cultural, religious, and political) 
may be at the heart of understanding the motivations for terrorism. He further notes the sizable 
body of research that links in-group/out-group polarization, categorical thinking, and the 
dehumanization of ―them‖ to an imperative to take action, intergroup violence, and terrorism.  
Psychology informs the understanding of how individuals process messages and how they are 
framed, a key in understanding the resonance with an ideology.  
Speckhard‘s paper (1.4) on contextual and motivational pathways to radicalization 
reinforces the importance of the need to understand radicalization as a process that engages on 
multiple levels: group (political grievance, and motivation for action), individual (vulnerabilities 
and motivations for involvement), ideology, and society.  She highlights key differences in the 
ways violent radicalization occurs between those in conflict zones, often motivated by trauma 
and a desire for revenge (loss of homes, loved ones, jobs, and opportunities), and non-conflict 
zones, in which radicalization is highly contextual and varies according to local grievances (e.g., 
discrimination, socio-economic inequality, alienation, and marginalization) and which involves 
vulnerable individuals looking for adventure, sense of meaning, and/or belonging or protection.  
She states that, when coupled with a charismatic recruiter with messages of a potential mission, 
excitement, sense of meaning (a classic example of an ―instigator‖ – see Mandel‘s paper), the 
vulnerabilities of the individual mesh with the goals of a group.  She states that exposure to 
violence (e.g., in homes or gangs) can effectively bring conflict zone effects into non-conflict 
zones and highlights an important difference in terrorism today – that modern technology, 
including the Internet,  also serves as a mechanism for experiencing trauma and motivating 
revenge (as in a conflict zone). 
Less discussed, but equally important, is the role of emotion in the escalation of hostility.  
Matsumoto (1.6) relates that group emotions serve as motivations for group behaviors, making 
attributions about in-group and out-group(s) and regulating social behaviors.  As such, 
understanding key emotions such as anger and, specifically, the progression from anger to 
contempt to disgust is important in understanding the dissociation and breakdown of 
relationships and progression from aggression to hostility and violence.  Tracking the change in 
emotions and understanding the mechanism by which hatred based on anger, contempt, and 
disgust is propagated (stories, narratives, and speeches made by leaders) across time provides a 
mechanism to look for and interpret intergroup behaviors and the propensity for hostility and 
collective violence.    
Another field of research that is less often mentioned when discussing the root causes of 
terrorism are neurology and criminology.  O‘Connor (1.7) argues that a distinction should be 
made between grievance and unfairness, in that the latter is subjective, contingent on the 
reference group and sense of relative deprivation, and depends on the social setting.  General 
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strain theory is unique in criminology in its emphasis on feelings of unfairness and grievance.  
Biosocial criminology, which draws on psychiatry, psychology, and medicine, has identified a 
number of factors related to violence including brain functioning (e.g., the correlation of criminal 
behavior with amygdala dysfunction combined with executive deficits), childhood development 
(e.g., traits that are strongly predictive of anti-social and violent behavior), and 
hormones/neurotransmitters (e.g., abnormally high levels of norephinephrine, acetylcholine, and 
endorphins result in the need for arousal, often through violence). Because unfairness, grievance, 
injustice, inequity, envy, and spite have been proven to have biological connections, it is 
imperative to consider both sociological and biological factors in understanding the propensity to 
engage in terrorism.  
The empirical study of Victoroff and Adelman (1.5) found that perceived discrimination 
and employment status is a powerful factor in influencing individuals to justify violence.  Their 
analysis of the Pew Muslim American Study data found that the belief that violence against 
civilians (i.e., terrorism) is justified to defend Islam was correlated with perceived discrimination 
for both European and U.S. Muslims. However, in the case of the European Muslims, direct 
experience of discrimination was the key factor, whereas for U.S. Muslims general 
discrimination (e.g., general suspicion or having been called names) was correlated with support 
for terrorism.  They also found differences between European and U.S. Muslims on the question 
of whether unemployment was related to support for terrorism in that, for European Muslims 
worry about employment was correlated to support for terrorism whereas for U.S. Muslims, 
actual employment status was the key factor in support for violent behavior.  Their results were 
compelling, albeit based on a small data set, and bear attention as well as providing focus for 
further research. 
It is critical to make the distinction between instigators (originators of collective 
violence) and perpetrators (those who carry out violence) when considering the individuals who 
participate in terrorism.  Mandel (1.8) identifies several key characteristics of instigators: non-
interchangeability, their role as catalysts of violence and propagators of nationalism, and their 
possession of power across the spectrum (low/physical to medium/wealth to high/information 
grades).  These characteristics speak to the uniqueness of the instigator role, their capability to 
accelerate and direct the focus of followers -- increasing their propensity to engage in collective 
violence, their ability to bridge the power gap between shaping the information space (people‘s 
attitudes and reactions to events) to control over external and organizational resources, and their 
ability to create a compelling call for action by framing social identity and motivating individuals 
– often by reinforcing a sense of collective humiliation.  Mandel posits that instigators of 
terrorism are motivated by threatened egotism and totalistic thinking (intolerance of ambiguity, 
undifferentiated views, and absolute confidence in the veracity and moral soundness of beliefs 
and belief in corruptness of alternative views).    
While root causes are certainly important and necessary in that they underlie a 
susceptibility on the individual and group level to radical messages - a call for action to right a 
collective grievance or social injustice - they are not sufficient to explain why individuals engage 
in collective violence.  The distinction and interplay between instigators and perpetrators of 
terrorism, in part, motivates the need to consider the dynamics of Violent Non-State Actors 
(VNSA), the topic of the next section.  We need a more nuanced understanding of the roles of 
individuals and intra and intergroup dynamics to understand why terrorism arises in some places 
and situations and not in others. 
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Section 2 – Dynamics of VNSAs 
One key insight researchers have gained through studies of terrorism is that the 
phenomenon is inherently dynamic. VSNA‘s undergo a dynamic life cycle, individuals undergo 
a dynamic process of radicalization, the relations between VNSA and their state opponents are 
constantly evolving, and the networks through which VNSAs operate are dynamically shifting. 
The contributions in this section review a variety of VNSA dynamics.  
Based on an empirical analysis of sixty-three incidents linked to al Qaeda (AQ), 
Sageman‘s preliminary conclusions (2.1) are that only two of them can be properly attributed to 
AQ and that most are the work of autonomous local groups acting on their behalf, essentially 
constituting a leaderless jihad of ―young people seeking thrills...trying to build a better world 
(and)...willing to sacrifice themselves for it.‖  He states that mobilization of these groups is not 
based on poverty, criminality, etc., but rather on friendship and kinship.  Radicalization is based 
on a sense of moral outrage (e.g., rapes, killings, and unfair police actions), specific 
interpretation of the world (e.g., ―the War against Islam‖), resonance with personal experiences 
(social, economic, political, and religious factors – for example unemployment) and mobilization 
through networks (both face-to-face as in student groups, mosques, study groups as well as 
virtually via the Internet).  He states that these new ―terrorist wannabees‖ or a ―leaderless jihad‖ 
cannot be controlled by AQ (since the members of the disconnected networks are unknown) and, 
since the appeal of the AQ social movement is limited due to the reality of its manifestations 
(e.g., limitations, problems associated with Taliban, Anbar Province), he concludes that the 
threat is self-limiting. However, he cautions that containment strategies must neutralize the main 
drivers of radicalization including the appeals to thrill/glory seekers and that all counter-
terrorism messages need to use vocabulary carefully and be backed up by consistent actions. 
As a counterpoint to the ―leaderless jihad‖ argument, Hoffman (2.2) reasons that the 
terrorist violence in Mumbai was planned, premeditated, and executed by trained people 
operating under command and control and using sophisticated weapons and tactics in an 
extremely effective manner – thus, this event had all the fingerprints of an existing mature, 
capable organization with training camps, a headquarters, and leadership to plan and direct the 
operation, knowledge of surveillance tradecraft, and members with the ability to repel 
determined counterattacks, namely al Qaeda.  He acknowledges that there are existing threats 
from homegrown terrorist groups (and mentions the foiled attacks in the Bronx and Fort Dix, 
New Jersey as examples), but emphasizes that the most consequential current threat is from an 
established terrorist organization with strong leadership; that is, al Qaeda. 
Beasley (2.3) states that terrorism is a social movement tactic, the result of well-
integrated individuals and organizations.  She outlines three key sociological approaches to 
understanding how social movements arise: political process, resource mobilization, and 
framing.  Political process theory posits that movements emerge in the presence of key factors: 
increased opportunity for participation in state systems, evidence of political instability, 
existence of splits within elites, and the presence of influential allies. She explains that responses 
to the opening of (political, etc.) systems are key in forecasting whether movements may use 
terrorism.  For example, democratization may be interpreted as a sign of goodwill or as a system 
weakness, resulting in nonviolent mobilization or terrorism respectively.  Resource mobilization 
holds that translation of grievances to action requires availability and use of organizational 
resources (e.g., membership, communication, and external support).  Framing theory addresses 
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the production of meaning for potential and current social movement members, critical for 
recruiting and building solidarity among members by providing a rationale for mobilizing and 
increasing belief in group efficacy. Three framing types - diagnostic, prognostic and motivational 
- serve to establish that problems/guilty parties exist and movement participation is necessary for 
change to occur.  The efficacy of framing is dependent on the framer‘s knowledge of the target 
communities (e.g., the Taliban is adept at incorporating key narratives and poetry).  These 
sociological approaches provide insight into mobilization tactics – the political process informs 
the perception of opportunities, resource mobilization informs the potential exploitation of 
opportunities, and framing informs the messages and understanding necessary for movement 
participants to act. 
An empirical analysis by Perliger, Pedahzur, and Kornguth (2.4) highlights some key 
characteristics of terrorist groups based on incidents/attacks in the ―fourth wave of terrorism‖ 
and identifies some epidemiological analogies and potential solutions for terrorism.  David 
Rapoport identified four waves of terrorism since the late 1800s: anarchist groups, 
decolonization movements, guerilla groups, and the current groups who focus on achieving 
maximum casualties, operate primarily on a domestic level, and aim attacks at occupation forces, 
emphasizing nationalist and separatist ethnic goals.  Perliger et. al‘s research focused on 
organizational factors: year of (organization) foundation, guiding ideology (nationalist, religious, 
right/left wing, Islamic), and group structure (network or hierarchal). They concluded that there 
is a clear trend of proliferation of militant Islamic terrorism, that Al Qaeda groups have shifted 
from hierarchal structures to network structures, and that attacks are increasing in lethality (this 
echoes Legault‘s assessment in the Prologue).  They identify four basic organizational 
configurations involved in militant jihadi violence: paramilitary, AQ, sleeper cell, and 
homegrown networks.  The configurations vary in structure, recruitment mechanisms, and 
member profiles. They compare the social network recruitment patterns of sleeper cells and 
homegrown networks to the dissemination of biological infection agents or metastases of cancer 
cells and the recruitment of new members through friendship/kinship in homegrown networks to 
the infection due to direct contact from proximate cells exhibited by viruses, bacteria, or tumor 
cells.  Consistent with this epidemiological analogy, they counsel the need for robust 
countermeasures for infectiousness -- attacking the social identity of the terrorist group (a la a 
binding analogy) and access to mass media and communications critical for spreading ideas (ala 
altered metabolism), essentially focusing on the environments in which terrorism (like disease) 
thrives and blocking the key nutrients for its spread.  
Beyond the identification of top-level trends based on organizational characteristics, Asal 
(2.5) identifies key factors that impact the decision made by an organization to turn to terrorism.  
He asserts that ideology is the most important factor behind an organization‘s decision to use 
terrorism and hypothesizes that this is because ideology can lead to strong or weak ―othering‖ of 
potential targets; that is, securing a positive identification of ―us‖ at the expense of stigmatization 
of ―them‖ or the ―other.‖  Both nationalist and religious ideologies are correlated with a 
propensity to use terrorist tactics, although ideology can also serve as a constraint against 
targeting.  Other key factors are organizational capabilities and resources (with a key one being 
external support) and state behavior (e.g., concessions or repression). 
Ballard (2.6) provides a method for assessing organizational characteristics in order to 
ascertain their potential to use Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) or Weapons of Mass 
Victimization (WMV).  The salient characteristics are Ideology, Knowledge, Management, 
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Audience, Social Distance, and Symbolic Value (IKMASS).  Assessment of Ideology involves 
the identification of ideological fracture lines as potential indicators for the increased potential 
for violence. The Knowledge factor involves an evaluation of whether an organization can gather 
and comprehend the necessary information for deployment of WMV (e.g., fuel cycle, materials, 
etc.). Management includes assessment of the organizational longevity, size, level of 
effectiveness, ability to get funding, and the provision of logistics support. Audience involves an 
assessment of the organization‘s understanding and use of ―front stage‖ and ―backstage‖ 
behavior. Social Distance involves the evaluation of the distance between the organization and 
the target population based on relative religious differences, racial/ethnic differences, cultural 
differences, and/or social/economic differences. Finally, Symbolic Value assesses the use of 
symbolic targets to convey a message. 
Duval (2.7) educates the reader on the importance of network analysis as a method with 
which to analyze, detect, and monitor terrorist organizations and VNSA‘s, essentially providing 
a way to describe and visualize the social structure of violent actors as networks, identify central 
actors and vulnerabilities, and ascertain the organizational structure (which clearly has some 
ramifications for their propensity to engage in terrorism) and avenues of recruitment.  Network 
analysis has proven to be a useful tool; for example, Sageman used it to identify substructures in 
al Qaeda Central, Southeast Asia, Maghreb, and the ―Core Arabs,‖ and it was instrumental in the 
hunt for Saddam Hussein and the ―Virginia Jihad‖ network. 
It is important to consider the impact of group behavior in decision-making processes 
since people who take part in collective violence are often acting out of broad community 
concern rather than acting from their own private motivations.  Gupta (2.8) explores why some 
ideas, particularly radical political ideas, spread.  He reminds us of the three broad forces 
discussed in Malcolm Gladwell‘s 2000 book The Tipping Point: messengers, messages, and 
context.  Political entrepreneurs translate grievances into actions by framing issues so that 
boundaries between ―us‖ and ―them‖ are clear, providing the impetus to overcome reticence 
toward collective action. Messengers, which include ―mavens,‖ connectors, and salesmen are 
accumulators of knowledge, know and are known by lots of people, and attract followers, 
respectively. Osama Bin Laden demonstrates characteristics of all three.  ―Sticky‖ messages, 
those that endure and have impact, must be simple, concrete, credible, with contents that are 
unexpected, appeal to emotion, and contain a compelling storyline.  The message that ―Islam is 
under attack,‖ is simple, credible (especially when bolstered by pictures of occupied lands, 
civilian victims of conflict), unexpected (e.g., the dissonance caused by not being a political or 
economic power), evokes fear (based on the implicit understanding that fear is typically the 
primary motivator for collective action), and contains a storyline peppered with powerful 
references (e.g., ―crusades,‖ ―Hulagu Khan‖).  The context - sociopolitical, historical, and 
cultural - determines the ―stickiness‖ of the message.  In Rapoport‘s ―fourth wave of terrorism,‖ 
the context is an interpretation of recent events that points to the ―timing being right‖: the spread 
of Islamic fundamentalism, manifestation of millenarian vision in the form of the Iranian 
Revolution, and the victory in the Afghan War.  Terror cells are born when radicalized members 
of a group find a way to act upon their convictions, when inspiration meets opportunity.   
The paper from Shellman and Asal (2.9) looks at the dynamics between actors: Violent 
Non-State Actors, Non-State Actors, and government that affect inspiration and opportunity.  
This innovative empirical analysis goes beyond the standard studies of correlates of conflict 
(based on ―static‖ factors which are measured annually) and builds on the work of Enders and 
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Sandler in which terrorists are assumed to be rational actors trying to maximize a shared goal 
(e.g., provoke media coverage, political instability, or generate fear) with constrained resources.  
This analysis that explores interdependencies and decisions by all key actors, enabling an 
analysis of direct and indirect effects and unintended consequences. For example, 
counterterrorism policies in India decrease armed attacks but increase bombings, essentially 
motivating a tactic change from overt attacks to covert due to increased police and military 
power.  In addition to modeling only ―terror‖ activities, modeling all Diplomatic, Information, 
Military and Economic (DIME) activities enable the systematic exploration of how government 
policies and tactics affect the choices and behaviors of VNSAs, other NSA‘s or segments of the 
population. A consistent finding is that government repression is an important explanatory 
variable for terror attacks.  
Two final papers in the Dynamics of VNSA Section provide some unique insights into 
the characteristics and strategies of terrorist organizations: one focused on terrorism and financial 
strategies and a second one on relationships and similarities between terrorists and criminals.  
Lemieux (2.10) points out that terrorist organizations not only seek short term funding to support 
logistics and operations but also engage in strategic financing to support long term activities such 
as recruitment, training, propaganda, maintenance of facilities, and community infrastructures.  
Terrorist organizations invest in economic development to maintain the allegiance of the 
community and to establish legitimacy by filling a gap created by a government failure to 
provide basic services.  The appropriate model here is the ―club model‖ of organizations 
(examples are the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna/Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA), Irish 
Republican Army (IRA), Taliban, Hamas, and Hezbollah). They obtain donations from an 
extended network (radicals who share the same goals) and sympathizers.  Funding strategies 
employed include capitalizing on opportunities from emerging markets, trade of legal/illegal 
good and services (often tobacco, gems, food), and acquiring and operating companies and non-
profits (e.g., textile businesses and cattle ranches help to fund Hamas activities and Hezbollah‘s 
obtains funds from cigarette smuggling between Virginia and New York which exploits breaches 
in market structures).  In weak states, lootable resources (e.g., diamonds and drugs) and 
unlootable resources (e.g., oil and natural gas) fuel civil wars and domestic terrorism (e.g., Peru 
and Angola). Terrorist groups trade with a wide variety of partners, developing financial 
alliances, maintaining trade relations, and exploiting loose economic structures.  It is extremely 
hard to enforce laws forbidding trade with terrorists as they are often hard to recognize and 
markets often do not discriminate. The potential impact of terrorism on markets is mixed – in 
places with resilient markets and low intensity terrorism, the recovery is faster; however, in 
places with limited foreign investment, the impact on the economy could be more severe.   
Mullins and Dolnik (2.11) explore the overlap between terrorism and crime, since there 
are a number of similarities in organizational structure, systems of social influence, methods, 
motives and profiles.  Terrorist organizations and organized crime often collaborate when it is 
mutually advantageous (e.g., drug cartels use of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or 
FARC, to guard cocaine plantations).  Some terrorist organizations engage in both organized 
(e.g., Hamas, Hizballah, FARC, Provisional Irish Republican Army, etc.) and petty crime (e.g., 
the Madrid bombers financed the operation with drug dealing and car thefts) as a way to generate 
funding and cut out middlemen.  Criminals are often recruited by terrorist organizations.  Both 
terrorists and criminals use similar methods (e.g., fundraising, intelligence techniques), have 
similar (profit) motives albeit different goals, and similar profiles (e.g., predominantly young 
 17 
UNCLASSIFIED 
men).  Social affiliations are the key route into both terrorist and criminal activities, and shared 
identity - belonging to a larger collective - is crucial for continuing participation. Membership in 
a criminal network is transient, whereas in a terrorist network members experience intense 
pressure to stay in order to sustain organizational size and maintain group stability. 
Disengagement strategies (for more on this see Section 4) need to address both the ―push‖ 
(negative consequences of continued participation) with ―pull‖ (attractive factors).   
There are those who believe the key motivation underlying the current global terrorism 
phenomenon is ideology, particularly religious ideologies that are thought to advocate violence 
or legitimize terrorism, and there are some who believe that ideology is a mechanism useful for 
rationalizing violence that was motivated by grievances, etc.  Regardless of whether ideology is, 
indeed, to blame for collective violence, there is no denying that the framing of radical messages 
often involves sophisticated communication strategies which artfully employ images, narratives, 
and ideological memes (e.g., cultural ideas, symbols, or practices) that resonate with susceptible 
individuals and/or groups.  The next section provides some perspectives on the messages and 
strategic communication strategies of VNSA‘s as well as thoughts on the role of ideology in 
terrorism.   
Section 3 – The Role of Ideology in VNSA 
Many studies of terrorism and VNSAs explain some variance in the data but invariably 
leave substantial areas of behavior unexplained. One commonly sees researchers invoke ideology 
as a causative factor to explain that variance. In this section, we present diverse views on how 
ideology may operate and whether ideology is a cause or consequence (symptom) of terrorism.  
According to Dauber (3.1), terrorists use three forms of communication: discursive 
(language), visual (images), and symbolic acts (behaviors that send a message) often with the 
goal of changing public opinion and political will or to recruit, fundraise, or ―rally the troops.‖  
Common discursive communication mechanisms used to persuade include rhetoric, argument, 
and narrative frames.  To fully understand the language, cultural referents need to be understood.  
Visual images are powerful due to the non-linear fashion in which they are absorbed. They have 
a visceral, powerfully emotional impact and, when in the news, are commonly regarded as 
objective truth. Symbolic acts are akin to terrorism ―theater,‖ sending messages to multiple 
audiences simultaneously.  Dates, locations (e.g., 9/11 attack on Pentagon is an obvious 
example), or the attack mechanism (e.g., anthrax attacks on politicians) can all be symbolic.  
New media and communications editing technology are contemporary ―game changers‖ in terms 
of enabling more sophisticated influence messaging. 
Despite the tendency to interpret the target audience of VNSA strategic communications 
literally (e.g., interpreting the target audience of Osama bin Laden‘s videos to be solely the U.S. 
or the U.S. President), these communications can, and often do, have multiple target audiences.  
Harlow (3.2) identifies several potential target audiences: foreign publics, foreign policymakers, 
domestic audiences, existing VNSA group members, and potential recruits.  Two aspects of 
VNSA‘s suggest that the latter two are the true audiences of most strategic communications – the 
fuzzy boundaries of most VNSA groups and the types of activities in which they engage to reach 
decisions (at the same time they are evading capture, etc.).  Bonafide groups have fuzzy edges 
best negotiated by public communication (i.e., broadcasting messages).  These groups engage in 
task processes, relational activities, and topical focus activities to reach decisions.  Large 
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broadcast type communications serve to maintain group relationships on a large scale or support 
problem solving and they are efficient for internal group communications. 
The insightful paper by Paz (3.3) states that the Internet is used as a ―soft power‖ vehicle 
for propaganda, indoctrination, publicity, and teaching, in part due to persecution and the 
difficulty in disseminating messages, and in part to promote transnational global solidarity.  It is 
the best means for consolidating a spectrum of doctrines, new interpretations, and conveying the 
image of a large volume of activity.  The first priority of militant jihadi websites is to target 
youth in order to indoctrinate them and build a collective identity.  In this vein, the Internet is 
effectively a global madrassa or open university for militant jihadi studies.  This has resulted in 
two contradictory developments: the appearance of a consolidation/solidarity (opinion, doctrine, 
etc.) process and, at the same time, the emergence of a growing number of debates (especially 
regarding more controversial activities such as targeting civilians, Islamic state in Iraq, etc.).  
The doctrinal sources of the militant jihadi Salafism on many radical websites are Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia, and Palestine.  They emphasize the Takfir principle, the labeling of (and treatment of) 
infidels - Muslims who do not follow ―correct‖ doctrines.  Internet scholars have emerged, some 
of whom have considerable influence.  Scholars like Al-Libi, who advocates ―total jihad,‖ 
discussion of Algeria as a ―model‖ for jihad, and videotapes from Iraq ―hotwire‖ the imagination 
of radicalized youth.  Contrary to those that criticize the pedigree of these websites, their 
function as a primary tool for open indoctrination dictates they must be credible and thus they are 
valuable for analysis.    
Hairgrove and McLeod (3.4) provide a case study on Hizbut Tahrir (HT) and their use of 
strategic communications for recruiting, training, and to reinforce and solidify membership.  HT 
is currently non-violent, but does not rule out their use of violence in the future, with the 
potential plan being the establishment of a Caliphate in Indonesia or in any of the mid-Asia 
―stans‖ essentially being a ―green light‖ for the commencement of a violent ―jihad phase‖ 
including attempts to overthrow non-Islamic governments. HT is adept at strategic 
communications, utilizing halaqa (small study groups) as a key method for recruitment and 
training with specialized indoctrination materials that can be downloaded.  The group utilizes a 
variety of communication media/mechanisms including websites, translated books, magazines, 
cell phones, international conferences, music, demonstrations, and television.  Their website is 
the fifth most popular in Indonesia, accessed actively during office hours. 
Lia (3.5) argues that the key to al Qaeda‘s (AQ) continuing appeal is three key factors: 
their propagation of a simple message that resonates strongly with deeply held grievances in the 
Muslim world, their powerful and captivating image as the world‘s most feared organization – an 
attractive force on young people seeking thrills and meaning - and finally, AQ‘s global character, 
open to virtually anyone irrespective of ethnic background or nationality as long as one can 
accept their radical ideology.  The simple message, which focuses on foreign ―Crusader‖ 
occupation, religious desecration of Islam‘s holiest places, and economic imperialism and 
plundering of Islam‘s natural resources (e.g., oil) resonates with Muslims because it rings of 
being true and plays on a list of widely shared grievances.  Images are increasingly used by AQ 
due to new information technologies.  Young people spend much of their time in cyber-space 
and are exposed frequently to powerful images.  AQ is exceptionally adept at attracting mass 
attention to sensational acts and the U.S. response to 9/11 reinforced notions about Western 
aggression and the power of AQ to provoke the world superpower.  Finally, the global reach and 
multinational and multiethnic character of AQ reinforces the credibility of its pan-Islamic 
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rhetoric, validated by the number of cooperative Muslim groups, some of whom have renamed 
themselves as AQ.  The Internet has been key and its role in fostering AQ‘s widespread appeal 
cannot be understated.  It contains a huge volume of materials available to cater to the needs of 
sympathizers, recruits, operatives, and recruiters.  The biggest AQ weakness is the internal 
schisms/dissent resulting from the use of controversial tactics and its unwillingness to prepare for 
a future transition to politics.  Lia asserts that, at some point, the image will fade, as all extremist 
ideologies have a finite life span, and being a militant jihadi will cease being ―cool.‖ 
In addressing the issue of the role of ideology of terrorism, Zuhur (3.6) states that radical 
Islamic messages would not be compelling in the absence of:  resistance to political or 
ideological domination by the West, failures of Western-style governments to create national 
loyalties and to meet needs, the shock of modernization, rural-urban migration, continued 
poverty, failures of social movements to right grievances, etc.  All of these circumstances push 
radicals into activism and promote recruitment.  Extremist ideology is attractive, in part, because 
other ideologies fail to attract or actually repel.  Zuhur elucidates key aspects of the new jihad 
ideology include hakimiyya (true sovereignty of Allah as compared to nation-states or civil 
laws), Islamic society and upholding hisba (commending good, forbidding evil) by following 
shari‘ah (enforcement of pious vs. materialistic, status-driven behavior based on group 
interpretation), the necessity for jihad (highlighting the doctrinal differences between 
justification for jihad in response to attack or to foster expansion of Islam versus insistence on 
the inevitability of jihad and necessity due to global conflict – also the debate regarding jihad as 
an individual [including women and children] or collective duty), occupation of Muslim lands 
(used as rationale for jihad as individual duty), martyrdom (linked with jihad and glorified 
through videos, poetry, songs, and internet postings), and takfir (labeling of governments as 
―infidels‖ and thus an object of jihad as a result of their weakness in being influenced by and 
subservient to western powers or due to their corruption).  The best ideological responses to 
terrorism come from people who were part of a movement and recanted versus the government 
clerics (ulema).  Clerics can back truces or an end to violence, but their influence varies.  In areas 
where the opposition to the local Muslim government is strong, the involvement of clerics or 
former movement leaders is more likely to be effective. 
Seitz (3.7) proposes a computational model of ideology in his paper based on the 
definition of a paradigm as the set of beliefs, values, and techniques shared by members and the 
concept of the role of ideologies as serving to reflect the consciousness of groups in various 
socio-historic circumstances, inform us about man, society, and the state, and provide direction 
for political action.  Both paradigms and ideologies provide standards and criteria of legitimacy.  
The inputs for the ideology computational model would include conditions that foster VNSAs 
and weak and failed states (e.g., inequality of resources, rapid changes in the division of labor).  
The field of action of the model includes a group‘s perception of other groups.  Ideologies are 
essentially throughputs between environments and the field of action.  This model could enable 
hyper-games in which ideologies were varied to reflect actors‘ perception of different worlds 
with different forces at work, and adoption of different strategies for addressing problems and 
different fields of action utilizing different data structures to filter information and different 
inference engines.  The field of action, inference engine and filtering lens could all be simulated 
with the field of action defining how information is given meaning and how the inferencing 
engine leads to new actions.  This simulation model could represent propaganda, the minds of 
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terrorists, uncommitted people, how leaders use metaphors to frame events and communicate to 
followers, etc.   
A provocative evolutionary psychology paper by Mort, Lawson, and Gous (3.8) discusses 
the role of ideology in motivating terrorism or violence as essentially a mechanism to rationalize 
violent behaviors resulting from an aggregation of cognitive mechanisms selected as a result of 
evolution that have been triggered by certain environmental cues.  They state that religion, in and 
of itself, does not cause anything.  Apparent examples of religiously motivated violence (e.g., 
pipe bombs exploding in Derry (Ireland), suicide bombings in Gaza, drowning of ―witches‖), 
upon inspection, often correlate with reported or apparent beliefs, motivations, or rationalizations 
that have a religious component. However, there is no evidence for religious beliefs causing 
violent behavior, rather, the evidence supports that explicit beliefs are often by-passed or 
undermined by folk psychological mechanisms.  The connection between violent behavior and 
religious thought and behavior is likely the existence of common cognitive mechanisms. 
Consistent with Mort et. al., Sandstrom (3.9) uses a cultural materialist paradigm to argue 
that due to the large variability between and within religions in terms of how followers behave, 
and the difficulty in separating religious behaviors from other behaviors or aspects of culture, 
religion should not be used to account for or explain behaviors.  Rather he advocates the use of 
the cultural materialist paradigm to provide a causative explanation of human behavior based on 
material conditions and the context of people‘s lives (e.g., economic deprivation, military 
conquest, political repression, market dynamics, and blocked social mobility). 
The next section focuses on programs to counter radicalization and terrorism or to 
deradicalize or disengage radical individuals and groups, assess key elements and their efficacy.  
These programs in various ways seek to address environmental (root cause) factors, 
psychological factors and ideological understanding and commitment with individuals and 
groups. 
Section 4 – Existing and Proposed Deradicalization and Disengagement Programs 
Most studies of VNSA neglect or minimize attention to efforts to counter radicalization 
or prevent terrorism through education, counseling, and social services, as well as the programs 
aimed at disengagement or deradicalization. In this collection, we highlight studies of counter 
radicalization and disengagement/deradicalization programs in order to bring attention to this 
frontier of combating terrorism. The issue of deradicalization is complicated by the confusion 
between deradicalization, which involves re-orientation of a person‘s political views, and 
disengagement, which involves the abandonment of violence alone. Researchers and 
practitioners debate the possibilities of both and these competing views are discussed in this 
section. This section will highlight some of the issues, as well as some potential solutions, in this 
area of counter-terrorism efforts.  
Jongman (4.1) provides a comprehensive look at radicalization, counter radicalization, 
and deradicalization from the perspective of the Netherlands, a microcosm in which we can view 
the effects of demographic/ethnic changes, government policies, and responses on radicalisation.  
He details how recent events, including several assassinations, have heightened tensions with 
non-indigenous segments of the population, particularly Muslims. The 2006 elections reflected 
general dissatisfaction with the national government and was key in the subsequent formation of 
a new non-indigenous party which has a platform that supports abolishing the mandatory 
integration course (for immigrants), pardon for asylum seekers who have lived in country at least 
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five years, and entrance of Turkey into the European Union, etc.  The flip side of this is the 
recent swell of support for parties who seek to exploit undercurrents of frustration by pushing an 
agenda to limit immigration, asylum, etc.   
In response, the Dutch launched a tailored (e.g., focus on youth and prevention of 
radicalisation) phased campaign to reduce tensions and intolerance.  A new National Counter 
Terrorism Coordinator, who is responsible, in part, for an annual threat assessment, made 
numerous changes in organizational coordination processes (e.g., CT Infobox effort collocated 
agencies to foster the reduction of tensions and intolerance), and in increased Internet 
surveillance for awareness and early warning of potential attacks.  The arrest and trial of 
members of the Hofstad group, a homegrown terrorist group foiled when a member assassinated 
a controversial filmmaker, Theo Van Gogh, resulted in a number of changes to antiterrorism 
legislation, including redefinition of crimes (including membership in a terrorist group) and 
criminals (including supporters/financiers of terrorism) and judicial, law enforcement, 
legislative, and intelligence reforms that focus on pre-emption and anticipation versus reaction. 
The view of the Dutch government is that a holistic approach is warranted for terrorism, 
one that deals with the underlying grievance causing the violence (e.g., poverty, alienation, 
marginalization, and segregation) – a hard-learned lesson from violence events in the 1970s 
related to grievances held by the Moloccan immigrant community.  This approach is based on a 
more nuanced understanding of radicalization and is broader than simply regarding terrorism as a 
law enforcement problem – resulting in new ways of counterterrorism coordination and 
cooperation within the Netherlands.  Their strategy is to focus on prevention of radicalization in 
Muslim youths and abolishing ―hotspots‖ to accomplish three goals: prevent attacks, be 
adequately prepared for a large attack, and pay attention to the causes of terrorism. Some 
policies, like restrictive immigration and asylum policies have unintended consequences: more 
illegal immigrants.  The four cities in which the majority of Muslims live, Amsterdam, 
Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht, all have tailored initiatives to improve relationships 
between groups and deal with socio-economic problems and counter segregation.    
Jongman talks about various national and local level metrics to assess the efficacy of 
government counterterrorism efforts including national surveys assessing the level of fear of 
terrorism and feeling of security and reduction in social problems in urban ―hotspots‖ (including 
school dropout and poverty rates, rates of dependence on social security, segregation levels, and 
crime). Biggest current worries are the lack of integration of African first and second-generation 
immigrants in the Netherlands (especially Somalis, who are clannish and tend to be more 
lonely/alienated), the Moroccan community (responsible for majority of crime and violence 
problems), and the threat of retaliatory attacks by al Qaeda in the Netherlands. 
Flannigan (4.2) examines how VNSAs employ social welfare services to win hearts and 
minds. Community services, education, health, and provision of social services are tools that 
terrorist organizations use to gain acceptance in their community.  The amount of power that a 
terrorist organization gains from providing services is related to the availability of these services 
elsewhere.  Provision of services can be radicalizing, increasing support and numbers of recruits 
and serving to silence those in the community who oppose the terrorist activities. Hezbollah is 
widely respected for its charities and social services, in spite of its violent activities.  Terrorist 
organizations sponsor community services as a way to socialize and recruit new members.  They 
are more likely to be engaged in providing services when they are not clandestine or have 
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military arms.  Strategies for preventing deradicalization or radicalization due to service 
provision include political inclusion (which prevents service provision by minority providers), 
proactively providing aid where violent organizations have not gained a foothold, and moving a 
community to passive support/genuine acceptance and active participation.  It is also good to 
support legitimate state actions in effective community service provision (e.g., Hezbollah‘s 
provision of services after the bombardment of southern Lebanon) or ensure that other apolitical 
mainstream organizations are able to provide quality services.   
Community services were critical in preventing radicalization in Brixton (south London).  
In Lambert‘s (4.3) paper, he details a program in which community police and Salafi managers 
of the Brixton mosque collaborated to counter street crime and prevent petty criminals and other 
vulnerable individuals in the area from becoming involved in terrorism as foot soldiers.  
Recruiters and propagandists for al Qaeda, including Abdullah el Faisel, were active in the area 
and offered high status and religious rewards to black Muslim converts, but they met their match 
in Abdul Haqq Baker et. al. in that they had both religious authority as well as ―street‖ 
credibility.  These clerics explained their position and role by saying that they ―don‘t disagree 
with the grievances, but explain how Islam tells you to act responsibly.‖ The program was (and 
continues to be) successful, despite  the fact that two extremists, Richard Reid and Zacarias 
Moussaoui (the former an impressionable petty criminal radicalized in prison and motivated to 
revenge U.S. government policies, the latter an extremist expelled from the Brixton mosque and 
motivated by trauma related to a friend‘s death in Chechnya), did arise from these communities.  
Indeed, the program tried to deal with both individuals, but they were too radical already and 
could not be turned back from their extremist paths.   
Al-Huda‘s paper (4.4) educates the reader about the power of religion in serving to 
counteract radicalization and extremism and to bring about resolution and reconciliation through 
peace building (establishing sustainable peace by addressing root causes of conflict through 
dialogue, institution building, political and economic transformation, and reconciliation) and 
peacemaking (reducing tension, resolving, managing and/or mediating conflict, and negotiating 
and/or find common ground).  Religious leaders are the key actors in peacemaking and can serve 
as mediators, observers, protectors, advocates, educators, and conflict resolution specialists (e.g., 
Maha Ghosannada, who led a march in Cambodia that demonstrated popular support for 
elections, and the ―Amman Message,‖ a statement designed to educate about Muslim and peace 
and the irresponsibility of Muslims to judge others as ―takfir‖ that was developed by Muslim 
scholars throughout the Middle East).  Peacemaking involves a variety of methodologies (e.g., 
forgiveness, recognition of pain, public confession, addressing the image of ―other,‖ and use of 
arts to express mutual respect) to reconstruct relationships, reconcile parties, negotiate 
agreements, and reconstruct a vision of peace. Islamic peacemaking is based on the fundamental 
principles integral to Islam, which espouse non-violence, peace, sacredness of human life, 
equality, and the pursuit of justice.  To counteract radicalism and prevent or reduce recruitment, 
it is important to leverage resources including qudi (religious judge who interprets/enforces 
shari‘ah), urf (customary conflict/dispute resolution practices), mukhtar (third party mediators), 
wasta (intermediaries to represent parties), hudna (truces), and atwah (compensation to victims).  
In order to counter radicalization or enable deradicalization, there is a need to understand the 
identification of communities with either victim or hero/savior, engage radicals with respect, 
giving the right to express reservations, fears, uncertainties, and grievances and make sure non-
violent leader‘s voices are heard. 
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A paper written by a UK imam (4.5) seeks to dispel the myths and misconceptions that 
people commonly have about Salafi Islam. He writes anonymously due to his support of counter 
and de-radicalization efforts. He states that Salafi Islam has been wrongly blamed as the cause or 
motivation for terrorism when, in fact, the perpetrators were not following the dictates of Salafi 
Islam or even attending Salafi mosques or study groups.  He argues that Salafi Islam is, in fact, a 
protective factor and that ―the more strict and serious the Salafi, the less likely that person will 
fall into radicalization.‖  He educates the reader that Salafi Islam is non-political, that Salafis 
frown on political parties or groups, holding clandestine or secret meetings, pledging allegiance 
to heads of organizations or political parties, or staging revolts or rebellions.  He points out that 
Salafis take into account the benefits and harms of actions and do not agree with the targeting of 
innocent people.  The issue is the confusion between Salafi and militant jihadi or extremist 
narratives.  Militant jihadi organizations effectively use Salafi narratives or claim to be Salafi as 
a means to gain legitimacy or be perceived as authentic.   Numerous well-known, credible Salafi 
scholars have taken stances against terrorism, extremism, and political agitation stating (these 
are) ―...extremely great crimes the world over....‖ 
Speckhard‘s paper (4.6) on prison and community based disengagement and 
deradicalization is encyclopedic, describing several community based counter radicalization 
programs and surveying the prison disengagement or deradicalization focused ―rehabilitation‖ 
programs.  She starts by stating that there are a variety of strategies that need to be employed 
singly or in combination to disengage or deradicalize an individual or group: one must 
delegitimize ideologies, tailor strategies to address the recruiting conduits, disengage recruits 
from active roles (e.g., intimidation, arrest, amnesty), deradicalize/rehabilitate through prison 
programs, and prevent radicalization at the societal level focusing on vulnerable populations 
(e.g., youth, gangs, military members). 
She describes street programs in the Netherlands and the UK focused on working with 
youth, through dialogue and outreach, to prevent the spread of radical militant jihadi ideologies.  
The UK program categorizes extremists and interdicts potential militant jihadis, mobilizing 
social services to address their needs.  The prison ―rehabilitation‖ programs in Saudi Arabia, 
Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Egypt, UK, Yemen, Turkey, and Iraq (U.S. program) are 
described, including their unique features (e.g., Singapore‘s low recidivism is, in part, due to the 
size of the island and their ability to monitor prisoners after release; Egypt and Malaysia use 
brutal treatment and even torture to motivate compliance).  Of special interest is the description 
of challenges faced by the author in planning and implementing a U.S. deradicalization program 
(with both ideological and psychological components) for Iraqi prisoners/detainees.  She 
summarizes key features that are important for successful prison programs addressing militant 
jihadis.  Paramount is the ability to establish rapport between the prisoner and a credible 
mentor/leader (i.e., a highly regarded cleric, imam, psychologist, or team member or someone 
who has ―walked the walk‖ such as a former militant jihadi).  Speckhard emphasizes the 
importance and efficacy of using both religious and psychological treatment to challenge the 
legitimacy of militant jihadi ideology and address psychological motivations, vulnerabilities, and 
traumas to reorient the individual toward a nonviolent identity and solutions.  Likewise, family 
involvement during and after release from prison, economic incentives for the prisoner and their 
family (e.g., jobs, cash, cars), and monitoring and follow-up are important. 
Gunaratna‘s paper (4.7) describes the Singapore prison rehabilitation program.  He 
emphasizes that operational terrorists can only be delegitimized by ideological and theological 
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refutation; thus, the Singapore Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) staff is 50 percent Muslim 
of which 25 percent are clerics or scholars.  Singapore believes that detainee rehabilitation and 
community engagement are strategic tools to safeguard the next generation of youth from 
radicalization.  The prison program, based on a partnership between the government, Muslim 
community, and academia, differentiates between leaders, members (ala instigators and 
perpetrators), and supporters/sympathizers and tailors the treatment to each category.  The ulema 
(scholars) are at the core of the program strategy, helping to dismantle the justification for 
violence.  All detainees are classified in terms of high, medium, and low risk.  The ―high risk‖ 
group includes spiritual leaders; thus, prominent scholars are needed to challenge the beliefs and 
ideological understanding of these detainees.  Even so, this group is most likely to return to 
violence.  ―Medium risk‖ individuals include operatives who are active ideologically but can 
more often be rehabilitated.  Active and passive supporters of terrorism are labeled as ―low risk‖ 
and they, in general, are not as knowledgeable about ideology.  Public education and awareness 
campaigns are used to complement the prison rehabilitation program. 
Boucek‘s paper (4.8) provides more detail on the Saudi prison disengagement 
―Counseling Program,‖ the first and longest running program of its kind.  This program is a 
unique Saudi solution in that it incorporates traditional Saudi methods of conflict resolution and 
conflict management and leverages extended social networks (recognizing the importance of 
treating families, not just the prisoner) and time honored methods of social control making use of 
―family honor‖ and social hierarchies.  Ideally, the program helps those with takfiri (declaration 
of other Muslims as apostates) beliefs to repent and abandon terrorist ideologies.  In fact, the 
program focuses on those individuals responsible for terrorist propaganda or providing support 
or logistics assistance – those with ―blood on their hands‖ are currently barred from the program.   
The program engages the prisoners in religious debates to correct an ―incomplete 
understanding of Islam‖ and provides psychological counseling.  In addition, the program 
provides a salary for the prisoner‘s family, finds jobs, housing, provides job training, and start-up 
funds for released prisoners to start businesses.  The released prisoners must continue to meet 
with religious scholars and they are encouraged to settle down and marry.  The prisoner‘s family 
is responsible for the prisoner after release.  Half of those participating in the Counseling 
Program renounce their radical beliefs and are released. Overall, the Saudi program claims an 
80-90 percent success rate. 
Conclusion 
We may not, as a research community, agree on the nature of the global terrorism threat, 
but we can certainly agree a serious threat exists, domestically and internationally, and must be 
reckoned with, using a portfolio of solutions based on a rich contextual understanding of the 
people involved in it.   
There is no ―one size fits all,‖ no simple formula or easy answers in understanding 
terrorism; however, there has been substantial progress in increasing our understanding of 
terrorism, in part due to increased availability of large databases and thus increases in empirical 
research.  This research is starting to shine a spotlight on the critical dynamics that fuel 
terrorism:  the interaction between an individual or group and their environment (including the 
government behaviors/policies/responses and the importance of the perception of group and/or 
government legitimacy), interactions and roles within the group and with other groups, 
interactions between messages/worldview/ideology and group behaviors (including recruiting 
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and mobilization), and the role of emotion and neurobiology and the effects of new technologies 
including those that exploit the ability of visual images to impact individuals at a more visceral, 
emotional level (especially as a trigger for increased radicalization and call for action).  A variety 
of techniques and tools are available to enable an analyst, planner, or decision maker to 
understand, for a given situation and set of actors, what the salient factors, interrelationships, and 
dynamics are, the impact of missing information and/or assumptions, and identify potential 
levers for solutions at the societal, institutional, organizational, and individual levels.  
The key in understanding the role of ideology is to know that ideology, including 
religion, serves as a resonator which, in the presence of an vulnerable individual or group, frames 
grievances and impels action as the only appropriate response to right an injustice or inequity 
within an (often apocalyptic) worldview.  However, it is also important to know that religion 
does not cause terrorism, since religious behaviors are inconsistent and subject to interpretation.    
Many of the violent behaviors associated with terrorism are, in fact, likely due to human 
susceptibilities triggered by environmental cues.  Any behaviors, including terrorist behaviors, 
must be viewed through a contextual lens (i.e., underlying conditions such as repression and 
relative deprivation).  However, this does not mean that ideology should be ignored.  The 
worldview, beliefs, and language in which they are expressed are critically important in 
understanding and effectively countering radicalization and terrorism. Also a caution is in order -
- loosely or erroneously applying labels to a terrorist threat, for example ―Salafi Islam‖ for the 
militant Islamist terrorism threat, over simplifies and inappropriately generalizes, diverting the 
focus from the real, more complex problem.  Further, too broad or inappropriate labels in many 
cases serve to alienate those constructive voices (e.g., Salafi clerics) who could serve as powerful 
agents for counter radicalization and deradicalization or disengagement. 
A number of solutions exist for countering terrorism or radicalization, disengagement 
from terrorism, or deradicalization, but they are not ―one size fits all‖ either.  Solutions must be 
tailored to the level of extremism, organizational role, culture, age, etc.  Counterterrorism 
programs, to be successful, need to be executed by credible (ideologically and street-wise) 
individuals who, individually or in combination, consider all the needs/vulnerabilities (familial, 
ideological, psychological), perceptions and worldview of the individual and or group.  Law 
enforcement, those engaged in prevention and rehabilitation and their communities, need to work 
hand-in-hand to foster a real, lasting change.    
back to top 
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Prologue:  Global Terrorism Overview – The Middle East and Islamist 
Terrorism and Beyond 
 
P.1 Where is Terrorism Happening? Numbers, Locations, and 
Representative Histories (Richard Legault) 
 
Author: Richard L. Legault, PhD 
Organization: START, University of Maryland 
Contact Information: rlegault@start.umd.edu 
 
 Terrorism, as a concept, has existed for some time, but its meaning has changed 
considerably since it was first used to describe organized political behavior in the wake of the 
French Revolution (Hoffman, 1998).  What is not so clear, however, is how to define terrorism 
as it is exists as a concept in our current understanding of political action, strategies, and tactics.  
There is an active debate among scholars who study terrorism about the best way to define the 
concept but very little agreement.  Nonetheless, there are some generally accepted ways to think 
about terrorism that are based on observation, systematic classification of events, and then 
making a decision about whether an act should be considered terrorism  based on predetermined 
criteria.  Using this method to measure terrorism tends to be far more productive in advancing 
our understanding of terrorist acts and actors as well as their characteristics.  Data that have been 
developed by using these methods have also provided new information about basic questions 
such as when and where terrorist attacks occur.  In order to answer these questions, it is 
important to understand the data and data sources being used, make decisions about how to use 
these data, and describe the events that involve terrorism. 
Characteristics of terrorist events can be observed and recorded by using set criteria to 
study terrorist events historically.  This is the method used by a number of open source terrorism 
databases to record a variety of information about terrorist incidents and allows researchers, 
policy makers, planners, first responders, or other interested parties to find and study the 
characteristics of a single terrorist act or to examine trends and categories of terrorist activity.  
This empirical technique may seem simple at first glance, but it has provided an important first 
step in understanding terrorism in a way that moves beyond speculation and provides concrete 
data upon which we can begin to test some of the assumptions that we have had about terrorism.  
The application of these quantitative, scientific techniques to the study of terrorism is relatively 
recent.  For example, in a recent Campbell Collaboration systematic review, Lum and colleagues 
(2006) examined 6,041 peer-reviewed publications and found only seven that used statistical 
tests sufficiently robust for effective evaluation of counter-terrorism policies. 
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Table 1. Characteristics of Selected Incident-Level Databases on Terrorism 
 
DATABASE  SCOPE  PERIOD  # INCIDENTS 
GTD 
(Synthesis) 
 Domestic & 
International 
 
1970-2007 
 
86,595 
ITERATE  International  1968-2000  10,837 
TWEED 
(Europe) 
 
Domestic 
 
1950-1999 
 
10,498 
U.S. Dept. of 
State 
 
International 
 
1980-2001 
 
10,026 
RAND  International  1968-1997  8,509 
TRITON 
 Domestic & 
International 
 mid 2000-
mid 2002 
 
2,452 
RAND-MIPT 
 Domestic & 
International 
 
1998-2001 
 
5,340 
GORGON 
 Domestic & 
International 
 
2000-2001 
 
1,569 
COBRA  International  1998-1999  1,041 
 
It is useful then to rely on standardized data that have been systematically collected based 
on set, predetermined criteria to discuss trends in terrorist activity and answer basic questions 
about the quantity, location, and patterns of terrorist incidents.  There are a number of databases 
that collect information about transnational or domestic terrorism, terrorism in a specific part of 
the world, or events over a short period of time.  A selection of these databases and their 
respective coverage is listed in Table 1.  The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is currently the 
only database that includes both domestic and international terrorism over such a long period of 
time.  The time component is important for a variety of obvious reasons, but it is of even greater 
importance to include domestic incidents as well as international incidents.  This is because 
research that has compared the two has consistently found domestic terrorism to be much more 
common than transnational terrorism (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2007; Schmid, 2004; LaFree & 
Dugan, 2007).  This database will provide the information for a discussion of terrorism trends 
and locations as well as some of the characteristics of terrorist events.  Further, because most 
unclassified terrorism databases have included only transnational terrorist attacks, the U.S. State 
Department has claimed that one-third of all terrorist attacks are directed at the United States 
(Crenshaw, 2006:8).   This is especially relevant for the United States because the U.S. has long 
been perceived as being the target of an inordinate number of terrorist attacks.  The inclusion of 
domestic attacks changes this viewpoint substantially. 
Because the GTD is described in detail elsewhere (LaFree and Dugan, 2007), only a 
summary of some of its important characteristics are detailed here. The original platform for the 
GTD was the Pinkerton Global Intelligence Services (PGIS) database.  From 1970 to 1997, PGIS 
trained researchers to identify and record terrorism incidents from wire services (including 
Reuters and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service [FBIS]), U.S. State Department reports, 
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other U.S. and foreign government reporting, U.S. and foreign newspapers (including the New 
York Times, the British Financial Times, the Christian Science Monitor, the Washington Post, 
the Washington Times, and the Wall Street Journal) and information provided by PGIS offices 
around the world.  In more recent years, PGIS researchers increasingly relied on the Internet.  
PGIS defined terrorism as events involving ―the threatened or actual use of illegal force and 
violence by a non state actor to attain a political, economic, religious or social goal through fear, 
coercion or intimidation.‖  Based on coding rules originally developed in 1970, the persons 
responsible for collecting the PGIS data excluded criminal acts that appeared to be devoid of any 
political or ideological motivation and also acts arising from open combat between opposing 
armed forces, both regular and irregular. Data collectors also excluded actions taken by 
governments in the legitimate exercise of their authority, even when such actions were 
denounced by domestic and/or foreign critics as acts of ―state terrorism.‖ However, they 
included violent acts that were not officially sanctioned by government, even in cases where 
many observers believed that the government was openly tolerating the violent actions. 
A more recent iteration of the GTD includes data from 1998 – 2007 and is based on set 
criteria that were derived from the original PGIS definition of terrorism.  In order to be included 
in the GTD2 an even must have met three criteria: 
 Criterion I: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious or social 
goal.  
 Criterion II: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate or convey some 
other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.  
 Criterion III: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities, i.e., 
the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law 
(particularly the admonition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants). 
The most recent data effort of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism (START) has been to combine the GTD1 and GTD2 datasets into a 
single, combined resource, the Synthesized GTD.
1
  These data offer the most comprehensive 
description of terrorist activity that is available from open source material and are used for each 
of the descriptive analyses included here.   
The analyses included here are descriptive of the GTD data.  There are no tests of statistical 
significance, independence or the relationship between terrorism and indicators or variables that 
may be related to terrorism, and the analyses are not intended to imply cause or correlation.  
Instead, descriptive analyses of terrorism incidents provide a baseline from which more complex 
multivariate analyses are launched that do not rely on speculation, overly complex interpretation 
or an educated guess. 
Trends in Terrorism 
Prior to the construction of datasets like the GTD, levels of overall terrorist activity were 
largely unknown.  Even basic knowledge such as the number of terrorist attacks worldwide was 
cause for speculation due to a lack of useful information.  Figure 1 details the total number of 
terrorist attacks as well as deaths and injuries resulting from those attacks from 1970 – 2007.  
                                                 
1
 These data are not publically available as of this writing; however, they are expected to be available for 
review on the START website by the end of spring 2009.  See http://www.start.umd.edu  
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There are a number of interesting observations to be made from this information.  First, 
terrorism, overall, was much more prevalent in the 1980s and 1990s than it was at the turn of the 
century.  Second, although the number of deaths and injuries appears to follow the more general 
trend of terrorist attacks they do not appear to be perfectly related to one another and even 
diverge at times.  Finally, it appears that the decrease in terrorism, leading into the 21
st
 century 
may be beginning to reverse direction in the last few years.  This begs the question, is terrorism 
becoming more deadly? 
 
 
Evidence presented by LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw (In Press) would suggest that 
terrorism is indeed becoming more deadly among groups that are officially named a threat to the 
U.S.  They find that three different and distinct waves of terrorist activity have occurred over the 
last 40 years, and that the most recent wave has been by far the deadliest.  Waves one and two 
consisted mainly of groups who committed fewer attacks that resulted in death or injury.  The 
groups that LaFree at al. (In Press) refer to as the 21
st
 Century Boom are much more deadly than 
groups in the 70s and 80s who were considered a threat to the U.S.  According to Rapoport 
(2001), the goals of terrorists have shifted from a desire for broad public exposure without a 
main focus on killing anyone to a desire for broad public exposure as well as a high body count. 
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Figure 2 presents the rates of deaths in injuries as a result of terrorist attacks.  This 
perspective shows an interesting observation when compared to the perspective of the first 
figure.  In this case, we can see that the number of persons killed or injured per terrorist attack is 
increasing over the life of the series.  This lends support to the notion that terrorism is becoming 
much more deadly overall in the last 10 years or so.  While terrorism, like many problems 
throughout the world, is of general concern to the United States, it would be a greater concern if 
the U.S. were more often the target of terrorist attacks. 
 
Figure 3 details the number of U.S. deaths and casualties compared to all terrorist attacks 
worldwide.  By examining these data we can see that only a very small proportion of all terrorist 
attacks result in U.S. casualties, and that the frequency of U.S. casualties has remained fairly 
constant in this time period.  However, if we limit the terrorist attacks to only those made against 
U.S. interests these attacks look very much like the pattern of  worldwide terrorism with the 
exception of the deaths caused by the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  These attacks are detailed in Figure 
4.  In fact, these attacks serve to obscure 
the true numbers of attacks suffered by 
U.S. interests over this time period. 
Past terrorist activities that have 
targeted the United States have yielded 
relatively low counts of casualties and 
deaths, with the obvious exception of 
the 9/11 attacks.  This is in keeping with 
the relative rarity of terrorism in general.  
However, these attacks tend to be high 
profile attacks that cause damage over a 
short period of time, meet the publicity 
and exposure desires of terrorists, and 
cause a great deal of disruption in public 
life.  Some of the more famous attacks 
appear as peaks in Figure 4; including 
the 1984 Salmonella attack in Oregon (over 700 illnesses), 1993 World Trade Center attack 
(over 1,000 injuries), and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing (165 killed, 400 injured).  To draw a 
contrast, the numbers of non-terrorism related murders in the U.S. in 1984, 1993, and 1995 were 
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18,692, 24,526, and 21,606, respectively.  It is also important to keep in mind that two of these 
three large-scale attacks were purely domestic in nature and committed by Americans. 
Overall, terrorist attacks are extremely rare events; however, when a terrorist attack does 
occur, a single attack may result in a large amount of death or injuries.  The likelihood of death 
and injury in terrorist attacks is increasing over the time period for which data exist, and 
terrorism since the turn of the last century has become increasingly dangerous worldwide as 
indicated by the increase in the rate of casualties per attack.  This being said, it is important to 
keep in mind that terrorism is still about 100 times rarer than homicide is in the U.S.
2
   
Where is Terrorism Happening? 
There is a modern 
conception among some that 
terrorism is a relatively new 
phenomenon.  We know 
that this is not the case.  
Similarly, there is a 
conception among many 
that terrorism comes from a 
specific part of the world.  
This also is untrue.  
Terrorism has proven a 
useful tactic among many 
groups that hope to 
influence a larger audience 
through violence and 
intimidation.  Figure 5 displays the percent of terrorist attacks that have occurred in various 
regions of the world from 1970 - 2007.  Figure 7 lists the 30 geographic areas in the world with 
the highest number of terrorist attacks from 1970 – 2007.   
In Figure 5, Central and South America (33% combined) and Western Europe (17.2%) 
dominate the chart.  The Middle East and North Africa represent 16.9% of attacks and South 
Asia about 14.9%.  This is not in keeping with public perceptions of where terrorism actually 
occurs.  Although only 2.2% of terrorism cases occurred in North America, in a 2007 Gallup poll 
44% of respondents reported that they were worried when asked if ―you or someone in your 
family will become a victim of terrorism‖ (Maguire & Pastore, 2009).  It is also difficult to 
understand the American public‘s view of where terrorism occurs, and the relative threat of a 
major terrorist attack on U.S. soil because, in a 2007 Pew survey 57% of respondents reported 
that U.S. government was doing well at reducing the threat of Terrorism (Maguire & Pastore, 
2009). 
                                                 
2
 This statement is based on the author‘s calculation of terrorism incidents from the GTD in the world 
population vs. U.S. homicide rates from the FBI‘s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) as reported in the 
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics (Maguire & Pastore, 2009). 
Figure 5.  Total Terrorist Attacks by Region
(1970 - 2007) 
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In sum, it is important to note that, while public perception has focused on the threat of 
Islamist terrorism that originates (at least ideologically) in various areas in the Middle East, 
Pakistan, Afghanistan and North Africa, these areas have not had the greatest amount of terrorist 
activity in the period covered by these data.  South America is still the leader with the highest 
level of attacks and when combined with Central America almost represents a majority of all 
attacks from 1970 – 2007.  In other words, terrorism is not simply a problem of the Middle East. 
Figure 6 lists the top 30 geographic areas where terrorist attacks occur as well as the 
levels of deaths and injuries in those areas. While recent activities in Iraq and Afghanistan place 
them in the top 30, no one region of the world dominates the list.  Furthermore, there is no 
pattern to the top 30 countries with respect to economic wellbeing, size, diversity of population, 
type of government, religion, or any of the other potential contributing characteristic that might 
explain participation in terrorism. 
If we focus on 
terrorism over the last few 
years, however, a more 
detailed picture emerges.  The 
difference in these long-term 
data and any recent activity 
may be the rise of the jihadist 
terrorism in the 1990s.  Prior 
to this, some terrorism in 
Europe was international, 
from the Middle East and 
North Africa, but was 
dominated by neo-Marxist 
groups made up of 
Europeans.  Groups like Red 
Brigades, Baader-Meinhoff, 
the IRA, and ETA as well as a 
number of similar, less 
famous groups, participated in 
most of the activity.  Even groups with transnational agendas (such as colonial natives in the 
Figure 7. Total Terrorist Attacks by Region
(1997 - 2007)
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 33 
UNCLASSIFIED 
Netherlands) were usually citizens of the country in which the activity took place.  It is also 
difficult to differentiate between domestic and international cases.  Questions arise, such as, ―Is a 
group that claims responsibility for an attack against a local business in their own country 
because the local business has contracts with another country (like the U.S.) a domestic or an 
international attack?‖  The attempts to completely differentiate between domestic and 
international terrorism are very difficult.  Terrorism is still, as far as we can see with the open 
source data, a local affair (LaFree et al., In Press). 
Figure 7 details the same data as Figure 5, but is restricted to only the last 10 years of the 
data (1997 – 2007).  In this case, we can see that the most recent wave of terrorism is focused on 
very different regions.  For instance, the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, and 
Southeast Asia completely displace South America and Western Europe as the leading regions 
for terrorist activity. 
Figure 8 is yet more telling of the change in the focus of terrorist activity over the last 
few years.  In this case, we can observe the change in location of terrorist attacks and the 
increase in the correlation of these attacks and the deadliness of these attacks by listing the top 
30 geographic areas to suffer from terrorist attacks from 1997 – 2007.  Many of the countries in 
this list reflect the regional shift in terrorism from South America and Europe to the Middle East 
and North Africa. 
Recent research by LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw (In Press) examined the trajectories of 
foreign terrorist groups that have been identified by the U.S. State Department and other 
government sources as a particular threat to the United States.  In examining data on over 16,000 
terrorist attacks from the GTD, they found that over 99% of attacks on the U.S. occurred in 
foreign countries against U.S. interests and over 90% of attacks by these groups were in foreign 
countries and did not target U.S. interests.  This indicates that foreign groups that are named 
specifically as a threat to the U.S. most often attack local targets in their own countries.   These 
findings indicate  that helping foreign governments to successfully combat terrorism in their own 
countries is indeed a valid and necessary strategy in fighting terrorism because proximity to the 
target is in fact one of the most important target selection factors among terrorists (Clarke & 
0
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Figure 8. Top 30 Geographic Areas by Terrorist Attacks (1997 - 2007)
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Newman, 2006).  Terrorism is difficult, then, to describe as simply a domestic or international 
issue because there is a great deal of overlap in the activity and intent of groups that use 
terrorism as a tactic. 
Conclusion 
Terrorism is difficult to define, track, or simplify in a meaningful way, but there are a few 
meaningful observations that can be made about trends and locations of terrorism from data that 
are collected systematically for scientific purposes.  By using these data to develop an empirical 
understanding of the patterns of terrorist events geographically and over time, a more informed 
and detailed understanding of terrorism is possible. 
Terrorist attacks and activity have followed patterns of three major waves over the last 40 
years or so.  Current activity is part of the most recent wave, described by LaFree et al. as the 
21
st
 Century Boom.  The activity during this period is characterized by an increased lethality of 
incidents as evidenced by an overall increase in the rates of killing and injuries from terrorist 
events.  The number of U.S. citizens who are victims of such attacks has remained relatively low, 
however.  Attacks within the U.S. are relatively rare, as much as 100 times rarer than the rarest 
violent crime.  Large-scale incidents that produce casualties do have a long-term, adverse effect 
on the public and require a great deal of public resources, nonetheless. 
Terrorist attacks are a popular tactic among groups all over the world.  The regions with 
the most terrorist attacks in the last 40 years include South and Central America with the Middle 
East coming in a distant second with South Asia close behind.  While some geographic areas 
suffer much less terrorism than others do, it is widespread.  There is no region in the world that 
has not experienced terrorism in the last 40 years.  Iraq and Afghanistan
3
 are among the top 30 
geographic areas for terrorist attacks, but these areas represent a number of countries throughout 
the world.  Finally, perhaps the most important factor in a terrorist groups‘ target selection is 
proximity.   Most of the attacks perpetrated by groups who are named as a particular threat to the 
U.S. are in foreign countries against local targets. 
In sum, terrorist attacks are rare but widespread.  Viewing terrorism as a recent problem 
that is limited to a particular region of the world is simply misguided based on the bulk of 
evidence about terrorism that has been compiled over the last few years.  A better way to view 
terrorism, in light of empirical evidence, is as a threat that has a long history and has become 
more deadly in its most recent incarnation. 
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P.2 Dangers of Domestic Terrorism in the United States (Jim Lutz) 
 
Author: James M. Lutz 
Organization: Indiana University-Purdue University Fort Wayne 
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 At the present time, domestic terrorist activity in the United States is relatively 
infrequent.  The most important threats domestically appear to be from right-wing extremists, 
radical environmentalists and animal rights groups, and militant jihadi extremists.  Violence from 
a variety of other groups is also possible.  While domestic terrorism from any source was limited 
since the attacks of 9/11, increased surveillance and concern over security after the attacks has 
probably led to all types of groups restricting the activities that they might have considered 
attempting.  In addition, it is possible that the attack of 9/11 may have had the additional 
psychological impact of deterring domestic groups from using terrorist tactics for fear of being 
linked with al Qaeda. 
The greatest domestic threat remains extreme right-wing groups.  There are a multitude 
of such organizations such as various splinter groups from the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), the Aryan 
Nations, and some militia groups -- and their hatred and fear of ethnic and religious minorities 
and foreign cultures has not abated (Michael, 2003).  It is likely that members of some of these 
organizations have participated in backlash attacks against Arab-American, Muslims, and 
members of other ―foreign‖ groups in the aftermath of 9/11.  Such activities and hate crimes 
may, for the moment, be the limit of their activities, but such activities are also indicative of the 
continuing threat.  The generalized suspicion that has fallen on foreign immigrants and residents 
may even have given these groups some hope that a portion of their desired policy changes may 
occur without continuing to resort to violence.  The recent debates over limiting immigration to 
the United States and controlling borders may have provided some additional hope to the groups 
that ‗foreign‘ elements would be excluded. 
While there have been limited activities by the right, the situation may not continue 
indefinitely.  Eventually, it will become clear that the racially pure society, cleansed of foreign 
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ideas and influences that the extremists hope to create, will not be achieved.  The election of 
President Obama, no doubt, has been seen by at least some elements of the extreme right as an 
indication that national policies are going in the wrong direction and that violence may again be 
―necessary.‖  The diffuse nature of the groups on the extreme right and their penchant for lone 
wolf and leaderless resistance styles of operations (Michael, 2003, p. 115; Smith, 2000) means 
that such groups will be difficult to infiltrate and guard against on a consistent basis, even though 
some potentially serious attacks have been stopped by authorities in the past (Pitcavage, 2001). 
Radical environmental groups such as the Earth Liberation Front and rights extremists 
such as the Animal Liberation Front are the so-called ―eco-terrorists.‖  They also pose a 
continued threat.  These groups in the United States have generally limited their attacks to 
property, although some observers fear that there is a danger of eventual escalation to violence 
against people if the property attacks fail as has already occurred with some animal rights and 
ecology groups in Europe (Ackerman, 2003).  These groups have been effective in the past with 
their property attacks, and these activities have led companies to change their practices.  The 
attacks have directly caused millions of dollars in damages, and they have also led the targeted 
companies to either expend funds for greater security in order to avoid damages in the future or 
to forgo the use of animals in ways that the animal rights groups oppose in other to avoid these 
security costs (Lutz & Lutz, 2006).  Given the past successes, these groups are likely to continue 
the same types of activities.  The activists in these groups have also utilized the leaderless 
resistance style of activity in their campaigns (Joose, 2007). 
There was a great fear that there would be domestic violence by individuals who 
identified with al Qaeda and global militant jihad (Kushner with Davis, 2004), but this fear has 
not been borne out by later events.  The domestic Arab and Islamic communities in the United 
States have not been hotbeds of religious extremism, and there have been only a few instances of 
extremists identifying with the global jihad.  A group in Buffalo (the Lackawana Six) had 
apparently decided against any action before their arrest.  The group in Liberty City, Florida that 
was infiltrated by the FBI probably would never have been able to launch any kind of serious 
operation on their own.  There were groups in northern Virginia and New Jersey, however, that 
were apparently more serious about planning attacks, but they seem to have been the exceptions 
(Silber & Bhatt, 2007).  As has been suggested elsewhere, the greatest danger from militant 
jihadi groups is more likely to come from the more radicalized, and thus more inclined to 
violence, sections of Islamic communities in West Europe than from American Muslims.   
The groups in Western Europe have been less well integrated into society and face more 
discrimination (Leiken, 2005).  These individuals or groups remain a danger to the United States 
since, as European passport holders, they can easily travel to the United States. 
There have been other groups that have been violent in the past and could continue to be 
so in the future.  Anti-abortion groups have successfully relied on property damage to clinics in 
the past to disrupt abortions.  More extreme members of these groups, however, have opted for 
intimidation, assaults, and even murder (Juergensmeyer, 2000, p. 21-4).  These operations have 
reduced the availability of abortions (Laqueur, 1999, p. 229) and, as long as abortions remain 
legal, such actions may continue.  The Jewish Defense League and similar groups were once 
active in terrorist operations against Soviet interests and those that disagreed with their aims 
(George & Wilcox, 1996, p. 306-12), but now they appear to be dormant.  Puerto Rican 
nationalists have also periodically launched bombing campaigns on the mainland and on the 
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island an effort to achieve independence.  Another series of such attacks by these nationalists is 
quite possible, especially as the effects of 9/11 fade into the past and the groups are less fearful 
of being compared to al Qaeda or being considered allies of that organization.  Other groups 
active in the past have included émigré groups unhappy with policies in their homelands (Lutz & 
Lutz, 2007, p.104-5, 125-6), and it is also possible that similar émigré organizations could 
reappear.   It is always possible, of course, that currently new or unforeseen groups with new 
agendas and complaints could appear and elect to use terrorism in order to achieve their goals. 
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P.3     Explaining the Strength of the Pakistani Taliban (Laila Bokhari) 
 
Author: Laila Bokhari1 
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On 7 August 2009 it was reported that the leader of Beitullah Mehsud, with one of his wives, had 
been killed by a U.S. drone in South Waziristan. The details are not confirmed, yet there seems to 
be an intense power struggle as to who would take on the leadership role. The confusion around 
his death shows how difficult it is to get reliable information out of the area, while the power 
struggle in the aftermath of his death is proof of how diverse and split the organisation really is. 
Mehsud was the leader that managed to unite these different groups and it could be the 
beginning of the end of the united group unless they find a leader just as uniting and charismatic 
as Mehsud. The death of Mehsud is seen as an important victory for the Pakistani leadership. 
 
Introduction – Pakistan, a Myriad of Militant Groups 
In spite of its rather young history, Pakistan has experienced several waves of political 
violence, many related to various forms of sectarian, ethnic, tribal or more recently, from so-
called global Jihadi movements. Together these movements are fighting various agendas, local 
sectarianism, regional jihads -- notably in Afghanistan and in India, and a more global jihad 
towards the West and western interests. At the very core of much of the tension and violence that 
the country has experienced, has long been the key question about what Pakistan is to be based 
on – the relationship between the state and religion and the very interpretation of the role Islam 
should play in society. The creation of Pakistan as a Muslim country in contrast to its large 
―Hindu‖ neighbour, India, formed much of the initial thinking and platform. The image of Hindu 
(or rather non-Muslim) India as the ‗enemy‘ has formed much of the rationale for the many 
Kashmiri groups we have seen – where ―Jihad‖ was a fight against the Indian army and the 
‗Hindu nation‘ over the territory of Kashmir with its majority Muslim population. The Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 gave a whole different flavour and momentum to the groups: 
mujahideen from all over the world passed through Pakistan on their way to Afghanistan, many 
of whom stayed behind in the region after their ―glorious victory over the Communists‖.  
Furthermore, the different schools of Islam present in South Asia (Barelvi, Deobandi and Ahl-e-
Hadith to name only some Sunni variants) have had an influence, creating support that resulted 
in friction at both local and national levels. And finally, the 1980s saw an underlying conflict 
between Shi‘as and Sunnis intensify – and groups defining their rationale in terms of sectarian 
struggles rose to the centre stage. These are still the groups that have taken the biggest toll on 
Pakistani people: sectarian groups of Sunnis targeting Shi‘as and vice versa.  
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Several observers point to a fundamental legitimacy crisis regarding the state and its 
institutions as being the very trigger for these continuous waves of tension (see Cohen, 2004; 
Abbas, 2005). It is, arguably, the very authority of the state that is also at stake in today‘s 
struggles in the border areas to Afghanistan. The question as to what structures will fill the void 
left by the state is central here. As was seen in the aftermath of the earthquake that hit the 
northern areas of Pakistan in 2005 and in the aftermath of the ongoing humanitarian crisis 
following the military offensive in the Swat valley, a number of Islamic charities have been both 
willing and able to fill these gaps. Some of these are seen to have ties to militant groups. 
Furthermore, the failure of the state in fulfilling many of their developmental agendas has led to 
continuous existential crises for successive regimes. Islamisation of the state, most clearly 
evidenced by General Zia ul-Haq in the late 1970s/beginning of the 1980s, with his promotion of 
Islamists in the, until then, relatively secular Pakistani Army, were clear signs of a change, one 
seen in a number of Muslim countries. The increasing Islamisation of both the Pakistani state 
institutions and the general society, coupled with the Afghan war, were clear turning points in 
the role of Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan. A more codified and strict Wahhabi Islam from 
Pakistan‘s close ally, Saudi Arabia, was imported into Pakistan through the funding of religious 
schools and mosques, an effect still strong and visible on Pakistani society today. The 1990‘s 
was also a decade when sectarian groups, Kashmiri-Jihadi groups, and more globally defined 
groups flourished – both in terms of membership and outlook. Underlying much of this, as 
previously mentioned, was the country‘s security build-up towards India, its large Eastern 
neighbour. Both moral and explicit support to a number of militant movements have been seen as 
part of a foreign policy tool, which arguably has now come back to haunt the Pakistani state 
apparatus and society.   
The build-up of the Taliban in Afghanistan cannot be understood without keeping the 
Pakistani theatre in mind. Both the Taliban movement and its support from Pakistan are based in 
the ideological wish of certain sections of society for a true Sunni Islamic Shariah state in 
Afghanistan and the national political aim of strategic depth into the hinterland of the Afghan 
territory. Thus, the roots of the Taliban were bolstered by the support - financially, ideologically 
and logistically - of the Pakistani Sunni groups and political religious parties (such as the Jamaat-
e-Islami and the Jamaat Ulema-e-Islam in Pakistan). Recent years have seen the militant nexus 
focus on Pakistani territory: The Pakistani Taliban (TTP) has emerged as a power in itself, while 
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) is seen as the base for much of the Taliban and 
al-Qaida leadership. Importantly, the links are seen increasingly into the Pakistani ―main land‖ – 
exemplified through the recent attacks and operations in the major cities of the province of 
Punjab.   
In the post 11 September 2001-era, Pakistan has seen the banning of a number of militant 
groups and the arrests and targeted killings of key al-Qaida and related militants. This is a result 
of not only pressure from the international community, most notably the United States, but also 
from a domestic realisation that the very survival of the state itself was at risk. Moreover, several 
assassination attempts on the lives of previous prime ministers and the country‘s president have 
led to increased efforts to clamp down on militant movements in the country. However, the 
banning of groups and arrests of key al-Qaida operatives (many of them local militants involved 
in international networks) has not hindered new groups and fractions from both appearing and re-
appearing. Recent years have seen an intensified hunt for militants, interpreted by many 
Pakistanis as an American-driven military incursion into the tribal areas of Pakistan. This has 
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often backfired with increased attacks on the Pakistani Army both in the form of counter attacks 
by the militants, which resulted in colossal casualties in the Tribal Areas, and in the form of 
direct attacks at regional and national military head quarters.  
Arguably, as of late 2007 we have seen the re-focusing of many of the militant 
movements towards the Pakistani homeland. While Afghanistan and the foreign forces operating 
there remain a key ―front line,‖ a key enemy and raison d‘être for the many groups, the aim and 
agenda of the most vocal and active actors in the Pakistani theatre have also shifted to focus on 
the Pakistani Army, the ―Apostate State‖ and its institutions as the enemy. This provides the very 
backdrop for the most recent development in Pakistan on which this article will focus.   
This study argues that over the last few years, groups and actors operating under the 
name of the Taliban - with more local Pakistani traits - have increasingly been seen developing 
relations with local tribes and gaining ground in new areas, such as the previously peaceful 
valley of Swat.  This has led to a nuanced and more local focus. The question, however, remains 
as to whether this is a temporary arrangement – a result from the backfire of recent events - or a 
more long-term shift. Recent changes in the local reactions to the militants may indicate that the 
militants may have gone too far, and that the support is not as deep as previously thought. And 
vitally: is this reflected in terms of defined enemies and goals of a struggle? An analysis of the 
Deobandi umbrella movement the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) below and some of its actors will try 
and exemplify some of the issues here at stake. With the highly publicized ―U.S. surge‖ in the 
region, however, one has seen indications of a provoked and stronger unified Taliban in 
Pakistan. Although it may be too early to ascertain as the Pakistani government has increased its 
focus and determination to clamp down on the Taliban threat to the state.  
The Taliban Movement of Pakistan (TTP) 
a. Who Are They? 
In December 2007, an umbrella organisation of Pakistani local groups active in the tribal 
areas announced the formation of the Pakistani Taliban movement - Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan 
(TTP). A Shura of 40 senior Taliban leaders was to guide the umbrella organisation, and militant 
commander Baitullah Mehsud was appointed its Emir. Maulana Hafiz Gul Bahadur of North 
Waziristan was appointed as Mehsud‘s deputy, and Maulana Faqir Mohammad from Bajaur 
Agency was named his third in command. Finally, Maulana Omar was named the TTP‘s official 
spokesperson. Among its constituent groups are the Movement for the Implementation of 
Muhammad's Shari'ah (Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi - TNSM) and the Waziristan 
Mujahideen. The TNSM is a Pashtun-based group led by the then jailed cleric Maulana Sufi 
Mohammad and now run by his vocal nephew Mullah Fazlullah, also called ‗Mullah FM‘ due to 
his active use of local radio stations to spread his messages (Abou Zahab & Roy, 2002). The 
Waziristan Mujahideen refers to the group representing the militants that initially signed the 
Waziristan Accord with the Pakistani government in 2006 (Bokhari, 2006). 
The geographical reach of the umbrella group surprised researchers, diplomats, local 
politicians and others. Not only did the TTP have representatives and membership from all the 
seven agencies constituting the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, they 
also included representatives from other regions such as Swat, Bannu, Tank, Lakki Marwat, Dera 
Ismail Khan, Kohistan, Buner, and Malakand (Abbas, 2008). According to the Pakistani 
newspaper Daily Times (2007), as many as 27 militant fractions and groups had agreed to 
centralized control under Baitullah Mehsud. Many of the groups who joined the TTP have long 
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been involved in violent confrontations with the Pakistani army in the tribal areas. They are seen 
to have grown out of local settings and local circumstances, led by their own distinct – often 
tribal – leaders, with their unique leadership style. The TTP is thus seen as mainly made up of 
local groups with local commanders as leaders. However, observers point to signs of possible 
inspiration drawn from other Pakistani groups and an influx of militants from other groups in 
Pakistan (including groups seen as based in ―mainland Pakistan,‖ Punjab). Importantly also, even 
if the many extremist factions are operating under local leaders and commanders, they are very 
different, often characterised by deep tribal differences. Furthermore, while many of these 
leaders and commanders share similar anti-U.S. and pro-al-Qaida worldviews, they are also 
known to express conflicting opinions on local, domestic and international issues, some of which 
will be exemplified below. Also, many of the components of the TTP have historical links with 
Pakistani Islamic groups and political parties. The Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-eMohammadi 
(TNSM), led by Fazlullah Muhammad in the Swat valley, for example, was formed by cadres 
from the Pakistani political parties Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), 
which broke away because they were disenchanted by JI and JUI‘s willingness to compromise on 
the demand of an immediate enforcement of the Shari‘ah. Much of the ideological basis of the 
TNSM can, however, be seen to stem from these political parties.  
While the groups constituting the TTP appear distinct, they are influenced by and 
augmented by members of other Pakistani groups. The umbrella group is made up of many local 
Deobandi groups in the Tribal Areas. They have been able to sustain and expand their influence 
largely due to their contacts with established Sunni extremist networks, based in the heartland of 
Pakistan, mainly Punjab (interview, Peshawar, June 2008). To what extent the umbrella of the 
TTP and its key actors have developed their own and distinct character with its own ideology – 
its own fault lines, defined aims and enemies - is a key question which will be explored below. 
Another question to be addressed is what initial fault lines and debates have been seen within the 
TTP membership and between the TTP and external actors. It may be too early to say, but the 
initial debates may provide some indications as to what key issues and conflicts may develop.    
b. Why This Development? 
While the Pakistani Tribal Areas have long been seen as safe havens and training grounds 
for the Afghan Taliban-insurgency and foreign fighters/al-Qaida elements operating from 
Pakistan, it is now also increasingly admitted that there is also an indigenous Pakistani 
movement operating under the label Taliban. This new generation of young militant Taliban is 
present and active on Pakistani soil, demonstrating not only a new aggression, but also a new 
willingness and confidence in taking on the government.  
According to the author Hassan Abbas (2008), the move from being ―Taliban supporters 
and sympathizers to becoming a mainstream Taliban force in the Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas (FATA) commenced when many small militant groups operating independently in the area 
started networking with one another. This sequence of developments occurred while Pakistani 
forces were spending the majority of their resources finding ‗foreigners‘ in the area linked to al-
Qaida (roughly in the 2002-2004 period).‖ According to Abbas, as more and more groups were 
made illegal in Pakistan, a number of individuals joined the Taliban in FATA ―some as followers 
while others as partners. During this period, they developed their distinct identity. From their 
perspective, they intelligently created a space for themselves in Pakistan by engaging in military 
attacks while at other times cutting deals with the Pakistani government to establish their 
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autonomy in the area. By default, they were accepted as a legitimate voice in at least two FATA 
agencies – South Waziristan and North Waziristan.‖ This development seems to have spread 
over the last year. According to a number of observers, the deals ―expanded the political space of 
Islamists without producing peace, effectively providing them a sphere of influence in the tribal 
areas and some settled districts of NWFP, including Swat (…)‖ (ICG Report, 2006; ICG Report, 
2009).  
It has long been known that the foreign Taliban forces and their sympathizers are 
becoming increasingly entrenched in the region and beyond - many having spent their time there 
since the first Afghan Jihad against the Soviets. Additionally, many married into local families 
and integrated into the tribal structures. Since then, however, we have seen a continuous stream 
of new and young militants settling – or spending time – in the tribal areas from other areas of 
Pakistan. Pakistani military commentators have pointed to the aggressive expansion of their 
influence and operations (especially in Tank, Dera Ismail Khan and Swat Valley in the North-
West Frontier Province) (interview, Islamabad, March 24-25, 2008).  
The year 2007 witnessed a number of serious episodes in Pakistan (including the Lal 
Masjid event and the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto) which, combined, 
resulted in increased lack of trust in the decisions and policies of President Musharraf and 
declining public support. This was also observed after the change of government with a 
significant rise in suicide attacks targeting the army, resulting in the reluctance of soldiers 
deployed in the area to engage tribal gangs militarily. Observing this, many militants associated 
with local Pakistani Jihadi groups moved to FATA to help their ―brothers in arms‖ and also to 
benefit from the sanctuary. The last year has also seen increasing attacks in Punjab, notably 
bigger attacks in Lahore and Islamabad. 
While some view that the primary focus of the TTP effort in creating an umbrella 
organization of Taliban on Pakistani soil is on de-linking the Taliban from al-Qaida (from 
foreign elements) and bringing them back into the Pakistani sphere of influence, others argue 
that it is impossible to separate the two movements, both in Pakistan and in Afghanistan (CSIS, 
2008). A continuous ―turf-war‖ has also characterised these very issues between the various 
groups and actors in the region. Attempts by several individuals in the Taliban leadership to unite 
the many strands have been observed and to refocus the fight towards Afghanistan, but as attacks 
continue in Pakistan, these efforts seem to have been in vain. Questions such as what to do with 
foreign fighters present in the Tribal Areas (e.g., the Uzbeks), who the main enemy is, and where 
battlefield should be, have both divided and united the different groups – and caused great 
discussion. 
The Tribal Areas are among the most underdeveloped areas of Pakistan. They are also 
semi-autonomous and lack any real political representation. This is due to historical political 
arrangements specific to these areas. Arguably it is this very lawlessness of the area that has 
paved the way for alternative authority structures and given room for militant movements to act 
freely in these areas. While there have been Government efforts at introducing economic and 
political development projects in the areas, few are viewed as successful. Observers blame both 
the lack of will and ability of both local and national governments to focus on these areas. This 
has arguably provided fertile ground for militancy to flourish – filling the gap left by the lack of 
governance. 
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c. What Do They Want? The Hierarchy of Jihad and Enemies 
While it is seen that most members of militant Islamic groups such as the Pakistani 
Taliban, discussed here, and other jihadist groups have almost the same anti-United States and 
pro-al-Qaida view of the world; the difficulty, according to the journalist Rahimullah Yusufzai, 
has been the very myriad of ―extremist factions operating under different leaders and 
commanders who sometimes express conflicting opinions on domestic and international issues‖ 
(Yusufzai, 2008).  
Who the enemy is and what the Jihad is to be targeted at have been continuous debates 
both within the TTP and between its key actors. This reflects a continuous debate among the 
militant movements operating from Pakistani soil. During the ―first‖ Afghan jihad, the enemy – 
the Soviet Union -- was priority one. After the Soviet Union retreated and the Taliban emerged, 
the focus of Jihad as interpreted by a number of Pakistani militant groups was to be carried out 
against whoever was in power in Kabul until Pakistan found a friendly government in place in 
the Afghan capital. Anti-Western, anti-American rhetoric and desire for Jihads to free Muslim 
lands of Palestine, Chechnya and Kashmir from occupation were the topics during Taliban rule 
in Afghanistan from 1996 – 2001.Since 2001, removing the infidels (foreign troops and puppet 
leaders) from Afghanistan became priority one for Jihadi groups operating from Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. Yet, due to ambivalent policies of the Pakistan military in dealing with the militants 
and the tribes in FATA, the military is often accused of harsh and seemingly indiscriminate 
attacks - with many civilian casualties. These factors have led to increased public questioning of 
the counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency efforts of the government.  
Arguably, a new and younger generation of Pakistan Taliban has now emerged in FATA 
and the adjacent areas. These young commanders and fighters are seen as not willing to follow 
the script of the traditional Pakistani militant groups. While the older generation of Afghan 
Taliban was a by-product of the Soviet invasion, the new Taliban is a result of American 
intervention and Pakistani support – and, as such, a different rhetoric is used. The Pakistani 
government response to events in Afghanistan (a U-turn in terms of support to the Taliban 
regime) and the handling of domestic Pakistani affairs, has led to the situation whereby many 
militant groups aim violent jihad not just at ‗infidels occupying Afghanistan,‘ but also the ‗local 
infidels‘ who are ruling and running Pakistan and maintaining ‗the secular values of Pakistani 
society and an apostate State‘. Two aims are thus expressed. First, the cleansing of Pakistan as a 
society, the aim being to turn it into a pure Islamic state, and, second, since the beginning of the 
Pakistani Army operations in the Tribal Areas and the Jamia Hafsa/Lal Masjid event in summer 
2007, an increased focus on targeting the Pakistani government and establishment. 
Has Jihad against the Pakistani establishment, therefore, become priority one for the 
Pakistan Taliban, and has the government of Pakistan become enemy number one? In December 
2007, following the establishment of the TTP, the Pakistani newspaper Daily Times (2007) 
reported that, through a number of demarches, the centralized control of the many militant 
fractions and groups (as many as 27 were reported to have joined) had expressed the following 
goals for the new umbrella movement: 
1. Enforce Shari‘a, unite against NATO forces in Afghanistan and perform ―defensive Jihad 
against the Pakistani army;‖ 
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2. React strongly if military operations are not stopped in Swat Valley and North Waziristan 
Agency; 
3. Demand the abolishment of all military checkpoints in the FATA area; 
4. Demand the release of Lal Masjid‘s leader Imam Abdul Aziz; and 
5. Refuse future peace deals with the government of Pakistan. 
Since then, many of these points have become the focus of negotiations between the TTP 
and the Pakistani government. However, they also mark fault lines and questions of debate 
within the Pakistani Taliban, many of the groups operating and growing out of very tribal 
contexts. Their demands are issues that have the potential of raising debates intrinsic to the 
Pakistani society in all its complexity and immaturity (interview with retired military officers, 
Islamabad, 24 – 25 March 2008).  
The enforcement of Shari‘a law in Pakistan has been a returning question for the state of 
Pakistan since the beginning of its existence. Sayyid Abu al-Ala al-Mawdudi was one of the 
thinkers who laid the foundations of this debate in the South Asian context through his writings 
and the establishment of the Jamaat-e-Islami party on the sub-continent in 1941. Mawdudi was 
an important early twentieth-century figure in the Islamic revival in India, and then after 
independence from the British, in Pakistan. Mawdudi (1967, 1976) believed that Islam was all 
encompassing, and, ―Everything in the universe is Muslim for it obeys God by submission to His 
laws... The man who denies God is called Kafir because he conceals by his disbelief what is 
inherent in his nature and embalmed in his own soul.‖ Mawdudi also believed that Muslim 
society could not be Islamic without Sharia, and Islam required the establishment of an Islamic 
state. This state should be a ―theo-democracy,‖ based on the principles of tawhid (unity of God), 
risala (prophethood), and khilafa (caliphate). Because Islam is all encompassing, Mawdudi 
(Jihad in Islam) believed that the Islamic state should not be limited to just the ―homeland of 
Islam,‖ but for all the world. 
The two Pakistani political parties, the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and the Jami‘at-i-Ulema-i-
Islam (JUI) have both played a role in forming the ideological debates and fault lines in Pakistani 
society. Until the 1980s, the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Mawdudi, as described above, enjoyed a 
virtual monopoly on political Islam and served as a link between the Pakistani army and pro-
Pakistan Afghan mujahideen of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar‘s Hizb-i-Islami. Even the JI leader, Qazi 
Hussein Ahmed is seen to have kept an eye on the recruitment of young Afghan militants. 
Jamaat-i-Islami has always respected the rule of law and has clearly chosen a political path, but 
its ideological radicalism has declared Pakistan‘s status as an Islamic state to be the sole reason 
for its existence (interview, Qazi Hussein Ahmed, Lahore, December 2005).  
The other party, Jami‘at-i-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI), a Deobandi-based party, was established 
in 1945 and although from a conservative background, soon developed more radical traits 
consistent with the radicalisation of Pakistani society observed in the latter part of the 1980s. The 
militant sectarian group Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and, in turn, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi emerged 
from JUI. The cornerstone of their ideology involves not giving up on the aims of complete 
introduction of Sharia law and regarding the Shias as the main enemy.  
These two parties have given rise to a number of militant groups and splinter groups 
inspired by the ideology of these two ―mother parties‖ but disappointed with their willingness to 
compromise on certain key aims. The issue of the immediate imposition of Sharia law in the 
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Pakistani society is one such issue; the other is the issue of when the time is ripe for a violent 
Jihad – and towards whom.  
This latter issue relates both to the ambiguous issue of previous Pakistani governments 
making a ―Jihad in Kashmir against the Indians‖ or a ―Jihad against the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan‖ a national agenda item. While a number of Pakistani militant groups have used the 
terminology ―Jihad‖ before – against the Shia-Muslim population of Pakistan, against Indian 
―kuffars‖ (a derogatory term for nonbelievers, non-Muslims) etc., the term ―defensive‖ Jihad is 
now being used also increasingly against the Pakistani government, the state and its institutions. 
An example of this is quoted as one of the key reasons for the establishment of the TTP: ―the 
defensive Jihad against the Pakistani army‖ (Daily Times, 2007). This must be seen against the 
backdrop of the incursions of the Pakistani army into the tribal areas over the past years. 
Arguably, this has both radicalised the local population and attracted militants from other parts 
of the country to the Tribal Areas (Mazzetti & Schmitt, 2008; Beg & Bokhari, 2009). ―Defensive 
Jihad‖ relates to this being a reaction to the behaviour of the Pakistani army against its own 
people. This was a point made in an interview with the TTP leader, Baitullah Mehsud, aired on 
Al-Jazeerah TV, 25 January 2008 (MEMRI, 2008):    
“The goal of our coalition is to conduct defensive jihad. The Pakistani army is induced 
by Bush to send its forces here, and it bombs our homes and fights us. Therefore, we 
established this coalition in order to provide security to Muslim individuals and Muslim 
society. The Pakistani army employs tactics of deceit. It wages war in South Waziristan, 
while it maintains a truce in North Waziristan. Then it wages war in North Waziristan, 
and maintains a truce in Bajaur. Then it wages war in Bajaur, and maintains a truce in 
Swat. This is a policy of deceit. We established this coalition in order to confront the 
deceit of the army and its soldiers‟ attacks.” 
The definition of an ―enemy‖ has evolved, and a 2008 unilateral ceasefire by the TTP and 
the willingness of the umbrella organisation to enter into (secret) peace talks with the new 
government of Pakistan demonstrates the certain trait of flexibility on this point. While the 
negotiations officially collapsed in late April 2008, the TTP spokesperson Maulvi Omar 
emphasised that they would be willing to negotiate, but only if the government met the demand 
to withdraw Pakistani troops from Waziristan (Graham, 2008; The News, 2008). A key demand 
from the Government was that the TTP would promise to lay down its weapons. Moreover, a 
recent statement by the TTP deputy leader Maulana Faqir Muhammad shows that the Pakistani 
Taliban would be willing to make a deal with the government, and even the military, as their 
primary goal was to fight the U.S. and other ―occupying forces‖ in Afghanistan. Accordingly, 
Maulana Faqir Muhammad warned, once the TTP had signed a peace deal with the government 
of Pakistan, then it would gladly free its fighters to join the Afghan Taliban and from there 
continue launching attacks inside Afghanistan (Yusufzai, 2008).     
However, the TTP has shown that despite being an umbrella organisation, they are 
disparate and not monolithic in their outlook and priorities. Some of the debates discussed below 
are indications of this. According to the Pakistani journalist Rahimullah Yusufzai (2008), ―Its 
components had to make decisions with regard to the needs of local politics in their respective 
areas of operation‖. The overview below of some of the key actors within the leadership cadre of 
the TTP may give some indications as to the various components, debates and possible fault lines 
that could trigger further disagreements and rifts.  
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Who Are the Main Actors and What Do They Want? 
As stated previously, when the umbrella group known as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan 
was established, Baitullah Mehsud was appointed as its head with Maulana Hafiz Gul Bahadar of 
North Waziristan as the deputy, and Maulana Faqir Mohammad from Bajaur Agency third in 
command. Other key TTP related individuals in terms of influence include two vocal 
personalities, Maulana Nazir and Maulana Fazlullah. A biographical outline is provided for each 
of these key actors including mention of topics and issues in the discussions connected with 
these actors. Some of the issues involve whether the TTP is seen as a unifying force or rather 
overshadowed by tribal fractions. While the 27 members of TTP agreed on the need to unify 
under one umbrella, it is questionable how ―unified‖ they really are. Some of the fault lines 
displayed will be discussed below.   
a. Baitullah Mehsud 
At the age of 34, Baitullah Mehsud was named the head of the newly formed Taliban 
Movement of Pakistan in December 2007. Shortly after, he was also identified by the Pakistan 
government and the CIA as the key suspect behind the murder of the former Pakistani Prime 
Minister Benazir Bhutto, a claim that is still disputed. 
Baitullah Mehsud is from the South Waziristan Agency and belongs to the Broomikhel 
tribe, an offshoot of sub-tribe Shabikhel, which again is part of the larger Mehsud tribe. The 
Mehsud tribe is one of the four Waziri tribes bordering the Afghan-Pakistani border (The Post, 
2007). He was born in Landidog in South Waziristan and has four brothers. According to Sohail 
Abdul Nasir, Baitullah ―even though not well educated, is known for his political and military 
maneuvering and skills‖ (Nasir, 2007). He is also known to be an inspirational and charismatic 
leader, ―who has a great ability to infuse vitality among his followers‖ (Nasir, 2007). Although 
described as more of a military leader than a thinker, he did, however, attend a local madrassa in 
South Waziristan, the name of which is unknown. It was during this time, inspired by the Taliban 
regime in Afghanistan, that he ―went as a volunteer to join the Taliban‘s enforcement of Sharia 
law‖ (meeting with officials in Pakistan, 24-25 March 2008). He grew to become known first 
and foremost as a commander but also a strong tribesman and leader. 
In 2005, Baitullah signed a deal with the federal government of Pakistan where he and his 
associates laid down arms at a tribal jirga meeting. This was interpreted by the government as 
surrender, while he, himself, described this as part of a negotiated temporary peace agreement. 
The agreement obliged Mehsud and his fellow tribesmen not to provide assistance to al-Qaida 
and other militants present in the area – and, importantly, not to launch further operations against 
government forces (The Nation, 2005). Critics of this agreement and the whole wave of 
agreements that followed claim that with the peace agreement Baitullah, and people like him, 
were strengthened by this deal and could more easily create their own platforms and enhance 
their standing in the lawless Tribal Areas. Baitullah Mehsud, to his defense, argues that the 
intrusion of the Pakistani military with a military offensive into South Waziristan in July 2007 
named Operation Silence after the peace agreement was signed had, in any case, violated the 
agreement, and attacks on military installations were therefore legitimized (The Post, 2007). 
Furthermore, in a September 2007 interview, his spokesperson is to have said on his behalf that: 
―Just as the government side has put my people on trial and sentenced them to imprisonment, I 
will put the soldiers of the Pakistan Army on trial. I have my own courts and we will try the 
soldiers for violating the peace agreement‖ (The Post, 2007). Baitullah Mehsud and his group is 
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known for having set up alternative structures ―of preventing vice and promoting virtue‖ in 
South Waziristan. 
From the few interviews that Baitullah Mehsud has given in the recent years, there are 
clear signs of changing priorities as to what the fight should be and who the main enemy is. Why 
this is so, is unclear, but often seems to reflect external factors and circumstances. Below are 
some excerpts from interviews with Baitullah Mehsud (Daily Jasarat, 2007):  
„Americans and their allies are coming to Pakistani areas and violating its sovereignty 
by waging war and bombing, so to safeguard the Muslims of the region we have formed 
TTP. We are fighting a defensive jihad.‟ (…) 
„Jihad is an injunction of Allah. Jihad is obligatory against oppressors. If there is an 
oppressor in the United States, the jihad becomes obligatory there. We will wage jihad 
everywhere where oppression is going on against the Muslims, be it Kashmir, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, or any place around the world.‟ (…) 
„Our fighting is not with the Pakistan army. We do not want to fight them. We are 
fighting them because they are the allies of the U.S. The friend of enemy is your enemy.‟ 
(…) 
In interviews from early 2007, Baitullah Mehsud was clear that his main goal was of 
freeing Afghanistan through Jihad (BBC, 2007). Back in 2005, in the aftermath of heavy fighting 
between the Pakistani Army and local militants in the tribal areas, Baitullah Mehsud had stated 
that they had started a resistance against the operation of the Pakistani Army in the area: ―during 
this operation innocent people were killed and injured and the tribesmen suffered billions of 
rupees losses as their houses were demolished and standing crops were affected‖ (BBC, 2007). 
Again, in an interview with Al-Jazeera TV, 29 January 2008, Baitullah Mehsud 
legitimises his cause as ―rooted in Islamic law‖ – he says he believes it serves as a defensive 
Jihad against the Pakistani army and its head President Musharraf, who he believes is subjugated 
to the command of the American president Bush and his administration. He also says that: ―the 
ultimate result of this alliance <the TTP>, which we basically formed as a defense, will be the 
implementation of Islamic Sharia Law all throughout Pakistan.‖  
His emphasis is clearly on defensive Jihad: ―Right now our Jihad is defensive. Pakistan 
fights us, and we are on the defensive.‖ He is however also occupied with the idea of a wider 
purpose, that of changing the constitution and laws of Pakistani society: ―We do not intervene in 
details, and Allah willing, the day will come when we will change the Constitution of Pakistan – 
and we will apply the Islamic Shari‘a literally‖ (Al Jazeera, 29 January 2008). 
Mehsud has said several times that he owes allegiance to Mullah Omar, the head of 
Taliban in Afghanistan. In October 2007, he was quoted as saying that Mullah Omar was his 
declared leader (New Taliban, 2007). Their relationship has, however, been subject to a major 
debate as to who is the main enemy. In January 2008, Mullah Omar‘s spokesperson announced 
during a press conference held after the establishment of TTP, that ―Mehsud had nothing to do 
with them since their priority is waging Jihad against the U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan 
and not against the Pakistan militancy‖ (Press conference, Taliban). This is increasingly a fault 
line – exemplifying the question of whom and where do we fight first: is the main enemy on 
Pakistani or Afghan soil – and who is this enemy? Claims were made after the press conference 
that the Afghan Taliban had distanced themselves from the Pakistani militants (the TTP) led by 
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Baitullah Mehsud, and they would not support any militant activity in Pakistan (Dawn, 2008). 
Furthermore, later it was reported that a spokesperson for the Taliban in Afghanistan had said 
that, ―Had he been an Afghan we would have expelled him the same way we expelled Mansoor 
Dadullah for disobeying the orders of Mullah Omar. But Baitullah is a Pakistani Talib and 
whatever he does is his decision. We have nothing to do with it‖ (Dawn, 2008).  
Another topic of debate is the question of what to do with the hundreds of foreign fighters 
who are said to be part of Mehsud‘s and others private militias. The fighters are said to be mostly 
Uzbek (loosely connected to the IMU) who had fought in Afghanistan and fled over the border to 
the Tribal Areas in Pakistan after the bombing in Afghanistan started in the Autumn of 2001. 
Government-led discussions with militants and tribal leaders in the Tribal Areas oftentimes 
centre on this issue. This is also a recurring issue with other parts of the leadership structure of 
the TTP.  
b. Maulana Faqir Mohammad 
Maulana Faqir Mohammad is based in northwestern Pakistan‘s Bajaur Agency of FATA, 
which borders on the Kunar province of Afghanistan. He belongs to the large Mommand tribe. 
He started his early education in a local madrassa and was taught by the scholar Maulana Abdu 
Salam, who is widely respected as a religious scholar in North West Frontier Pakistan (NWFP). 
He used to belong to the Deobandi school of Islam, but is now said to have adopted a Salafi-
inspired view and has also shifted his school to Peshawar (Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism 
News). Even though he is best known for his leadership as a commander, he is also a Muslim 
cleric. Like most of the leadership of the TTP, he is relatively young - merely 39 years old. 
Faqir Mohammad was deeply inspired by Maulana Abdu Salam – and became his student 
at one of the most prestigious religious schools in the Central Peshawar Valley. It was here, at 
this school in Peshawar, that he became interested in fighting in Afghanistan. It has been 
acknowledged that Maulana Sufi Mohammad (the founder of TNSM) was Faqir Mohammed‘s 
first jihadi teacher and mentor who introduced him to militancy in Afghanistan in 1993. It is 
thought that the TNSM heavily inspired the Afghan Taliban.  After fall of Taliban in late 2001, 
Faqir Mohammad played a vital role in helping al-Qaida and other militants get access the Tribal 
Areas, and especially his home Agency, Bajaur.      
Maulana Faqir Mohammad, in addition to being one of the top leaders of the TTP, is also 
a key member of the TNSM (Movement for the Implementation of Mohammad‘s Sharia law). 
He has always been close to the al-Qaida leadership, and is also said to have hosted the dinner-
party in Damadola, Bajaur, in January 2006 that the U.S. targeted with the dramatic Predator 
attack in which it was said that al-Zawahiri escaped (Washington Post).   
Maulana Faqir Mohammad is known to address his tribe and his followers through long 
political speeches given in large public rallies, often at religious venues. Through these public 
speeches, he transmits messages, such as his belief that the biggest enemy of Pakistan is the 
former American president George W. Bush and, that as part of the war on terrorism, Pakistan 
has become a puppet of American policies. He also believes that as part of this ―selling out of the 
country‖ the Mujahideen have the right to ―wage Jihad against the rulers in the nook and corners 
of the country as a result of continued operations against them‖ (Nasir, 2006). He also said that 
while he does not want to topple the government, as such, he would like to see the imposition of 
an Islamic system in the whole country. 
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c. Maulana Fazlullah 
Another young commander and leader in the new umbrella of local Taliban groups is 
Maulana Fazlullah. The 28-year old man leads the outlawed Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-
Muhammadi (TNSM). His father-in-law, Sufi Muhammad, was the group‘s original leader who, 
until recently, was in jail.  
Maulana Fazlullah is from the valley of Swat, part of the North West Frontier Pakistan 
(NWFP). He runs a madrassa in Iman Deri in the Swat valley and is viewed as a very charismatic 
and inspiring leader. He has managed to inspire a large following, partly out of fear.  
Maulana Fazlullah is known to have ‗revitalized‘ the TNSM through his frequent use of 
an illegal FM radio station, where he transmits his messages and, in this way, reaches a new and 
younger audience. For an hour a day he broadcasts his interpretation of the holy book, the Koran, 
and at night he and his men distribute newsletters. He is known for his strong direct and often 
threatening messages directing CD shops and barbers to shut down or else they will be burnt 
down. During several of his FM radio broadcasts, he has ordered mothers not to let their 
daughters out of the house or not to give them access to an education.  
Previously, Maulana Fazlullah‘s aggression was largely aimed against NATO forces in 
Afghanistan and the U.S. but since the bombing of a local madrassa in October 2006 (in Swat) 
and the Lal Masjid operation in July 2007, there appears to have been a shift towards targeting 
Musharraf and the Pakistani army. The Lal Masjid incident was of particular importance to 
Fazlullah and his supporters as many students at the madrassa came from Swat. 
Maulana Fazlullah has given a number of public speeches and radio broadcasts. He is 
vocal and, compared to the TTP-head Baitullah Mehsud, not at all media shy. A recent interview 
conducted by The Dawn (a daily English newspaper in Pakistan) journalist, Syed Irfan Raza, 
gives some interesting insights into his views. Some of the key issues are mentioned below. 
On the question of what Maulana Fazlullah means by Jihad, he underlines that the basic 
objectives of ―human creation is to establish the Khalifat and that the imposition of Shariah law 
is a key objective. Its approach should be through Abdiayat (submission and obedience) and in 
order to get it achieved Jihad is the only way which is possible through unity. The spreading of 
religious values is possible only through Jihad, and it is the most important responsibility of all 
Muslims and it is what the prophets did‖ (interview via email, Syed Irfan Raza). 
An important message of Maulana Fazlullah is that, in his opinion, Islam is not being 
implemented in a true (proper) fashion in Pakistan, and that the leadership and elites have 
become servants to a Western agenda. In his broadcasts, he emphasizes the need to react to a 
government he views as infidel: ―We are bound by Islam and we do not want to go by our own 
will. (…) We will defend our religion in every way and would readily die for it. This is what 
Islam taught us, to defend ourselves and our religion. (…) And this is a government of infidels. 
When the officials are attacking us we will defend ourselves and when we kill them we are 
martyrs, and they the other way round‖ (interview via email, Syed Irfan Raza). 
A recurring topic of debate has been that of entering into peace talks both with previous 
and present governments. While the local militants in Swat have signed accords with the local 
government, the question has often been who violated the agreement first: ―The prophet 
Muhammad solved most of the issues and problems through discussions and accords. So we are 
also bound to honour accords. We have reached agreement with the government and we are 
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bound by it. It is un-Islamic to violate the agreement, but the government has adopted an 
approach involving the killing of the Taliban, religious scholars and have also bombed the 
mosques and seminaries. This is not acceptable to people in Swat, including its women. Though I 
(Maulana Fazlullah) have reached an agreement with the government it does not mean that the 
entire Swat people are part of this agreement. I am bound by the peace agreement and I am not 
going to violate the accord and whenever I want to violate the agreement I will directly announce 
my disengagement with the agreement. But the power lies with the people of Swat.‖ 
Similarly, even if he admits to have told his followers to be prepared to defend 
themselves through a ―defensive Jihad,‖ he does not take responsibility for attacks that have 
taken place against government and military personnel. Rather, the attacks are seen as a reaction 
to operations conducted by the government: ―I just told my followers to be prepared for Jihad. 
Whatever has started in Swat is not related to my announcement, but it is related to the 
government operation in Lal Masjid and Jamia Hafsa. And such violent incidents are not limited 
to Swat district only but it is going on throughout the tribal belt and Pakistan. So it is wrong to 
implicate me in whatever is going on in Pakistan. It is the responsibility of every Pakistani to rise 
in arms against those who are bombing their own people‖ (interview via email, Syed Irfan Raza). 
A key disagreement within the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM), has 
existed between Fazlullah and Maulana Sufi Muhammad, the until recently detained former head 
of TNSM, Sufi Muhammad has several times expressed disagreement with the activities of 
Maulana Fazlullah in Swat Valley, saying that they were bringing a bad name to Islam: ―They 
are doing no service to Islam by carrying out suicide attacks, but rather damaging the cause for 
the enforcement of the Shariah in the Malakand region,‖ he said. Furthermore, ―We (TNSM) 
never intended to pick up arms for the enforcement of Shariah. We can't even think of killing 
people for the purpose. Peaceful struggle (within the parameters of the Constitution) had been 
our policy, and I will clearly tell the people to support peace overtures. I will urge people to 
abandon Fazlullah, who is a rebel" (Jan, 2008). 
Maulana Sufi Muhammad was recently released from jail, and it is unknown what the 
release will mean for the TNSM. He was arrested along with scores of his supporters in 
November 2001 when they were fleeing to Pakistan from Afghanistan where they had gone to 
fight against U.S. forces. He and 30 others were tried under the Frontier Crimes Regulations, and 
Sufi Muhammad was sentenced to 10-year imprisonment in 2002. 
In a recent agreement with the government, referred to in the above interview with 
Fazlullah, the TNSM had pledged to continue its struggle to enforce Shariah law through 
peaceful means. It is said that one of the demands of this negotiated ceasefire was the release of 
Maulana Sufi Muhammad. Importantly, in the agreement, Maulana Fazlullah distanced itself 
from ‗elements‘ involved in attacks on government officials, installations and law-enforcement 
agencies and condemned ‗miscreants‘ indulging in such activities (Ali, 2008). The preamble of 
the agreement released by the provincial government said that the deaths of innocent people in 
suicide bombings and attacks on government installations and functionaries were against Islam 
and moral principles and a violation of human rights (Ali, 2008). 
d. Maulvi Nazir 
Another key actor in the Tribal Areas has been Maulvi Nazir. He has often been seen to 
be at odds with Baitullah Mehsud, specifically on the issue of how to deal with foreign fighters 
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present in FATA, and generally on whether to host the mainly Uzbek fighters that have created 
conflict along tribal lines but also with relation to the Pakistani Army. 
Maulvi Nazir is 32 years old and a dual citizen of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Although he 
presently resides in South Waziristan, he is a frequent traveller to Afghanistan‘s Paktika province 
and Kandahar, and his extended family lives on both sides of the Durand Line. He belongs to the 
Kakakhel tribe, which is a sub-clan of the Ahmedzai Waziris (who dominate parts of South 
Waziristan) (Abbas, 2007).  
Nazir is known for his battle experience and guerrilla training and is said to have joined 
the Taliban movement in Afghanistan. He is thought to be politically aligned with the Jamaat-
Ulema-i-Islam (JUI) and its leader Maulana Fazlur Rehman, but has also been close to the late 
Mullah Dadullah and Siraj Haqqani, son of Jalaluddin Haqqani, a veteran mujahideen and an 
important leader of the Taliban. Nazir has been an important actor in South Waziristan and the 
local shura there. When he was announced as the Emir of the local Taliban in the South 
Waziristan Agency, he was viewed to have an instrumental role in the enforcement of rigid 
Sharia laws. Apparently able to act unhindered by government forces, in 2006 he directed his 
supporters not to confront the Pakistani military. He was supported in this endeavour by: 1) 
about a dozen independent pro-Taliban groups of the area; 2) Punjabi Taliban (mostly members 
of banned sectarian and Kashmiri militant groups); and 3) his tribe members. 
His credentials came from having established some degree of control in the South 
Waziristan, but he has since been challenged on his views on what to do with the foreign 
fighters, the ―immigrant Uzbek militants‖ in the area. He aligned himself with the Pakistani army 
in his operations, and in return, the army provided medical cover to Nazir‘s forces and also 
helped him secure the bases vacated by the Uzbeks. The Uzbeks, under Tahir Yuldashev of the 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), suffered colossal losses in these confrontations in 
spring 2007. His close alignment with the Pakistani army and the government led to 
disagreements with other local tribes. Interestingly, however, it seems that his motivations for 
challenging the foreign presence in South Waziristan were both the fact that the foreign militants 
were involved in the brutal killing and robbing tribesmen, creating local rivalries among 
tribesmen and increasing the level of crime, as well as economic interests. This is explained by 
Hassan Abbas (2007): ―(…) economic interests are also playing a part in this power matrix. 
Uzbeks started coming to the area during the late 1980s and early 1990s; however, the major 
influx began after key developments in 2001. Uzbek families managed to acquire large 
properties, some of which were bought and some of which were offered as gifts by the local 
people who entered into relations with them. The Uzbeks worked hard and gradually developed 
some lands into model farms. This became the bone of contention between the settlers and the 
locals. Some locals partnered with the Uzbeks in business and also acted as their protectors. 
Others naturally developed a grudge. On the other hand, Nazir has always looked for economic 
opportunities, and soon after his first victory over Uzbek militants, he publicly urged the 
Pakistani government to initiate development work in the area and specifically asked mobile 
phone companies to start their services in the area.‖ 
It is also interesting to note that Maulvi Nazir, by his own confession, had not joined the 
fight against Uzbek militants as a Taliban emir, but as a member of the Kakakhel tribe, which 
again indicates the tribal nature of the various actors of the TTP, even if this was before their 
very naissance (Bokhari, 2007). These conflicts, therefore, may create further tension and splits 
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along tribal lines within the TTP and a number of pragmatic interests and alliances may play out 
along tribal lines. Inherent in this dynamic is a history of conflicts that have not been forgotten: 
family and friends of the assassinated leader Nek Mohammad, a legendary figure, are still 
supportive of Uzbek fighters and al-Qaeda elements; Mehsud tribesmen (the largest tribe in 
terms of numbers in the area) under Baitullah Mehsud are also resisting Nazir; and Haji Omar, a 
senior pro-al-Qaida Taliban commander in South Waziristan and an arch opponent of Nazir, has 
publicly warned the Pakistani military in becoming party to a very local tribal struggle (Bokhari, 
2007). 
Signs of Strength: A Unified Force or Tribal Fractions? 
Upon the announcement of their establishment, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan demanded 
the Pakistani military halt operations in ‗Taliban territory‘ and release their members from 
Pakistani jails. There was a clear message that the Pakistani army and the government would be 
regarded as the foremost enemy. This message was seen as a shift from the until then active 
Taliban forces. Several attacks in Pakistan mainland towards Pakistan government targets over 
the last year have been blamed on Baitullah Mehsud. Moreover, attempts have been made to 
gather the forces – the fractions – into a more unified struggle (see The News, 2009).  
The TTP, however, has also stated it would continue the fight against Coalition forces in 
Afghanistan: ―Our main aim is to target the U.S. allies in Afghanistan but the government of 
Pakistan‘s ill-strategy has made us to launch a defensive Jihad in Pakistan (...) ... The 
government of Pakistan would be paid in the same coin now‖ (Roggio, 2007). Therefore, it may 
seem that the change of focus on Pakistani society and its establishment and institutions as the 
enemy and battlefield arena may just be a temporary arrangement, designed to gather forces and 
be able to focus with greater strength on the real enemy. This may be an indication that the fight 
against the Pakistani leadership is pragmatic and not ideologically based as often thought. 
Despite the wish to unite the different groups under the umbrella of the TTP and under 
the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud, a number of fault lines have been observed. The 27 groups 
and factions who united to form the TTP consist of a number of different leaders and 
commanders who have oftentimes expressed very different opinions on both local and more 
global issues. Some of the issues at stake have been whether to launch attacks against the 
Pakistani Army and whether to engage in negotiations with the Pakistani government. A look at 
the negotiations themselves and the many attempts and nuances of peace agreements, also show 
that the contents of each negotiation have been different, again to some extent indicating the 
pragmatism at play. The fault lines may also be indications that the local conflicts and aims are 
quite different. At very local levels, conflicts have focused on land ownership and rights, 
sectarianism and even personality/leadership issues. 
A recurring issue is whether the aim of the implementation of Shariah law can be 
compromised for other short-term, pragmatic interests. In the past, this has often caused both 
factions and splinter-groups to develop. Already one can see that often the territorial and tribal 
limits of each Taliban group and commander have seemed to be the more decisive. Similarly, 
―the groups have regional and local political agendas and are under pressure from their tribes and 
communities not to become involved in wider conflicts that could transform their areas into 
battle grounds and contribute to suffering‖ (Yusufzai, 2008).  
The geographical reach of the umbrella group has surprised observers. Not only does the 
TTP cover all the seven agencies constituting the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) 
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of Pakistan, they also cover representatives from other regions of the adjacent NWFP (Abbas, 
2008). Individual militants from ‗mainland‘ Pakistan may have joined under the umbrella of TTP 
not only as a protest against the handling of issues in the Tribal Areas but also as a reaction of 
the Lal Masjid event in 2007. Baitullah Mehsud justified the broad reach of the group based on 
its overarching aim to fight a common enemy: the Pakistani government as an anti-Muslim 
apostate state. Recent negotiations with the new Pakistani government are, however, already 
causing fault lines with regard to this aim within the organisation. The very tribal nature of the 
TTP is shown in its pragmatism, based on the very local dimensions of the conflict. The shift in 
the militants‘ main thrust of the ―War against the West‖ (described by Baitullah Mehsud as a 
result of ―The infidel world launched a war on Islam through agents such as the Government of 
Pakistan‖) and reflected in the shift in focus from Afghanistan to Pakistan, may therefore have 
local and more pragmatic reasons (Al Jazeera, 2008).  
Baitullah Mehsud and the Pakistani Taliban have, however, been able to overcome many 
of these internal conflicts. Arguably, their unity has been aided by the drone attacks and 
increased military activity in the border areas (Shah, 2009). This has both united and 
strengthened them and also possibly made the links with other Pakistani groups more prominent. 
Until recently, a hesitant and indecisive Pakistani government response to the militants‘ activity 
also led to further unity. This may, however, change as the government appears to be starting to 
take on the militants with strong and overwhelming force.  
back to top 
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Introduction 
In recent years, a serious academic discussion about the al-Qaeda organization (or AQC – 
al-Qaeda Central) has been underway, one that has also found its way into the popular media. It 
has focused on whether AQC has ceased functioning as an active organization and turned into an 
icon only, and whether its role as leader of the global militant jihad has been assumed by a mass 
movement run by a network of people, groups, and organizations whose members have 
undergone a process of self-radicalization (Sciolino & Schmidtt, 2008). A response to this 
question may be found in an analysis of the activities of al-Qaeda and its affiliates but also 
depends on understanding the concept of struggle according to al-Qaeda and its relationship with 
its affiliates. Al-Qaeda views itself as the leader of the global militant jihad movement and as a 
role model for its affiliates. As such, the organization has sought to stage dramatic and 
innovative terrorist attacks that would pave the way for its collaborators without insisting on 
exclusivity for acts undertaken in the name of global militant jihad. Moreover, al-Qaeda has 
encouraged independent activity, which is often carried out without its approval or knowledge. 
Al-Qaeda, well aware of its limited power and resources, has always viewed its own 
terrorist acts, and the terrorist acts it encourages others to undertake, as a tool to launch an 
historic process whose final objective is restoring Islam to its former primacy and glory. Al-
Qaeda does not feel it necessary to carry out many attacks and prefers to focus on a limited 
number of showcase attacks. Terrorism, viewed by al-Qaeda as ―propaganda by the Deed,‖ is the 
first in a chain reaction meant to enhance its destructive and moral effect and launch a 
sophisticated, global propaganda system. This system is directed by the organization with the 
assistance of its production company, al-Sahab, through internet sites and Arab satellite 
channels, primarily al Jazeera. It is no coincidence that al-Qaeda contributes as many resources 
and efforts to mounting these productions as it does to mounting terrorist attacks. 
The discussion that follows focuses on the central arenas where al-Qaeda and its global 
militant jihad affiliates were active in 2008, an assessment of the expected trends in their 
activities in coming years, and an examination of the threat they represent. 
Al-Qaeda and Their Affiliates: Theaters of Activity 
In recent years, al-Qaeda and its affiliates have focused their activities primarily in Iraq 
and the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) border region between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, as well as other local arenas. 
 56 
UNCLASSIFIED 
22
75
178
142
224
127
0
50
100
150
200
250
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total: 
Iraq 
The American-led coalition invasion into Iraq supplied al-Qaeda with a golden 
opportunity to extricate itself from its difficult position and the pressure exerted on it after the 
severe blow it and its Taliban sponsors suffered following the 9/11 attacks. 
Al-Qaeda did not invest the bulk of its resources or dedicate its most senior commanders 
to the war in Iraq and most have remained protected in Afghanistan and Pakistan, particularly in 
the border area between them. However, al-Qaeda commanders have invested significant 
informational/propaganda efforts to stress the extreme importance of the campaign in Iraq as the 
central arena for the contest between the Islamic world, led by global militant jihadists, and the 
West, together with its Arab allies. With the assistance of recruiting and logistics networks 
directed by supporters around the world, the struggle in Iraq has become a locus attracting 
Muslim volunteers worldwide seeking to join the militant jihad activity there. Moreover, the 
fighting in Iraq over the past five years has largely drawn the coalition forces‘ attention away 
from their initial objectives and depleted the resources – in terms of money, manpower, 
equipment, and time – allocated to wage a focused war against al-Qaeda bases in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan. 
The massive presence of 
Western forces in Iraq has helped 
al-Qaeda operate its affiliates in the 
country against the invaders. The 
fact that ―the distant enemy‖ (i.e., 
the United States and its allies) 
came to a region considered to be 
holy Muslim ground (wakf) in the 
heart of the Arab Levant gave al-
Qaeda "home court advantage" in 
attacks. In addition, it helped 
strengthen its basic narrative: the 
prosecution of a holy war by means 
of legitimate ―armed military 
resistance.‖ Al-Qaeda took 
advantage of this opportunity to 
prepare highly skilled cadres with 
combat experience and train them in 
terrorist and guerilla warfare for future use in the global militant jihad. Furthermore, the fighting 
in Iraq afforded al-Qaeda an opportunity to demonstrate and entrench the act of self-sacrifice in 
the path of God (istishhadia) that has become its trademark through intensive use of suicide 
attackers, most of them from the ranks of the foreign volunteers, who were sent to their targets 
by al-Qaeda in Iraq (Figure 1) (Human Rights Watch, 2005). 
The fighting in Iraq has provided al-Qaeda‘s elaborate and effective propaganda machine 
with a wealth of visual material documenting the terrorist and guerilla activities against the 
foreign forces. In recent years, these materials have served al-Qaeda in its psychological warfare 
as it celebrates a heroic narrative of the "Muslim mujahidin" rendering powerful blows against 
the invading ―infidels.‖ There is no doubt that the raw materials photographed during the 
Figure 1. Suicide Attacks in Iraq 2003-2008 (Institute 
for National Security Studies - INSS) 
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fighting in Iraq, posted on many internet sites around the world identified with the global militant 
jihad, represent one of the concrete achievements of the organization and are likely to serve it in 
the future. 
The removal of Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq did not hurt al-Qaeda, as it had 
viewed him as one of the heretical Muslim leaders who do not lead their lives according to the 
laws of Islam. However, the rise of the Shiites to the top of the Iraqi regime and their cooperation 
with the United States and its allies turned the Shia into a legitimate target of attacks. Many Iraqi 
citizens, particularly those who joined the new regime and the security and police forces, were 
also placed on al-Qaeda‘s enemy list in Iraq and many acts of terrorism targeted them. 
Al-Qaeda operatives‘ 
murderous activities and 
provocative conduct in Iraq 
against the local population 
have angered many Iraqi 
citizens. Thus starting at the 
end of 2005 (Pitman, 2007), a 
rift gradually occurred between 
al-Qaeda operatives in Iraq and 
the heads of the Sunni tribes 
there who, until then, 
cooperated with them. The 
revolt of these Sunni tribal 
leaders - dubbed ―the revival of 
the Anbar movement‖ that was 
supported and funded by the 
U.S. and coalition forces and 
were strengthened by the surge (Semple, 2007) and aided by Iraqi security forces - bore fruit and 
helped to weaken al-Qaeda. The year 2007 symbolized a further and more advanced stage of al-
Qaeda‘s weakened capabilities in Iraq. Based on assessments submitted in 2008 by senior 
American officers and administration personnel, a guarded analysis suggests that the 
organization is on the brink of collapse in most parts of Iraq (Samuels, 2008). 
Another sign of the organization‘s weakness and the blow rendered to its operatives is the 
rise in 2008 of al-Qaeda‘s use of female suicide bombers, the highest in comparison with 
previous years (Figure 2). Such a step usually attests to operational difficulties in organizations 
dispatching suicide missions. In addition, al-Qaeda‘s declaration of the establishment of Islamic 
Caliphate in Iraq in 2005, supported by the AQC, has remained an empty slogan, in part because 
of the organization‘s current distress. 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the FATA Border Region 
In recent years, al-Qaeda has strengthened its hold on the FATA ―no man‘s land‖ and 
enhanced its infrastructure there. The area is formally under Pakistani sovereignty, but functions 
largely as an ex-territorial autonomous region with the central government in Islamabad wielding 
no authority over it, both because of its topography and its unique ethnic composition. The 
evidence thus far points to the fact that this is the area where Bin Laden and most of the senior 
al-Qaeda operatives are in hiding, along with members of the former Taliban regime who fled 
Figure 2. Female Suicide Bombers in Iraq, 2000-2008 
(INSS) 
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there in late 2001. This region serves as a base for the planning of the joint activities of al-Qaeda 
and the Afghani and Pakistani Taliban (NEFA Foundation, 2008). Since this is presumably the 
al-Qaeda and Taliban stronghold, the past year saw clashes between Pakistani military forces and 
Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters. Furthermore, since the prevailing opinion was that Pakistan has 
not taken sufficient steps against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, the U.S. has carried out aerial attacks 
there (Pickler, 2007). 
Over the 
last two years, the 
relationship 
between al-Qaeda 
and the Afghani 
and Pakistani 
Taliban has grown 
much closer, to 
the extent of 
establishment of 
joint war rooms, 
joint planning and 
participation in 
raids, and joint 
fighting against 
Pakistani regular 
forces (NEFA 
Foundation, 2008). The most obvious manifestation of al-Qaeda‘s influence on the activities of 
the Afghani and Pakistani Taliban was the upgrading, in both number and intensity, of the 
terrorist attacks perpetrated by these elements within Afghani and Pakistani cities. The two 
Taliban organizations added suicide bombing to their repertoire and made it a primary combat 
tactic. This was particularly obvious in Afghanistan which, until recent years, did not suffer from 
this type of activity, not even during the ten years of warfare against the Soviet military (1979-
89), the subsequent civil war that raged until the Taliban took charge, or during the years of 
Taliban rule. Starting in 2005, with al-Qaeda‘s assistance and encouragement, Afghanistan was 
flooded by a wave of dozens of suicide bombings (Figure 3) in some cases due to the direct 
involvement of senior al-Qaeda personnel (Warrick, 2009). The total of 249 suicide bombings in 
Afghanistan over the past three years is an extraordinarily high number, relative to other arenas 
in the Middle East and around the world, with only Iraq in the same league. Most of the suicide 
bombers, young Pakistanis recruited at madrassas, are joined by a small number of foreign 
volunteers dispatched by the Taliban, with al-Qaeda‘s fingerprints all over this activity 
(UNAMA, 2007). 
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Figure 1. Suicide Bombings in Afghanistan 2000-2008 (INSS) 
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Likewise, Pakistan, which 
in the past experienced only 
a small number of sporadic 
suicide bombings within its 
borders, has over the last 
two years seen a sharp 
increase in the number of 
suicide attacks carried out 
under the influence of the 
association between al-
Qaeda and the Pakistani 
Taliban (Figure 4). Al-
Qaeda has been directly 
linked – and took public 
credit – for the suicide 
attack that took place at the 
Danish embassy in Islamabad on June 2, 2008 in which eight people were killed and twenty-
seven injured (CNN, 2008). Al-Qaeda had specifically threatened Denmark, in response to a 
cartoon in a Danish newspaper that the organization deemed an insult to Islam and an offensive 
portrayal of the prophet Muhammad (AP, 2008). Furthermore, al-Qaeda, led by the head of the 
organization‘s operational division in Pakistan, Osama al-Kini (Schmidtt, 2009) staged a brazen 
attack at the Marriott Hotel, which killed 54 including five foreigners – among them the Czech 
Ambassador – and injured 266 (BBC, 2008). 
Al-Qaeda Influence on Terrorism in Other Arenas 
Al-Qaeda has invested significant efforts in uniting the various militant jihad movements 
under a single umbrella organization. This was meant to close ranks among the militant Islamic 
organizations that identify with the idea of global militant jihad so as to be better able to plan and 
coordinate their activities and promote their joint agenda. This unification trend is not new, with 
precedents in 1998 when the organization started to launch independent suicide bombings. That 
same year, al-Qaeda launched the umbrella organization called the International Front for Jihad 
against the Crusaders and the Jews and, in June 2001, the formal unification between al-Qaeda 
and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, commanded by Ayman Zawahari, was made public, and Qaedat 
al-Jihad was founded. 
In recent years, al-Qaeda has also established relationships with other umbrella 
organizations, in particular with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which includes operatives 
from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania, and, of course, al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia (al-Qaeda 
in Iraq), which includes Iraqi, Kurdish, and Jordanian operatives as well as volunteers from other 
Muslim countries. By virtue of these alliances, and through their ties with al-Qaeda, their 
reciprocal relationships (Lav, 2007), these organizations have upgraded their level of operational 
activity. This has expanded their scope of activity and the inclusion of strategic, political, and 
financial targets for attack, such as political leaders, energy targets, infrastructures and tourist 
areas, international and foreign military forces, with, of course, suicide bombing – al-Qaeda‘s 
trademark – as the preferred method. 
Figure 4. Suicide Bombings in Pakistan, 2000-2008 
(INSS) 
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While al-Qaeda‘s activity in Iraq since the 2003 war is well known, its activity in the 
Islamic Maghreb has aroused growing interest in recent years because of the rise in volume and 
quality of operations. Its major, though not exclusive, locus of activity has been Algeria. Since 
the organization announced in January 2007 the unification between it and al-Qaeda (Aljazeera, 
2007), it has upgraded the level of its targets to the most senior echelon of the Algerian regime 
(the president and prime minister) and the country‘s institutions (the Supreme Court). 
Furthermore, it has extended its activity against foreign and UN targets (NCIC, 2008). After the 
unification, the organization started to stage suicide attacks along the al-Qaeda model. Al-Qaeda 
had similar influence on the Moroccan branch of the umbrella organization and it, too, has 
intensified its activity in recent years, with several attempts at suicide bombings against targets 
in the Moroccan regime and security establishment as well as activity against foreigners (BBC, 
2007, April 14).
1
 Some were successfully executed and some were foiled (BBC, 2007, April 
11).
2
 Additional terrorist activity was carried out by the umbrella organization in Tunisia (the 
hostage taking of Austrian tourists) and Mauritania (a shooting attack against the Israeli embassy 
in Nouakchott). 
Another al-Qaeda theater has been the Arabian Peninsula (Al Saheil, 2008). In Saudi 
Arabia, authorities succeeded in foiling terrorist activities of the local branch of al-Qaeda by 
arresting many members of the organization and by launching an aggressive counter-propaganda 
and reeducation campaign within areas supporting al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Further 
south, the activity this year of the Islamic Jihad in Yemen (IJY) stood out in particular. Even 
though this organization is not under the direct command of al-Qaeda, it did adopt al-Qaeda‘s 
agenda, especially after 2007 when Bin Laden‘s former secretary became its leader (Ulph, 
2005).
3
 Along with attacks against senior governmental targets in Yemen, the organization 
staged a dramatic suicide attack against the American embassy in Sana‘a in September 2008, 
killing nineteen (Worth, 2008). In his annual security estimate, the head of the CIA noted that 
global militant jihad organizations are growing stronger in both Yemen and Saudi Arabia 
(Mazetti, 2008). 
Africa, too, is an important arena of activity for al-Qaeda and the organization, as it is 
wont to do, is nurturing its prior connections with local organizations and past operatives to help 
carry out attacks in Kenya, Tanzania, and Somalia. The breakdown of the central government in 
Somalia has encouraged the growth of local militant jihad organizations, some of which have 
carried out suicide bombings against institutional targets including the presidential palace and 
foreign targets such as the Ethiopian embassy and UN offices in which 28 people were killed 
including a senior in the Somaliland (Somalia‘s northern provinces) government and UN 
personnel (Edmund, 2008). 
                                                 
1
 On April 14, 2007, two suicide terrorists tried to enter the American Embassy. When a policeman 
stationed at the entrance refused to let them enter, they blew themselves up. Both terrorists were killed, 
and one woman was injured in the attack.  
2
 There was a string of attacks in March-April 2007. Two terrorists blew themselves up at an internet café 
on 11 March 2007. According to the Moroccan Ministry of the Interior, during one of the arrests on April 
10, four terrorists detonated their explosive belts and killed themselves and one of the policemen. 
Moroccan sources reported that the suicides belonged to a cell headed by the terrorist who blew himself 
up at the internet café in March.  
3
 The current head of the organization is Omad Masir al-Waha‘ayshi, known by his alias abu-Huriya al-
Tzanani, who escaped from jail in Yemen in February 2006.  
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The Islamic Jihad in Uzbekistan (IJU) is another organization to whom al-Qaeda has 
grown closer and that has accordingly refined its activity to match the agenda of global militant 
jihad. This organization broke away from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) because 
of internal differences as to whether to focus on the Islamic agenda in Uzbekistan or to dedicate 
itself to global Islamic activity and, in recent years, has operated in the FATA region alongside 
Taliban and al-Qaeda forces (Sandee, 2008). Its operatives have participated in attacks in 
Uzbekistan, Germany, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. For example, the Afghanistan attack, which 
occurred on March 3, 2008 in the Sabari district in the eastern Afghan province of Khost, was 
committed by a German citizen of Turkish descent who carried out a suicide bombing against 
American soldiers (Gebias, Musharbash, & Stark, 2008). Also, a dramatic attack against 
American targets in Germany, including a military base and a club frequented by American 
soldiers, was foiled (Whitlock, 2007). The attack was supposed to be carried out by a terrorist 
network recruited, trained, and operated from afar by the organization. In Europe, security forces 
still view terrorist networks directed by al-Qaeda and global militant jihadists as an acute threat 
after the exposure in 2008 of a number of terrorist networks in Belgium, Spain, Germany, and 
Turkey (Yusuf, 2008). 
Al Qaeda, Global Militant Jihad, and Israel 
Loci of Threats against Israel 
It is difficult to assess how the horrific photographs from Operation Cast Lead, Israel's 
2008-09 Gaza incursion, together with the venomous anti-Israeli commentary broadcast via 
propaganda networks, especially Arab and Muslim media, might affect the decision of al-Qaeda 
leaders, some of whom also joined in these attacks (Reuters, 2009), to translate this propaganda 
into action and try to extract revenge from Israelis and Jews. It is possible that al-Qaeda, or its 
affiliates, might decide to take advantage of the anti-Israel atmosphere to attack targets identified 
with Israel as well as earn propaganda points sure to accrue from such actions and in order to 
refute claims against them that they are doing nothing to assist the Palestinians other than 
provide verbal support. Kidnapping of Israelis by factions identified with global militant jihad, a 
threat that skyrocketed in the past year (Shapira, 2008), continues to represent a steady threat 
because of militant jihadists‘ desire to demonstrate their willingness to assist the Palestinians and 
because of their understanding that such actions would touch a particularly sensitive nerve in 
Israeli society. 
Al-Qaeda Seeks to Encroach on Israel 
It seems that through its regional affiliates, al-Qaeda has intensified its efforts to 
penetrate Israel‘s borders in order to inflict harm on Israeli citizens. It has also tried to attack 
Israelis visiting Arab countries that have diplomatic relations with Israel (Schweitzer, 2007). A 
few years ago, a number of attacks against Israeli tourists, attributed to global militant jihadists, 
were carried out in Jordan and Egypt and especially in Sinai. 
Previous rockets firings in the past from Jordan and Lebanon towards Israel should be 
seen in this context. Lebanon continues to be the arena for global militant jihadists involved in 
rocket attacks against Israel. In 2008 too, a number of rockets were fired towards northern Israel 
from Lebanon; the launches were attributed to the al-Ansar Divisions, which identifies itself with 
the global militant jihad (Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2009). Also during the 
IDF operation in the Gaza Strip (December 27, 2008 – January 17, 2009), a number of rockets 
were fired from southern Lebanon towards northern Israel while others were discovered before 
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being launched (Intelligence and Terrorism, 2009). At this stage, it is not clear if the attackers 
were global militant jihadists, but the threat of continued rocket fire towards Israel remains. 
Interestingly, Bin Laden, who views Lebanon as a convenient springboard to harm Israel, has 
violently condemned Hizbollah and Iran, calling them allies in a American-Israeli plot in 
planning the Second Lebanon War. The purpose of this war, according to bin Laden, was 
ostensibly to prevent al-Qaeda and its affiliates from approaching Israel from Lebanon‘s 
southern border by means of the subsequent ceasefire agreement formulated in UN Security 
Council Resolution 1701 (NEFA Foundation, 2009). While his notion of a fourfold plot sounds 
surreal, it reflects his frustration with al Qaeda‘s affiliates‘ limitations in attacking Israel from 
Lebanon and, at the same time, clearly expresses his intentions. Another arena for locals 
identified with the global militant jihad stream is the Gaza Strip, where there are a number of 
groups such as the Army of Islam (relying mostly on members of the Dughmoush clan), the 
Sword of Islam, and the Army of the Believers – al-Qaeda in Palestine. These groups, whose size 
is unknown or estimated to consist of a few dozen operatives at most, engage in sporadic terrorist 
activity. In addition to firing Qassam rockets, these activities include kidnapping foreign citizens, 
burning schools, harassing internet cafés, and acting as morality police (Kershner, 2007).  
Al-Qaeda's hope that Hamas‘ June 2007 takeover of the Gaza Strip would allow its own 
supporters more convenient access to engage in anti-Israel activity was not fulfilled. Because of 
its desire to be the sole ruler of the Gaza Strip, Hamas has prevented groups in the Strip 
identified with the global militant jihad to act against Israel autonomously and without its 
permission out of concern that such a situation might embroil it with Israel at a disadvantageous 
time and place. Speaking to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, the head of 
Israeli intelligence said that while Hamas has enabled al-Qaeda operatives from abroad to enter 
the Gaza Strip (Meranda, 2008) and has even allowed groups identified with it to shoot rockets 
towards Israel from time to time, whenever any of them has challenged its authority, Hamas has 
not hesitated to use brutal force to suppress the challenge, as happened with the Dughmoush clan 
(Intelligence and Terrorism Information, 2008).  
In the past year, attempts to band together into cells to carry out attacks were exposed in 
the West Bank region and among Israeli Arabs of Bedouin descent identified with global militant 
jihad, but these were foiled in time (Fied, 2008; Harel, Azulai, & Schtern, 2008). The difficulties 
al-Qaeda has in operating against Israel across Israel‘s borders stems from the fact that Israel‘s 
neighbors, foremost Egypt and Jordan, who are also fighting the growing threat of global militant 
jihad against their own regimes and within their sovereign territories, are acting decisively to 
stop al-Qaeda activity and to protect their citizens and the tourists visiting their countries. Syria 
and Lebanon are likewise engaged aggressively in attempts to foil global militant jihadist 
intentions to operate against Israel within their own territory and areas they control, out of a 
concern of entering into confrontations with Israel. Even Hamas acts aggressively in the same 
spirit, and it seems that it will continue this policy in the future, unless circumstances radically 
change. 
The Threat to Israel from Global Militant Jihadists from across Its Own Borders. This 
threat is ongoing but is not expected to become more severe unless there are significant changes 
in Israel‘s relations with its neighbors because of the mutual interest of Israel and its neighbors to 
avoid embroilments between them. 
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Egypt and Israel see eye-to-eye on the question of the danger posed by the strengthening 
of global militant jihadists in Egyptian territory and particularly in the Sinai region. Sinai is not 
well controlled by Egypt and, therefore, the region is prone to trouble. Nonetheless, recently the 
region has become the focus of more attention on the part of the Egyptian security services and 
greater vigilance on the part of Israeli intelligence and security services, which repeatedly issue 
warnings to Israeli citizens to avoid visiting recreational sites in Sinai. 
Jordan and Israel also share a common interest in preventing any global militant jihadist 
activity within the kingdom and from Jordan against Israel, and cooperate closely in order to foil 
any such eventuality. 
In Lebanon, there is a danger of escalation by global militant jihadists who have 
intensified their activities in both northern and southern Lebanon and who, from time to time, 
even launch rockets towards Israel. The ability of the Lebanese military to stop their activities 
will determine the level of threat that these represent for Israel. Paradoxically, Hizbollah shares 
Israel's interest in preventing the strengthening of global militant jihadists in Lebanon and having 
them engage in activity against Israel, especially if this is liable to lead to an armed conflict with 
Israel, which is not to Hizbollah‘s advantage. 
Syria, too, does not allow global militant jihadists to operate against Israel from its 
territory, first because Syria does not allow any element to operate from within its borders 
against Israel lest this embroil Syria in a confrontation, and second because it views the militant 
jihadists as a threat to Syria‘s own regime. In the course of 2008, Islamists carried out a number 
of severe terrorist attacks against the Syrian regime. Nonetheless, the Syrian regime enabled 
global militant jihadists to use its territory as a passageway to the fighting in Iraq and, therefore, 
particular alertness on Israel‘s part is required lest these elements attempt to operate against it, 
against Syria‘s wishes. Should political contacts between Syria and Israel progress over the next 
few years, it becomes virtually certain that these factions will launch attacks, hoping to provoke 
the sort of reaction from Israel that would completely destabilize talks with Syria.  
Despite the hostility and violent clashes between Hamas and Israel, Hamas‘ primary 
interest is presumably in preventing independent activity against Israel on the part of al-Qaeda 
and global militant jihadists operating in the Gaza Strip that is outside Hamas‘ own control. This 
interest outweighs Hamas‘ desire to harm Israel and, therefore, unless Hamas-Israel relations 
suffer a steep deterioration, global militant jihadist organization in the Gaza Strip, and certainly 
al-Qaeda itself, will not be granted a free hand in operating against Israel from there. 
The Threat of a Showcase Terrorist Attack on Israeli Territory. Despite the limitations 
regarding the possibility of al-Qaeda or its affiliates staging a dramatic attack on Israeli 
sovereign territory, it is clear that such an operation continues to represent a desirable goal on 
their part. Their ability to realize such intentions depends largely on their ability to receive 
internal assistance, (e.g., from Israeli Arabs, Palestinians entering Israel as laborers or as illegal 
residents), or as has already happened in the past, through foreign citizens (Schiff, 2006). To 
date, Israel‘s security services have succeeded in foiling these intentions but, obviously, there is 
clear and present danger. In recent years, the initiative to act against Israel has come primarily 
from local Palestinians, and their contacts were mainly in the junior ranks of global militant 
jihadists and not with al-Qaeda itself. Should this relationship develop, especially with al-
Qaeda‘s mechanism dedicated to staging attacks abroad, the threat level will, of course, rise.  
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Conclusion 
Loci of Global Threats 
From the vantage point of late 2008, it is clear that despite the ongoing efforts of the 
international coalition against terrorism to overcome al-Qaeda and its affiliates, these are still far 
from conceding defeat and may be expected to be the primary threat in terms of international 
terrorist activity in the years to come. The main threat from terrorist organizations such as al-
Qaeda and its affiliates stems from their desire to affect the entire system of international 
relations and to undermine the current world order. To do so, they do not hesitate in carrying out 
mass terrorist attacks of a level unknown in the past against anyone opposed to their worldview 
and chosen path. 
There are a number of critical threat areas with long-term significance from al-Qaeda and 
their cohorts in the coming years: 
Intensified Activity in Uncontrolled Areas in Fragile States. Al-Qaeda and global 
militant jihadists are particularly active in places where there are Muslim populations and the 
central government lacks full control and effective enforcement capabilities. Al-Qaeda takes 
advantage of this situation to foment trouble among the local populace and to recruit volunteers 
into their ranks. It thus appears that in the coming years the central arena of struggle of al-Qaeda 
and its Taliban partners will likely be in the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Al-
Qaeda is preparing for the intensification of the expected war against it and its Taliban associates 
on the part of NATO forces, the United States military, and Pakistani forces, as reflected in the 
declarations of senior American officials in the new administration and in the decision to send 
thousands more American soldiers into the region (Spillius, 2008; Scott, 2008). Al-Qaeda is also 
expected to contribute to the ongoing spate of suicide bombings in Afghanistan and Pakistan in 
order to undermine the stability of the ruling regimes of these countries.  
Activity to Undermine the Regimes of Central Muslim States, Primarily Pakistan – a 
Nuclear Weapons State. A primary threat coming from al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, and the border area is that the security situation in Pakistan and its surroundings 
may deteriorate and ultimately result in the rise to power of radical Islamic elements instead of 
the current president, Zardari. Such a scenario is liable to allow radical elements access to the 
country‘s arsenal of nuclear weapons. 
Absorbing New Cadres and Sending Them to the West. Al-Qaeda can be expected to 
assimilate into its ranks new volunteers from all over the world and, in particular, fighters who 
are veterans of the war in Iraq in order to insert them into areas of conflict involving Muslims. At 
the same time, it will likely train the most suitable new recruits to operate under the cover of 
their foreign citizenships, European or other, to carry out terrorist attacks abroad, whether under 
the command of al-Qaeda‘s dedicated terrorist mechanism abroad or as part of independent 
global militant jihad terrorist networks (Sandee, 2009). 
Efforts to Carry out Showcase, Mass-Casualty Attacks in a Western Country. An attack 
on that order of magnitude would again place al-Qaeda on the map of international terrorism and 
serve as model for its affiliates. Al-Qaeda‘s success in carrying out a dramatic large-scale 
terrorist attack in the near future is largely dependent on its ability to rehabilitate its special 
division for terrorist attacks abroad. This group was heavily damaged in recent years by the 
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assassinations and arrests of many of its senior commanders and most experienced veteran 
operatives. It would seem that al-Qaeda is not going to relinquish the notion of staging such 
attacks, despite the constraints and pressures applied to it, in order to continue fulfilling its 
vanguard role. It largely depends on the creation of the suitable operational conditions in one of 
the arenas where the organization is active. In its annual security estimate, the CIA estimated that 
al-Qaeda was preparing for a dramatic, spectacular attack (Warrick, 2008). 
Continued Efforts to Undermine the Stability of the ―Heretical‖ Regimes in Middle 
Eastern Countries to Replace Them with Muslim Regimes Ruled by Islamic Law. On the basis 
of the ―Zawahiri doctrine,‖ al-Qaeda is expected to continue assisting terrorist acts of global 
militant jihadists against the leaders of regimes and central government institutions in the Middle 
East as well as Africa in order to replace them with regimes that uphold Islamic ritual law. 
Attaining the rule of one or more primary Muslim countries in order to establish an Islamic 
regime is one of the cornerstones of Zawahiri‘s philosophy expressed in his book, Knights 
Serving Under the Flag of the Prophet. Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and North African countries 
have all been potential candidates. 
Al-Qaeda and its Salafi-jihadist militant affiliates will, in the foreseeable future, continue 
to present multiple threats, on multiple fronts, to the west, its allies, and to prospects of a more 
moderate global order. Of all the threats they present, none is more pressing for most nations in 
the world, and for members of all religions numbered among Al-Qaeda's multiplying enemies, 
than terrorism that could inflict a catastrophe on the human race: unconventional, and, especially, 
nuclear terrorism. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, then, must be met with a general mobilization of 
forces that are determined to curb and defeat it. Victory in this struggle is more important to the 
world's safety today than ever in the past.  
back to top 
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Terrorism as a Totalitarian Political Tactic 
After the attacks on the Pentagon, the World Trade Center, and the attempted attack on 
Washington, DC on September 11, 2001, the world scrambled to discover what makes a believer 
into a terrorist.  
The first theory is that extremists are poor, uneducated, and easily led. But Mohammed 
Atta, the ringleader of the attacks, was wealthy and studied architecture at two leading 
universities. Bilal Abdulla, who was convicted of conspiracy to murder for failed car bomb 
attacks in Scotland and London in December 2008, is a physician. The next theory is that 
terrorists are marginalized citizens of oppressed cultures. But David Copeland, who planted 
bombs in three areas of London in hopes of starting a race war, is white. Michael McKevitt, the 
leader of the Real IRA who was convicted of directing terrorism, lived a solid middle-class life. 
A few suggested that religion drives the devout to extremism, but Eric Rudolph, who bombed the 
Centennial Olympic Park, two abortion clinics, and a bar, killing two people and injured at least 
150 others between 1996 and 1998, is a Roman Catholic, a faith that expressly prohibits the use 
of violence against the innocent - as does Islam. 
The more we look at terrorists, the more we have to agree that what unites them are their 
tactics, not their beliefs. Their beliefs, ideological, religious, and social, drive them, but that 
cannot be what creates terrorists. Though I am certain that ideology fans the flames – nobody 
would fly a plane into an office building unless he subscribed to a logically contorted ideology 
that made the sacrifice worth it – I think ideology does not create extremists, it supports them. I 
think terrorism is born out of cultures of dominance and the struggle between the haves and the 
have nots. Terrorists use terror as a means of domination, which their cultures require. When 
their domination is threatened by the encroachment of other powerful cultures, they inflict 
violence on civilians as a tactic to maintain power – terrorism sends a message of dominance to 
the victims as well as the terrorists‘ own people.  
Such dominance almost guarantees poverty and necessitates a dictatorial ideology in the 
terrorists‘ culture, though I do not believe poverty and ideology cause radicalism. The Taliban‘s 
Afghanistan, Hamas‘ Palestine, and Omar al-Bashir‘s Sudan are poor, but so are many other 
countries. They have strong ideologies, but so do many other peoples. The difference between 
these terrorist hothouses and other places is that the cultures are totalitarian and believe their 
power structures to be threatened. So it is a mistake to think poverty, ideology, and religion 
cause people to radicalize -- those are not causes, they are tools used by exploitative 
governments -- just as it is a mistake to think that terrorism is new, foreign, or rare. 
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In every culture, including our own, those with power dominate those without. That is 
humanity. But in many cases, such as Afghanistan, when under the control of the Taliban, a very 
few dominated the vast majority completely and choked off any hope of future freedom while 
constructing belief systems positing that it is wrong to want freedom at all. The difference 
between a believer and a radical is the difference between the willingness to die for a belief and 
the willingness to kill for it, and the latter are not free to decide the morality of such an act. In 
free democracies like ours, we teach our young that to die for a belief is a sacrifice borne of 
honor and courage. In cultures where extremist ideology serves the power structure, they teach 
their young that to kill innocents is a right and a necessity. The men of our first army, 
Washington‘s Army in the Revolutionary War, were willing to die for their belief in freedom, 
though it was something many of them had never really witnessed -- some of those soldiers were 
slaves and some of them were indentured servants, but they saw they had the opportunity for 
freedom. They were willing to die for their belief, but they were not willing to plant bombs in 
Parliament for it. The theory of freedom as written in our Declaration of Independence made 
such an act ideologically inconsistent. Extremists believe the opposite. 
So, though their religions may celebrate peace, the powerful elite twist those religions 
into an ideology that requires violence to support the governing structures. And the people most 
likely to be harmed by such cultures of dominance, in my experience, are the weakest members 
of the cultures themselves. In my 37 years in the United States Army, stationed all over the 
world, I have seen that wherever there are large portions of the population that live hand to 
mouth, live an indigent life - from Rwanda to Ireland to New Orleans - there is more abuse of, 
and less value to, people's lives than in democracies in which people have educational 
opportunities, the right to own property, and can take care of their families.  
In my opinion, that is why Muslim radicals, who are by no means the majority of 
Muslims, are so threatened by Western culture. It is not because of what they see on TV, that we 
are permissive, selfish, colonialist, or immoral, though they do believe that and such is the 
danger of globalization. Radicals are threatened because the West‘s economic and military 
power is a threat to their dominance, and our constitutional freedom from subordination is 
attractive to their people. Extremists are even more disturbed by the encroachment of competing 
cultures into their own territory – there is no strategic reason to bomb co-religionists, who are 
their natural supporters, other than to maintain dominance. The challenge to their dominance is 
great enough that radicals feel the only way to defend or expand their hegemony is to scare 
ordinary people via civilian violence. Such violence maintains their sphere of influence and 
signals their power and intent to keep it. But it is also an invitation. 
The message is clearly that those who transgress against the dominant are in danger. But 
the subtext is that those who join the power structure will become powerful (and according to the 
ideology, morally scrupulous) themselves. That is an attractive proposition to those who have 
little or nothing, including a future.  
And therein lies a leverage point. Those opposed to civilian violence cannot win over 
dominant cultures with competing religious theories or ideologies -- extremists use religions and 
ideology as motivators, and offering more ―attractive‖ ones supports the dominator‘s rationale 
that they are being culturally colonized. The answer to radicalism is political, and the operating 
principle is opportunity. I very strongly believe, as The Gallup World Poll has found in surveys 
in 162 countries, that what people, all people in every society, want is security and the ability to 
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care for their families. That is true everywhere on earth. The single greatest human motivator is 
the need for safety and the need to feed your children. When people can do that, and when they 
have the opportunity for freedom, education, health, and the ownership of property, they are 
much more difficult to exploit. When people have jobs and a safe neighborhood, they are not 
such easy picking for extremist recruiters and they are less willing to accede to dominators. 
Essentially, make it harder to exploit the weak, and you undermine dominance. Undermine 
dominance, and you choke radicalization at the root. If you attempt this overtly or 
confrontationally, however, you entrench the opposition. 
Take, for example, modern military operations in civilian territories. Military operations 
are meant to achieve a political outcome. It is more difficult to achieve that outcome when the 
enemy is camouflaged by the civilian population. As in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, or anywhere 
a military is fighting guerillas or terrorists, soldiers must sort out the terrorists from the civilians. 
The only way to do that is to make civilians tell you who the enemy is and is not. That requires 
human intelligence. Our biggest mistakes in attacking targets have come from basing too much 
on technical intelligence. A precision weapon is not so precise when it kills 10 or 15 civilians. 
Our targets know that. And they know that they may die that night, but so will 15 or 20 kids. 
They know this is going to further their cause and weaken the position of those who seek to kill 
them. When we were first hunting Osama bin Laden in the late 1990s, he hid out in the desert in 
tents, and then he went to caves, but we generally believe now that if he is alive, he is inside the 
population some place. He knows that if he is close to civilian targets, the probability of us using 
a massive air strike to try to kill him is diminished. On the other hand, trying to kill him in a tent 
in the middle of the desert was pretty difficult with a weapon fired from 2,000 miles away.  
The only way to sort out enemies from civilians - and we must, because that is the 
difference between us and extremists - is for locals to differentiate them. There are two ways to 
do that. One is to appeal to greed and pay informers. Greed can be a very powerful human 
motivator. And if we find bin Laden it will probably be because somebody pointed him out for 
the cash. Appealing to greed is limited, though, because it only works as long as the money lasts, 
and if the source is scared enough of the radicals, there may not ever be enough money. The 
other, more sustainable solution is to make the locals safer and more able to care for their 
families. What makes some resist the psychological domination of extremists can be as simple as 
running water. Food. Electricity. Security. If you can provide basic needs, your political aim 
becomes more attractive than the ideology of the radicals. That is exactly why the U.S. military 
are building roads in Afghanistan. And that is exactly why the Taliban is blowing them up as fast 
as they are built. But we keep building them because we know that roads will change the culture 
of a country that imports flour and exports wheat and that exports tomatoes and imports tomato 
paste. Building new roads and similar activities, I think, explains some of the success we have 
achieved in Iraq. In the latter parts of the war, we spent a lot of time and resources providing the 
basic necessities of life and we earned the confidence of the people. Those people, in turn, are 
the ones who helped point out the terrorists. And then we gave those subordinates the means to 
protect themselves, which was their awakening. We empowered the tribes and the tribes took 
back the streets. Success in this area was limited by al Qaeda -- as long as al-Qaeda has free rein, 
our military intervention cannot secure the society. But it is better than it was a year ago, it is 
certainly better than it was two years ago, and is a far cry from what it was three years ago. 
But no military can provide necessities forever without becoming colonizers -- and it may 
be important to note that many of today‘s terrorists grew up in societies that have only recently 
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shaken off outside colonization: Iraq and Afghanistan have been conquered and reconquered 
since the time of Alexander the Great. The importation of Scottish Protestants into Northern 
Ireland starting in 1609 was part of King James I‘s attempt to colonize the country, resulting in 
hundreds of years of terrorist reprisals. Racists like Copeland and Rudolph are members of 
cultures that, until very recently, legally subjugated masses of their citizenry. So colonization, 
actual or ideological, is a danger to be consciously avoided. A soldier‘s mandate is security, to 
allow a government to create an environment in which people can take care of their families. I 
think that should be the limit of a military objective and it should be tied to a political objective. 
The aim is not to change the people; it is to get them to a point where they can make their own 
decisions. Sometimes that backfires on us. As Churchill said, democracy is the worst form of 
government, except all the other ones that have been tried. There are people in Iraq who say life 
is better without Saddam, and there are young radicals who say they are being occupied. 
Americans have never accepted foreign armies occupying our land and we cannot expect others 
to feel differently, though one may note how little those radicals remember that Saddam 
Hussein‘s regime killed thousands of them annually and that he settled differences by sending a 
regiment of the Republican Guard to cities that offended him to kill everyone in it.  
I believe opportunity works. And that is the key. I believe that people will be less 
amenable to violent ideologies, and less vulnerable to dictators, if they have the tools – 
education, healthcare, jobs - that let them control their own futures, to secure their own 
environment. As the society becomes more sophisticated, more educated, and more of its human 
capital is developed, the people of that society will perceive their unalienable right is to live the 
way they want and to live without the threat of civilian violence. To use Afghanistan as an 
example again, in April 2009, 300 Afghan women marched in protest against a law that would 
have legalized, among other things, marital rape. They were surrounded by three times as many 
men screaming abuse and throwing rocks. But the women marched two miles to the parliament 
building and demanded their rights as human beings. That is the sign of a dominant culture being 
sapped by its own subordinate class. And that is just it - outsiders cannot eradicate the cultures 
that lead to radicalization - only insiders can. But to get to those insiders, we must do three 
things:  respect the culture, communicate, and ameliorate unintended consequences. 
No one, no one, can be forced into a different culture, no matter how much better we say 
it is, especially extremists. They do not want their beliefs challenged; they want dominance. But 
more importantly, even the men making bombs in caves want to feed their kids. They want their 
nephews to go to school. They want their nieces to be able to play outside without setting off 
bombs. They want safety, the amenities of a decent life, and a future. And they know that if they 
can provide those things to their people, they will obtain true power. And we know that as more 
of the people are exposed to a better way of life, the reasonable people will move toward it and 
away from extremist ideologies. However, when we pressure people to exchange their culture for 
another, we justify their suspicions of our motives, force them to defend their beliefs, and 
undermine our own objectives. After the Afghan women‘s protest, one of the senior clerics of the 
madrassa that wrote that law said, ―We Afghans don‘t want a bunch of NATO commanders and 
foreign ministers telling us what to do.‖ That is true of every society, but we must remember that 
cultures that accept civilian violence react violently to outside pressure.  
So, when dealing with individuals in radicalizing environments, you have got to 
understand and appreciate the culture and work within it. To do that, you have to communicate. 
If you cannot communicate, you get the total opposite effect of what you wanted. In the military, 
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if we are not happy with how the troops are responding, some sergeant will get out front, yell at 
the troops, use a few profanities, and the troops buck up and move on. In some cultures, if you 
raise your voice to a village chief, you may engender the anger of the entire village because you 
showed a lack of respect. And it goes without saying that fluency in local languages is essential. 
We need the respect and assistance of everyone in an environment that permits civilian violence 
and we cannot get it if we cannot talk to them. Communication is the first step toward 
cooperation. Cooperation reduces our need to react violently, it furthers our political aims, and it 
reduces the potential of unintended consequences. And those can be very, very serious. 
Soldiers very rarely find themselves in situations in which they can control every 
eventuality. And now, everything the soldier does can be on CNN by dinnertime. That is how 
tactical actions become strategic issues. The terrorists were delighted by the photos from Abu 
Ghraib: because they did not realize how appalled Americans were by the treatment of the Abu 
Ghraib prisoners, the Iraqi people could easily believe that such is how Americans think about 
people of Islamic faith. The lack of respect shown by seven soldiers to a handful of prisoners 
became an effective recruitment tool for the terrorists. An American, Nick Berg, who went to 
Iraq to fix TV antennas, was beheaded in retaliation. And a small-scale tactical action became a 
strategic problem for an entire administration, the U.S. military, as well as us as a nation.  
That is why we cannot force change – it is disrespectful and counterproductive. We can 
only offer opportunities. In poor countries with a dominating culture, very few people feel secure 
or are able to take care of their families adequately. Give them the opportunity to do that and 
they will not feel forced to defend their ideology to themselves. Help them develop their own 
human capital, and they will have the power to confront their own dictators. I saw it happen 
when I was the Commanding General, 2nd Infantry Division in South Korea, where an 
oppressive military regime gave way to a solid capitalist democracy. South Koreans now have a 
strong working class of artisans, people who can build things and make things, and such a 
reverence for education that every child gets a chance to go to school. Poor kids still have to 
work harder to lift themselves up, but a South Korean can change his or her circumstances, much 
like an American can, through education. That could happen in Afghanistan, though the odds are 
against it.  
South Korea changed relatively quickly – most of the time, sustainable change takes the 
art of patience. It is hard. It is slow. It is frustrating and it does not always work. But it is the 
most reliable path to deradicalization we have seen and we are already seeing it work.  
And it works in solid democracies such as our own. Eric Rudolph is living proof that 
cultures of domination can be found in the United States too. To eradicate them, we have to use 
the same methods that work overseas: understand the culture first -- kids in America do not join 
gangs for the job experience, they do it because they find in gangs the social and economic 
support they are not getting at home. Support the systems of opportunity -- invest in Railroad 
Street as much as we do Wall Street and Main Street. Do not let the dominant exploit the weak 
because soon, they will come after everybody else. As we have seen.  
Again, it is not easy or fast, and it will be frustrating. But we need to be persistent and 
patient -- even in our own country it has taken over 230 years for everybody to really feel that 
they have the freedom promised in the Declaration of Independence and the opportunities 
promised by the Constitution. It is going to take time, it is going to take patience, and it is going 
to take a relentless effort to reach a political resolution to radicalization, homegrown or foreign.  
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Those who have nothing to believe in or work toward but an ideology of violence are 
easily exploited by those who seek to dominate. Those who have hope, freedom, and a future are 
not such easy pickings. When we give the dominated the opportunity to genuinely support 
themselves, I believe the dominated become free. Free people dismantle cultures of dominance 
bit by bit. And as cultures of dominance die away, ideologies of violence fade with them.  
back to top 
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Much has been written, assessed, analyzed, and postulated since the attacks of September 11, 
2001 about the "terrorist" threat posed to the U.S., our allies, and a modern civilization that respects 
human rights, dignity, and the rule of law. But as a nation, and as a member of the greater 
international community of nations, we have yet to comprehend and recognize it for what it is, the 
nature of the movement with which we are dealing. Consequently, we have yet to devise and 
articulate, let alone resource, initiate, or wage, a holistic, synchronized campaign to discredit and 
defeat this threat. We have expended vast resources and sacrificed many precious lives. But absent a 
comprehensive understanding and a coherent strategy, results have been mixed at best. We lack the 
means to determine whether we are winning or, for that matter, what victory and failure look like.  
While it is clear that violent militant jihadi extremism is not a monolithic movement, core 
ideological interpretations provide connective tissue that bind radical Islamic movements worldwide. 
Although al Qaeda is perhaps the one, transnational, and stateless organization that seeks to unite 
disparate extremists through a franchised global network, there are loosely affiliated movements, 
organizations, and individuals that share common goals, tactics, funding, training, etc. Whether their 
ascetic vision of an imagined past  is manifested through local insurgencies, regional movements, or 
global strategies, the threat is real and must be addressed globally—universally—as an affront to 
modern civilization, perhaps especially within the Muslim world.  
In violent militant jihadi extremism, we are facing an implacable, hateful perversion of the 
Islamic religion, which is antithetical to human rights, modern rule of law, freedom of expression, 
and self-determination. This extremism is a dangerous and insidious enemy, fanatically committed to 
implementing a vision of religious piety and purity that places no apparent premium on human life.  
Radical militant jihadi dogma is propagated virally, through a highly adaptive, loosely coupled, 
and pervasive global network. Whether this threat manifests itself through the actions of 
governments, organizations, groups of malcontents, or disturbed individuals, it is perhaps best 
approached as a collision of chaos and complexity theories. Couplings will naturally occur through 
apparently random processes that, when examined more closely, will be seen to satisfy common 
requirements in discernable patterns.  
This global network of the disenfranchised continues to form and grow autonomously and 
recursively. Perhaps the only way to counter its malignancy is to introduce into the environment 
benign conditions that satisfy the needs of its constituent members. In other words, change the 
environment and offer alternatives. This network of ideological radicals cannot be contained or 
controlled. But it can be discredited.  
The stated goal of the most virulent strains of violent militant jihadi extremism, Al Qaeda and 
related movements, is to establish a caliphate that can challenge western hegemony. If left alone, this 
complex, adaptive network will succeed in obtaining the capability to satisfy its stated intent. Al  
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Qaeda and related local "jihadist" movements worldwide, funded and sustained through narcotics, 
arms, and human trafficking, could eventually pose a significant threat to our national interests and 
those of our partners worldwide. Further, these movements could cause us to constrain the values we 
cherish, and that characterize us, as Americans. This, in itself, represents a new definition of 
"existential threat."  
We need to interrupt the network of violent extremism, addressing legitimate grievances by 
offering alternatives through cooperation with Muslim partners. The first step in our process is to 
acknowledge the true nature of the threat and formulate a national strategy to discredit and defeat it. 
It is my hope that this white paper will provide the means to begin this process.  
Only Muslims can expose the virulent corruption of their religion and cultural ideologies. 
Non-Muslims in America and worldwide can support this effort by demonstrating even-handed 
religious and cultural tolerance, addressing those negative stressors that most affect the third world 
and contribute to an environment in which extremist networks might successfully couple with 
sympathetic movements and individuals. Critical to this effort is recognizing the nature of the threat 
and exposing it through healthy dialogue and positive action.  
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Introduction 
Unfortunately, it‘s nothing new. 
Whether in the jungles of Colombia, the mountains of Peru, the subways of Tokyo, the 
streets of Northern Ireland or the center of Oklahoma City, or across markets, buildings, and 
schools in Pakistan or Afghanistan, recent history is marred with numerous examples of non-
state actors committing acts of unspeakable violence, often at the cost of their own lives, against 
unarmed civilians. 
These acts of violence are not necessarily against government facilities or targets. They 
are more often than not planned simply to make a point, spread terror, and kill as many innocent 
people as possible in the most gruesome and spectacular manner achievable. 
Certainly, the groups behind these attacks in many cases have specific and different 
ideological and political goals. However, they all share at least one common characteristic:  
individuals feel not only justified, but morally compelled to commit these incredibly violent acts. 
Much has been postulated and written about the factors that lead to such attitudes and 
behavior. However, there have been very few if any validated and replicated works that attempt 
to determine on a global scale, using large-scale representative samples, what the common 
underlying factors are that create the ―swamps‖ from which violent extremists are born. 
An opportunity to examine these factors presented itself with the launch of the Gallup 
World Poll in 2005. The World Poll was by no means ever intended to be an instrument designed 
specifically to measure the causes of extreme radicalism. However, it provided a survey vehicle 
that measured, in a consistent manner, attitudes, beliefs and opinions across approximately 140 
countries. Sample sizes were sufficient for sample error levels of only +/- 2% or better, since 
each country included between n=1000 and n=2500 interviews per wave. 
From Organizational Barriers to Societal Barriers 
The conceptual basis for Gallup‘s research regarding radicalism came from a somewhat 
unlikely place. For several years, Gallup had been studying the reasons why managers or 
departments within organizations create ―barriers‖: policies, practices or behaviors that further 
their own agenda, often despite the harm created for other departments, or for the organization as 
a whole. These barriers tended to fall into one of five root causes, including fear of loss 
(including loss of respect or loss of ability to meet a goal), lack of alignment (either with current 
leadership or intolerance of other groups), how information is filtered and processed, decisions 
that provide short-term benefit with longer term consequences, and conflict over resources 
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(Rieger & Kamins 2006). Since these factors were found to be the root causes behind instances 
on a micro basis where decisions were made to benefit a small group at the expense of others, it 
was an intriguing question of whether these same factors could explain similar, though certainly 
more dramatic, events on a more macro scale. 
Model Development 
As a first step, Gallup mapped the World Poll 2005/2006 questionnaire against its 
database of barriers found through its management consulting work and subsequently sought to 
determine whether these factors were predictive of extreme radical views. 
For the dependent variable, a group of respondents were identified who held radical 
views. Specifically, they strongly believed the attacks of 9/11 were completely justified, strongly 
believed that attacks against civilians in pursuit of a goal were completely justified, especially 
those committed by other civilians. To be classified as having radical views, a respondent must 
have given the strongest possible response to all of these questions.  
It is important to note that these political radicals were not necessarily violent non-state 
actors. Rather, in theory they might be more likely than others to make up the ―swamp‖ – those 
who provide active or passive support, a center of gravity, safe haven, a potential recruiting pool, 
financial support, or even just be more likely to look the other way. For the purposes of this 
paper, these individuals are referred to as ―political radicals‖ since their views, but not 
necessarily their actions, are radicalized. All other respondents were classified as part of the 
contrast group. The total sample size for this effort was n=27,528 (included countries where all 
questions were asked and respondents who provided valid responses to all model questions).
 
Since the objective of the exercise was to classify each respondent into the group that 
represented the best fit for that individual (radical or non-radical), stepwise discriminant function 
analysis was used. Initial results of the model in terms of strength of classifying members of the 
attitudinally radical group were quite strong. Approximately 86% of respondents were classified 
correctly, and model fit statistics were quite stable (Wilkes‘ Lambda = .971, Chi Square = 283.5, 
sig. at 99%+ CL)
 
(Rieger, 2008, pp. 4-5).
 
However, further examination showed an interesting pattern. While the model did an 
excellent job of identifying non-radicals, it only correctly classified a little over half of the 
radicals. Given that the non-radical group was much larger, these results were still quite 
compelling. But the false negatives in particular (those that model said were not radical, but in 
actuality were) were at a relatively high level. 
Further analysis of this group of false negatives was quite illuminating. A second, and 
very different, type of radical was identified. In other words, individuals classified as ―political 
radicals‖ appear to form two clusters or distinct groups relative to the ―barrier‖ factors (given the 
focus on political radicals, the model was named ―POLRAD‖). The two types (the Type One 
Radicals identified in the original model and Type Two Radicals identified in the residual 
analysis) showed very different demographic and attitudinal characteristics. 
Given that attitudes formed a continuum, it was also possible to identify a group of 
―fence sitters‖, whose attitudes were almost, but not quite, strong enough to classify them as 
having radical attitudes. This group was named ―high potentials,‖ and may represent the main 
battleground for undecided hearts and minds. 
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Model Validation 
The original model was developed using data from the 2005/2006 World Poll. Gallup 
tested the replicability of the model with data from the 2007 World Poll. The 2007 data included 
a different mix of countries, different respondents, and some additional questions that could be 
potential additions to the model. 
When the analytical process was repeated using 22,068 interviews from the 2007 data, 
not only was a model found that contained factors that were virtually identical to the first model, 
but the weights of each factor were also nearly identical to those found in the 2005/2006 model 
as well. Model statistics in the validation run were also quite robust (Wilkes Lambda = .998, Chi 
Square = 199, Sig. 99%+ CL) (Rieger, 2008, p. 6). 
Characteristics of Type One Radicals 
One of the most distinguishing characteristics of the Type One Radicals indicated by the 
data was intolerance or elitism. This group strongly believed that living in harmony with others 
who were different was completely unjustified, and they were in general intolerant of other 
groups.  
A second strong characteristic found among the Type Ones was a distinct lack of 
confidence in current governance. This lack of confidence was not limited to just national 
government but also extended to include local leadership. Often, perceptions of lack of 
government confidence had roots in a perceived lack of progress, particularly on improving basic 
services, or dissatisfaction with the electoral process and/or judicial systems. 
Other secondary characteristics of the Type One Radicals were that they tended to have 
experienced some past hardship and also tended to live in areas where people were concerned 
over personal safety. 
Also interesting was what the Type Ones were not. This group was not demographically 
distinct from the rest of the population. In fact, they were very much mainstream in terms of age, 
income, and profession. 
Secondly, while the data indicated they tended to be in favor (in Islamic countries) of 
having Shari‘a play a strong role in legislation, they were not themselves more religious than the 
rest of the population in that they did not attend services more regularly than other respondents 
and were less likely than others to say that religion was important to them personally. 
In summary, the data indicated that Type One Radicals were highly intolerant 
mainstream individuals who had little to no confidence in their current government‘s ability to 
meet what they saw as a desirable future. 
Characteristics of Type Two Radicals 
Type Two Radicals were quite different than the Type Ones. While the Type One 
Radicals were very intolerant, the Type Twos tended to believe they were the victims of the 
intolerance of others. A ―victim mentality‖ was a strongly defining characteristic of this group. 
Secondly, while the Type Ones were more mainstream, the data showed that Type Two 
radicals were distinctively downscale, especially in terms of income. 
In addition, analysis showed that the Type Two Radicals were strongly leader seeking, to 
the point where they were much more likely than others to indicate that they would leave family 
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and friends for a leader, go to jail for a leader, and even die for a leader they believed in. In 
general, this group was also much more likely than the Type Ones to say they would be very 
willing to sacrifice their lives for a cause. In general, this group tended to have very favorable 
opinions of virtually any strong or violent action in pursuit of a goal. 
Along with leader seeking, this group was also ideology seeking. This finding should not 
be interpreted as solely applying to an extremist interpretation of Islam (in predominantly 
Muslim countries). It did not necessarily relate specifically to religion of any type. Analysis 
showed it could also be some form of nationalism, or some other ideological framework. 
Ideology in general appears to be a galvanizing force, used by a sought-out leader, to form strong 
views within this group. 
In summary, Type Two Radicals were downscale individuals who viewed themselves as 
victims and sought a strong leader and/or ideology for hope. 
Support for the Concept of Two Types of Radicals 
There has been a fair amount of debate over whether radicals are primarily the 
downtrodden, as is the case with many suicide bombers, or if they are more upscale or 
mainstream, such as the leadership of Al Qaeda.  
An examination of the history and profiles compiled by Post (Post, 2008) shows some 
support that leadership in many cases tends to show many characteristics of the Type Ones 
(intolerance toward another group and/or antipathy toward a current government), while the 
followers tend to show many characteristics of the Type Twos (downscale, victims, leader 
seeking), although further research is necessary to determine the extent to which this delineation 
exists. 
Other research in Central Asian region by Thomas and Kiser found what they referred to 
as ―ideology entrepreneurs,‖ who were quite analogous to the Type Ones, who sought to recruit 
the victimized poor, who were similar to the Type Twos
 
(Thomas & Kiser, 2002). 
Additional work by Kuznar regarding deprivation, risk and conflict also found support 
for two distinct mainstream and downscale groups of non-state actors (Kuznar, 2009). 
All in all, there appears to be strong evidence and corroborating support that 
understanding the etiology of radicalism requires an understanding that not all radicals are the 
same, and that individuals can become attitudinally radicalized through one of at least two very 
different and complementary paths. 
That said, it is important to note where the model should or should not be applied. The 
model requires a fairly large number of surveys to be able to identify these groups in sufficient 
numbers for meaningful analysis. The model cannot be applied in denied areas where research is 
not possible. In addition, care should be taken to ensure the items are translated properly, and 
that the sample design is truly representative of the population being studied. Otherwise, the 
analyst risks making conclusions based on incomplete or un-projectable data. Across the globe, 
however, there are only a few areas where these limitations exist (such as North Korea, the 
FATA region of Pakistan, and other denied areas). 
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Achieving Critical Mass 
The critical question that follows from this research is at what point are levels of political 
radicalization high enough to result in the formation of a ―swamp‖ that fosters activity. 
While causality can certainly not be inferred, general guidelines can be determined 
through examination of radicalism levels (as identified by the POLRAD model described in this 
paper) relative to incidents reported in the NCTC‘s public reporting of terrorist events (National 
Counter-Terrorism Center Worldwide Incidents Tracking System 2009).
 
There were sixteen countries from the 2007 World Poll where POLRAD estimates were 
available in the NCTC 2008 database. In comparing radicalism levels within those countries to 
the number of incidents in the year following data collection, it became very apparent that once 
3% of the population became politically radicalized, there was a much greater likelihood of 
subsequent high levels of activity. While these data do not conclusively show that a causal 
relationship exists, there is clearly a pattern where areas showing high levels of radicalism today 
tend to show high levels of activity in the not too distant future. Specifically, countries with low 
levels of radicalism (greater than zero but less than 3% of either Type One or Type Two 
Radicals) experienced on average 83 acts of terror in the subsequent year.  
Countries with Type One or Type Two radicalism levels of at least 3% experienced on 
average 971 acts of terror in the subsequent year. Even if India and Pakistan were excluded as 
outliers, there was still quite a difference (83 vs. 282). (Note:  Iraq and Afghanistan were not 
included in this analysis, as World Poll data were not available for those 
countries).
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Figure 1. Average Incidents vs. POLRAD Levels 
Certainly, these results do not necessarily show that activity will always spike once the 
3% threshold is hit, but it does appear that radicalization is strongly related to hostile/violent 
activities in areas with support at approximately 3% of the population. 
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While these results are quite dramatic, looking solely at country level totals can 
potentially hide other ―swamps‖ hidden within the population. It is important to note that 
populations are rarely uniform. There may very well be pockets within a country that have much 
higher radicalism levels than others, or even within cities among particular ethno-sectarian 
enclaves. These pockets may form within a particular geographic area, within a religious sect, 
among a particular ethnicity or tribal group, or even among workers in a particular industry. 
Application of the model is most useful when sufficient sample size is included to allow for such 
sub-group analysis. 
Conclusion 
There are at least two very different types of radicals with very different characteristics. 
In developing strategies to counter emerging radicalization, it is critical to understand not only 
which type of radical is being created, but also what specific predictive factors appear to be at 
play. 
By developing a deep understanding of these dynamics within a population, strategies 
can be developed that are specifically tailored to the most critical dynamics influencing a 
particular group to help counter emerging threats. 
And, if caught early enough, a population can potentially avoid becoming radicalized in 
the first place. 
back to top 
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1.2. Individual and Group Mechanisms of Radicalization (Clark McCauley, 
Sophia Moskalenko)
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We define political radicalization as changes in beliefs, feelings and behavior in the 
direction of increased support for a political conflict.  Radicalization can involve the movement 
of individuals and groups to legal and nonviolent political action (activism) or to illegal and 
violent political action (radicalism).  An extreme of radicalization is terrorism, in which a non-
state group targets not only government forces but civilian citizens supporting the government. 
Analysts often describe jihadist radicalization as either ―top-down‖ or ―bottom-up‖ (U.S. 
Department of State, 2006; National Intelligence Council, 2007). Top-down radicalization refers 
to cases in which a radical group seeks new members through an organized recruiting campaign 
(charismatic imams, mobilizing networks, education and outreach programs). By contrast, 
bottom-up radicalization refers to cases in which individuals or small group develop radical 
feelings and beliefs in relative isolation from any existing radical group and only then seek 
connection with an existing radical group or move to radical action on their own initiative.   
Unfortunately, the top-down vs. bottom-up distinction is not easily applied to the current 
array of cases of jihadi radicalization.  If friends engaged in a community service group move to 
radicalization after watching Al Jazeera, or after watching videos of Muslim victimization on a 
jihadi web site, or after talking in a radical chat room—is this top-down or bottom-up?  It is 
bottom-up in the sense that the friends have not been contacted personally by members of an 
existing radical group.  But it is top-down in the sense that jihadist groups provide footage for Al 
Jazeera, put inciting films on their web sites, and organize radical chat rooms.  The news, films, 
and chat rooms of jihadist and radical groups ARE, in effect, their recruiting programs.   
Rather than trying to reconcile the differences between top-down and bottom-up 
perspectives, a more promising approach is to identify mechanisms of political radicalization that 
operate across groups as varied as militant jihadis and U.S. domestic radical groups.  These 
mechanisms occur at three levels: individual, group, and mass public (McCauley & Moskalenko, 
2008).  Individuals are moved to join existing radical groups by a range of personal motives and 
experiences.  Activist and radical groups become more extreme through competition with 
government forces and with groups trying to represent the same cause.  A mass public is 
radicalized in and through intra and inter-state conflicts.  Here we focus on individual- and 
group-level mechanisms.  It is important to note at the outset that none of these mechanisms 
enables a 100 percent prediction of radicalization; rather each is a contributor for movement 
toward radicalization. Usually, individuals radicalize due to a combination of mechanisms. 
                                                 
1
 Support for this research was provided by the Department of Homeland Security through the National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), grant number 
N00140510629. Any opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations are those of the authors and do 
not necessarily reflect views of the Department of Homeland Security. 
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Individual-level Mechanisms 
 Individual mechanisms are the most relevant for understanding how individuals join an 
already radicalized group.  The next section, group-level mechanisms, focuses on how an 
existing group becomes more radical over time.  In practice, the two levels of mechanisms tend 
to become mutually reinforcing.   
1. Individual Radicalization through Personal Grievance.  An individual can be 
radicalized as a result of the perception of unjustified harm to self or loved ones.   Although 
often cited as an explanation for terrorism, this mechanism is difficult to quantify.  We are not 
aware of any research that attempts to count the proportion of terrorist group members with a 
personal grievance against their target group.  
However, several observations indicate that personal grievance is seldom sufficient for 
radicalization.  Most individuals with a personal grievance do not know or cannot reach the 
individuals who victimized them; their target of radical action and terrorism is the larger group 
that the perpetrators are seen to represent—police, army, government officials, and citizens 
supporting the government.  Terrorist groups may include individuals seeking revenge, but a 
terrorist group aims to represent a political cause that is more than a collection of vendettas.  
Indeed, personal motives of revenge can undermine the cohesion and united action that make an 
effective terrorist group.  Thus, we argue that personal grievance seldom leads to radicalization 
unless it is interpreted (with help of group and mass-level rhetoric) as part of a larger political 
struggle (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008).  
 In areas where intergroup violence is high and long-standing, most individuals will have 
some direct experience of personal victimization or loss at the hands of the enemy.  Thus, the 
Chechen Black Widows included many women who were widowed or brutalized by the Russian 
Army (Granville-Chapman, 2004; Parfitt, 2004 ). Personal grievances led some of these women 
to suicide terrorism (Speckhard & Ahkmedova, 2006).  There are similar accounts of personal 
victimization among Tamil Tiger and Palestinian suicide terrorists (Arnestadt, 2004). 
 In areas where intergroup violence is low, fewer individuals will have experience of 
personal victimization, and such victimization, when it occurs, is more likely to take the form of 
bias and discrimination than physical brutality and death.  Muslims in Europe who turn to 
terrorism are less likely to be trying to revenge a personal grievance than Muslims in Iraq or 
Afghanistan.  
2. Individual Radicalization through Political Grievance.  An individual can be 
radicalized as a result of strong identification with a political group or cause that is highlighted in 
the mass media or Internet.  It is rare that this mechanism of radicalization goes all the way to 
violent action without some group or organizational support; more commonly the growing 
radicalization of beliefs and feelings leads the individual to associate with similar others through 
group dynamics described below.  But cases of ―lone-wolf terrorism‖ do occur.   
Ted Kaczynski, the Unabomber, became so invested in his personal crusade against 
technological progress that he began mailing bombs to those he saw responsible for such 
progress.  Mohammed Reza Taheri-azar, a young immigrant from Iran, drove a sport utility 
vehicle into a crowded area of the University of NC Chapel Hill, injuring nine people to ―avenge 
the deaths of Muslims around the world.‖  Lone-wolf terrorism is often attributed to 
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psychopathology, but there may be many examples labeled as ―hate crime‖ that do not involve 
any psychiatric disorder.     
3.  Individual Radicalization in Action—The Slippery Slope.  Individuals may become 
radicalized as a result of experiences they have after joining an existing radical group. Except for 
suicide bombers, it is rare for a new terrorist recruit to be entrusted with carrying out a lethal 
attack. Instead, interviews with former group members indicate that progression toward the most 
radical behaviors is deliberately slow and gradual (McCauley & Segal, 1987). At first, a new 
recruit may be asked to carry insignificant pieces of information, or to serve as a lookout. Later, 
the recruit may be asked to deliver a weapon and later still asked to drive a senior member to a 
meeting. This progression continues until the now-tested recruit is ready to use a bomb or a gun.  
The power of this progression is its gradual nature.  The first step is easy with little risk to 
the recruit and little harm to anyone.  Each new step in the progression is only minimally more 
radical.  On this slippery slope, there is no transition marked ―terrorist,‖ and an individual 
looking back on a terrorist career can find it difficult to answer questions about ―When did you 
decide to become a terrorist?‖ 
Recruiting for the Basque terrorist group, ETA, has been described as the development of 
a personal relationship between a terrorist and a potential recruit.  The new man is mentored and 
brought along into ETA in a very gradual progression. A Red Brigade militant in Italy described 
his experience this way: ―A choice [made] in cold blood, such as ‗now I will become a terrorist,‘ 
[did] not exist.  It was a step-by-step evolution, which passed through a kind of human relation 
that I had with Guido, and with the people I worked with‖ (della Porta, 1995, p. 168).  
4. Individual Radicalization in Relationship—The Power of Love.  In order to avoid 
penetration by government security forces, radicals and terrorists tend to recruit from within the 
trusted circle of friends and family of those already radicalized (della Porta, 1995, p. 167-168; 
Sageman, 2004). Similarly, individuals may join radical groups in order to be with or to protect a 
loved one who is already a member. The bond that brings people into the group is likely to 
become even stronger as they share common experiences of threat from the authorities or rival 
groups, as well as the experience of isolation, common to radical groups that tend to make group 
members more dependent on one another. Former members of radical groups recall that once a 
loved one is threatened or killed, any doubts about the group‘s tactics or cause become 
irrelevant. In this mechanism, an individual may become highly radicalized in terms of actions 
without a parallel radicalization in political beliefs.   
Sophia Perovskaya, one of the leaders of the nineteenth century Russian terrorist group 
―People‘s Will,‖ initially objected to the idea of using violence to advance the organization‘s 
cause.  She nonetheless participated in the organization‘s activities, including assassination 
attempts, because of her loyalty to her lover Anrdej Zhelyabov.  Anrdej was one of the most 
radical of the group leaders and committed to violence (Radzinsky & Bouis, 2006).  
A particular form of love that can move individuals to join a radical group is the ―love-at-
a-distance‖ that is sometimes referred to as charismatic leadership.  A strong and confident 
personality combined with public speaking skills can provide an important attraction for new 
recruits.  This is one of the keys to Osama bin Laden‘s staying power.   
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5. Individual Radicalization in Status and Thrill Seeking. Terrorism offers a number of 
rewards to those who seek adventures and the admiration of others: access to a secret society 
with grandiose goals; the thrill of operations that involve guns and money; and status and fame 
unparalleled by the achievement of an ordinary life. Young men, in particular, are susceptible to 
the appeal of these rewards as they transition from adolescence into young adulthood, trying to 
position themselves relative to their peers (Wilson & Daly, 1985). A strong social structure will 
often provide outlets for the young and restless including firefighting and military and police 
service. But even when these legitimate outlets are available, a proportion of thrill and status 
seeking youths will be attracted to street gangs or criminal networks for a life of unpredictability 
and danger. For these individuals, the ideology of the group they join matters less than the 
anticipation of thrill and status (Goldstein, 1994; Kanasawa & Still, 2000). 
Abu Musab Al Zarqawi is an example of this kind of radicalization. A petty criminal 
imprisoned for rape and drug possession, he ascended the ranks of a prison gang by severely 
beating his rivals and demanding complete servitude from other prisoners. Released from prison, 
he went to Afghanistan where he could indulge his inclination for violence and thrills in the war 
against Russians. There he met Osama bin Laden and adopted the fundamentalist militant jihadi 
ideology. But as leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq, Zarqawi released videotapes of beheadings he 
personally carried out, despite requests from Zawahiri, bin Laden‘s deputy, to avoid alienating 
Muslims. For Zarqawi, the rewards of violence and status could be more important than 
forwarding the global caliphate.  
6. Individual Opening to Radicalization: Unfreezing. For many individuals, the path to 
radicalization is blocked by prior commitments and responsibilities. Supporting a family, 
building a career, and attachments to friends and neighbors would all be jeopardized by joining 
an illegal and dangerous organization. But what if these commitments and attachments are lost?  
Perhaps parents or a spouse die suddenly. Or a civil war ravages the country, destroying homes, 
families, jobs, and social networks. Or an individual moves from home to a foreign country or 
remote city and has to begin again with no social ties and few resources. Thus disconnected, an 
individual is an easy prospect for any group that offers comradeship and connection. If group 
membership comes with an ideology, it may seem like a reasonable trade. 
In his analysis of the 9/11 bombers, Sageman (2004) concluded that isolation and 
alienation opened the door to radicalization of young Muslims living in Europe.  It is important 
to note that unfreezing can facilitate many different new identities, but for a Muslim living in a 
non-Muslim country, shared religion is a likely to be a high-salience source of similarity and 
support. 
Group-level Mechanisms 
 There are a few individuals who translate their own personal grievance into political 
violence without participation in a radical group, but these lone-wolf radicals do not usually 
represent a large threat.  Radical power comes from groups with enough cohesion and 
organization to plan and carry out collective action and, in the case of terrorism, collective 
violence.  In this section, we emphasize the mechanisms that move a whole group toward 
political radicalization - key to understanding deradicalization or desistance from illegal political 
action.  We return to this issue at the end of the section on Implications and Research Issues.   
7.  Extremity Shift in Likeminded Groups—Group Polarization.  Group discussion 
among like-minded people tends to move average group opinion further towards the direction 
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favored initially by a majority of group members (Brown, 1986, p. 200-301).  Discussion among 
people who favor the same political candidate, for instance, is likely to move average opinion 
toward even stronger approval of this candidate.  This tendency is the result of two forces.  
First, discussing an issue will bring out new arguments, not previously considered.  In a 
like-minded group, most of the new arguments will be in the direction already favored.  Group 
members are then persuaded by the new arguments they hear and become more confident and 
more extreme in the initially favored direction.  Second, individuals who are more extreme in the 
group-favored direction are viewed as more admirable and influential. Less extreme members of 
the group then tend to gravitate toward the more extreme opinions in order see themselves as 
more influential and admirable (Brown, 1986, p. 200-301).  
 These two forces are likely to affect groups of people who come together around some 
issue of political reform (saving redwoods, animal rights) or of resisting reform (integrated 
schools, gun control).  A group drawn together by concern for the same political issue is likely to 
become more radical over time, especially if their efforts do not seem to be making enough 
difference.  In the U.S., the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) came to their 
first demonstrations in 1960 well dressed and clean-shaven with the Bible in one hand and the 
U.S. Constitution in the other.  By 1966, SNCC‘s leader Stokely Carmichael was talking about 
―Black Power‖ and violent confrontation with whites.  Similarly, despite the 1962 Port Huron 
statement, a manifesto focused on poverty and civil rights in which the Students for a 
Democratic Society (SDS) called for democratic reform, the organization drifted toward 
increasingly radical politics and more confrontational tactics (Sale, 1973).  
 8. Activist Radicalization in Competition with State Power--Condensation.  This 
mechanism of radicalization arises in conflict between a government and an activist group 
challenging the government.  Initially, the members of the challenge group are not prepared to 
get involved in illegal or violent action.  As activists, they may participate in non-violent protest 
or spread propaganda. When the state response is repressive and the costs of continuing political 
action are raised, the less committed members drop out. Those who remain are likely to turn to 
more radical rhetoric and action (Mechanism 7), typically leading to even harsher response from 
the state.  Over time, only a tiny fraction of hardened radicals remains and may go underground 
as a terrorist group.    
   The group dynamics at the heart of this mechanism are a reliable consequence of facing 
outside threat or attack.  Hostility toward the threatening group is the obvious result, but equally 
important is the impact of threat on the interactions among those feeling threatened.  Perceived 
interdependence within the threatened group increases as group members see they will share the 
consequences of the outside threat.  They see, as Dr. Johnson put it, that ―we must hang together 
or assuredly we will hang separately.‖  The result is increased group identification (increased 
cohesion), idealization of ingroup values, increased respect for ingroup leaders, and increased 
readiness to punish anyone dissenting from group norms.  This mechanism is a powerful source 
of radicalizing beliefs, feelings, and behavior as a group facing threat moves toward the unity of 
thought, feeling, and action that prepares them to fight the threat (Grant & Brown, 1995; LeVine 
& Campbell, 1972).  
 In Italy in the 1970s, the terrorist Red Brigades condensed out of leftist protest movements, 
after years of escalating conflict between protestors and Italian police. Similarly, the Weather 
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Underground condensed out of the Students for a Democratic Society after escalating conflicts 
between protestors and U.S. police (Sale, 1973).  
 9.   Group Radicalization in Competition for the Same Base of Support—Outbidding.  
Groups rallying behind the same political cause can be in competition for the same base of 
sympathizers and supporters.  This support can be crucial in providing cover, money, and new 
recruits.  As competing groups try different tactics to advance their cause, the competition may 
escalate to gradually more radical acts if sympathizers favor these acts – a competition described  
by Mia Bloom (2005) as ―outbidding.‖  
 The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) is a Marxist-Leninist group that 
eschewed the rhetoric of jihad and did not organize martyrdom actions in the early years of the 
Second Intifada.  Polls of Palestinians indicated that support for the PFLP was dwindling.  The 
PFLP began talking about jihad and fielded its own suicide bombers and its poll numbers 
recovered (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). 
 10.  Group Radicalization from Within-group Competition—Fissioning.  The intense 
pressure for conformity within a radical group can result in factions and internal conflict.  The 
conflict may be about tactics, with one faction advocating more violence, or may be more to do 
with personalities and internal power struggles.  Sometimes the conflict can escalate to violence 
but even if it does not, the factions may separate to form new groups.  The ingroup dynamics 
resulting from external threat (Mechanism 6) again come into play, and at least some of the new 
groups are likely to be more radical than the group from which they separated. 
 The IRA provides an example of many competing factions—Official IRA, Provisional 
IRA, Real IRA, Continuity IRA, INLA—who sometimes targeted one another. In perhaps the 
most extreme case of within-group conflict, Japanese authorities in 1972 found a mountain 
hideout of the Japanese Red Army with the dismembered bodies of twelve terrorists who had lost 
out in an intragroup conflict that had spun out of control (McCauley & Segal, 1987). 
11.  Social Reality Power of Isolated Groups—The Multiplier.  Some would say that 
science and engineering do not address the most important human questions.  What is beautiful 
and what is ugly?  What is fair and what is unjust?  What is worth working for, or fighting for, or 
dying for?  Am I a good person?  What does it mean that I am going to die? In group dynamics 
theory, the only source of confidence in answering these questions is consensus: agreement with 
others (Festinger, 1954).  Systems of meaning and values represented in religions and secular 
ideologies offer abstract answers to these questions, but the specifics for implementing these 
systems in relation to the current situation typically depend on group consensus. 
When an individual belongs to many different groups with competing values, any one 
group has little power over the individual. But when a group is isolated from outside influences, 
its power over individual members becomes extremely strong.  Isolated groups--terrorist groups, 
youth gangs, religious cults, soldiers in combat—have unchecked power to determine value and 
meaning. Consensus power in such groups can justify and even require extreme beliefs, feelings, 
and actions against anyone who threatens the group.  The unchecked value-setting power of an 
isolated group is a multiplier, but it is not necessarily the propensity for illegal and violent action 
that is multiplied.  In a monastery, isolation can serve to multiply religious fervor and prayer.  In 
an underground terrorist cell, however, isolation is likely to multiply the intensity of violence and 
justify escalation of violent tactics.  Group radicalization through condensation, outbidding, and 
fission mechanisms are all multiplied to the extent that the group members are cut off from all 
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but fellow-radical group members. 
 Just how far the social reality power of the group can go is suggested by the comments of 
Mark Rudd, a leader of the Weather Underground, looking back on the violence of his youth.  
―We were just stupid kids too in love with our ideas to realize they weren‘t real. We believed 
they were real because we thought them. That‘s the essence of the downside of idealism‖ (Rudd, 
2008). 
Implications and Research Questions 
 1. Pathways to Radicalization are Many and Variable.  There is no one path, no 
―trajectory profile‖ to political radicalization.  Rather there are many different paths.  How many 
can be estimated by calculating how many different combinations can be made of the 
mechanisms already identified.  Some of these paths do not include radical ideas or activism on 
the way to radical action, so the radicalization progression cannot be understood as an invariable 
set of steps or ―stages‖ from sympathy to radicalism.  Radicalization by the power of love for 
someone already radicalized, for instance, can occur for an individual with no previous political 
activity.  Joining a violent group for thrill, money, or status similarly does not require any 
political ideas or ideology (della Porta, 1995). 
 2. There is No Conveyor Belt from Activism to Terrorism.  Whether or when legal 
activists graduate to illegal political or violent action depends on culture, time, and place.  Some 
activists have moved on to terrorism, and some with radical ideas have moved on to radical 
action.  The question is, how common are these transitions?   
 After the 7/7 bombings in London, polling showed that five percent or 50,000 adult 
Muslims believe that these attacks were justified in defense of Islam (Pew, 2005).  But the UK 
security services are focused on no more than 2000 individuals as jihadist threats, suggesting that 
only about four percent of those who justify terrorism are actually any kind of security threat 
(Gardham, 2009).  
 Similarly, it appears that few activists graduate to terrorism.  Of the tens of thousands of 
U.S. college students involved in 1970s activist organization, Students for a Democratic Society, 
only a few hundred moved on to terrorism in the Weather Underground.  Comparable ratios are 
seen for the 1970s student movements that produced the Red Brigades in Italy and the Baader-
Meinhof Gang in Germany (Sale, 1973).  
 It appears, then, that the proportion moving from radical ideas to radical action is small, 
and the proportion moving from legal activism to radical action and terrorism may be even 
smaller.  Certainly the proportions are too small to support the metaphor of a ‗conveyor belt‘ 
(Baran, 2004) with its implication of an inevitable end for anyone who steps onto the belt. 
What about the proportion of radicals or terrorists with a previous history of legal 
activism?  This question is in need of study, but examples suggest that even here the proportion 
may be small. In the UK, none of the individuals involved in the 7/7 bombing was a regular 
member of an Islamic activist group such as Hizb ut-Tahrir or al-Mahajiroun, though several of 
the bombers seem to have been peripherally involved in these groups.  Obviously, no one 
considering illegal political activity is likely to risk the attention of police and security forces by 
joining an activist group, even if the activism is entirely within the law.   
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 3. When Does Activism Compete with Terrorism? In some places and times, legal 
activism may serve as a safety valve for the expression of grievances that might otherwise lead to 
terrorism.  Groups involved in legal activism may even compete with terrorist groups for 
potential recruits.  A group such as Hizb ut-Tahrir may contribute to jihadi terrorism to the extent 
that it encourages the same beliefs and feelings encouraged by Al Qaeda--seeing the war on 
terrorism as a war on Islam, feeling humiliated by Western power--but may inhibit jihadi 
terrorism to the extent that it discourages Hizb members from translating these feelings and 
beliefs into violent action.  Assessing the balance of these two tendencies is a difficult issue for 
researchers, security forces, and policy makers. 
 4.  How Important is Ideology in Moving Individuals and Groups to Terrorism?  As 
already noted, there are many paths to radicalization that do not involve ideology.  Some join a 
radical group for thrill and status, some for love, some for connection and comradeship.  
Personal and group grievance can move individuals toward violence, with ideology serving only 
to rationalize the violence.  Indeed videos of Muslims killed or maimed in ―crusader‖ attacks are 
often cited as motivation for jihadi attacks.  Hussain Osman, arrested in connection with the 7/21 
attempted bombings in London, reportedly told his Italian interrogators that, ―Religion had 
nothing to do with this. We watched films. We were shown videos with images of the war in 
Iraq. We were told we must do something big. That‘s why we met‖ (Leppard & Follain, 2005).   
 Osama bin Laden‘s speeches offer another clue.  He emphasizes Muslim grievances 
against the U.S. – support for authoritarian Muslim leaders, support for Israel, U.S. troops in 
Muslim countries – but spends little time selling the global caliphate that he asserts is the answer 
to these grievances.  As was the case with SNCC and the Weather Underground, ideology for 
jihadist groups may be more a product of contention than a cause of contention. 
 The idea that ideology may be relevant to only a fraction of a radical group is reflected in 
the latest U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide (2009, p.6). ―Modern insurgencies are 
often more complex matrices of irregular actors with widely differing goals. At least some of the 
principal actors will be motivated by a form of ideology (or at least will claim to be), but that 
ideology will not necessarily extend across the whole insurgent network.‖ 
 5.  What is the Role of Emotion in Radicalization?  The literature on radicalization tends 
to emphasize cost/benefit calculations, but many have noted the salience of emotions such as 
anger or outrage, shame, and humiliation in political conflict.  Research on emotional aspects of 
radicalization is needed.  For instance, it is not clear whether hate is an emotion or a powerful 
form of negative identification that can be the occasion of many emotions - both positive and 
negative - depending on what is happening to the target of hatred (Royzman, McCauley, & 
Rozin, 2005).  Similarly, it is not clear whether humiliation is a distinct emotion or a synergism 
of more fundamental emotions such as anger and shame (Lindner, 2006). 
 6.  How Does Martyrdom Contribute to Political Radicalization?  Many have noted the 
power of martyrdom for political mobilization, and there is a significant literature that asks how 
individuals are encouraged or recruited to give their lives in suicide terrorism (Merari, 2004; 
Speckhard & Ahkmedova, 2006).  Still, research is needed to determine how a particular death is 
framed and accepted as martyrdom, and the mechanisms by which a perceived martyr moves 
others toward sacrifice for the martyr‘s cause.   
 7. Does Encouraging Individual Desistance from Terrorism Interfere with Group 
Desistance from Terrorism?  Crenshaw (1996) makes an important distinction between two 
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kinds of government accommodation with terrorists.  In one case, a new alternative is offered to 
the group as a whole; in the other case the alternative is offered to individual members of a 
terrorist group.  Both Venezuela and Colombia have offered amnesty to violent opposition 
groups and legalized their political participation on condition of their giving up violence.  In 
contrast, the Italian government encouraged ‗repentance‘ of Red Brigade individuals who could 
earn reduced prison sentences by informing on comrades.  The opening for groups works best 
when the group has high cohesion and strong leadership so as to minimize the splitting off of 
factions that want to continue violence.  But the opening for individuals works best when 
cohesion is low and leadership is weak, when at least some terrorists are disillusioned, bored, or 
remorseful (McCauley, in press).  
back to top 
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The Challenge and the Utility of Individual Psychology in the Study of Terrorism 
In this paper, several distinct areas within the broader field of psychology that have 
contributed to the study of terrorism will be briefly considered.  It is worth noting however that 
this review can only encompass a very thin slice of the overall wealth of information that can be 
leveraged from the psychological domain.   Furthermore, efforts to focus on the psychology of 
the individual as an attempt to elucidate a ‗terrorist profile‘ or ‗terrorist personality‘ have been 
widely regarded as unsuccessful in terms of their application across individuals, groups, social 
context, and over time (see Horgan, 2005; Post, 2007 for additional discussion of individual 
approaches to the study of terrorism, profiles, and pathologies).  That said, there are certainly 
some aspects of individual level psychology that make significant contributions in this field – 
especially to the extent that they can be incorporated into a broader context that considers intra-
group dynamics as well as intergroup relations (e.g., Forsyth, 2010).  When considered within a 
broader context, psychological factors at the individual, group, and intergroup levels can be 
especially useful in addressing potential root causes of terrorism.  In particular, we can draw 
upon a fundamental principle of social psychology that places a premium on examining the 
interaction between people (encompassing aspects of personality, experience, attitudes, social 
norms, etc.) and situations (encompassing group dynamics, social influence, leadership, and the 
broader socioeconomic and sociopolitical contexts, etc.).  By assuming an interactionist 
perspective, the strengths and limitations of theory and research that has been developed or 
extended to unpack the complexity of terrorism can be considered.   
Stage Models: Perspectives that Offer Promise to Understanding the Role of 
„Triggers‟? 
When applied to the question of ‗who becomes a terrorist,‘ the interactionist perspective 
requires not only a consideration of personal attributes (i.e., personality and dispositional 
characteristics) but also a consideration of the situation, including social and cultural context 
(also see Moghaddam, 2004 for a detailed discussion of the cultural preconditions for terrorism). 
This perspective is evident in several exemplary models of terrorist development, identity, and 
ultimately, behavior. To understand motivations for terrorism rather than other forms of political 
action, or mobilization more generally, several psychological models detail stages or levels that 
individuals move through as they become increasingly radicalized toward terrorism.  Two such 
models have been developed by Moghaddam (2005) and McCauley (2009).  Moghaddam (2005) 
posits a ‗staircase model‘ in which terrorism is viewed as sequential progression from lower 
floors to higher floors on an increasingly narrow staircase. Each floor is characterized by unique 
psychological processes and progressive restrictions in response options, such that the final 
outcome is ―destruction of others, or oneself, or both‖ (Moghaddam 2005, p.161; also see 
Waller, 2002 for a discussion of the systematic progression toward intergroup violence).  
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In his conceptualization of the trajectory of radicalization toward the use or endorsement 
of terrorism, McCauley‘s (2009) ‗pyramid‘ model positions terrorists as the apex of a pyramid 
composed of a general population, passive supporters, and active supporters. In this model, 
terrorists are but a very small fraction of the overall collective that the broader pyramid is meant 
to represent.  Both of these models assume a multiplicity of reasons for how and why someone 
might be drawn to a particular group or cause that involves terrorism; however, the models can 
have a practical application in looking at the pathways to, and varying levels of involvement in, 
terrorism. At the very least, such models may provide a foundation for conceptual clarity and 
distinction between those who may passively or actively support terrorism and those who might 
take a more direct role.  If, for example, we make a conceptual connection between the 
progression – as implied by Moghaddam‘s (2005) staircase model and consider some of the 
important implications that have been empirically established in the study of conformity (e.g., 
Asch, 1955), compliance (e.g., Cialdini, 2008), and obedience (Milgram, 1974) in which an 
authority figure gives clear directives to those who lack relative power, we can get a potential 
glimpse into the type of powerful situations in which terrorists may become increasingly 
immersed as they move closer toward taking violent action.  
Individual and Group Level Factors: Experiences, Emotions, and the Challenge of 
Generalization 
From a psychological perspective, it is important to note that there is little evidence to 
suggest that terrorists have abnormally high levels of mental illness or psychopathology (Reich, 
1998; Horgan, 2005; McCauley, 2004). What does emerge, however, is the consistent finding 
that terrorists are rational actors with purpose, intent, high levels of commitment, and deeply 
held convictions (Crenshaw, 1998; Post, 1998). And while external factors such as global 
poverty, inequalities in health care, education, or even access to the basic requirements of food, 
water, and shelter have been implicated as necessary causal factors of terrorism, these are not 
sufficient (e.g., Marsella, 2004; Moghaddam, 2004). Rather, these may constitute background 
conditions in which recruiting, indoctrinating, and motivating individuals toward terrorism may 
become increasingly likely (Lemieux & Pratto, 2003; Staub, 2003). However, this is not 
necessarily true for all terrorists or even all types of terrorism.  We must qualify precisely this 
kind of statement in the face of evidence such as the detailed descriptions that Sageman (2004) 
provides of the global militant jihad, its networks, and characteristics of its membership.  
Sageman found in his sample that factors such as the experience of poverty, low education 
levels, and the like were not linked in a causal manner to those who ultimately became involved 
in the global militant jihad.  In fact, in his sample they appeared to be fairly well educated, and 
solidly middle to upper-middle socioeconomic status. Again, this particular example effectively 
demonstrates the importance of context, and also provides a counterfactual to the popular 
assumptions about terrorists, such as poverty or lack of education as core causal features, are 
often unsubstantiated by reliable data.  Merari (2007) notes in his review of suicide terrorism that 
in fact, among Palestinian suicide terrorists, the socioeconomic profiles correspond to those of 
the general Palestinian population, and that at the time of their attacks, suicide terrorists even had 
slightly higher levels of education.  
There is an intuitive appeal to linking traumatic experience with the development of 
terrorism (e.g., Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2006).  In fact, there are a number of biographies and 
narrative accounts of those who had been involved in terrorism (see Post, Sprinzak, & Denny, 
2003 for an account of interviews with interviews of incarcerated terrorists).  While such 
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accounts are particularly interesting because of the depth of experience and involvement they 
convey, there is considerable difficulty when one takes those key findings from retrospective 
accounts and narratives and tries to leverage them to develop valid and reliable predictive 
models. That said, there are some very important and recurring themes that can inform our 
broader understanding of some individual level factors that can plausibly have a distinct impact 
on one‘s trajectory toward terrorism. For instance, the interviews that Post et al. (2003) analyze 
show that the vast majority of their sample recount traumatic experiences, coupled with their 
living in a community that was closely and deeply involved in conflict.  Thus, to truly understand 
the motivations requires a careful examination of the context that interacts with individual level 
psychological factors in very significant and influential ways. By carefully examining the types 
of stories and statements that those who are (or have been) involved in terrorism can provide 
very useful information and can help to clarify which psychological principles may seem to be 
the most relevant or applicable – which may then lend itself to further empirical evaluation. 
However, there is a long and rich history of empirical research on motivation that 
demonstrates that behavior is not always driven by consciously made decisions (Bargh & 
Barndollar, 1996).  Here, the clear implication is that people are not always as aware of the key 
drivers of their own behavior.  This may be further compounded by memory problems, 
especially where there is a pronounced tendency for individuals of all walks of life – likely 
including terrorists – to fill in details that are not based on accurate memories but rather are 
based on sequences of events that are logical and consistent with their attitudes and expectations 
(Taylor & Fiske, 1991; also see Neuberg, 1996, for a related discussion of expectancy 
confirmation).  It is in this way that we can consider the strength of narrative richness in personal 
accounts, but also consider some of the potential difficulties posed by relying on interviews or 
other methodologies that are built on the words and recollections and stated goals and ideals of 
actors with appropriate caution. With these potential limitations in mind, we can learn some 
important lessons about the type of emotions and attributes that have been implicated as 
especially informative in the context of terrorism. 
The emotional experience of humiliation has been widely cited as a potential catalyst for 
political violence in general and terrorism in particular (e.g., Marsella, 2004; McCauley, 2004).   
Among the wide range of emotions that have been examined as triggers for terrorism, 
humiliation is frequently positioned as a form of grievance that is necessary (but not necessarily 
sufficient) in the motivation of terrorism.  Depending on cultural conditions, humiliation may in 
fact require that steps be taken to address it and rectify it.  That may include the use of violence, 
and is an especially important consideration when discussing cultures where honor is paramount 
and the manner in which insult is both perceived and expressed, along with how such grievances 
need to be remedied.  
Narcissism is another individual level factor that has been studied in this context (Post, 
2007).  This personality factor may be well-suited for a conceptual analysis of certain terrorist 
leaders including Ocalan of the Kurdistan Worker‘s Party (PKK), Prabhakaran of the LTTE, and 
Guzman of the Shining Path to name but a few. However, in and of itself, narcissism does not 
provide a compelling predictive value of the advent of terrorism specifically, though it may be 
very useful in parsing intra-group relations with a particular emphasis on the dynamics between 
leaders and followers.  Considering the dynamic between leaders and their followers may shed 
some light on individual level motivations (Deikman, 2006).  The tendency to follow a leader is 
likely to have a significant relationship to one‘s tendency toward authoritarianism, which makes 
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them significantly more likely to support and follow established authorities, especially to the 
extent that the leader is setting an agenda that attempts to rectify current wrongs and that might 
usher in a more perfect time as had been present at some prior point in history (see Altemeyer, 
1988, 1996, for a discussion of Right Wing Authoritarianism).  
Another potentially applicable personality factor that clearly links the individual to a 
broader collective is altruism.  In the context of terrorism in general, but suicide terrorism in 
particular, unpacking the psychological underpinnings of altruism may provide some conceptual 
insights.  The research on the altruistic personality conducted by Oliner and Oliner (1988) 
suggests that when self-sacrifice is positioned as necessary and important for a greater good, it 
can lead to the adoption of attitudes and behaviors that are often at odds with one‘s own health, 
well-being, and possibly even one‘s survival.  Thus, the concept of altruism and the empirical 
research that examines when this particular type of self-sacrifice is more likely might provide 
useful information in the context of terrorism and countering terrorism. There are some benefits 
to the actor (in terms of recognition, glory, and honor; see Richardson‘s 2007 discussion of 
‗renown‘), but there are also very significant benefits to the suicide terrorist‘s family, their 
community, and their ethnic and religious community (e.g., Pedhazur, 2005; Moghadam 2008).   
Thus, from a social psychological standpoint, many of the causes that are most frequently 
uncovered through close scrutiny and analysis of interviews, narratives, messages and 
propaganda of leaders (e.g.,  Kepel & Milelli, 2008) and participants in online discussion forums 
(e.g., Brachman, 2008), we get a glimpse of the kinds of ideas, attitudes, and considerations that 
are particularly influential.  Building on this premise, we can briefly consider the role of 
influence and how the radicalization process has been both enhanced and increasingly enabled 
by advances in technology that create dynamic social networks in which ideas and information 
can be exchanged, in which social comparisons can be made, and in which participants may 
move toward increasingly extreme viewpoints.  The understanding of how people interpret, 
process, select, and use information (which is widely available on the internet; Weimann, 2006) 
is a direct focal point of Al Qaeda (Brachman, 2008).  One key potential contribution of 
psychology and communications is analyzing the way in which people process such messages 
and how they are framed.  The extent to which individuals identify with people, causes, and 
organizational goals is both shaped and fueled through propaganda and its sequelae in terms of 
attitude and behavior change.   
The study of motivation for terrorism very often focuses on questions of why, which 
provides myriad answers and can capture a wide range of responses – many of which appear to 
reflect idiosyncratic tendencies as much as (or perhaps more than) discernable patterns that can 
be harnessed in a manner that enables effective prediction of who will engage in terrorism.  
Rather, the line of inquiry about motivations can also be informed and complemented by an 
increased emphasis on how this happens (Horgan, 2005).  By extending the question in this way, 
we are in a much better position to draw on empirically established principles of group dynamics 
(Forsyth, 2010) for instance. Again, it is the integration of the individual level psychology with 
that of small groups, social influence networks, and broader sociopolitical and economic contexts 
that starts to provide a more accurate and informative picture.  It is certainly the case that no one 
of any of the aforementioned personality characteristics, group backgrounds, or other variables 
holds a monopoly on developing a complete understanding of the individual level catalysts of 
terrorism. However, combinations of these that take the context and environment into careful 
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consideration may provide some important insights that can continue to inform both the policy 
and research communities alike.   
Terrorism as an Intergroup Phenomenon: Looking for Triggers in Intergroup 
Events and Relations  
Terrorism is a particular form of asymmetric conflict in which actual or perceived threats 
to identity may play a particularly important role (Taylor & Louis, 2004).  When social identity 
is perceived to be under challenge or threat, it can mark potentially serious problems that groups 
may respond to in a variety of manners.  The perceived locus of the threat to that identity (in 
terms of the perpetrators) can have a bearing on the type of actions that the group members 
support, or would actually engage in, potentially including terrorism.  Thus, the issue of identity 
(social, cultural, religious, political, etc.) may be at the heart of understanding motivations for 
terrorism. This point directly ties to the psychology of the individual because there is ample 
evidence to suggest that many important aspects of individual identity are largely derived from 
social affiliations and group memberships (Taylor & Louis, 2004). 
Research in the formation and maintenance of social identities has consistently shown 
that when people belong to a group, they act in ways that favor their ingroup. Acting in ways that 
give advantage to the ingroup is characteristic of groups that are formed based on even the most 
trivial criteria (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). As group identity becomes increasingly salient, 
intergroup competition has been shown to increase both stereotypes and harm of outgroups 
(Sherif, 1966). Generally, rigid, categorical thinking (i.e., ‗us versus them‘) sets a necessary 
precondition for both intergroup violence and terrorism (Post, 1998; Staub, 2005). Whether it is 
used to justify acts of violence, to explain group differences, or, even in the context of policy 
decisions, social categorizations that privilege one group identity over another are a frequent 
correlate of intergroup violence and terrorism (Hewstone & Cairnes, 2001; Sidanius & Pratto, 
1999). In fact, categorical thinking and the differentiation of ‗us versus them‘ has been a central 
feature of many instances of extreme intergroup violence in addition to terrorism, including the 
genocides in Turkey, Germany, Cambodia, and Rwanda (Power, 2002; Staub, 1989). In the most 
extreme examples of intergroup violence, dehumanization of the outgroup plays a pivotal role.  
Not only is this other group not us, but they are also not human. By reducing the humanity of an 
outgroup, it places them squarely outside the realm of moral inclusion (Opotow, 2005). At this 
point, the moral imperative may actually shift toward requiring actions that are intended to limit 
or altogether eliminate members of that group (Bandura, 2004).  Again, the process by which this 
happens has been fairly well established (Waller, 2002; Staub, 1989) in which the progression 
and importance of dehumanization leading toward intergroup violence has been clearly 
elaborated. 
One critical aspect of intergroup relations that may provide an especially useful platform 
from which the impact of grievances can be considered is when people become aware of what 
others have in relation to themselves, in terms of both material resources and social status.  To 
the extent that they perceive the differences to be both meaningful and potentially unjust, they 
feel deprived of something that is rightfully theirs. This feeling of relative deprivation (e.g., 
Gurr, 1968, 2000; Runciman, 1966) is characterized by resentment and frustration, and is 
especially poignant when it occurs as the fortune of one‘s ingroup seems to be declining while 
the fortunes of others are improving. Thus, a heightened experience of relative deprivation is 
likely during economic downturns as a response to both military defeats and terrorist attacks and 
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may result in increases in prejudice and scapegoating (also see Staub, 1989, 2003; Waller, 2002). 
Labeling broad categories of people as appropriate targets may indeed serve as a catalyst for 
continued intergroup conflict. 
The related concept of ‗hate‘ has emerged as important based on its place in public 
dialogues about terrorism and also in its potential application to understanding intergroup 
violence and terrorism, albeit with limited empirical evidence (Sternberg, 2003; Sternberg, 
2005). The kind of hate that may be operating in the context of terrorism is neither blind nor 
disorganized. Rather, it is intense, focused, and often highly organized. This organization takes 
place by category, and to the extent that the hate is more categorical, rather than directed at a 
specific policy, action, or individual, it may be more intense (Opotow, 2005).  Though this may 
seem somewhat counter-intuitive, it helps to provide a framework in which hate is directed at a 
broader collective of people based primarily (if not solely) on their group membership.  If we 
consider terrorism an example of ―killing by category‖ as McCauley (2009) has posited, then it is 
important to understand how those categories are formed, reified, and acted upon. In sum, 
triggers for terrorism that may appear to operate at the individual level must necessarily take into 
account the intergroup context, as terrorism is most often an intergroup phenomenon.   
How Can our Understanding of „Triggers‟ Be Refined and Applied? 
The idea of specific triggers leading directly to terrorism is not directly supported by the 
evidence of the often relatively mundane manner in which potential terrorists move into and 
through organizations.  Horgan (2005) gives a very interesting perspective on this phenomenon 
and pulls the thread into the study of the conditions under which people leave terrorism.  In fact, 
one of the key findings thus far is that people who get involved may not have a real sense of 
what they are actually getting into.  Rather than the fame or notoriety that is often considered a 
prime motivation, many of the tasks that newer members of the organization take on may be 
rather boring and unsatisfying. Thus, there may be a fundamental disconnect between the 
motivations and triggers that bring someone over the threshold of involvement in the first place 
and the subsequent reality of their involvement. In this way, another useful consideration might 
be to differentiate individual psychological characteristics that might have a pronounced 
influence on ‗success‘ as measured by the ability to persevere and persist, which may lead to a 
focus on those who may be less impulsive, more able to delay gratification, and those with the 
requisite patience and the ability to adapt to meet the demands of a situation that may be 
inconsistent with their initial expectations. This particular course of inquiry might have prime 
applicability in understanding the selection process that occurs as people move further into the 
organization and is important to understand – not just with regard to the individual level factors, 
but also with relation to the pull, and the push, associated with the group dynamics that are 
inherent across group and organization types – including terrorists.  
  Taken together, a more in-depth analysis of exactly how and when such precursors 
motivate terrorism would better focus preventive efforts, and would require interdisciplinary 
collaboration as I have previously asserted (Lemieux, 2006).  One example of an 
interdisciplinary collaboration is the experimental research reported by Asal, Lemieux, and 
Wilkenfeld (2008) that examines the relative impact of grievance, perceived risks of getting 
involved in political action including terrorism, and the impact of social-personality factors.  As 
Moghaddam (2004) suggests, having a strong sense of the cultural preconditions that have both 
conceptual and practical links to some of the phenomena may increase the likelihood for 
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terrorism to emerge.  However, to increase the utility, it is of the utmost importance to consider 
any particular focal point as part of a broader constellation of factors, some of which may 
involve understanding more about the individual level attributes, characteristics, and 
experiences, while others may focus on higher-order factors including group level attributes. In 
conclusion, this brief analysis suggests that a multi-disciplinary, multi-method approach (of 
which psychology is one area that offers some important conceptual and methodological 
approaches) is likely to be of the greatest benefit in understanding the roots of terrorism and of 
greatest utility to the policy community and others. 
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In recent years, the processes by which people, young people in particular, within and outside 
of conflict zones become radicalized and transition from peaceful citizens to individuals enacting 
violent acts of terrorism have been studied intensively.  There is a growing understanding that 
the radicalization trajectory can be understood to operate as a process that engages individuals on 
four levels, each operating with its own motivational forces and vulnerabilities (Hafez, 2006; 
Moghadam, 2003; Speckhard, 2005a). These four levels are:  
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1. the group itself and its political reasons for existence and motivations for action;  
2. the individual and his or her own vulnerabilities and motivations for involvement; 
3. the ideology employed by the group, often to rationalize and justify political violence; 
and 
4. the segment of society that supports all of the above.  
As we increasingly begin to understand the processes of, and threats from, violent 
radicalization, governments in Western, as well as Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian, societies 
have begun to understand that it is necessary to mount an equal and as comprehensive a fight 
against violent radicalization.  This fight should include four main areas: 
1. preventing radicalization, particularly among vulnerable populations; 
2. immunizing society against violent ideologies;  
3. identifying and disengaging (by arrest, amnesty programs, or simple intimidation); and  
4. deradicalizing those who are on the brink of, or already have committed, violent acts on 
behalf of the militant groups.  
Pathways to Militant Jihad 
If we look at what we have learned from studies on suicide terrorism, terrorism in 
general, and radicalization processes in particular – especially those that are dealing with jihadist 
militant ideologies - we know that there are key vulnerable populations and venues to target for 
prevention, inoculation, and disengagement and deradicalization programs. This paper very 
briefly addresses these populations and describes how their location and particularly how 
contextual issues plays into their motivations for engaging in terrorism – motivations that must 
be addressed in order to successfully reduce terrorism. The first and largest group to consider in 
the development and implementation of programs to deal with militant jihadi terrorism includes 
existing Muslims as well as potential converts to (radical) Islam because these are the people 
who may be attracted into violent and extremist aberrations of the Muslim faith.  This is 
particularly true of predisposed individuals if they fall under the influence of a charismatic 
militant jihadi leader or group that meets their individual needs – needs that may not have much 
to do with the actual goals of the terrorist group.  These needs may range from protection, 
friendship, positive identity, a sense of mission, a guardian of sacred values, comfort against 
discrimination or marginalization, psychological first aid, or to find a means of enacting revenge 
or fight occupation (Speckhard, 2005a; Speckhard & Ahkmedova, 2005). The mechanisms by 
which these dynamics lead to radicalization may differ between environments that are inside, 
versus outside, conflict zones. 
Inside Conflict Zones 
In order to counter violent radicalization, one must understand how it occurs.  The 
pathways are many and vary with the most dramatic variance occurring between violent 
extremism stemming from conflict and non-conflict zones (Speckhard, 2005a; Speckhard & 
Ahkmedova, 2005).  When bombs are falling, homes are destroyed, loved ones are imprisoned, 
tortured, and killed; when individuals lose their ability to pursue education, to be employed, or 
become refugees, etc., as often occurs inside conflict zones, radicalization to violence/terrorism 
is accomplished quite easily.  It occurs as a result of traumatization and the presence of one or 
more desires: for political freedom, to end occupation, to live in peace, to rescue loved ones, and 
revenge losses, etc. (Speckhard & Ahkmedova, 2006; Speckhard & Akhmedova, 2005).   
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Within conflict zones, the individual motivations for engaging in terrorism include 
fighting perceived or real occupation, fighting gross human rights violations, and enacting 
revenge for very real losses.  Individual motivations for terrorism are usually laced with trauma 
and the desire for revenge.  Those individuals with the most traumatic losses are often at highest 
risk as they are in deep emotional pain and the militant jihadi ideology offers for them a 
legitimate and honorable exit from life as a ―martyr‖ and a type of  short lived psychological first 
aid (Speckhard, 2005a). Likewise, children and adolescents whose life views are in the process 
of forming and who are subjected to violent experiences often fall prey to world views offered to 
them by radical groups employing violent jihadist ideologies.   
Extremist groups that support terrorist attacks against the civilian populations of the 
opposing force within an active conflict zone generally enjoy widespread support from the local 
populace.  After all, when one‘s own population is actively under attack or are the victims of 
widespread collateral damage, as is nearly always the minimum case inside conflict zones, 
attacking civilians of the opposing side with terrorist tactics can easily be rationalized as 
retaliation.     
Inside Non-Conflict Zones 
In non-conflict zones, radicalization occurs quite differently and varies according to the 
local context and local grievances.  For instance, we know that vulnerabilities exist particularly 
within first- to third-generation Muslim immigrants living in Europe who are disengaged from 
society or are alienated and marginalized – particularly those that have been ghettoized or are 
self-isolated.  These vulnerable individuals are often young people looking for adventure, a sense 
of positive identity, a group to belong to, meaningfulness, and protection – especially in areas 
where criminal gangs are active (Speckhard, 2007a, 2008a). In another non-conflict zone, 
Morocco, the author found that these sources of motivation were overshadowed by poverty, 
frustrated aspirations, and hopelessness (Speckhard, 2005b).  In either case, when coupled with a 
charismatic recruiter who promises a mission, excitement, sense of meaning, and/or a heroic exit 
from a life of despair or ennui along with the rewards of martyrdom, the vulnerabilities of the 
individual may begin to mesh with the goals of the group.   
Bringing the Conflict Zone into the Non-Conflict Zones 
Lastly recruiters often find a way to foster conflict zone effects by bringing the conflict 
zone to non-conflict zones to vulnerable individuals via graphic pictures, videos, etc., which 
induces a secondary traumatization response and sense of outrage.  When this is accomplished, it 
is not difficult to exploit emotional responses, vulnerabilities, and needs to influence 
consideration of the militant jihad as a means of righting injustice.   Likewise, we must keep in 
mind that even in non-conflict zones, exposure to violence or direct traumatization can open the 
pathways to accept violence in exchange for the rewards of group membership, such as in violent 
homes, gangs, or exposure to other violent or traumatic events.  Violent experiences in prisons 
among detainee populations can also provide a receptive audience for charismatic jihadist 
recruiters (Speckhard, 2008b).  Thus, it is not entirely possible to make the dichotomy between 
conflict and non-conflict zones.  Those who grow up in urban ghettos, within the influence of 
gangs, exposed to domestic violence essentially grow up in mini-conflict zones and may show all 
of the vulnerabilities to terrorism recruitment that an individual growing up in an active conflict 
zone features.  Likewise, the ability today to bring graphic images, mainly via the Internet and 
television, into non-conflict zones blurs boundaries dramatically.   A Belgian second generation 
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Moroccan immigrant may, for instance, experience secondarily the violence in Chechnya, 
Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, or elsewhere via satellite television and Internet and also be 
growing up amidst gangs, domestic violence, or both and as a result show the same motivational 
aspects as someone coming out of one of these active conflict zones.   
Summary 
It is important to consider motivational and contextual issues when attempting to address 
terrorism at its roots. Understanding that those who are heavily exposed to violence may have 
differing motivational factors than those who are responding to alienation, social 
disenfranchisement, hopelessness, frustrated aspirations, group dynamics, etc., is important in 
designing appropriate responses.  Likewise, these motivational states are heavily influenced by 
location, particularly by whether the social milieu is embedded in violence. 
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Abstract 
A subset of those involved in the global Muslim fundamentalist movement will 
consistently select political violence as a strategy to accomplish their goals. However, the pool of 
supporters and potential recruits will balloon or shrink depending on potentially modifiable risk 
factors. Our analysis of the Pew Global Attitudes Survey of 2006 and the Pew Muslim American 
Survey of 2007 supports our hypothesis that perceived discrimination and employment security 
are risk factors that influence the proportion of the general Muslim diaspora community who feel 
supportive of terrorism on behalf of Islam. In so far as perceived discrimination and rate of 
employment are modifiable by laws or social policies, so is community support for anti-Western 
terrorism. 
Introduction 
Political violence arises from grievance and from ambition for change. Evidence suggests 
that the emergence and development of terrorist groups is tied to the support they receive from a 
larger population group (Crenshaw 1995; Schmid & Jongman, 1988). So, for example, when a 
large population contains a certain proportion of individuals who feel politically aggrieved, some 
of those individuals may become radicalized, some of those who are radicalized may become 
activists, some activists may be willing to join extremist groups, and some members of extremist 
groups may commit acts of political violence—including terrorist attacks on civilians. The 
impetus for the winnowing process that leads to formation of activist, extremist, and terrorist 
cells tends to arise from psychologically collective behaviors of distressed and angry people, 
often with the provocation of charismatic leaders. Recruitment to violent groups depends on the 
proportion of those in the larger population who agree (cognitively) and feel sympathetic 
(emotionally) with the image, goals, and methods of terrorist groups.    
It is self-evident that some intelligence/police/military actions will reduce the risk of 
extremist violence by co-opting, capturing, or killing terrorists. It is less obvious, but perhaps 
equally likely, that carefully designed social policies will help to prevent terrorism by addressing 
the underlying socio-economic, cognitive, and emotional risk factors of populations prone to 
contribute moral support, material support, or participants to the extremist enterprise.  
An illustrative historical example is the emergence and dissolution of the violent black 
separatist movement in the U.S. in the early 1960s. Methodologically rigorous research is hard to 
 105 
UNCLASSIFIED 
find, but it is intuitively plausible that the prejudice, discrimination, oppression, and economic 
and political exclusion of African Americans were causally related to the emergence of the Black 
Panthers. The slew of U.S. federal Civil Rights legislation beginning with the Voting Rights Act 
of 1965 was temporally associated with a marked decline in the activity of the black separatist 
movement. It is not possible to quantify the degree to which the decline in the black separatist 
movement was attributable to the FBI‘s enforcement efforts as opposed to the impact of social 
policies that undermined the allure of membership by making some grievances moot. Yet U.S. 
national security seems to have been enhanced at least in part by policies that had short term 
impact on immediate grievances (such as improved perception of civic enfranchisement) and, 
perhaps more importantly, long term impact on inter-group relations via restorative justice 
stratagems such as affirmative action and forced busing in the interest of integrative social 
contact beginning in elementary school.  
The social science of inter-group conflict clearly played a role in this transformation.  
Although these massive social policy initiatives were hardly intended as controlled studies, the 
small-scale efforts of pioneering scientists such as Williams, Sherif, and Allport drew attention 
to the problem and provided critical guidance toward the solutions even before the critical mass 
of public sentiment and political will absolutely compelled action. The job is far from finished 
(Massey & Denton, 1993). Yet the U.S. civil rights era stands as a historic model for the 
potential impact of applied social science to defuse a deadly and dangerous inter-group conflict. 
A global Muslim fundamentalist movement has been gaining ground for several decades.  
Evidence suggests that, although there are relatively few active members of violent Salafist 
jihadi groups, support for anti-Western behavior is widespread throughout the Muslim 
populations of the Middle East and commonplace in the Muslim diaspora population of Europe.  
Multi-pronged intelligence/military/police initiatives have led to the killing or incarceration of a 
number of dangerous individuals, and some avenues of material support have been interdicted.  
Yet financial backing, moral support, and recruitment continue to flourish in many regions. It is 
worth examining whatever data are available to identify and quantify risk factors for such 
collective support. In so far as such risk factors are modifiable by social policy, one has a new 
tool for defusing conflict. 
To that end, we examined the datasets of two large surveys recently conducted by Pew: 
the 2006 Global Attitudes Project 15-Nation Survey, which included Muslim participants in 
Europe, and the 2007 Muslim American Survey. Based upon long-established theories of social 
conflict, we hypothesized that: 
 
1. The opinion that ―violence against civilian targets is justifiable to defend Islam‖ 
would be associated with perceived discrimination; and 
2. The opinion that violence against civilian targets is justifiable to defend Islam 
would be associated with unemployment. 
Method  
To test our hypotheses, we conducted secondary data analyses on two publicly available 
opinion surveys. The Pew Global Attitudes Project (http://pewglobal.org) conducts face-to-face 
interviews regarding public opinion on a regular basis. We downloaded the Spring 2006 15-
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Nation Survey from the Pew website. The Global Attitudes Project bears no responsibility for the 
interpretations presented or conclusions reached based on the reported analysis of the data. 
Of the original 16,710 participants from 15 nations, we included only those representing 
European Muslims in Great Britain, France, Germany, and Spain. This yielded a total of 1,627 
participants (879 males, 747 females). The mean age was 35 years (SD = 12.48; range = 18 to 97 
and over). 
We focused on responses that specifically related to support for suicide bombing and 
other violence against civilian targets, as well as those related to demographic factors, economic 
factors, perceived discrimination, and other aspects of inter-group relations. We used the Muslim 
weight variable, along with the European Muslim filter variable in the downloaded SPSS 
(advanced mathematic and statistical software) datafile. 
A second dataset, called the 2007 Muslim American Survey, was provided by the Pew 
Research Center (http://peoplepress.org/dataarchive/form.php?DocID=319) under the auspices of 
The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press (http://people-press.org/). The survey was 
conducted via phone interviews made from January through April, 2007. A total of 1,050 
Muslim Americans completed the survey. The Pew researchers employed a complex sampling 
method, weighting the data from these 1,050 subjects to account for sampling errors that would 
limit generalizability to the larger U.S. Muslim population. We used the WesVar statistical 
software for complex samples to conduct all analyses, enabling our findings to better predict 
responses from the larger population.  
Results 
Our results are summarized in Tables 2 and 3. As some of the effect sizes are not large on 
an absolute basis, additional research or validation may be advisable before developing strategies 
based on these correlations.   
As shown in Table 1, among European Muslims, the opinion that terrorism is justifiable 
was inversely correlated with age and with favorability of opinions regarding the U.S., 
Americans, and Jews. The opinion that terrorism is justifiable was directly correlated with 
having had a bad personal experience of discrimination and with worry about unemployment. 
Table 2 shows that, among American Muslims, the opinion that terrorism is justifiable 
was also negatively correlated with age and with employment status. The opinion that terrorism 
is justifiable was positively correlated with having experience that others were suspicious of the 
respondent, having been called offensive names (i.e., having experienced harassment and/or 
discrimination), and the opinion that it has become more difficult to be a Muslim in the U.S. 
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Table 1: 
Correlations (Pearson‟s r) between queries in the 2006 Pew European Muslim Study and 
the Opinion that Terrorism is Justifiable 
(0 = never justified, 1 – rarely justified, 2 = sometimes justified, 3 = often justified)  
―Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets are 
justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter what the 
reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that this kind of violence is 
often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never justified?‖ 
 
Query r p 
Age - .159 .001*** 
Sex .003 .895 
Are you very worried, somewhat worried, not too 
worried, or not at all worried about unemployment 
among (survey country) Muslims? 
.072  .005** 
Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat 
favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very 
unfavorable opinion of The United States? 
- .021 .431 
Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat 
favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very 
unfavorable opinion of Americans? 
- .097  .001*** 
Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat 
favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very 
unfavorable opinion of Jews? 
- .076  .005** 
In your opinion, how many Europeans do you think are 
hostile toward Muslims – would you say 
most, many, just some, or very few? 
.063  .015* 
Which of the following phrases comes closer to 
describing your view? I favor the U.S.-led efforts 
to fight terrorism, OR, I oppose the U.S.-led efforts to 
fight terrorism. 
- .008 .749 
In the last two years, have you personally had a bad 
experience due to your race, ethnicity, or 
religion, or hasn‘t this happened to you? 
.110*** .001*** 
* = p < .05 
** = p < .01 
*** = p < .001 
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Table 2: 
Correlations (single predictor in the regression model) between queries in the 2007 Pew 
Muslim American Study and the Opinion that Terrorism is Justifiable 
(0 = never justified, 1 – rarely justified, 2 = sometimes justified, 3 = often justified)  
―Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets are 
justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter what the 
reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that this kind of violence is 
often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never justified?‖ 
 
Query Beta p 
Age - .165 .003** 
Sex .029 .571 
Education - .59 .178 
Are you now employed full-time, part-time, or not 
employed? 
- .123 .022* 
In the past twelve months, have people acted as if they are 
suspicious of you because you are a Muslim, or not? 
.114 .040* 
In the past twelve months, have you been called offensive 
names because you are a Muslim, or not? 
.113 .046* 
In the past twelve months, have you been singled out by law 
enforcement Officers (other than airport security) because 
you are a Muslim, or not? 
.027 .552 
In the past twelve months, have you been physically 
threatened or attacked because you are a Muslim, or not? 
.014 .711 
And thinking more generally – NOT just about the past 12 
months – have you ever been the victim of discrimination as 
a Muslim living in the United States? 
.056 .245 
Do you think that coverage of Islam and Muslims by 
American news organizations is generally fair or unfair? 
- .036 .238 
Do you think that the government‘s anti-terrorism policies 
single out Muslims in the U.S. for increased surveillance 
and monitoring, or don‘t you think so? 
.016 .762 
Do you think the U.S.-led war on terrorism is a sincere effort 
to reduce international terrorism or don‘t you believe that? 
.034 .418 
Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, has it become more difficult 
to be a Muslim in the U.S., or hasn‘t it changed very much? 
.098 .040* 
* = p < .05 
** = p < .01 
 109 
UNCLASSIFIED 
Discussion 
As some other studies have found, younger Muslims are more likely to support extremist 
ideas and behaviors (Buonfino, 2007; Lieberman & Collins, 2008; and others). It was no surprise 
to find that age was inversely correlated with the opinion that terrorism is justified.   
The findings in this study that are new and potentially useful to decision makers are those 
related to discrimination and to employment security. Hypothesis 1 was largely confirmed by 
this study; that is, the hypothesis that violence against civilians (terrorism) is justified to defend 
Islam is correlated with (but not necessarily caused by) perceived discrimination. Variables that 
appear highly relevant to perceived discrimination were correlated with the opinion that 
terrorism is justifiable, both among European and U.S. Muslims. Yet the pattern of responses 
was somewhat different: The direct experience of discrimination was highly correlated with 
support for terrorism among European Muslims, and the (more general) experience of 
discrimination (indirectly by having experienced being a subject of suspicion, or directly by 
having been called offensive names) was correlated with support for terrorism in the U.S. The 
more general question of ever having been a victim of discrimination in the U.S. was not 
correlated with support for bombing. Overall, the findings are consistent with the social science 
observation that perception of injustice universally tends to provoke an angry response 
(DiGuiseppe & Defrate, 2006), although anger does not equate to support for or engaging in 
terrorism. 
Hypothesis 2, that is the hypothesis that employment would be correlated with support for 
terrorism, was strongly confirmed by this study, although the variables in the two data sets 
relevant to employment were somewhat different. Among European Muslims, worry about 
unemployment was correlated with support for bombing; among U.S. Muslims, actual 
employment status (less than full-time employment) was correlated with such support. It is 
reasonable to conclude that employment security plays a role in determining the likelihood that a 
member of the Muslim diaspora community living in the West will support violent behavior.  
Our findings are consistent with the social science theory that, without a meaningful, purpose-
driven adult identity— including a rewarding job—some individuals will turn toward anti-social 
behavior (Zimbardo, 1969). 
Since Muslims in the West whose employment is insecure are more likely to opine that 
terrorism is justifiable, full employment would seem highly desirable. Since being called 
offensive names is associated with support for terrorism, initiatives to prevent hate speech would 
perhaps be worth pursuing. It would be more difficult to change other significant correlates of 
support for terrorism, such as community suspiciousness of Muslims, or the perception that it has 
become more difficult to be Muslim in the U.S. post-9/11.  
To date, little empirical research has examined whether specific initiatives to alter these 
potentially modifiable risk factors actually do so. For example, targeted programs to ensure full 
employment of at-risk Muslim men could be assessed for their impact on the reservoir of 
community support for terrorism. Forced integration of Europe‘s segregated Asian/White school 
systems might yield longer-term benefits. Demonstration projects evaluated with rigor would 
seem to be essential. Yet, even before those data come in, policy makers may wish to consider 
whether cost-efficient mechanisms exist that, theoretically speaking, could address the factors 
shown to significantly correlate with support for terrorism among Muslims living in the West.  
back to top 
 110 
UNCLASSIFIED 
References 
Buonfino, A. (2007).  East London – The local dynamics of migration, alienation and extremism. The 
Young Foundation, East London.  
Crenshaw, M. (1995). Thoughts on relating terrorism to historical contexts. In. In M. Crenshaw (Ed.) 
Terrorism in context  (pp. 3-24). University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press. 
DiGiuseppe, R. & Tafrate, R. C. (2006). Understanding anger disorders. Oxford University Press. 
Lieberman, J. & Collins, S. (2008, May 8). Violent Islamist extremism, the Internet, and the homegrown 
terrorist threat. Majority & Minority Staff Report, United States Senate Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs. Retrieved from 
http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/IslamistReport.pdf. 
Massey, D. S., & Denton, N. A. (1993). American apartheid. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Schmid, A. P. & Jongman,  A. J. (1988). Political terrorism: A new guide to actors, authors, concepts, 
data bases, theories, and literature. North-Holland. 
Zimbardo, P. G. (1969). The human choice: Individuation, reason, and order, versus ividuation, impulse, 
and chaos. Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 17, 237 – 307. 
 
 
1.6. The Role of Emotion in Escalating Violent Non-State Actors to Hostility 
(David Matsumoto) 
 
Author: David Matsumoto, Ph.D. 
Organization: San Francisco State University 
Contact Information: dm@sfsu.edu 
 
 One crucial aspect of human behavior that is often overlooked by researchers, operators, 
and policy makers is that of human emotion. Although emotion is often viewed as too soft for 
serious consideration or research, an understanding of emotion is central to an understanding of 
any individual or group behavior. On the individual level, emotions are evolutionarily evolved 
information processing systems that aid in survival (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Darwin, 
1872/1998). They are transient, fleeting reactions to events that have implications for our 
welfare, and require immediate response (Ekman, 2003; Lazarus, 1991). They prime behaviors 
by initiating unique physiological signatures and mental structures (Levenson, 1999, 2003). They 
aid in bonding memories and cognitions (Bower, 1981; Forgas & Bower, 1987). And most 
importantly, they are a major source of motivation (Tomkins, 1962, 1963).  
Emotions also exist on the group level, and serve similar functions. Group emotions are 
emotions shared by individual members of groups, often about their own groups or other groups. 
Group emotions occur when a sufficient proportion of individual members of a group have 
similar emotions about their group or about other groups (although there is no definition or 
consensus in the field about what that proportion may be). Like individual-level emotions, 
groups have emotional reactions to events that have consequences to their perceived welfare and 
survival. Group level emotions serve as motivations for group behaviors. They provide 
guidelines and bases for making attributions about ingroups and outgroups. And they aid in 
regulating social behavior and preventing social chaos (Matsumoto et al., 2008). Thus, a 
 111 
UNCLASSIFIED 
complete understanding of behavior starts with the recognition of the importance of emotion, 
because emotion is motivation (Tomkins, 1962, 1963). This is true on the level of individuals as 
well as groups. Importantly for this article, it is true for the understanding of the behavior of 
Violent Non-State Actors (VNSA), especially acts of hostility.  
Understanding Emotions as Discrete Constructs 
There are many ways to understand and categorize emotions. A simple way, for instance, 
is to classify emotions simply by their valence (positive or negative) or intensity (strong v. 
weak). Indeed, this way of understanding emotions is very popular not only among laypersons 
but also in academic psychology (Feldman Barrett, 2004; Russell & Feldman Barrett, 1999), and 
its simplicity merits attention. But there is a large body of literature that demonstrates 
convincingly that not all emotions are the same, nor should they be reduced to simple dimensions 
such as valence or intensity (Ekman, 1999; Izard, 2007; Panksepp, 2007). This framework is 
known as a discrete emotions perspective, and in this perspective, different categories of emotion 
are qualitatively and uniquely distinct from each other; that is, emotions are discrete entities.  
Take the emotions of anger, contempt, and disgust, for example, all of which can be 
considered negative emotions in the simplistic valenced view above. There are important 
differences among these emotions that make it clear that they are not alike, and these have major 
practical implications. Anger, contempt, and disgust are very different emotions, with different 
physiological reactions, different mental state changes, and different nonverbal expressions 
(Ekman, 1999), all of which prepare us for different behaviors. When we are angry, for instance, 
our heart rate increases, and the blood flows differentially to our arms and hands, preparing us to 
fight (Levenson, 2003). The function of anger, therefore, is to remove obstacles. The function of 
disgust, however, is to eliminate or repulse contaminated objects, while a primary function of 
contempt is to make a statement about one‘s evaluations of another‘s actions vis-à-vis status and 
hierarchy. Anger, therefore, is an emotion about what someone or a group did. Contempt and 
disgust, however, are emotions about who the person or group is.  
While laypersons often do not make such distinctions among emotions, those distinctions 
are important. In particular, there is a special place for disgust in understanding terrorism and 
violence, for several reasons. First, studies of emotions in interpersonal conflicts indicate that it 
is disgust (and contempt), not anger, that is associated with the breakdown of a relationship 
(which could be seen as a component of hostile acts between groups) (Gottman & Levenson, 
2002; Gottman, Levenson, & Woodin, 2001). Second, as mentioned above, disgust is a basic, 
primary emotion, elicited by perceptions of agents of contamination or disease. It is universal, 
not only in its signal properties (Ekman, 1993), but also in terms of its elicitors (Rozin, Haidt, & 
McCauley, 1999; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999). Third, disgust is a moral emotion, and 
it is often used to sanction our moral beliefs and behaviors (Chapman, Kim, Susskind, & 
Anderson, 2009). Fourth, our anecdotal observations of the videos of terrorists such as Osama 
Bin Laden or the Virginia Tech University shooter Cho Seung Hyi, as well as the speeches and 
writing of world leaders who incited wars (e.g., Hitler, Milosevic, etc.) indicated an escalation of 
disgust (in facial expressions) leading up to violent acts. Disgust leads individuals to kill 
cockroaches, and it does not matter whether the cockroaches are male, female, or infants; they 
are cockroaches and must be eliminated. Likewise, terrorist acts do not differentiate between 
men, women, or children; they must be eliminated because they are vermin (or infidel dogs).  
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Thus, although much research on aggression has focused on anger, in today‘s context of 
terrorism as a global phenomenon, disgust must be considered a central emotion to study on the 
group level, as there it represents a shift toward making an assessment of the inherent 
characteristics of the other group, rather than a temporary judgment about an act committed by 
that group. Disgust transforms aggression, which sometimes can be constructive, into hostility, 
which is almost always not, and anger into hatred. The transformation of anger to contempt and 
then disgust is akin to a transformation of a situational attribution about an act to a dispositional 
attribution about the person. Consequently, if a person or group does something bad, anger is 
focused on the act, but the person or group may or may not be bad, and in fact may be 
rehabilitated in some way in the future. Evaluations resulting in contempt and disgust, however, 
mean that the person or group is inherently bad and there is no chance for rehabilitation; thus, the 
logical recourse is to eliminate them.  Elimination can occur in various manners: from the 
extreme form of violently eliminating them, to shunning, to avoidance, to simply dissociating 
them from one‘s consciousness. 
Intergroup Emotions 
Although the scientific study of emotion has traditionally focused on the individual, in 
recent years, group level emotions have increasingly become an object of scientific research. 
Most studies have examined the types of emotions felt by members of groups toward outgroups. 
Studies of intergroup anxiety, for instance, suggest that anxiety toward outgroups may occur 
because of fear of embarrassment about not knowing what to do with the outgroup, fear of 
negative behavioral consequence, fear of negative evaluations, a history of negative intergroup 
relations and minimal previous contact with the outgroup, large status differences between the 
ingroup and outgroup, or higher ratios of outgroup members compared to ingroup (i.e., more of 
―them‖ than ―us‖) (Niedenthal, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2006; Stephan & Stephan, 1985). Studies 
on the Stereotype Content Model suggest that group members have different emotions toward 
outgroups based on the dimensions of perceived warmth and competence (Cuddy, Fiske, & 
Glick, 2007). Intergroup Emotions Theory suggests that group members feel anger toward 
outgroups when the ingroup is in conflict with the outgroup and the ingroup view is the majority; 
this anger will lead groups to confront, oppose, or attack the outgroup (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 
2000).  
Some studies have also examined the emotions that are attributed to ingroup and 
outgroup members. Infrahumanization Theory, for instance, suggests that ingroup favoritism and 
outgroup derogation leads to the attribution of more human characteristics, including emotions, 
toward ingroup members compared to outgroups (Cortes, Demoulin, Rodriguez, Rodrigues, & 
Leyens, 2005; Demoulin et al., 2004; Rodriguez Torres et al., 2005). Thus, ingroups are more 
likely to attribute the more ―human‖ emotions of compassion, shame, serenity, bitterness, or 
contempt to ingroups. At the same times, ingroups attribute more ―basic‖ or ―primary‖ emotions 
such as surprise, anger, pleasure, fear, attraction, or disgust to outgroups. Interestingly, these 
emotions are those considered to be shared between humans and non-human primates (LeDoux 
& Phelps, 2008).  
Thus, the dehumanization of outgroups involves emotional attributions about those 
outgroups associated with animals, not humans, and intergroup emotions are the glue that keep 
such attitudes about outgroups connected. Without their emotional bases, these attitudes would 
have little meaning or practical consequence. But intergroup relations are complex and 
 113 
UNCLASSIFIED 
potentially deadly, especially among VNSAs, precisely because outgroup cognitions are 
associated with strong emotions.  
A Framework for Understanding the Role of Emotions in Escalating VNSA to 
Violence 
Not only are emotions important to the creation and maintenance of intergroup attitudes 
and relations, but changes in those emotions across time may be associated with different 
intergroup behaviors (because the primary function of emotion is to motivate behavior, on both 
the individual and group levels). In my view, violence and hostility are the direct result of the 
planned inculcation and careful, methodical nurturing of hatred in VNSAs. As mentioned above, 
this theoretical framework is based on a view of discrete emotions (Ekman, 1999), most notably 
those having to do with morality (Rozin & Fallon, 1987; Rozin, Lowery et al., 1999; Tangney & 
Fischer, 1995). Although emotions such as shame and guilt have received considerable attention 
as moral emotions in the past (Shweder & Haidt, 2000; Tangney & Fischer, 1995), more recent 
work has focused on anger, contempt, and disgust and their relationship to autonomy, 
community, and divinity (Rozin, Lowery et al., 1999). More specifically, Rozin and colleagues 
(1999) proposed that anger, contempt, and disgust are often elicited in response to violations of 
autonomy, community, and divinity, respectively, known as the CAD (community, autonomy, 
divinity) Triad hypothesis.  
 Sternberg (2003) has proposed a triarchic theory of hatred that is based on these three 
emotions, and fear. He proposes that hatred is based on a negation of intimacy (based on 
disgust), passion (based on anger and fear) and decision-commitment based on devaluation and 
diminution of others (based on contempt). According to his model, different kinds of hatred can 
exist based on different combinations of these three components. Because there are three 
components, they can yield seven different combinations of hatred: cold, cool, hot, simmering, 
boiling, seething, and burning hatred.  
 An interesting aspect of Sternberg‘s (2003) theory is that hatred is propagated via stories. 
Stories serve an important and interesting purpose, by bringing to life the various components of 
hatred in a concise, easy-to-understand and easy-to-communicate method. It provides group 
leaders with a platform by which group emotions can be developed, fostered, maintained, or 
extinguished, and for those same emotions to be propagated within groups by its members who 
communicate the stories to others. According to Sternberg (2003), there are many different types 
of hate stories that achieve this purpose:  
 
 the stranger 
 impure other (v. pure ingroup) 
 controller (v. controlled) 
 faceless foe (v. individuated ingroup) 
 enemy of God (v. servant of God) 
 morally bankrupt (v. morally sound) 
 death (v. life) 
 barbarian (v. civilized ingroup) 
 greedy enemy (v. financially responsible ingroup) 
 criminal (v. innocent party) 
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 torturer (v. victim) 
 murderer (v. victim) 
 seducer-rapist (v. victim) 
 animal pest (v. human) 
 power crazed (v. mentally balanced) 
 subtle infiltrator (v. infiltrated) 
 comic character (v. sensible ingroup) 
 thwarter-destroyer of destiny (v. seeker of destiny) 
 
Stories also serve the important function of providing members with a way to 
communicate attitudes, values, beliefs, and opinions across generations, a central component of 
culture, which refers to a shared meaning and information system transmitted across generations 
(Matsumoto & Juang, 2007). VNSA organizations, like many groups, are uniquely characterized 
by their own cultures. Collectively, this system provides guidelines for normative behavior, the 
basis for the nature and function of attributions, communication systems, and intergroup 
relations. VNSAs, especially terrorist organizations, are characterized by sacred values and 
beliefs (Atran & Axelrod, 2007; Ginges, Atran, Medin, & Shikaki, 2007), but then again so are 
many ideologically-based organizations (e.g., pro- or anti-abortion groups, gun groups, death 
penalty groups, etc.). Research on terrorists and other ideologically-based groups suggests that 
they are comparable to each other in their social psychological dynamics (Stahelski, 2005). 
Hatred and disdain of others is facilitated by a culture of hatred and disdain that is permeated 
throughout the group, and future generations are similarly enculturated.  
Work on the CAD Triad hypothesis (Rozin, Lowery et al., 1999) is important because it 
highlights the importance of specific, discrete emotions in moral systems. Sternberg‘s (2003) 
work is important because it uses the CAD Triad hypothesis as a basis to understand the various 
components of hatred. Building on this previous work, I propose that these emotions are 
transformed over time, often via stories, to inculcate cultures of hatred and violence. 
Specifically, I suggest three phases in this emotion transformation: 
Phase 1 – Outrage based on Anger. Phase 1 involves the group identifying events that 
obstruct goals or are based on perceptions of injustice. Phase 1 may also involve the 
group identifying threats to well-being, physical safety, or ways of life. These 
interpretations and attributions lead to, or are fueled by, feelings of anger toward the 
outgroup. 
Phase 2 – Moral Superiority based on Contempt. In Phase 2, groups begin to reinterpret 
anger-eliciting situations and events identified in Phase 1, and take the high road; that is, 
they reappraise the events from a position of moral superiority, identify links between 
similar behaviors or events, no matter how tenuous, thus making the attribution that the 
outgroup is morally inferior. These reappraisals and attributions lead to, or are fueled by, 
the emotion of contempt. 
Phase 3 – Elimination based on Disgust. In Phase 3, there is a further reappraisal of 
events and situations that lead to the conclusion that distance needs to be placed between 
the ingroup and outgroup (the mild form of elimination), or that the outgroup needs to be 
eliminated (the extreme form). These ideas are promulgated by the emotion of disgust. 
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 This perspective allows us to understand how groups can hate, but not all hatred leads to 
violence or hostility. Hatred based primarily on anger and/or contempt will not be associated 
with violence or hostility, but hatred that involves disgust does, because disgust is the emotion of 
repulsion and elimination. Groups can be angry or contemptuous, but when they are also 
disgusted, they may become dangerous. Further, it is interesting to note that many definitions of 
hatred involve concepts of intense aversion, which is related to the emotion of disgust, or intense 
animosity, which has its roots in animals (and therefore not human), also related to disgust.  
 How do these appraisals and reappraisals occur, and group emotions get created or 
transformed? Powerful leaders set the tone for groups to interpret or reinterpret events in certain 
ways that then lead to group emotions. Leaders do this by creating stories based on their 
appraisals or reappraisals of critical events and situations, and by communicating the emotions 
associated with their reappraised stories to their followers and subordinates. The communication 
occurs through the specific types of emotion-laden and emotion-related words, metaphors, 
images, and analogies used, as well as nonverbally through their faces, voices, gestures, and 
body language. That is, it is not the case that emotions are communicated directly to groups (e.g., 
we perceived an obstacle, so we must be angry); instead, emotions are communicated indirectly 
via the associations made to groups with emotion-laden words, metaphors, analogies, and 
nonverbal behavior. Through the careful use of language and nonverbal behaviors, leaders are in 
a position to motivation, escalate, or defuse situations, and incite action or not, through emotion. 
back to top 
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 The aim of this piece is to inform the reader about what scientific evidence exists, to date, 
regarding the neurological basis for feelings of unfairness and sensations of grievance, 
particularly those feelings and sensations that may lead to violent behavior such as terrorism.  It 
should be noted that a number of intervening mechanisms and pathways exist between a basic 
neurological event and complex behavioral action.  Other than epileptic seizures where 
accidental physical harm can result, few neurological conditions are the direct cause of violent 
behavior.  They can be causes, however, in the antecedent sense, but numerous pathways exist 
depending upon psychological, social, and cultural factors.  This author is a criminologist with a 
special expertise on stress-induced crime and how perceptions of unfairness can lead to violence 
(O'Connor, 1993).  The approach adopted here comes from the field of biosocial criminology, 
where biological forces are seen as operating on, as well as influenced by, environmental stimuli.  
Biology, psychology, and sociology are integrated. 
 Criminology is an appropriate discipline to draw upon because of its strengths in 
specifying the dependent variables (outcomes or results).  Other social science disciplines, such 
as sociology and psychology, have strengths in elaborating the independent variables (inputs or 
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causes).  In recent years, criminologists have demonstrated a willingness to consider research 
findings from other sciences that study criminal behavior.  Integration of biological and social 
knowledge has increased awareness, understanding, and the possibility of effective treatment 
modalities.  However, conceptualization issues remain problematic.  For present purposes, the 
dependent variable of crime is defined as ―any socially harmful act or analogous social injury 
which is prohibited by the State and against which the State may react by punishment‖ 
(Sutherland, 1949, p. 31).  This is a broad enough definition to cover the many types of 
terrorism, for which the requisite mental state is premeditated or purposive use of violence, 
according to State and Defense Department definitions (Office of Coordinator, 1997; U.S. 
Departments of the Army and Air Force, 1990). 
 Unfairness is conceptually different from grievance but a common sense distinction 
should be made.  To use an example, every society has a nudity taboo, and a woman may 
experience a sense of unfairness to learn that a nude photograph of her has been taken 
surreptitiously, but a sense of grievance only ensues if she learns her photograph has been 
published somewhere.  Ultimately, the concepts are a matter of judicial determination, but they 
also exist subjectively and depend upon the social setting.  Subjective perceptions are difficult to 
measure, and study is further complicated by the field's reliance upon two interminable concepts: 
the reference group and relative deprivation.  Both terms were initially developed by Merton 
(1968) as an alternative to the older frustration-aggression hypothesis, which relied mostly upon 
a Freudian interpretation of natural impulses being thwarted.  It is standard sociological practice 
to assume a reference group (whom a person chooses to compare their own or group's condition 
with) may be real or imagined, and the effects of relative deprivation (sense of injustice) are real 
in their consequences.  Along these lines, the field of social psychology includes a wealth of 
research on "deprivational forms of inequity" (Singer 1981: 88), the history of which can be 
summarized as largely focused first on exchange theories, then equity theories, subsequently on 
the sociology of emotions, and finally on general strain theory (Agnew 1992).  General strain 
theory is the only model in contemporary criminology that emphasizes feelings of unfairness and 
sensations of grievance.  In its present form, it is decidedly sociological but not incapable of 
integration with the insights of other disciplines. 
Biosocial criminology first emerged in the mid-1970s, but was largely ignored until the 
late 1980s.  Wilson (1980) was one of the pioneers who argued on behalf of using biology to 
explain presumably social traits like selfishness and spite.  C. Ray Jeffery‘s (1977) use of 
biology for criminological purposes was overshadowed by the simultaneous rise in the popularity 
of models for situational crime prevention or CPTED (crime prevention through environmental 
design).  During the 1990s, biosocial criminology had plenty of false starts and dead ends such as 
the compulsive masculinity thesis (O‘Connor, 1994).  However, by the start of the 21st century, 
biosocial criminology continued to draw upon "hard science" psychiatry, psychology, and 
medicine and now is believed to have moderate to strong empirical veracity (Rowe, 2001; Walsh 
& Beaver, 2009).  For example, brain neuroscience (Blair, 2008), childhood development (Lahey 
et al., 2008), hormones and neurotransmitters (Hubbard, 1983), and studies in molecular and 
behavioral genetics (Wright et. al., 2008; Walsh & Beaver, 2009) have all been usefully 
imported.  The following bodies of literature are now customary aids to understanding criminal 
behavior: 
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 Brain Functioning:  Imaging studies show that amygdala dysfunction is strongly 
related to the conditioning of emotional reactions, particularly fear, and when 
combined with executive deficits (dorsolateral, orbitofrontal, and medial cortices of 
the frontal lobes) produce emotional states and cognitive biases that motivate criminal 
behavior. 
 Childhood Development: Callous-unemotional traits such as lack of empathy are 
traceable to the interaction of early childhood temperament with parenting factors, 
and are strongly predictive of subsequent antisocial and violent behavior. 
 Hormones and Neurotransmitters: Abnormal levels of norepinephrine, acetylcholine, 
and endorphins produce a fight or flight reaction characterized by a need for arousal 
at fairly regular intervals, usually via violence.  
 Phenotypes and Genotypes: A phenotype results from the expression of an organism's 
genes as well as the influence of environmental factors while a genotype reflects the 
inherited instructions of genetic code, with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder 
(ADHD) being the gene-environment interaction with the most relevance to chronic 
misbehavior.  
Biosocial criminology, compared to other approaches in criminology, tends to explain at 
least as much variance (10-20%) as general stress or strain models (O‘Connor, 1993).  This 
means that among general population samples, research on various models or an assemblage of 
variables will explain about 10-20% of all possible causes for violent behavior.  Even the best 
sociological theories in criminology will typically produce research findings in the 20-30% range 
(Agnew, 1992).  Clearly, the right combination of sociological and biological factors has yet to 
be found.  Research is compounded not only by the aforementioned conceptualization problems, 
but by the fact that proxy biological variables often have to be used since brain scans, blood 
tests, hair samples, and various other ideal data collection measures rarely pass human subjects 
review.  Some (e.g., Rowe, 2001) have argued that biological factors alone (without adding 
sociological variables) may produce better research results, for example, in the 40-60% range, 
but again, ethical problems exist which would likely prohibit the carrying out of such research.  
Yet, only by moving forward with such research can the full potential of biosocial criminology 
be realized.   
It may be that the most appropriate uses of biosocial criminology, for now, involve the 
development of screening mechanisms for adequate diet, nutritional intake, and organ 
functioning.  With such a control purpose, the explanatory power of biosocial theories could be 
increased by verifying the ability to predict non-violent behavior.  After all, one of the promises 
of biosocial criminology is to resolve a recurrent explanatory problem in social science about 
how to account for individually different reactions to similar environmental stimuli.  In other 
words, biosocial theories may be best tested by predicting who does not become a violent 
criminal or terrorist.  On the other hand, the question remains about what to do when screening 
mechanisms reveal neurological defects.  It is clearly inappropriate to say all persons with such 
deficits are destined to become criminals or terrorists, but some intervention may be warranted, 
particularly when sociological factors are facilitative of such pathways.  Biological defects alone 
do not govern one‘s destiny.  It is possible for a small number of people to cope with their 
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handicaps by psychologically ―insulating‖ from such influences.  It is also possible that strong 
personality variables like hardiness, self-reliance, and work ethic can insulate a person from 
influence.  To better zero in on the people with the most risk, biosocial criminology has 
borrowed heavily from the field of endocrinology (Fishbein, 1990) and explored most broadly 
the concept of psychopathology (Raine, 1993). 
It is important to look for biological influences that may be disguised as sociological 
factors.  Endocrinology provides just such a look.  The key concept of endocrinology is central 
motive state.  In psychology, the equivalent concept is desire.  Some examples are thirst, hunger, 
and sex.  Various hormonal pathways or "circuits" exist for other states of excitation or arousal 
(Fishbein. 1990), and it is important to note that hormonal reactions do not occur in a vacuum.  
Desires have an appetitive (searching) phase and a consummatory (fulfilling) phase. Individuals 
can generate the appetitive phase of a hormonal reaction by themselves, but they need the 
hormonal reactions of others (pheromones) or additional environmental stimuli to generate the 
consummatory phase.  It is possible that some criminal, violent, or terrorist behavior is generated 
by hormonal reactions. 
Testosterone, and other androgens, have been the most-studied hormones in criminology 
(Walsh & Beaver, 2009).  Testosterone has been related to aggressive criminal behavior in a 
number of studies, and many criminologists believe that high levels of testosterone reduce a 
person's social integration, making them more of a loner, and, by decreasing their inhibitions, 
increasing their likelihood of deviating from society's norms (Brain, 1993).  Hormones exert a 
strong influence, primarily by inducing brain events that prompt people to behave in certain 
ways to environmental stimuli not only reactively, but anticipatorily in the form of what might be 
called unconscious behavior (by making a person think they want something before they see it).  
Hormonal disorders are easily treatable - not only by medicine, but also by geographic relocation 
since often a different set of weather conditions or seasonal patterns will provide  a cure. 
Neurotransmitter problems in the brain are more difficult to diagnose and treat.  The 
strongest evidence in criminology exists for the statement that antisocial personalities have 
significantly lower levels of serotonin than ordinary people (Fishbein ,1990).  Most people with 
such problems complicate their situation by ―self-medicating‖ with alcohol or drugs.  Despite the 
genetic basis for a person‘s production of neurotransmitter levels, it is quite easy to manipulate 
them with drugs, with diet, with counseling, and even with altitude.  Also, neurotransmitter 
balances are constantly changing as stored memories create new neural pathways.  It may be that 
brain imaging will one day tell us that certain stored grievance memories follow a particular 
pathway, but right now, the science as well as treatment is seriously underfunded.  People in our 
society seem willing to accept that antisocial personality disorders are largely untreatable. 
 Vitamin deficiencies as well as vitamin dependencies may play a role in perceptions of 
unfairness.  Certain vitamin B deficiencies are correlated with criminal as well as mentally ill 
behavior (Rafter, 2008), the mental illness-crime connection being suggestive of cognitive 
distortion and bias.  Vitamin deficiencies also cause low IQ, mental impairments, and weak 
immune systems.  A vitamin dependency is different, requiring a genetic predisposition, and is 
most often diagnosed as a food allergy.  Criminologists hesitate to generalize about the effects 
and most often only allow for the possibility of "transient states" of criminality (Fishbein, 1990). 
It should be apparent that most biosocial models need psychological and/or sociological 
factors to be added as intervening or mediating variables.  For these purposes, the concept of 
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inequity from general strain theory (Agnew, 1992) is an excellent choice.  It deals with 
distributive justice expectations in a relatively straightforward way, positing that people evaluate 
reward and punishment allocations on the basis of comparison levels.  Comparison levels were 
first examined by Thibaut and Kelley (1959) and defined as what it takes, at a minimum, for 
someone to seek out new friends for respect, appreciation, or acceptability.  The concept bears a 
remarkable affinity to Cooper‘s ―doctrine of necessity‖ (Cooper, 1977), which holds that a 
person becomes a terrorist when they come to believe that continuance of the status quo is worse 
than any consequence of the act of terrorism.  In other words, utter hatred of the status quo helps 
overcome any feelings of guilt about killing innocent people.  Clearly, inequity is a sociological 
trigger for biosocial factors that drive the terrorist mindset. 
 Inequity as a sense of unfairness is characterized by a desire for retaliation or revenge, 
which follows from a perceived injury or deprivation.  Misattribution to imagined injuries are 
common, and although it might not be possible to ameliorate the neurological foundations of 
such distortions, it is entirely possible to alleviate ―equity distress‖ as Walster et al. (1978) put it.  
Doing so would require calm, rational discussion (or public information) of the benefits and 
costs of contemplated terrorist action.  In accordance with Schoeck (1966) who stated the 
emotion of envy was a critical source of relative deprivation, what might be helpful would be a 
national dialogue on the inherent danger of a society of equals.  Inequality cannot be conquered, 
but inequity can.  We need only imagine ways to provide achievable status enhancements instead 
of stigma for the more unfortunate and embittered. 
 To summarize, biosocial criminology has a good deal of potential not only for an 
increased understanding of violence and terrorism, but for the prevention of both.  Further 
research in this field may enhance, as well as inspire, counterterrorism solutions.  To the extent 
that factors such as unfairness, grievance, injustice, inequity, envy, and spite are related to the 
causes of terrorism, there is at least moderate proof that these causes have biological connections 
to what are often mistaken to be solely environmental influences.  No cases are likely to be 
driven completely by biological factors, but some terrorism problems may be driven by a 
combination of biological and sociological factors.  Some hypotheses along these lines might 
explore such factors as diet and exercise combined with parental upbringing as well as peer 
group behavior that aggravates hormonal or neurotransmitter problems.  Biosocial approaches 
offer an alternative to purely sociological approaches.  They also move interdisciplinary work 
forward.  Finally, they put the causal order of variables back on track for the development of 
truly general theories, which can explain antecedent as well as intervening and triggering factors.         
back to top 
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Psychological theory geared towards understanding collective violence, whether by 
violent state or non-state actors, has tended to focus on three groups:  victims, perpetrators, and 
bystanders (e.g., Baumeister, 1997; Miller, 1999; Staub, 1989). In this paper, I propose that the 
category ―perpetrators‖ needs to be refined or, rather, divided (also see Victoroff, 2005). 
Specifically, those who instigate collective violence need to be distinguished from those who 
subsequently carry it out. We may call the former instigators and the latter perpetrators.  
The main point is that instigators play a critical role in the origination of collective 
violence, whereas perpetrators play a critical role in its execution, and the latter tend to operate in 
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the service of instigators. Of course, in some instances, the two sets overlap. The lone-wolf 
terrorist epitomizes the case of strong, if not perfect, overlap, but also illustrates its limits. As the 
complexity of terrorist operations and the size of a terrorist organizations increase, the likelihood 
of instigators and perpetrators being one and the same steeply diminishes. As organizations 
grow, they also tend to grow more complex and, accordingly, the functions of their various 
members tend to become more differentiated. This is no different for organizations of violence. 
Hence, we should not be surprised to see a division of labor there too.  
Instigators:  Why Study Them? Why Don‟t We Study Them?  
Given that it is the goals, plans, and acts of instigators that set in motion a complex, 
causal chain of events leading to collective violence, the importance of understanding the 
―psychology of instigation‖ should be evident. The significance of examining instigators, 
however, has often been downplayed in favor of understanding how presumably ordinary 
members of society can be led into becoming perpetrators of collective violence. For example, as 
Staub (1989) stated in reference to the Holocaust, "there will always be wild ideas and extreme 
ideologies. For us the question is how the German people came to follow a leader and a party 
with such ideas, and how they came to participate in their fulfillment" (p. 98). The implication 
here is that Hitler was possessed by these crazy ideas, and what is really important is not why he 
became possessed but rather why he was able to influence other ―normal‖ people. 
One reason for this focus is social psychology's aim of formulating accounts that 
generalize to the mass of ordinary people. Instigators of collective violence, with their "wild 
ideas" do not seem to fit this mold. These theorists do not deny the importance of instigators, but 
view them as largely inexplicable in terms of the psychological processes used to describe 
―ordinary individuals.‖ Consider Milgram (1974): "The psychological adjustments of a 
Wehrmacht General to Adolf Hitler parallel those of the lowest infantryman to his superior, and 
so forth, throughout the system. Only the psychology of the ultimate leader demands a different 
set of explanatory principles‖ (p. 130, my italics).  
Another reason for the reluctance to focus on instigators may be the concern that people 
will misconstrue explanations of their behavior as exculpatory statements. Indeed, this concern 
may be well founded as Miller, Gordon, and Buddie (1999) found that explaining a perpetrator's 
behavior increased the likelihood of their participants condoning that behavior. Other possible 
reasons include the fact that perpetrators greatly outnumber instigators, and perpetrators tend to 
carry out the actual killings; thus, they may seem more important to understand. I would argue, 
however, that it is precisely because instigators can lead so many others to participate in acts of 
collective violence, or stand idly by while it unfolds, that we need to try to understand them as 
well as their followers and bystanders.  
Characteristics of Instigators 
Non-interchangeability 
A defining feature of instigators, which serves to distinguish them from perpetrators, is 
the non-interchangeable role that they serve in the development of collective violence. Kershaw 
noted this when he wrote, "whatever the external circumstances and impersonal determinants, 
Hitler was not interchangeable" (1998, p. xxvii). Accordingly, most perpetrators will pass a 
counterfactual test of ―undo-ability,‖ whereas most instigators will fail the test. The same could 
not be said even for top-ranking Nazi perpetrators of the Final Solution, such as Himmler or 
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Heydrich. In rerunning history with Hitler, one can imagine substitutions for the others that 
would still leave the core features of the historical episode intact. Perhaps a substitution of 
Heydrich would have slowed the Final Solution and saved many lives that were lost, but it would 
not have prevented the Holocaust—at least, that is not easy to imagine but for Heydrich. In a 
similar vein, we can easily imagine substitutions of individual 9/11 terrorist hijackers and, yet, 
still imagine that the attacks would have taken place in essentially the same manner with 
different perpetrators. The same cannot be said for bin Laden. That is, it is much easier to 
imagine:  ―No bin Laden, no 9/11.‖  
I am not aware of any study that has formally tested the non-interchangeability of 
instigators hypothesis. Nevertheless, I suspect that if one were to elicit the views of terrorism and 
political violence scholars or counter-terrorism practitioners about the non-interchangeability of 
instigators and perpetrators, a reliable and large difference would be found. This hypothesis 
could quite easily be tested in future research.  
Catalysts of Violence 
Instigators often achieve their non-interchangeable position by appealing to a mass 
audience. They may offer hope to their followers, usually in times of social crisis in which many 
are searching for meaning and a sense of belonging in their lives. This hope is energizing and 
provides a common vision, but it is often a vision that rests on hatred, distrust, and justification 
of violence. Hitler capitalized on Germany's high propensity for violence during a period of 
dramatic social unrest and consolidated immense power in the process. In exchange, he imparted 
a new form of coherence to an unstable social system, albeit one that culminated in incalculable 
misery and destruction and that proved to also be unstable. In so doing, his role was figural 
against a background of other enabling conditions and transformed those conditions. As Yehuda 
Bauer put it, Hitler was "the radicalizing factor" (1994, p. 308). Bauer's statement is indicative of 
an important point about instigators. It is characteristic of instigators, but not perpetrators, that 
they serve a catalytic role in the development of collective violence. The characteristic fits bin 
Laden as well:  his key role as Al Qaeda‘s first in command, quite arguably, has been to incite 
and sustain widespread hatred toward the West and Israel. That is why the periodic releases of 
his tapes calling for renewed jihad are damaging even if they are short on specifics. They inspire 
the idea, ―Be creative. Find your own way of carrying out jihad. That is your duty to God.‖  
The catalytic function served by instigators does not mean, however, that they are ―initial 
causes‖ of collective violence. Rather, instigators increase the propensity for collective violence 
and intentionally act to accelerate its pace and direct its focus once it has started. For example, 
the racial anti-Semitism propagated by the Nazis under Hitler had as one of its own proximal 
causes the many anti-Semitic German writings and speeches of the late 1800s. If Hitler had not 
been exposed to these ideas as a young adult, it is unlikely that he would have turned out to be 
―Hitler‖ (Mandel, 2002b). Few instigators of collective violence construct their justifications for 
violence without influence from a mix of ideas that have already permeated the instigator‘s 
culture to some extent. In this sense, instigators can be seen as the conduit between the cultural 
background and the expression of violence that they help bring to the foreground.  
Cross-spectrum Power Holders 
In his analysis of power in contemporary societies, Alvin Toffler (1990) defined three 
forms:  low-grade power relies on physical force or the threat of violence, medium-grade power 
relies on control of capital wealth, and high-grade power relies on access to, and control of, 
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information and knowledge. A critical factor that distinguishes instigators from other 
perpetrators is the acquisition of power across this power spectrum. Instigators are likely to 
achieve higher positions of authority than perpetrators (including dictatorial or even quasi-
messianic status). The roles that even high-ranking perpetrators take on tend to be shaped and 
sanctioned by these ultimate leaders (Kelman & Hamilton, 1989). Unlike most perpetrators, 
instigators may attain the power to mobilize armies, paramilitary forces, and the police. Although 
the ability to achieve control over state apparatus may be limited for non-state instigators, their 
power in this regard will still tend to be greater than that of the perpetrators they lead.  
Instigators are likely to have greater powers than perpetrators in many other respects as 
well. They tend to have better control over sources of financing and use of organizational 
resources. If they rise to power as state leaders they will have greater powers to change laws, 
while as non-state actors they will have greater powers to challenge the validity of existing laws 
that do not serve their interests. Unlike perpetrators, a key task of instigators is to influence the 
attitudes of the masses in ways intended to serve their strategic intent. In short, instigators not 
only have the power to authorize individuals to participate directly in collective violence, they 
also have greater powers than perpetrators to shape bystanders' reactions to these events and 
establish the social parameters for depersonalization and stigma (Goffman, 1990) and 
dehumanization and moral exclusion (Bandura, 1999).  
Propagators of Nationalism  
As LeBon (1896) emphasized over a century ago, the effective instigator energizes his 
followers by agitating their emotions and by appealing to the sentiments that guide their reason. 
In modern history, nationalism has been one of the most effective political strategies for 
accomplishing this goal (Hobsbawn, 1992; Smith, 1986), and its success is fundamentally due to 
its psychological power. On the one hand, nationalism creates an egotistic sense of in-group 
cohesion by emphasizing the shared greatness of a people. On the other hand, it exacerbates 
feelings of threat by pointing to the nation's precariousness, feelings of hatred by pointing to 
those deemed responsible for its hardships and failures, and feelings of insult due to the belief 
that one's nation has not received the respect it deserves. As Isaiah Berlin noted long ago in an 
essay entitled, The bent twig:  On the rise of nationalism (reprinted in Berlin, 1991), nationalism 
is often motivated by some form of collective humiliation. The same message was articulated 
decades later in Staub‘s (1989) book, The Roots of Evil, and later still in Stern‘s (2003) Terror in 
the Name of God:  Why Religious Militants Kill. It is interesting to note that when bin Laden in 
his August 23, 1996, Declaration of War Against the Americans Who Occupy the Land of the 
Two Holy Mosques issued a call for jihad, the call was for ―a guerilla war, where the sons of the 
nation, and not the military forces, take part in it‖ (Federation of American Scientists, 2001). 
That is, bin Laden appealed not to Arab or Muslim states, but to the ―Moslem nation.‖  
Chirot (1994) has documented that, in case after case, twentieth-century tyrannies have 
been characterized by a combination of perceived national superiority coupled with perceived 
national threat and/or a collective sense of insult from the outside world. The Nazi image of a 
German master race threatened by an international Jewish plague that mocked Germany and her 
people illustrates the point. Similarly, bin Laden points to the ―humiliation and disgrace‖ hurled 
on the Islamic world by the West ―for more than eighty years‖ (Lewis, 2003). The reference to 
―eighty years‖ may not be evident to most Westerners of our generation, but it would not fail to 
have significance for Muslims likely to recall that in 1918 the Ottoman sultanate, the last great 
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Muslim empire, was defeated, occupied, and later partitioned by the British and French empires 
into Iraq, Palestine, and Syria (and later Lebanon). As Bernard Lewis (2003) points out, these 
insults must be understood in historical context, both in terms of the geopolitical reality that 
since the birth of Islam, Muslim empires ruled most of the civilized world for the next 
millennium and were exporters of civilization to the emerging West, and also in terms of the 
religious tradition of jihad, with its dual connotations of militant struggle and duty to God.  
According to bin Laden, ―hostility toward America is a religious duty, and we hope to be 
rewarded for it by God‖ (PBS Frontline, 2001). The reframing of calls for violence as ―duties‖ or 
―moral obligations‖ is a popular technique of instigators to legitimize collective violence. By 
linking the perpetration of terrorism to a religious duty, bin Laden uses God as the ultimate 
authority. In effect, bin Laden has claimed that if you fail to try to kill Americans, you have 
failed in your duty to God. Such messages can instill powerful feelings of moral obligation to an 
ideal or cause. Hannah Arendt (1965) noted in her famous report of the Adolf Eichmann trial 
how a strong sense of obedience to Hitler and his ideals served as an important source of 
Eichmann‘s diligence in overseeing the transport of Jews to death camps during the Holocaust—
so much so that Eichmann was willing to violate orders by his superior, Heinrich Himmler, 
toward the end of the Holocaust to stop transporting Jews to the death camps in order to follow 
what he believed was Hitler‘s wish.  
Nationalism and religious fundamentalism play upon a key aspect of human social 
cognition—the tendency to categorize individuals into groups. As we know from Tajfel‘s (1981) 
classic work using the minimal group paradigm, people will discriminate in favor of ingroup 
members and against outgroup members even when the basis of social categorization is trivial 
(such as when an experimenter tells participants that their test scores reveal a preference for 
paintings by either Klee or Klimt). Nationalism is particularly effective at creating this sense of 
us versus them because nations (unlike states) tend to be defined in terms of features that are of 
high personal and social importance, such as ethnicity, race, religion, ideology, and language 
(Azzi, 1998). Consequently, the nation is likely to be seen not merely as an aggregate but as a 
cohesive entity (Campbell, 1958). For example, German völkisch nationalists conceived of their 
nation as an organic whole whose members were united by blood bonds that went back to the 
beginning of human history (Stackelberg, 1999). Religious fundamentalism goes even further:  
not only are there blood ties, there are also duties to God that serve to unite the ummah or nation 
of Muslim believers.  
What Motivates Them? Concluding on an Unanswered Question 
For those of us who share very different political views, social perspectives, and cultural 
ideals from the instigators and their movements we wish to better understand, it may be tempting 
to think that instigators are savvy manipulators of the public that use nationalism merely as a 
means of political expediency and power grabbing. To be sure, successful instigators will use the 
sentiments of the masses to gain power and will do so strategically. But, it would be shortsighted 
to think that instigators were merely being Machiavellian, but that, privately, they were 
unconvinced of their own arguments. Rather, it appears that in many cases the motivation to 
instigate comes from a genuine sense of the same sentiments that instigators propagate or incense 
in their supporters.  
Surely, there are numerous psychological factors that play a role in each case history. As 
I have argued elsewhere (Mandel, 2002b), Hitler‘s rage seems to have been provoked in no small 
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measure by an extreme form of threatened egotism, which as Baumeister, Smart, and Boden 
(1996) define, refers "both to favorable appraisals of self and to the motivated preference for 
such favorable appraisals, regardless of whether they are valid or inflated" (p. 6). These authors 
have reviewed considerable literature indicating that violence is more likely to be carried out by 
people with high but unstable self esteem than by people with either high and stable self esteem 
or low self esteem. There is of course an interesting parallel between this person-level 
characterization of the threatened egotist and the group-level characterization of the threatened 
nation. Both share the elements of positive self-regard and a need for such positive appraisals, 
coupled with a sense of frustration that their deserved standing has been marred. But, it is unclear 
how well threatened egotism serves as an important psychological factor if we look across the 
spectrum of instigators. For instance, whereas Hitler met with much personal failure and was on 
the brink of destitution by the start of WWI (Kershaw, 1998), bin Laden came from one of the 
wealthiest Saudi families and there is little evidence, at present, that his doctrine of threatened 
Muslim nationalism is driven by a parallel threatened sense of self.  
Perhaps a more likely generalizable candidate for the indication of figures who may turn 
out to be instigators of collective violence is totalistic thinking, by which I refer to a constellation 
of factors including intolerance of ambiguity, an undifferentiated view of key issues, and an 
overriding confidence in the veracity and moral soundness of one‘s own belief and the falsity 
and moral corruptness or ―evilness‖ of those who adopt alternative views (Mandel, 2002a). 
Totalistic thinking has been central to many examples of armed conflict and collective violence. 
For Hitler, Germany was locked in a mortal struggle with two possible outcomes:  utopia or 
perdition, with the Jew as the mortal enemy of the German (Mein Kampf means ―my struggle‖). 
For bin Laden, the struggle is between the true Moslem believers and the rest of the world (one 
connotation of the term jihad is ―struggle‖). We see in these statements two key factors. First, 
there is a reduction of perspectives to two sides that are seen as diametrically opposed and, thus, 
not in a position for negotiation. Second, the stakes of the conflict are ultimate, thus conveying 
the clear message:  If the ends were ever to justify the means, the time is now. These aspects of 
the totalistic mindset may prove to be important preconditions for ―radicalization‖ (Mandel, in 
press), that imprecise term often used these days to convey what goes on before the terrorists‘ 
bombs go off.  
back to top 
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2. Dynamics of Violent Non-State Actors  
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 The U.S. administration change in 2009 provides an ideal opportunity to re-assess the 
transnational Islamist terrorist threat confronting the West, its evolution over time, and the 
implications for an effective counter-terrorism strategy. This must be based on solid empirical 
grounds and not on anecdotal evidence or ‗conventional wisdom.‘ 
 The goal of any campaign to fight terrorists is homeland security: protection of the 
population. A strategy to reach this goal must rest on an empirical understanding of the enemy‘s 
behavior. To gain such understanding, a comprehensive, quantitative review of all operations in 
the West, either linked to or in the name of ―al Qaeda,‖ over the past two decades was conducted 
for the NYPD using open source information, field visits and research, trial transcripts, and 
lengthy consultations with law enforcement agencies and intelligences services in the West. 
The results are outlined here. The study revealed that out of 61 different attempts, only 
two operations in the West, with any degree of success defined in terms of any casualties, could 
be attributed to al Qaeda itself – the 9 September 2001 attacks upon the United States and the 7 
July 2005 London underground attacks. There were 12 other successful operations conducted in 
the West, but nine conducted in France in the mid-1990s were attributed to the Algerian GIA 
terrorist group. The other three, the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the Madrid 
bombings in 2004, and the assassination of Theo van Gogh, were carried out by independent 
informal groups that did not have any formal links to other terrorist groups. The number of 
attempts in the West peaked in 2004 with 10 attempts and has been in sharp decline since. Most 
of the plots were carried out by autonomous local groups acting on behalf of al Qaeda. Most of 
the finances were raised locally by the perpetrators themselves; as in the last five years, there 
was little financial support from al Qaeda. In terms of training, al Qaeda‘s role has decreased 
dramatically in the past five years, and other terrorist groups (Lashkar e-Toyba, Jaish e-
Mohammed, Islamic Jihad Union…) have taken over. In the data analyzed, the vast majority of 
the plots ended in failure (Sageman & Silber, in press). 
 The enemy (al Qaeda [AQ], AQ affiliates, and AQ copycats/wannabes) is a relatively 
small group of mostly young people, who aspire to belong to a social movement that uses 
violence against civilians for political ends in the name of their version of Islam. An 
overwhelming majority of traditional Muslim scholars has condemned this version as deviant, 
but the politics of sensationalistic journalism have selectively given voice to a minuscule number 
of mostly self-appointed imams who support this use of violence. A majority of Muslims 
                                                 
1
 Marc Sageman is a forensic psychiatrist, a sociologist, and a former a CIA case officer and the first Scholar-in-
Residence at the NYPD. He is a consultant for various government agencies and the author of Understanding Terror 
Networks and Leaderless Jihad. 
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understand the difference between Islam and the claims of the terrorists and point to the biased 
Western reporting as just another instance of this alleged ―war against Islam.‖ This bias 
effectively increases the pool of young Muslims susceptible to the messages of the terrorists, 
especially those expressing that they are the only ones who can defend Muslim interest and 
honor against Western cultural and physical aggression. 
The terrorists in the incidents studied are simply young people seeking thrills and a sense 
of significance and belonging in their lives, like other terrorists have worldwide in the past 
hundred and thirty years. This sense of significance comes from their belief that they are special, 
part of a small vanguard trying to build a better world in the name of a cause. These terrorists 
want to build a utopia modeled on the community fostered by the Prophet because they believe 
that it was the only time in world history when a just and fair community existed. They are 
willing to sacrifice themselves for this cause in the name of God. Contrary to popular belief, 
radicalization to the point of conducting terrorist acts is not the primarily due to poverty, 
brainwashing of youth, ignorance or lack of education, lack of jobs, lack of social responsibility, 
criminality or mental illness. Their mobilization into this violent social movement is based 
predominantly on friendship and kinship. The vast majority of recently arrested terrorists in the 
West – Europe, North America and Australia – are part of the Muslim Diaspora, expatriates, and 
the second or third generation of immigrants. They are radicalized in the West, not in the Middle 
East. 
 The strategy to fight these terrorists must be based on understanding the radicalization 
process, which breeds new participants in this terrorist wave against the West. The logical 
answer is to decrease the number of newcomers into the violent social movement and increase 
the number of those leaving it, either through internal factors, arrests, or deaths. If the number of 
those leaving greatly exceeds those entering, this terrorist movement will fade away. The speed 
of its demise will depend on the size of the flow in and out of the social movement. By 
radicalization, I mean the process of transformation of ordinary people into fanatics who use 
violence for political means. The word itself is a source of confusion, as some people use it to 
describe extremist views. Here, we should stick to violent behavior rather than ideas, because it 
is the violence that is the real concern and not what people think. This process of radicalization 
consists of four prongs: a sense of moral outrage, a specific interpretation of the world, 
resonance with personal experiences, and mobilization through networks. These four factors are 
not stages in a process, nor do they occur sequentially. They are simply four recurrent phases in 
this process. As mentioned earlier, this process is driven by young Muslims chasing dreams of 
glory by fighting for their version of justice and fairness. They are enthusiastic volunteers, trying 
to impress their friends with their heroism and sacrifice. Suicide bombers, or shahids as they call 
themselves, have become the rock stars of young Muslim militants. 
 One of the major themes expressed by Islamist radicals conveys a sense of moral outrage, 
a reaction to perceived major moral violations like killings, rapes, or unfair local police actions. 
Before 2003, the major source of such outrage was the killings of Muslims in Afghanistan in the 
1980s; Bosnia, Chechnya, Iraq and Kashmir in the 1990s; and the second Palestinian intifada at 
the turn of the century. Since 2003, the sense of outrage has stemmed from events in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and now Somalia. Although the war in Iraq did not cause this social movement - 
after all, 9/11 occurred before the invasion of Iraq - it has become the focal point for global 
moral outrage for Muslims all over the world. In all my talks with Muslims, Iraq, along with the 
humiliations of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, monopolizes the theme of any conversation about 
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Islam and the West. On a more local level, Muslims are concerned about the actions of the local 
representatives of their respective governments, especially local law enforcement agencies. If 
these activities appear anti-Muslim, they perceive that they are victims of a larger conspiracy, 
bridging local violations with perceived global moral violations. 
 To fuel radicalization, this sense of moral outrage must be interpreted in a certain way: 
these global and local moral violations are part of a unified Western global strategy, namely a 
―War against Islam.‖ Having said this, it is important to realize that this worldview is 
deliberately vague and that there has been far too much focus on ideology in trying to understand 
radicalization. The new terrorists are not Islamic scholars. The defendants at terrorist trials in the 
West were far from being Islamic scholars or even intellectuals who decide what to do after 
careful deliberation. The explanation for their behavior is not found in how they think, but rather 
in how they feel. They dream about becoming heroes in this ―War against Islam,‖ modeling 
themselves on the seventh century Muslim warriors that conquered half the world and the 
Mujahedin who defeated the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Many hope to emulate 
these predecessors by fighting in Iraq against coalition forces. Their interpretation, that the West 
is involved in a ―War against Islam‖, is just a sound bite and has little depth to it. People 
bombing Western cities and volunteering for Iraq are not interested in theological debates but in 
living out their heroic fantasies.   
The ―War against Islam‖ interpretation is embedded within cultural traditions that differ 
from country to country. Their respective consistency across cultures of this interpretation 
explains one of the major differences between Europe and the United States in motivations for 
radicalization leading to terrorism. In Europe, national myths are based on an eternal essence 
common to all citizens of a country, such as Frenchness, Englishness, or Germanness. In the 
United States, and other countries built on waves of immigration, the national myth is that of a 
―melting pot.‖ The point is that the myth of a national essence excludes non-European Muslim 
immigrants, while that of a melting pot facilitates their inclusion into the host society. The notion 
of the ―American Dream‖, the land of opportunity, partially protects the United States. Whether 
it is true or not, the important point is that people believe it. A recent poll found that 71 percent 
of Muslim Americans believe in the American Dream (Pew Research Center, 2007). This is not 
the case in Europe, where Muslims complain about discrimination in the labor market. In the 
United States, belief in a ―War against Islam‖ is not consistent with the inclusiveness of the 
melting pot and the equal opportunity of the American Dream. This makes homegrown terrorism 
within the United States less likely than in Europe. 
 The ―War against Islam‖ interpretation ―sticks‖ more to Muslim Europeans than 
Americans because it resonates with their everyday personal experience. This notion of 
resonance encompasses the social, economic, political, and religious factors that constitute their 
everyday life experiences. This set of factors is what is traditionally referred to as the ―root 
causes‖ of terrorism. First, from a historical perspective, we are dealing with very different 
communities. The United States was able to ―cherry pick‖ immigrants and allowed Muslim 
engineers, physicians, university professors, and businessmen to immigrate. The result is that the 
Muslim American community is solidly middle class, with a higher average family income than 
the rest of the population
2
. This is not true of Europe, which imported unskilled labor to 
                                                 
2
 Although this is the demographics of the individuals forming the first ripples of a terrorist wave, these 
leaders justify their actions in the name of their less well off brethren.  I have called this contributing 
 132 
UNCLASSIFIED 
reconstruct the continent that had been devastated by World War II. So, on a socio-economic 
scale, we are dealing with very different populations: mostly middle class in the United States 
and an unskilled labor pool in Europe. In terms of the labor market, Muslim Americans believe 
that they are facing equal opportunity. Muslim Europeans know that this is not the case, as the 
unemployment rate for male Muslims is much higher than its host counterpart. Muslim 
Europeans strongly believe they are facing discrimination because they are Muslim. Welfare 
policy also distinguishes Europe from the United States, as Europe tolerates a higher 
unemployment rate. Many unemployed Muslim Europeans are on the welfare payroll. Some do 
not feel any sense of urgency to get a job and some spend their idle moments talking about jihad. 
Ironically, European states, through welfare payments, contribute to the funding of inexpensive 
terrorist operations. Probably the most devastating effect of the lack of meaningful employment 
is boredom from idleness. Here, the thrill of participating in clandestine operations may prove 
almost irresistible to some. 
 The factors described above influence some young Muslims to become angry, and vent 
their frustration. What transforms a very small number of them to become terrorists is 
mobilization through networks. Until a few years ago, these networks were based on face-to-face 
interactions. They were local gangs of young immigrants, members of student associations, and 
study groups at some radical mosques. These cliques of friends became radicalized together. The 
group acted as an echo chamber, which amplified their grievances, intensified the members‘ 
bonds, bred values rejecting those of their host society and facilitating a gradual separation from 
it. These natural group dynamics resulted in a spiral of mutual encouragement and escalation, 
transforming a small number of young Muslims into dedicated terrorists willing to follow the 
model of their heroes and sacrifice themselves for comrades and the cause. Their turn to violence 
and the terrorist movement was a collective decision, rather than an individual one. In the past 
two or three years, face-to-face radicalization is being replaced by online radicalization. It is the 
interactivity of the group that changes people‘s beliefs, and such interaction is found in Islamist 
extremist forums on the Internet. The same support and validation that young people used to 
derive from their peer groups through direct contact are now found in these forums, which 
promote the image of terrorist heroes, link them to the virtual social movement, give them 
guidance, and instruct them in tactics. These forums, virtual marketplaces for extremist ideas, 
have become the virtual ―invisible hand‖ organizing terrorist activities worldwide. The leader of 
this violent social movement is in effect the collective discourse on roughly half a dozen 
influential forums. These foray are transforming the terrorist movement, attracting ever younger 
members, and now more prominently women, who can participate in the discussions. 
 The Atlantic Divide in cultural, social, and economic factors explains the greater 
likelihood of formation of homegrown terrorist networks in Europe than the United States. The 
main reason for the absence of a second 9/11 type of attack in the United States is the relative 
absence of homegrown networks there. The main threat to the U.S. homeland still comes from 
Europe. In quantitative terms, the threat of a homegrown attack in Europe is about seven and a 
half times greater in terms of per capita Muslim than in the U.S.. 
 The nature of the terrorist threat has evolved over time. The first wave of Muslims who 
joined this terrorist social movement consisted largely of some ―Afghan Arabs,‖ companions at 
                                                                                                                                                             
factor to terrorism ―vicarious poverty.‖ See Marc Sageman, 2008, Leaderless Jihad, Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press: 48-50 for further details.  
 133 
UNCLASSIFIED 
arms of Osama bin Laden, who had come to Pakistan to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 
1980s. They were, in general, well educated, from a solid middle class background and joined al 
Qaeda around the age of 30. They still form the al Qaeda Central leadership, but there are at most 
a few dozen left, hiding in the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. The 
second wave consisted of elite expatriates from the Middle East, who came to the West to pursue 
their education, became radicalized in the West, and traveled to Afghanistan around the age of 
25 for training in the 1990s. They were incorporated into al Qaeda Central, and there are at most 
about a hundred left, again in the FATA. The third wave is completely different from its 
predecessors. It consists mostly of terrorist ―wannabes,‖ who, angered by the allied invasion of 
Iraq, aspire to join the social movement, but cannot link up to al Qaeda Central, which had to go 
into hiding after the allied invasion of Afghanistan post-9/11. These newcomers are generally 
poorly educated, homegrown, and join the movement around the age of 20 (Sageman, in press). 
They form fluid informal networks that are self-financed and self-trained. Very few succeed in 
connecting with al Qaeda Central or remnants of Lashkar e-Toyba or Jaish e-Mohammed. Those 
that succeed do so either through family connections (mostly British Pakistani Muslims) or 
through chance (mostly Northern Europeans). Others seek out the glory of fighting in Iraq and 
connect with fluid networks of smugglers linked to al Qaeda in Iraq. But these constitute a small 
minority of this violent social movement. The threat to the West has evolved in a Darwinian way 
in response to the post 9/11 habitat. The ongoing process of radicalization now takes place in a 
very hostile, physical but tolerant, virtual environment and results in a scattered, decentralized 
social structure – a ―leaderless jihad‖ (Sageman, 2008). It lacks formal command and control but 
the Internet gives it a semblance of unity and guidance. 
This dynamic suggests that the threat to the West, far from being an inevitable ―clash of 
civilizations‖ or a ―long war,‖ is actually self-limiting. At present, al Qaeda Central cannot 
impose discipline on the third wave wannabes, mostly because it does not know who they are. 
Without this command and control, each disconnected network acts according to its own 
understanding and capability, but the collective actions do not amount to any unified long-term 
goal or strategy. These separate groups cannot coalesce into a physical political party, which 
would become a vulnerable target for Western military or law enforcement power. Without the 
possibility of a physical presence or ability to negotiate with its enemies, which might encourage 
it to show a semblance of unity, the social movement is condemned to stay a leaderless jihad, an 
aspiration, but not a lasting physical reality. Al Qaeda has not been able to rally any state to 
provide protection against Western pursuit. Without a viable and effective sanctuary, it cannot 
fully regroup and consolidate into a physical power able to capture some territory in order to 
establish its utopia. 
There has been talk of al Qaeda resurgence, but the truth is that the al Qaeda hard core 
members of the first and second waves are dwindling in numbers and are not being replaced. The 
campaign with numerous Predator strikes that started in the second half of the 2008 has dealt 
enormous blows to al Qaeda leaders and cadres, from which they may not be able to recover. 
The few members of the third wave who succeed in making contact with al Qaeda Central in the 
FATA have been turned around to conduct operations in their respective countries and are not 
incorporated into al Qaeda Central. The survival of this social movement relies on a continuous 
inflow of new members, which, in turn, depends on the reasons young Muslims might be 
attracted to this violent social movement. Here, again, the appeal of the al Qaeda social 
movement is limited. Its appeal thrives only at the abstract fantasy level. The few times its 
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aspirations have been translated into reality – the Taliban in Afghanistan, part of Algeria during 
the civil war, and more recently in Anbar Province of Iraq – resulted in governments, actions and 
events that were particularly repulsive to most Muslims and alienated its former supporters. A 
Taliban like government, whose only role is to ensure that its subjects follow its interpretations 
of the law, is not an attractive reality to many. Furthermore, as each generation tries to define 
itself in contrast to its predecessor, what appeals to the present generation of young Muslims 
might not appeal to their successors. A major source of this appeal is the empowerment of 
fighting to right the source of moral outrage caused by the allied invasion of Iraq. As the Western 
footprint there fades, so will its appeal. And finally, new hotheads in the movement will always 
push the envelope to make a name for themselves and cause ever escalating atrocities. The 
magnitude of these horrors will turn off potential supporters. 
More than seven years after September 11, 2001, the United States strategy to counter 
this terrorist threat continues to be frozen by an inability to get past the horrors of that tragedy 
and relies more on wishful thinking than on a deep understanding of the enemy. The pursuit of 
―high value targets‖ who were directly involved in the operation was an appropriate first step to 
bring the perpetrators to justice. While it succeeded in degrading the capability of al Qaeda 
Central, this strategy is not viable against this third wave leaderless jihad, which has become the 
present threat to the West. On the ideological front, the strategy promotes a political vision of 
democracy and freedom as an antidote to terrorism. This resonates with American audiences but 
is seen as an exercise in cynicism for Muslim populations, who know all about their respective 
governments‘ rigged elections and denial of freedom, often with implicit United States 
complicity. However, the dramatic downturn in the economy chased terrorism from the headlines 
of the recent presidential campaign. This electoral neglect of the issue was a great improvement 
over the previous campaign, where each side was trying to convince the electorate that it was 
tougher on terrorism than its political opponent, degenerating into a frenzy of sound bites, fought 
on national news channels fueled by photogenic commentators worried about their share of the 
viewing audience. This mindless simplification of ―you are with us, or you are against us,‖ 
essentially echoes the arguments of the enemies engaged by the United States in the ―War 
against Islam,‖ uniting the Muslim world in opposition to U.S. international policy. Ironically, 
the best propaganda tool for the enemy was the American media, where sensationalism trumps 
substance. The election of President Obama has greatly undermined the appeal of the jihadist 
ideology that the U.S. is unfair and would never elect an outsider who is an obvious 
representative of a minority
3
. Even jihadi chat rooms are still debating this event and are trying 
to reconcile this result with their claim that the U.S. represents the epitome of injustice. Young 
Muslims in Europe now are no longer turning to al Qaeda, but are asking questions about the 
inability of their respective political systems to generate their own Obama. 
If national security is the true aim of this fight and the threat is self-limiting, then the 
logical strategy is one of containment while waiting for the threat to disappear due to internal 
reasons. The key is to accelerate, not slow down or stop, this process of internal decay. Nothing 
should be done that will make the threat grow to include virtually all Muslims; such an escalation 
might then, indeed, become an existential threat to West. Containment must neutralize the main 
                                                 
3
 The U.S. President Barak Obama‘s Cairo Speech in early June 2009 is a good illustration of this point. 
Osama bin Laden had released an audio recording about six hours prior to the speech. Yet, what was 
debated on the Jihadi websites that I monitored was President Obama‘s speech and not Osama‘s tape, 
which was almost completely ignored. 
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drivers of the radicalization process: fantasy, fashion, and thrills – ―jihadi cool‖. Terrorist acts 
must be stripped of their heroic nature and reduced to common criminality. There is nothing 
more heroic than to go against uniformed members of the only remaining superpower. The fight 
against these terrorists must be demilitarized and turned over to collaborative law enforcement. It 
is also important not to give too much attention to the terrorists who are arrested or killed. The 
temptation to hold press conferences to publicize another ―major victory‖ in the war on terror 
must be resisted for they elevate the status of these criminals to that of heroes. Low-key arrests 
and prosecution should serve to degrade the status of the terrorists.  The military role should be 
limited to sanctuary denial, either directly or through allied forces, because sanctuaries have the 
potential to transform local terrorist activities into transnational coordinated plots. 
Containment is not a passive strategy. It relies on the U.S. technical capability to detect 
terrorist activities worldwide and construct strong international alliances against these specific 
terrorists to disrupt and eliminate international plots. It must interrupt the radicalization process 
and prevent potential members from joining this movement.  
In terms of confronting the sense of moral outrage on a global level, the non-Muslim 
foreign footprint in Iraq must be reduced as soon as possible. There has been a lot of confusion 
about al Qaeda and Iraq. The two issues are separate. The U.S. invaded Afghanistan because al 
Qaeda was there, but al Qaeda came to Iraq after the allied invasion because non-Muslim 
invaders were there. The argument that the ―terrorists will follow us home‖ has so far been 
unfounded. In contrast to Afghanistan, where wannabe terrorists learned their trade and returned 
home, the foreign volunteers come to Iraq to die. The ―bleed out‖ from Iraq will be a problem for 
adjacent Muslim countries, but probably not for distant Western countries. On a more local level, 
law enforcement authorities must be viewed as protective rather than hostile to the Muslim 
community. In a sense, this is what happened in many European countries, where white 
policemen patrol immigrant neighborhoods. To be seen as part of the community, the makeup of 
police forces must change to reflect that of the community by recruiting young Muslims, who 
could cultivate an ongoing everyday relationship with young people in the community. It is not 
enough to hold regular meetings with community leaders, whom the younger generation does not 
respect. To regain the trust of the Muslim community, local police actions must be explained. 
This has become a problem in Britain because of the legal ban on reporting on criminal cases in 
litigation. However, the opposite – making exaggerated claims of threat for short-term political 
benefits – will also alienate the Muslim community. So far, Muslim Americans have shown 
themselves to be very patriotic, but this has not been well recognized either by the press or by 
our government.  It is important to trust them to continue to be patriotic and not to alienate them. 
 In terms of countering the terrorist interpretation, the West needs to convince Muslims 
that its counterterrorism efforts are not part of a ―War on Islam.‖ Hostile statements to Islam 
made by Western leaders and the use of a belligerent vocabulary (e.g., the use of ―crusade‖) have 
not helped. The ―war‖ metaphor needlessly elevates the status of the terrorists to that of a 
―worthy‖ opponent and may inspire glory seeking young people to join the fight. Without a clear 
definition of who the enemy is, a segment of the population might feel targeted. Many Muslims 
around the world suspect that the American use of the term ―terrorist‖ is a code word for Muslim 
and believe the ―war on terror‖ is really a ―War against Islam.‖ The widely disseminated rants of 
Islamophobic bigots reinforce their fears. Most Muslim Americans do not even believe that the 
U.S. led ―global war on terrorism‖ is a sincere effort to reduce terrorism since ―actions speak 
louder than words.‖ To regain the confidence of the Muslim community, state officials should 
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carefully define who the terrorists are and actively challenge those who question the loyalty of 
Western Muslims. Since most Muslims in the West are part of the Diaspora, Western 
governments should educate their constituencies about the benefits of immigration to foster 
greater acceptance. Publicized stories of successful immigrants could celebrate an international 
version of the American Dream and provide role models for young Muslims, who may come to 
view Western success as ―cool.‖ The ―war of ideas‖ or the search for a ―counter-narrative‖ as 
presently conceived by the U.S. government is generally misguided: terrorists are not 
intellectuals. They do what they do because of fantasies and fashion, not out of well thought out 
positions derived from any scripture. The ―war of ideas‖ should be replaced by the inspiration of 
new dreams and hopes for young Muslims.  We should learn our lessons from our own 
experience with the Civil Rights movement, when Reverend Martin Luther King inspired a 
generation with his speech ―I Have a Dream!‖ 
In terms of resonance with people‘s daily experiences, the United States is doing much 
better than Europe and can show its Western allies ways of mitigating soft social and economic 
discrimination of local immigrant communities. Discrimination against Muslims at airports and 
with law enforcement should be eliminated. More Muslims should also be encouraged to enter 
into the realm of politics and show that they can peacefully influence their environment. 
Domestic policies to even the social, economic, and political playing field differ from country to 
country and tactical recommendations must be country specific. 
 In terms of mobilization through networks, it is imperative to disrupt and, when possible, 
destroy existing terrorist networks. Terrorists must be eliminated or brought to justice. This is a 
police rather than a military mission, which must rely on properly trained international allies, 
aided by U.S. technical means and sharing of electronic intercepts. Terrorists‘ prosecution must 
be conducted with complete transparency and fairness. This is very much a battle for young 
Muslims‘ hearts and minds: any appearance of persecution and discrimination for short-term 
tactical gains will be a strategic defeat in this battlefield. The point is to regain the international 
moral high ground, which served the U.S. so well during the Cold War. This international 
alliance with local police must be carefully monitored because local tyrants would like to 
eliminate any internal opposition in the name of the ―war on terror.‖ The U.S. must be very 
careful in its choice of alliances, so as not to be inadvertently dragged in local persecution of 
legitimate dissent against tyranny. With the advent of the Internet, there has been a gradual shift 
from offline to online networks, centered on Internet forums, where young Muslims share their 
dreams, hopes, and grievances. This is an internal Muslim discussion. However, the U.S. might 
encourage more participation of voices that reject violence and challenge the emerging calls to 
violence. The focus must shift from celebration of terrorist actions to a focus on the victims of 
these horrors and reflection on the devastation they bring. Young people must learn that 
terrorism is about death and destruction, not about virtual self-glorification. It is necessary to 
reframe this whole debate about terrorism, from imagined glory to the very real horror. The 
voices of the victims and their relatives must be heard over the cacophony of bragging and 
pretending that occur in chat rooms. 
Western Muslim communities are relatively young, having mostly immigrated in the last 
half century. Their younger generations are searching for their identity and trying to define their 
role within Western society. It is important for the West to welcome them, help them integrate 
better within its fabric, continue to promote its core universal values of justice and fairness, and 
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fight its internal elements that try to single out and antagonize what has now become an integral 
part of the West. 
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2.2. Good-Bye To All That: The End of the Leader-Less Jihad v. Leader-
Led Jihad Debate  (Bruce Hoffman) 
 
Author: Bruce Hoffman 
Organization: Georgetown University  
Contact information: brh6@georgetown.edu 
 
Among the fatalities of the tragic November 2008 attacks in Mumbai was the so-called 
―bunch of guys‖ theory.  Like the scores of dead and hundreds of wounded, it too was the victim 
of a terrorist operation that was planned and premeditated; executed by trained commando-like 
teams deployed as part of an evident command and control apparatus that orchestrated their 
deployment and coordinated their assaults.  Schooled in the use of automatic weapons and 
apparently well versed in close quarters combat tactics, the gunmen were able to stand their 
ground against furious security force responses and counter-assaults.  The operation also showed 
detailed surveillance, directed intelligence gathering, and meticulous logistical preparation.  In 
sum, the fingerprints of an existing, identifiable terrorist organization, complete with the training 
camps needed to prepare the attackers, the operational headquarters to plan and direct the 
operation, and the knowledge of surveillance tradecraft to successfully affect them, are literally 
all over the operation. 
In contrast, the ―bunch of guys‖ theory of leaderless jihad claimed that terrorism in the 
21
st
 Century had drifted from the provenance of top-down direction and implementation 
provided by established, existing organizations to an entirely bottom-up, loosely networked 
phenomenon of radicalized individuals gravitating towards one another with a shared penchant 
for violence.  These collections of individuals were defined as the new threat we all had to 
prepare for: self-selected, self-radicalized, and mostly self-trained wannabes with a limited 
capacity for violence that were allegedly multiplying and spreading to challenge both the more 
traditional conceptions of terrorism and the attendant countermeasures and security force 
responses based upon this anachronistically organized style of terrorism.  Indeed, with the rise of 
the leaderless jihad, it was argued, organizations had become as immaterial as they were 
superfluous.  The main terrorist threat had now become decidedly low-level - easily addressed by 
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local police forces with modest resources rather than by standing militaries and the vast array of 
kinetic instruments at their disposal.  
A debate of sorts over the organizational vice leaderless nature of contemporary terrorism 
had arisen over the past year or so.  At congressional hearings and conferences, in the pages of 
Foreign Affairs and the New York Times, among the variety of informed and distinctly 
uninformed blog and web sites arrayed across the Internet, as well in the corridors of power in 
the globe‘s national capitals, the issue was discussed and contested.  On 26 November 2008, 
however, it was resolved in Mumbai by the terrorists themselves.  In a blaze of automatic 
weapons‘ gunfire and hurled hand grenades, they settled the matter - and drove home their point 
over the course the next 48 hours, ceasing only when Indian security forces had shot dead the last 
gunmen holed up in a waterfront, luxury hotel. 
Mumbai saw the eclipse of leaderless jihad as the salient terrorist threat today as 
disciplined teams of well-armed, well-trained terrorists simultaneously spread throughout the 
city to execute their mission at least ten different targets.  In each case, they stood their ground 
and inflicted the carnage and bloodshed they were trained to accomplish.  And, at the Taj Mahal 
Palace and Tower and Oberoi hotels, the terrorists not only effectively resisted counterattack by 
Indian security forces, but impeded and inflicted serious loses on those same forces - including 
the deaths of the city‘s top police counterterrorist commanders.  The leader of an Indian Marine 
commando unit marveled as the fighting finally wound down how the terrorists were ―very, very 
familiar with the hotel layout. . . . They were a very, very determined lot.  They were moving 
from one place to the other. . . . . Not everybody can fire AK-47 weapons like that.  They were 
trained somewhere‖ (Wax & Lakshmi, 2008).  Thus the delusional theories about the 
diminishing role of organizations in orchestrating terrorist violence were blown away too. 
At the same time, it must be emphasized that a continuing risk from home-grown 
extremists clearly still exists and cannot be dismissed or ignored.  The 2007 plot by six self-
identified Islamic militants to attack Fort Dix, New Jersey is a case in point.  Another is the half-
baked plot to attack two synagogues in the Bronx, New York that was foiled in May 2009 by the 
FBI after an informant penetrated the motley cell.  But while authorities must continue to worry 
about attacks by ―amateur‖ or wannabe terrorists like these, their focus - preparations and 
response capabilities - will inevitably have to be geared to the more ―professional,‖ trained, 
disciplined and deployed terrorists as it is doubtful that home-grown terrorists could amass the 
numbers and have the requisite skill-set required to hit multiple target sites with the ferocity that 
the Mumbai attackers exhibited.  Indeed, whether in Britain or in Germany, in recent years the 
more competent and ambitious indigenous terrorists have repeatedly found it necessary to take 
advantage of the training opportunities that only actual, existing terrorist organizations can 
provide in real-life, and not Internet-enabled, so-called virtual training camps.   
An Emergent Consensus  
One has to wonder, in fact, if there is any professional intelligence agency or senior 
official who still believes that the most consequential terrorist threat emanates from bunches of 
guys and not from established terrorist organizations like al Qaeda?  In one of his last major 
public addresses before stepping down as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCIA) in 
November 2008, Michael V. Hayden variously explained how ―al-Qa‘ida [sic], operating from 
its safe haven in Pakistan‘s tribal areas, remains the most clear and present danger to the United 
States today;‖ that, ―If there is a major strike on this country, it will bear the fingerprints of al-
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Qa‘ida;‖ and that, ―Today, virtually every major terrorist threat my Agency is aware of has 
threads back to the tribal areas‖ (Hayden, 2008).  Revealingly, Hayden did not mention once the 
threat from ―bunches of guys‖ or self-radicalized, self-selected individuals belonging to a social 
network rather than a bona fide terrorist organization.  His words are all the more important, not 
only for their timing - coming just two weeks before the Mumbai attacks - but also because when 
the DCIA talks he is not speaking only for himself but is inevitably expressing the collective 
wisdom of the world‘s most powerful intelligence service.  
Nor were these conclusions exclusively the domain of allegedly ―blinkered‖ American 
intelligence chiefs and their agencies who, critics often claim, ―see al-Qaeda everywhere and in 
every plot and attack.‖  The Netherlands‘ General Intelligence and Security Service (Algemene 
Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst, or AIVD), for example, is among the most professional and 
prescient of the world‘s intelligence and security agencies.  Though far smaller than many of its 
Western counterparts,
1
 it is an elite and perspicacious service that is as impressive for its early 
identification and incisive analysis of emerging trends as it appears genuinely able to ―think out 
of the box.‖   
The radicalization phenomenon, for instance - involving homegrown, domestic threats by 
organizationally unaffiliated militants - that is now so ingrained in our thinking and assessments 
of contemporary jihadi threats, was first publicly highlighted by the AIVD seven years ago in its 
Annual Report 2002.  Thus, as far back as 2001, AIVD agents and analysts had detected 
increased terrorist recruitment efforts among Muslim youth living in the Netherlands whom it 
was previously assumed had been assimilated into Dutch society and culture (General 
Intelligence and Security Service, 2002).  This assessment was proven tragically correct in 
November 2003 when a product precisely of this trend that the AIVD had correctly identified, a 
17 year-old Dutch-Moroccan youth named Mohammad Bouyeri, brutally murdered the 
controversial film maker, Theo van Gogh, as he rode his bicycle along an Amsterdam street.
2
  
Accordingly, any assessment of current jihadi trends by the AIVD is to be taken very seriously, 
indeed.  
The 2007 AIVD Annual Report 2007 highlighted five principal international developments 
in jihadi terrorism that are of enormous consequence to the security of the West and the U.S. as 
well as the Netherlands.  The sober AIVD analysts took particular note of the following 
disquieting trends: 
 
1. ―There has been a shift in the source and nature of the threat,‖ the report argues.  
―Whereas it used to come principally from autonomous local networks, 
internationally-oriented local networks now also present a danger to the West.‖ 
2. ―From the known threats in neighbouring [sic] countries, the AIVD can discern a shift 
in the international orientation of these networks.  In the past, they were concerned 
mainly with supporting and sometimes recruiting for the violent jihad in traditional 
conflict zones.  Now, though, they also seem to be focusing upon traveling abroad for 
                                                 
1
 The AIVD reportedly employs some 1,100 people.  See Dutch News LG accessed at: 
http://www.dutchnews.nl/dictionary/2006/11/aivd.php. 
2
 See the excellent book by Ian Buruma, Murder in Amsterdam: Liberal Europe, Islam, and the Limits of 
Tolerance (London & New York, Penguin, 2007), for an especially perceptive analysis of both the van 
Gogh assassination, Dutch society, and the Muslim milieu from which Bouyeri emerged. 
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training before returning to pursue their struggle in the West.  This appears to have 
added a new dimension to the jihadist threat.‖ 
3. ―The degree of influence on European jihadist networks and individuals from Pakistan 
and the Pakistan-Afghanistan border is increasing.‖ 
4. ―The AIVD has discerned signs that core Al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan is 
recovering, and that its influence as one of the primary sources of inspiration for 
jihadists around the world has further increased‖ [my emphasis] (p. 29).  
 
The AIVD‘s assessment is particularly noteworthy in that it dovetailed very closely with 
the publicly released key judgments of the seminal July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate 
(NIE) produced by the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) (National Intelligence Council 
(NIC), 2007).  This capstone document, representing the collective wisdom of the American 
intelligence community, had similarly concluded that the threat posed by al-Qaeda to the U.S. 
homeland and elsewhere had increased as a result of the movement having re-grouped and re-
organized along the lawless frontier spanning both Pakistan and Afghanistan.  The 2007 NIE had 
forcefully argued that: 
 
• ―Al-Qa‘ida [sic] is and will remain the most serious terrorist threat to the Homeland, as 
its central leadership continues to plan high-impact plots, while pushing others in 
extremist Sunni communities to mimic its efforts and to supplement its capabilities.‖   
• ―[Al-Qa‘ida] has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack 
capability, including: a safe haven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas (FATA), operational lieutenants, and its top leadership‖ (NIC, 2007).    
And, the 2008 AIVD Annual Report both confirmed and reiterated these key trends.  "An 
analysis conducted in 2008 by the AIVD and verified by fellow services,‖ it states,  
―indicates that core Al-Qaeda‘s ability to carry out terrorist attacks has increased in 
recent years.  . . .   One development of particular concern is the growing evidence 
that people from Europe are undergoing military training at camps in the border 
region.  As a result, the ability of (core) Al-Qaeda and its allies to commit or direct 
attacks in Europe could increase. Not only might the trainees themselves carry out 
such actions upon their return to Europe, but they could also guide or support 
others‖ (General Intelligence, 2007)  
A Future of More of the Same 
There is not much likelihood of the organizational salience in terrorism changing in the 
future - at least not for the next 16 years.  According to the U.S. National Intelligence Council‘s 
authoritative assessment of global trends to the year 2025, ―Terrorist and insurgent groups in 
2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long-established groups - that inherit 
organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to 
conduct sophisticated attacks . . . .‖  Admittedly, while the report also mentions the continuing 
threat posed by ―newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-
radicalized,‖ its emphasis clearly is on the continued predominance of, and the more serious 
threat posed by, organized terrorism and the operational entities that orchestrate it rather than by 
―bunches of guys‖ (NIC, 2008). 
 141 
UNCLASSIFIED 
In this respect, the dramatically and tragically successful Mumbai attacks contrasted to 
the amateurish, botched Bronx synagogues plot is a timely and powerful reminder that in 
terrorism, organizations most certainly still matter.  
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2.3. Terrorism as Social Movement Tactic Theory, Mobilization (Maya 
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Terrorism can best be seen as a social movement tactic rather than a political aberration 
or act of insanity.  Individuals who participate in terrorism are not brainwashed into accepting 
their missions; rather, they are generally well integrated into society and sign on in the interest of 
fighting their enemy.  Along these lines, social movement organizations (SMOs) which utilize 
terrorism are generally integral parts of society, and individual members typically go to great 
lengths to deepen their social ties (Pape, 2005).  Using a basic definition of terrorism: ―the 
deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence [against 
civilians] in pursuit of political change‖ (Hoffman, 1998), it is clear that terrorism is not only 
committed by insurgent groups.  Many nation states, including Apartheid South Africa, 
Guatemala, Britain, and Turkey have employ(ed) terrorist tactics on a regular basis.  However, 
when applied to non-state actors, we can view terrorism as a form of collective action, and 
therefore have access to a variety of theories to predict its incidence. 
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Theoretical Approaches to Social Movements and Collective Action 
A common perception pertaining to social movement activity is that it arises out of the 
sense of strain felt by insurgent groups. Strain or deprivation theories generally predict a positive 
relationship between the level of deprivation experienced by a group and collective action.  
Specifically, psychological responses to changes (especially increases) in strain, most frequently 
measured in terms of financial deprivation, generate rising discontent, which, in turn, increase 
participation in insurgencies (Jenkins & Perrow, 1977). 
These theories have been applied with mixed success over the past forty years.  As 
Turner and Killian point out, ―there is always enough discontent in any society to supply the 
grass-roots support for a movement if the movement is effectively organized and has at its 
disposal the power and resources of some established elite group‖ (Turner & Killian, 1972).  
Effectively, while some sort of perceived strain is necessary, it is not sufficient to explain the 
emergence and persistence of social movements. 
This paper addresses the three primary approaches to social movements: political process, 
resource mobilization, and framing, all of which are intricately linked to one another.  I will 
provide a brief overview of each of these approaches and examples, as well as describing their 
relation to one another, and their application to terrorism. 
Political Process 
The political process approach to social movements contends that there are three key 
factors (aside from strain) which produce a successful social movement.  As shown in Figure 1, 
these include political opportunity, the strength of social movement organizations, and the 
subjective meanings potential participants attach to their situations.   
Political Opportunity 
The basic premise of political opportunity theory is that collective action is facilitated or 
constrained by external environmental factors.  Political opportunities for social movements 
emerge when (a) social movement actors are given increased occasion to participate in 
institutional/state systems; (b) evidence of political instability appear; (c) splits within elites 
emerge; (d) insurgents gain influential allies and (e) the capacity of state or opposition groups to 
repress dissent decline and/or opportunities to advance movement claims appear (Tarrow, 
1998).
1
   
Each dimension of political opportunity is determined, in part, by the degree of openness 
of the state systems within which insurgent groups exist.  Hence, within non-democratic systems, 
ones characterized by minimal institutional access, new openings in the political system should 
encourage open dissension which was previously politically repressed (Tarrow, 1998).  
Similarly, within non-democratic systems, the absence of consistent avenues for political 
competition means that indications of political instability signal an opportunity to openly 
mobilize as the potential for repression is minimized by the volatility of the system itself.  For 
example, the collapse of Mussolini‘s Fascist regime after WWII, coupled with changing political 
alignments within Italy provided openings for peasants to openly mobilize for land-rights.  While 
                                                 
1
 This dimension is not addressed in the white paper. 
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their claims were not new, the opportunity to act against the Fascist regime had previously been 
non-existent (Tarrow, 1998).   
 
 
 
 
Insurgents are also more likely to act when they have powerful allies that can advocate on 
their behalf within systems to which they generally have limited access.  Thus, peasant 
movements within Central America during the 1980s benefited from alliances with political 
party activists, guerilla groups, and union organizers who were already key players in the 
political mix.  Along these lines, divisions within elite actors are likely to increase insurgency.  
These splits provide occasions for social movements to take greater risks and may also incite 
elite group members to realign with insurgent groups in order to seize additional power (Tarrow, 
1998).   
Unlike many forms of collective action employed by social movements, terrorism is an 
extreme and violent measure.  Many social movements and related social movement 
organizations use terrorist tactics, as well as both non-violent and other forms of violent 
insurgency.  While social movement theory generally indicates that insurgents are more likely to 
employ violent tactics when faced with violent repression (Araj, 2008), we have not, as of yet, 
tested whether the same holds true for violent tactics which target civilians such as terrorism.  
While the aforementioned dimensions of political opportunity can aid in predicting when 
movements that employ terrorism will mobilize in some capacity, their ability to predict the use 
of terrorism must come with caution/caveats.   
In particular, responses to the opening of systems - whether stimulated by 
democratization, political instability, splits among elites, new alliances, or changes in the degree 
of direct forms of repression against insurgency – may vary depending on specific social 
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Figure 1. Political Process Model, adapted from McAdam, 1982 
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movement organizations and their full agenda.  The opening of systems through democratization, 
for example, may be received as a sign of good will and be met by non-violent, constrictive 
forms of mobilization.  However, democratization may also be perceived as a form of 
governance imposed upon groups, which see the transition itself as a weakness of the system to 
be exploited through a variety of tactics including terrorism.    
Along a similar vein, political openings based on influential alliances with other terrorist 
organizations, divisions among elites, or lowered state capacity to repress, may incite the use of 
terrorist tactics.  For example, conflicts based on a foreign occupation may attract the attention of 
more established social movement elites within or outside of the region willing to provide an 
emergent insurgent movement with resources and encouragement to pursue their rebellion via 
terrorist acts if elite(s) perceive a common threat.  Repression may constitute less of a threat to 
the use of terrorism since martyrdom frequently aides movements by gaining sympathy and 
support.  
Indigenous Organizational Strength 
Another principal component of the political process approach is the strength of social 
movement organizations (SMOs).  While openings in the political sphere provide opportunities 
for effective mobilization, the ability to exploit those opportunities is, in part, dependent on the 
resources of insurgent groups (McAdam, 1982).  Of significant importance to organizational 
strength are membership, incentives for participation, networks, and leadership.  Because many 
of the issues related to indigenous organizational strength are subsumed by resource mobilization 
and framing approaches, particularly as they pertain to participation, I will address these issues in 
their respective sections.   
Framing and resource mobilization approaches tend to emphasize the role of financing 
indirectly by focusing on network building.  However, a key aspect of organizational strength is 
the direct effect of financial backing which can assist movements with providing spaces to 
organize, staffing, technology to communicate, and political influence.  For example, McAdam 
asserts that the Civil Rights Movement was enabled in part by financing from the black middle 
class, which had emerged to support segregated black communities.  Although relative to its 
white counterpart, the black middle class was small, the financial support it provided was critical 
to social movement organizations.  Internal funding is especially important to movement 
emergence since external financiers are unlikely to provide support without clear indication of a 
movement‘s initial efficacy.  Many terrorist groups have, however, received substantial external 
funding and continued to receive it contingent on their success in carrying out terrorist attacks. 
Cognitive Liberation 
While political opportunities and increased SMO capacity are imperative to the emergence and 
sustenance of a social movement, the subjective meanings potential participants ascribe to shifts 
in opportunities determine whether they will act.  The perception of opportunities by insurgents, 
not simply the objective existence of such opportunities, is therefore critical to political process 
theory.  As a collective, people must define the source of their frustrations as unjust and capable 
of change through mobilization.  According to the political process approach, changes in 
political opportunities serve as cues for cognitive liberation and social movement organizations 
provide prospective participants environments in which they are likely to recognize those signals 
and provide a sense of political efficacy.  
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Resource Mobilization 
As with any form of collective action, the timing and impetus to mobilize depends, in 
part, on the availability of resources to act.  Resource mobilization theory asserts that the 
translation of grievances into action requires the availability and use of a variety of 
organizational resources including membership, communication, and external support, most of 
which are reliant on social networks (McCarthy & Zald, 1977).  As such, my review of this 
approach focuses primarily on the mobilization of social networks related to social movements. 
Micro Level Processes 
Social movement scholars have long held that the psychological or attitudinal fit between 
participants and social movements are inadequate to explain movement participation.  Instead, 
the preponderance of movement research indicates that social networks are the primary source of 
movement recruitment and participation, a key resource of social movements.  Micro-structural 
accounts concentrate on two components of recruitment: interpersonal ties and membership in 
SMOs or related organizations.  Accordingly, strong interpersonal networks with individuals 
already tied to a social movement serve as conduits of information for prospective participants 
and reinforce the salience of the identity relevant to participation.  As prior research has shown, 
the stronger a given tie is, the stronger the influence applied to a potential recruit (McAdam & 
Paulsen, 1993).  In contrast, the presence of network ties who actively oppose movement related 
identities or understandings weaken the influence of networks associated with a movement.  
Similarly, membership in organizations relevant to a social movement serves to reinforce 
interpersonal ties between prospective movement participants and those already active while 
increasing members‘ sense of self-efficacy.  For example, Snow et al demonstrated that a sample 
of students participating in political movements at a Texas university in the late 1970s were 
pulled into movement activities through pre-existing interpersonal ties (Snow et al., 1980).     
 A key distinction made by social network researchers is between network degree (number 
of direct ties to a movement) and network range (total number of different groups to which an 
individual is connected) (Burt, 1980).  Network degree helps determine the frequency of 
interactions, which is indicative of recruitment efforts, information dissemination, and social 
influence.  On the other hand, network range denotes the diversity of information received by an 
individual (Tindall, 2004).  Movements that employ terrorism, as with any movement, rely upon 
social networks to build membership, reinforce relevant identities, and counter contradictory 
efforts or ideologies.  Consider, for example, the impact that urbanization had on building the 
Civil Rights Movement.  As blacks moved to Northern and Southern urban centers throughout 
the first half of the Twentieth Century, their ability to recruit and sustain momentum increased 
dramatically. 
Meso Level Processes 
Although frequently overlooked, meso-level networks are important to movement 
emergence, persistence, and efficacy.  Unlike micro-level networks between individual 
grassroots participants, meso-level networks are those between movement leadership and 
organizations.  In this case, leaders serve as brokers who share information between geographic 
locations and social movement organizations (Hedstrom et al., 2000).  Thus social movement 
organizations can act in collaboration to further movement goals, share tactics and strategies, and 
act in tandem at two or more distant locations.  The existence of meso-level networks among 
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terrorism-related movements helps to explain the increasing existence of transnational 
movements and increased diffusion of terrorist activity. 
Framing 
The framing approach to collective action addresses the production and maintenance of 
meanings for participants and targets of social movements.  It is closely related to the concept of 
―Cognitive Liberation‖ introduced by the political process approach; the significance of framing 
is its capacity to recruit and build solidarity among movement participants through the 
construction of rationales for mobilization and by increasing participants‘ belief in their group 
efficacy. It provides a tie between an objective political opportunity and the social resources 
imperative for movement efficacy by identifying a rationale for individuals to mobilize 
collectively. There are three key types of framing, each of which serves a different purpose: 
diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational.  Prognostic frames seek to prove to participants that 
change is possible, and motivational frames convince social movement members that their 
participation is necessary for such change to occur (Gamson, 1992).   
Diagnostic frames highlight specific societal problems and identify the parties guilty of 
creating them.  By naming those at fault, framers also construct boundaries (Gamson, 1992). 
Consider, for example, the way in which white supremacist movements frequently use religious 
tenets to distinguish racial minorities and Jews as subhuman ―others‖ responsible for the 
destruction of white rights (Dobratz, 2001).  In this case, the others include minorities and Jews 
and the diagnosed problem is the abrogation of white rights.  In similar fashion, Al-Qaeda faults 
the U.S. and Zionist sympathizers for the suffering of Muslims in the Middle East.  Osama bin 
Laden‘s 1998 edict asserts that, 
 
―For over seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in 
the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its 
rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the 
Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim 
peoples.‖  
―Despite the great devastation inflicted on the Iraqi people by the crusader-Zionist 
alliance, and despite the huge number of those killed, which has exceeded 1 
million... despite all this, the Americans are once again trying to repeat the 
horrific massacres, as though they are not content with the protracted blockade 
imposed after the ferocious war or the fragmentation and devastation.‖  
 
In this case, the United States, Israel, and their allies are the ―other‖, while the problem is the 
violence and destruction perpetrated against Muslims.   
A critical aspect of framing which has particular significance to both regional and 
transnational movements that employ terrorism is the importance of framers‘ knowledge of 
target communities.  That is, close familiarity with the values and concerns of specific 
communities are frequently integrated into movement frames as an incentive for participation. 
Hence, the problems cited by social movements must be consistent with what potential 
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participants perceive as their problems.  In transnational movements, this may require that 
diagnostic frames simultaneously engage local and global issues.   
In the early 1920s, for example, Ku Klux Klan leaders in Indiana not only framed the 
issue as one concerning race, religion, and national origin, but also exploited local concerns 
including problems related to surplus agricultural production such as corn (McVeigh et al., 
2004).  In particular, the Klan opposed tariffs enacted in 1921 and 1922, which overwhelmingly 
impacted the ability of corn farmers, also suffering from the Depression, to sell to foreign 
markets.  The Klan capitalized on this issue by incorporating Indiana‘s local problems into its 
framing.  As the Grand Dragon of Indiana‘s Klan explained in November 1923 (McVeigh, 
Myers, & Sikkink, 2004):  
―The manipulators of our national government have seen fit to erect high walls of 
tariff to protect our industrial interest, which were not justified, and while they 
have permitted the Federal Reserve Bank to become a tool in the hands of selfish 
and sordid men, the great agricultural districts of America have been sorely 
neglected to a point where they have suffered almost beyond hope of repair.‖ 
In this case, the Klan extended its framing to include economic policies that affected corn prices. 
Unlike diagnostic frames, prognostic framing provides specific solutions and tactics for 
dealing with the diagnosed problems.  Consider, for example, the remainder of bin Laden‘s 1998 
edict: 
―All these crimes and sins committed by the Americans are a clear declaration of 
war on Allah, his messenger, and Muslims. ….On that basis, and in compliance 
with Allah's order, we issue the following fatwa to all Muslims:‖  
―…..We -- with Allah's help -- call on every Muslim who believes in Allah and 
wishes to be rewarded to comply with Allah's order to kill the Americans and 
plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it. We also call on Muslim 
ulema, leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan's U.S. troops and 
the devil's supporters allying with them, and to displace those who are behind 
them so that they may learn a lesson.‖ 
Not only does bin Laden reaffirm the United States as the principal ―other‖, but he clearly 
identifies that the solution is for Muslims to kill American troops and their allies in addition to 
raiding American financial markets. 
With the problem diagnosed and its solution at hand, the principal purpose of 
motivational framing is to rally people into action.  It requires allaying fears of potential reprisal 
and reaffirming the benefits of their action.  Bin Laden, for example, appealed to Muslim‘s 
religious duty in his 1998 edict: 
―The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians and military -- is an 
individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is 
possible to do it….‖ 
He goes on to cite various passages from the Qur‘an and points to unanimous agreement among 
Islamic scholars that jihad is an individual duty if enemies destroy Muslim countries.  Bin 
Laden‘s edict is a straightforward example of the way in which social movement leaders and 
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social movement organizations are able to provide a problem, a solution, and a reason for 
individuals to participate.  
Summary 
Although there is no precise way to relate the three main approaches to social movements 
to one another, all have significant complementary insights into mobilization processes that can 
be applied to movements which employ terrorist tactics.  While the political process model 
emphasizes the structural conditions, which must be in place for mobilization to occur, it also 
points to the importance of the role of social movement organizations and individual perceptions 
of those opportunities.  In contrast, resource mobilization focuses on the ways in which 
movements and related organizations build and act upon those opportunities.  It neglects, 
however, the messages and understandings, which potential and current participants require to 
act.  The strength of framing is its stress on the representation of problems, solutions, and 
motivations, which move participants to mobilize.  If we view terrorism as a tactic rather than a 
phenomenon, we can apply these approaches with relative ease. 
back to top 
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Introduction  
Our goal in this paper is three-fold: 1) to utilize several datasets that include information 
on both international and domestic terrorist events as well as comprehensive data on the universe 
of terrorist groups that have operated over the past four decades, and parse the terrorist entities 
by major ideological concepts underlying the groups organization; 2) to identify the change in 
organizational structure of these groups over the past four decades, and then 3) to focus on 
specific characteristics of the contemporary wave of terrorism (1980 to the present) that will 
enable development of countermeasures to this threat.  
A helpful resource describing the changes in the nature of terrorism over the last 130 
years is David Rapoport‘s ‗The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism‘ (See – 
Rapoport, 2001, 2006). The first wave lasted from the last two decades of the 19
th
 century until 
the First World War and was characterized by anarchist groups that reacted to undesired political 
and economic reforms undertaken by political leaders in eastern and central Europe. The second 
wave spanned from the 1920s to 1960s and was catalyzed by the end of the Second World War 
with the move toward self-determination and decolonization. The third wave was precipitated by 
the success of the guerilla groups during the Vietnam War, and spread all over the world as left 
wing groups in Latin America and Western Europe used controlled tactics—such as hostage 
taking—to advance their revolutionary ambitions. The success of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 
and the subsequent defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan marked the end of this wave and 
ushered in the current fourth, or ‗religious wave.‘  
Maximizing the number of victims was one of the operational characteristics of the fourth 
wave groups; the mechanism utilized a de-centralized (horizontal network) structure (Dolnik, 
2003; Steven & Benjamin, 2000; Tucker, 2000; Hoffman, 1999, 2002, 2003).
1
  The initial 
manifestations of religious Islamic terrorism around the early 1980s involved organizations 
characterized by hierarchical structures. These organizations included Hezbollah, Hamas, 
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT), and the Harakat Ul-Mujahidin (HUM).  They operated mostly on the 
                                                 
1
 For example: the March 1995 attack by the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo sect, which released a deadly gas 
into a crowded Tokyo subway station, injuring some 5,000 commuters and causing the death of twelve; 
the September 11 attacks; the March 2004 attacks in Madrid; and the London bombings in July 2005.  
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domestic level, aiming their attacks at occupying foreign forces (Pape, 2005). In the early 
1980‘s, these groups did not perpetrate attacks on Western soil and tended to blur their religious 
ideology by emphasizing nationalist and separatist-ethnic goals.  
Datasets Used in this Report 
Two databases were utilized for our analysis. The first is the terrorist group database that 
contains detailed information from three sources on terrorist groups established between 1900 
and 2007. The three sources include: (1) Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, 
Concepts, Data Bases, Theories and Literature (Schmidt, Jungman, & Stohl, 1988); (2) the MIPT 
Terrorism Knowledge Base (MIPT); and the (3) U.S. Department of State‘s Patterns of Global 
Terrorism Project (U.S. Department of State). These sources provided information about the 
characteristics of 2242 violent political groups.
2
 Since not all of the groups included in the above 
three compilations warranted the label ‗terrorist,‘ groups that did not meet the following four 
criteria were omitted: (1) the group‘s activities included violent acts, which (2) were perpetrated 
in some type of political context, (3) involved a symbolic or psychological effect aiming to 
influence a wider audience and not just harm the immediate victims, and (4) were aimed at non-
combatants or civilians (Schmidt et al., 2006). The second dataset is an adapted
3
 version of the 
original ‗Global Terrorism Database‘ (GTD) of the START project (see START). The adapted 
dataset included 68,791 incidents of international and domestic terrorism that occurred between 
1970-2004. For every incident, the dataset provides the following information (a) the date of the 
attack, (b) the tactic used, and if it was (c) a suicide attack or not, (d) the specific location of the 
attack, (e) the type of targets, and (f) the identity of the group responsible for the attack. 
Analysis 
In the first stage of our analysis, we focused on two variables: (a) guiding ideology of the 
terror group, and (b) groups organizational structure to test if indeed there is an increase in the 
level of religious terrorism from the early 1980s to the present and if indeed most of these groups 
adopted decentralized structure. As for the ideology variable, the categories are as follows: 
nationalist, religious, right or left political wing, and Islamic or non-Islamic. Since some groups 
have multiple ideological agendas, we analyzed their rhetoric and formal teachings so as to 
identify their long-term goals and, from these, the leading ideology of each group. For example, 
Palestinians Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad can both be regarded as religious Moslem 
groups because while they strive for national liberation, the long-term goal of both is to 
transform Palestine into a part of a large Moslem entity spanning the entire Middle East.  The 
second variable, group structure (network or hierarchical), intended to verify if the fourth wave 
groups adhere to a decentralized structure.
4
 To distinguish between network and hierarchical 
                                                 
2
 Since the paper focus on changes in the characteristics of groups exercise political violence, we did not 
included non-violent groups which hold the same or some of the characteristics as the violent groups.    
3
 The GTD consist originally from two separate datasets: one for the years 1970-1997 and the other for 
the years  1998-2004. The latter dataset include more variables and some of its operational variables 
include more details then the first. We merged the two dataset into one dataset running from 1970 to 2004 
and modified the differences in the variables in order to construct one unified coherent dataset, in which 
all its variables will have the same categorization.   
4
 It should be noted that in different operational situations, groups can transform their organizational 
structure in order to adapt to new conditions and improve the ability of the group to survive. See for 
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groups we used Arquilla and Ronfeldt's (2001) typology of networks. Groups are defined as 
having a network structure when they consist of scattered, independently operating cells with 
limited operational and logistic links either to one another or to headquarters. They are defined as 
having a hierarchical structure when there is a clear line of authority from a central command to 
the operational forces carrying out the attacks (Mayntz, 2004) and when they have clearly 
identified leaders who serve in their leadership position for an extended period of time and 
directly supervise and organize the group's violent campaigns. 
Ideology and Group Structure 
Of the 103 religious groups in the dataset, 92 (89.3%) were founded after 1970 and 82 
(79.6%) were founded after 1980. Religious groups accounted for only 45.8% of the groups 
founded after 1980. The others were mainly left wing (29.3%) and nationalist (18.1%) groups. 
Among the religious groups themselves, we noted that 27.3% also had a nationalist ideological 
affinity. Since the 1990s, 67.1% of the groups were religious or held religion as some part of 
their ideological platform.  We conclude that during the last two decades there has been a 
marked increase in terrorist groups having a religious ideological basis.  
 
Table 1. Logistic Regression Models Based on the Groups‟ Dataset (Time = Independent)1 
Dependent variable  
 
B (S.E.) Wald Constant Nagelkerke 
R
2 
Religious  
 
 .94(.12)  63.840*** 64.605 .274 
Islamic 
 
.97(.12)   63.248*** 64.049  .280 
Left wing 
 
-.17(.007) 6.519*  6.372  .021 
Right wing 
 
-.17(.007)    5.393*   4.956    .020 
Nationalist 
 
-.14(.007)      3.954* 3.681  .013 
Structure .26(.009)      29.103** 9.335 .140 
     
1
 In all models, the time is the only explanatory variable, while the dependent variable is a binary one. 
*P<.05, **P<.01, ***P<.001 
 
The series of logistic regression models (Table 1) in which the ideology served as the 
dependent variable and time (represented by year of foundation) was the independent variable 
further supports the finding that religious Islamic terrorism increased over this time period. They 
also clarify that there was no meaningful increase in the appearance of other ideological groups 
during the same time period.   
                                                                                                                                                             
example the Palestinian Hamas after and before 2002. After Israel initiated operation ‗Defensive Shield‘ 
in the West Bank, the organization abandoned many of its hierarchical characteristics and operated by 
independent networks scattered all over the West Bank. In the current paper we looked at the basic 
structure of the group after it was established.  
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Table 2. Logistic Regression Models Based on Incidents‟ Dataset (Time = Independent)* 
Dependent variable  
 
B (S.E.) Wald Constant Nagelkerke 
R
2 
Religious  
 
.067(.003) 553.702***   573.460 .037 
Islamic 
 
.141(.007)  405.432***   401.693 .243 
Left wing 
 
-.050(.002)  1026.734***  1028.847  .040 
Right wing 
 
-.033(.003)     152.562***   142.028   0.10 
Nationalist 
 
-.061(.001)       2223.011***   2189.454  .051 
Structure .011(.002) 28.512*** 25.381 .001 
     
1
 In all models, the time is the only explanatory variable, while the dependent variable is a binary one. 
*P<.05, **P<.01, ***P<.001 
Using the incident dataset from Table 2, we found that 94.4% of the attacks by religious 
groups occurred after 1980, and 63% after 1990 (the former includes the attacks of the 1990s and 
2000s as well). Table 2 indicates that only the rise in Islamic terrorism yielded a significant 
model with meaningful explanatory power. This reveals that while there is a significant rise in 
the attacks perpetrated by Islamic groups over time, there is a less significant increase in attacks 
by other religious groups.   
Only 44.6% of the groups established since 1980 had decentralized structures compared 
with 62.8% of those established since 1990. Over the last three decades, the number of attacks 
initiated by decentralized groups never exceeded 30% of the attacks (per year) and in most years 
was lower. The results of the two logistic regression models illustrates that while there is indeed 
a significant increase in the number of groups with decentralized structure over time, this change 
is less dominant than the ideological one (refer to Tables 4 and 5). In other words, the shift to 
religious Islamic ideology in the last two decades is more pronounced than the shift to 
decentralized structure, as some of the prominent religious groups (Hezbollah, MILF and others) 
actually adhere to semi-military hierarchical structure.   
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Tactics and Lethality   
 
Figure 12. Share of Attacks in Which Suicide Tactics Were Used 
 
Figure2. No. of Attacks in Which WMD Were Used 
 
The findings regarding suicide attacks (see Figure 1) indicate a gradual and consistent 
growth in the use of this tactic over the last three decades. In the 1980s, the average number of 
suicide attacks per year was 4.9, in the 1990s it jumped to 10.2 and between 2000 and 2004, it 
escalated to 76.4 per year. Figure 2 presents the measure (p-value) of suicide attacks out of total 
attacks per year. The increase in suicide attacks is not a result of the growth in the general 
number of terrorist attacks. Furthermore, suicide attacks still comprise less than one percent of 
the total number of terrorist attacks. As for WMD, the incident dataset indicates 129 cases of the 
use of chemical and biological substances during attacks.  WMD attacks during the period from 
1980 to 2004 do not appear to have increased linearly as a function of time.  
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Figure 3. Yearly Average Number of Fatalities and Injured per Terrorist Attack 
 
In Figure 3, we present the gradual increase in the average number of fatalities and 
injured in terrorist attacks every year. The data on victims was modeled by converting the yearly 
average number of fatalities and injured persons per terrorist attack to a log scale and fitted a 
quadratic regression (i.e., a degree 2 polynomial). The models for victims and fatalities were 
highly significant (Injured: F=30.08***, R
2=
.48; Fatalities: F=40.54***, R
2=
.55). They confirm 
that there is a clear rise in the number of victims over the years; terrorism is indeed becoming 
more and more lethal. Thus, the assumption that the fourth wave groups are more inclined to 
maximize the number of victims from their attacks is substantiated by our analysis. 
Explaining the Fourth Wave  
From 1993, a new configuration of Islamic violence started to gain momentum. Small 
cells of Muslims perpetrated attacks in Western countries or against Western targets on neutral 
ground. The shift in the geographical site of terrorist attack, from a local to global target, raised 
the question whether a ―leaderless Jihad‖ had emerged. The ‗leaderless Jihad‘ thesis of Marc 
Sageman (2008) and others (Bourk, 2004) views the global Salafi Jihad as a diffused 
phenomenon of isolated homegrown cells that no longer follow the dictates of a core group of 
leaders (i.e., Al-Qaeda central). While these groups are inspired by the ideology, acts and 
propaganda of the Islamic veteran groups, Sageman postulates that they evolve spontaneously 
and act independently in terms of training, target selection, timing of the attacks and the choice 
of tactics. The networks are composed primarily of Muslim immigrants and their descendants 
who have found it difficult to assimilate in their new countries and have therefore developed a 
strong sense of alienation.  
The alternative approach, offered by Hoffman (2008), concurs with the argument that the 
global Jihad is less centralized and coordinated than it used to be as a result of the killing of 
senior and mid-level Al-Qaeda activists in Afghanistan. Hoffman, though, argues that Al-Qaeda 
is a key actor in the global Salafi Jihad. According to his contention, the group was able to find 
replacements for those who were killed or apprehended and utilizes skilled operators in ―sleeper 
 155 
UNCLASSIFIED 
cells‖ to rebuild its operational capabilities. Hoffman concludes that sleeper cells rather than 
homegrown independent networks should be the prominent security concern of the West.  
Development 
 
Figure 4. Number of Groups Founded by Decade and Configurations of Islamic Terrorism 
The data indicates three phases of the evolution of Islamic fourth wave groups (see 
Figure 4). The first stage consists of the paramilitary groups, 31.1% of which were established 
during the 1980s and another 26.6% during the 1990s. Moreover, in the 1980s they comprised 
97% of the Islamic groups. A significant portion of these groups were established before the 
"formal beginning" of the fourth wave (20% in the 1970s and 17% before then). The second 
stage started with the formation of Al-Qaeda in 1988 and the consolidation of its affiliated 
groups during the mid to late 1990s and again in the early 2000s. The third stage was marked by 
the appearance of sleeper cells and homegrown networks. The majority of these groups (70.8%) 
became active during the last decade and none of them can be traced to the period prior to 1993. 
Use of the statistical Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) technique with the year of attack as the 
variable under examination indicated significant differences between the paramilitary groups and 
Al-Qaeda groups (the small number of attacks of the two other configurations led to their 
disincorporation in this specific analysis) (F=18.429***). These findings substantiate that indeed 
paramilitary groups in general preceded the appearance of the Al-Qaeda groups.   
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Figure 5. No. of groups founded by Geographical area and configurations of Islamic 
terrorism 
Significant differences were found with regard to the number of attacks of the different 
configurations. While the majority of networks (both sleeper cells and homegrown) perpetrated a 
single attack and then disappeared, the two other configurations generated continuous campaigns 
of terrorism. This is reflected in the data extracted from the incident dataset. The paramilitary 
groups were responsible for 94% of the total volume of Islamic terrorism. Almost five percent of 
the attacks were perpetrated by Al-Qaeda and its affiliates while, as indicated above, a negligible 
percentage can be associated with the different networks. Geography also seems to have a 
significant effect. Only 2 out of 45 paramilitary groups (4.4%) were active on Western soil (see 
also Figure 5). All the others were located in developing countries, most notably in the Middle 
East, North Africa and South East Asia.  This finding is also relevant for the Al-Qaeda central 
network that operates in these areas. Networks in general present a more diverse geographical 
scope. Sleeper cells serve as bridges between paramilitary groups and homegrown networks. 
While the majority of these cells operated in developing countries, (7, 63.6%) some were 
observed in different parts of the world (4, 36.4%) such as in Argentina and Australia. The 
majority of the homegrown networks operated in the West (10, 71.4%) and the four other groups 
in moderate Muslim countries whose regimes were allied with the West (Morocco, Turkey). This 
implies a division of labor within the global Jihad. While the sleeper cells operates in countries 
with weak counterterrorism mechanisms in the third world and therefore can operate undercover 
for years, the homegrown networks evolved and operate in western countries with advanced 
counterterrorism mechanisms. In those latter countries, it is more difficult to instill sleeper cells, 
hence the spiritual leaders of the global Jihad foster the emergence of networks of local activists, 
providing them the ideological justification for their attacks and helping them in forging ties with 
Islamic organizations that can provide them logistic and operational assistance.    
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Terrorism as a function of ideology and Organizational Structure 
 
Figure 6. Internal Division by Ideology (Percentage) within the Different Ideologies 
Figure 6 illustrates that greater than 80% of the Al-Qaeda, sleeper cells and homegrown 
network cohorts currently extant in the fourth wave of terrorism have a religious base 
ideologically. In contrast, the paramilitary groups share a nationalist religious ideological 
framework.  
 
Figure 7. Internal division by Organizational Structure (Percentage) within the Different 
Ideologies 
 
The different configurations of the groups are reflected in their organizational structure 
and operational characteristics. The group data indicates that the paramilitaries were more 
structurally diverse than the other groups. More than half of the paramilitary groups (65.6%) had 
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a clear hierarchical structure while only 16.7% of the Al-Qaeda groups and 9.1% of the sleeper 
cells (and no homegrown network) had a hierarchical structure (See Figure 7). The current 
paramilitary units have characteristics similar to such groups that existed in the first three waves 
of terrorism; they utilize a military infrastructure (such as training camps). In the case of Al-
Qaeda, the reliance on known structures dropped to 31.6% and in the case of the sleeper cells 
and the homegrown networks, to 8.3%.  We can conclude that while in the early stages of the 
fourth wave most religious groups strived to imitate the structure of military units; during the 
later years, more and more groups acknowledged the advantages of creating less stationary, more 
mobile, dynamic and decentralized organizational frameworks.    
 
Table 3. Sleepers Cells and Homegrown Networks 
 Average 
No. of 
members 
Average 
No. of 
hubs
 
Affiliation 
to other 
groups 
Military 
Training 
Recruitment Tactics 
Sleepers 
cells 
(N=11) 
 
18.0 1.85 Groups was 
dispatched 
by sponsor 
group 
(Hezbollah, 
Al-Qaeda)  
70.4%   Pre-Planned, 
based on 
operational 
needs  
Adherence 
to suicide 
attacks  
Home 
grown 
groups 
(N=14) 
 
24.36 3.55 Limited 
connection 
(After 
group was 
established)    
42.7%   Primordial 
ties  
Adherence 
to suicide 
attacks  
 
Table 3 presents the main structural and operational characteristics of the sleeper cells 
and the homegrown networks. In nominal terms, the homegrown networks are 25% larger on 
average than the sleeper cells. This could be explained by their different recruiting mechanisms. 
The homegrown networks are typically established on the basis of existing social ties of kinship 
and friendship. Hence, there is a form of grassroots evolution of the network rather than top 
down development. In the case of the sleeper cells, members tend to be preselected, and 
recruitment is supervised by a central group of operatives.  
These findings are further supported by the number of hubs in the networks.  Hubs are 
locations where the players centrality
5
 is twice as high as that of the regular members. The hubs 
are responsible for coordination of network activities. The less centralized and supervised 
homegrown networks have on average a higher number of hubs (3.3) than sleeper cells (1.85). 
The homegrown networks are based on ties between family members, neighbors and colleagues; 
hence, we can expect to find a relatively high number of actors who are familiar with the 
                                                 
5
 Measure of network analysis which essentially reflect, for specific network member, the fraction of 
number of existing ties from all the potential ties (Wasserman & Faust, 1994, 178-180).  
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majority of the networks, while in the case of the sleeper cells the emphasis on division of 
function is more strict.     
As for ties to other groups, sleeper operatives are usually dispatched by the group to a 
designated country in order to form an infrastructure for future attacks. The homegrown 
networks are not supervised by a sponsor group but the link, if it is created, comes at an 
advanced stage when the group is ready to operate and requires financial or logistical support. 
This is reflected in the fact that in sleeper cells, 70.4% of the members have had military training 
prior to joining the cell, while in the case of the homegrown network, the number is much lower 
(42.7%). Further, most of the activists in such cells have had minimal training, mainly to 
familiarize themselves with the explosive devices they intended to use.  
Countermeasure Development 
Several characteristics of the Homegrown and the Sleeper cell configurations of the 
Islamic Terrorist organization have social network recruitment patterns that bring to mind the 
dissemination of biological infectious agents (naturally emergent or intentional) or metastases of 
cancer cells. The homegrown networks are populated by recruitment through existing social ties 
of kinship and friendship. The seeding of participation of a new recruit to a terrorist group is 
through direct contact from proximate cells (family, friends) in the same manner as viruses, 
bacteria or tumor cells spread from proximate infected regions of the body or neighbors. In the 
case of the sleeper cells, members are recruited through supervision by a central group of 
operatives. The seeding in this case is also achieved through social networks (analogous to viral 
or bacterial dissemination through intimate contact). From this biological disease model, several 
strategies emerge for diminishing the likelihood that terrorist group(s) will thrive in a particular 
societal setting. From the perspective of the virulent agent, terrorists - or threat agents - become 
more robust or infectious as the identification of society members with the terrorists increases 
(binding analogy with bacteria or viruses), as the access of terrorists to mass communication and 
media through the web, posters, television increases (altered metabolism analogy), and can 
become more agile and dangerous, like the ability of a discredited terror group to morph into a 
new shape or deliver a new message. The Freikorps experience in Germany following WWI and 
the Werewolf experience following WWII are illustrative in this regard. There was a profound 
difference in two experiences that were associated with host susceptibility factors (the 
response/attitude of the conquered population to the occupation).   
The countermeasures needed to transform an accepted terror group into a dysfunctional 
unacceptable entity may have similarity to biological systems that recruit the immune system to 
destroy invading infectious agents or cancerous cells. The expertise needed to accomplish 
transforming an accepted terrorist entity into a foreign set includes social scientists, linguistics, 
computer science, cognitive and neural science experts, as well as cooperation between 
intelligence, military and academic centers in the affected nation state. At a minimum, the 
approach most likely to succeed requires extensive knowledge of the culture, language, ethos of 
the specific region affected and access to leading edge data mining, statistical modeling, political 
organization, communications research. In the same manner that metastases of tumors from a 
primary location to new sites is affected by the concept of ―seed and soil,‖ where the cancer seed 
or infectious agent seeks out favorable soils for spread, so the terrorist seeks out favorable 
environments in which to thrive. The cancer spread is blocked by precluding growth of blood 
vessels to the newly implanted tumor. The ability of the terrorist entity to become implanted in a 
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region or state may be impeded by blocking its nutrient requirements (e.g., access to public 
information networks, supply of weapons and personnel, and transfer of funds that support the 
threat and infrastructure). 
The international responses to the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in the 
United States, the London railway bombings, and the Madrid railway bombings have been in 
large part successful because they led to actions that caused the Al-Qaeda unified network to 
realign into smaller cells that have been less effective on an international scale. The positive 
countermeasures have included increased surveillance of potential terrorist cells, their 
communications networks and financial transactions.  
Conclusions 
The major observations reported here are that: 1) over the last three decades there has 
been a clear proliferation of Islamic terrorism compared with violent groups that adhere to other 
ideologies; 2) that Al-Qaeda based terrorist groups have shifted from hierarchical to network 
structures involving home grown and ―sleeper cells‖ while most other terrorist groups show less 
of a structural change; 3) there has been an increasing lethality of terrorism worldwide. 
In our analysis of Islamic based groups and attacks of the fourth wave, the data indicate 
that there are four main configurations: paramilitary, Al-Qaeda, sleeper cells and homegrown 
networks. Each configuration emerged under different conditions. In general, these four 
configurations may not share a common ideology; they vary in structure and recruitment 
mechanism and the profile of their members is different. While we see a clear decline in the 
emergence of homegrown Islamic terrorist networks in the West since 2005, Al-Qaeda central 
and its affiliates seem as active as ever in central Asia and the Middle East. This continued 
presence may serve as a component to seed the global re-emergence of a centralized terror 
organization.  
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2.5. Terrorism: Organizational and Group Level Factors (Victor Asal) 
Author: Victor Asal   
Organization: Rockefeller College, University at Albany, SUNY  
Contact: vasal@ email.albany.edu  
Identifying the causes of terrorism is both an extremely important and challenging 
problem.  The effort to do so is important because of the human, political and economic cost and 
challenging because of the diverse possible causes and the lack of empirical data available and 
how politicized the discussion can often become.
1
  I borrow from Crenshaw by defining the 
causes of terrorism as ―… root causes (or preconditions) are those factors that set the stage for 
terrorism over the long run, whereas trigger causes (or precipitants) are specific events that 
immediately precede the occurrence of terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981).‖   
This overview narrows the field by focusing primarily on those factors that impact the 
decision by groups and organizations to turn to terrorism leaving aside important factors related 
to the individual psychological level or the larger institutional or societal   level.  Examining 
causes at the organizational and group level  are important because:   
―What we must explain in order to explain terrorism is not simply why some people are 
aggrieved and how they are organized, nor even why they resort to violence, but why 
they employ violence against civilians or noncombatants in particular (Goodwin, 2004, p. 
259-260).‖ 
                                                 
1
 For an excellent overview of the psychological review of the literature see (Borum, 2004) For broader 
overviews of the general terrorism literature see (Enders & Sandler, 2006; Lia & Skjolberg, 2004; Silke, 
2004).   
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Given the importance of the issue, I should note at the outset that there has been very 
limited amount of quantitative research on terrorism (Lum et al., 2006; Kennedy and Lum, 
2003).  The data and analysis that has been done mostly focuses on counterterrorism efforts and 
looks at the international level of terrorism rather than the domestic level of terrorism (Eubank & 
Weinberg, 2001; Enders & Sandler, 2000; Mickolus et al., 1989; Mickolus et al., 2004; 
Mickolus, 1982).
2
 
In addition, most of the data that has existed up until recently is event data but not 
focused on organizational or group factors.  Event data (data that simply says an attack happened 
on x date at y location potentially with information on who did the attack),  by itself, cannot 
address why organizations might have resorted to terrorism (Silke, 2004; Pynchon & Borum, 
1999; Borum, 2004). Event level data, though, has been used to advance our understanding of 
what factors might be related to terrorism at the country and regional level as opposed to the 
organizational level (see for example Borum, 2004; Li & Schaub, 2004; Li, 2005; Hamilton & 
Hamilton, 1983; Krueger & Maleckova, 2002; Hewitt, 2000) but that is not the primary focus of 
this paper. Even the work that has collected data on organizational factors has focused on 
terrorist organizations – which can tell us about why terrorist organizations behave in certain 
ways but cannot tell us why they chose to be terrorist organizations in the first place (Asal & 
Rethemeyer, 2008a, 2008b, forthcoming).    
On the other hand, there has been important qualitative work and a few quantitative 
pieces that have advanced our understanding of why organizations might turn to terrorism 
(Oberschall, 2004; Bloom, 2005; Hofnung, 1994; Crenshaw, 1981, 1990; Hafez, 2003; Hafez, 
2006; Pedahzur, 2001, 2005; Weinberg et al., 2003).  The reasons advanced in this work include 
a need to transform the world based on ideological motives, desperation in the face of intractable 
political and economic circumstances, use of terrorism as a psychologically potent strategic 
weapon, and socialization processes that encourage terrorist behavior as both justified and 
normal. In this paper we will review different factors that might lead to an organization to 
choosing terrorism.  I will then review some new findings based on a new data set of ethnic 
organizations in the Middle East that includes organizations that both use terrorism and those 
that do not.    
Ideology  
Crenshaw argues that ―terrorist ideology, no matter how unrealistic, must be taken 
seriously as a guide to intentions.  Coupled with analysis of capabilities it provides a basis for 
expectations (Crenshaw, 1988, p. 15).‖ Indeed, Wilkinson asserts that the most important factor 
explaining why organizations choose to use terrorism is their ideological motivations 
(Wilkinson, 2000).  The argument for seeing ideology as a key  cause for the deployment of 
terrorism by an organization is that ideology ―… sets out the moral framework within which 
[organizations] operate (Drake, 1998, p. 53).‖  Ideology- particularly religious ideology- has 
been argued to be the reason why terrorism has become more lethal in the last decade (Laqueur, 
                                                 
2
 A new data base, the Global Terrorism Database now allows for an analysis of domestic terrorism 
(about 90% of all terrorism events), but it is still too new to have generated a great deal of research and, 
like the existing data bases, it still focuses on events rather than organizational features (Dugan et al., 
2005; LaFree & Dugan, 2007). 
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1998, 2004, 1999; Hoffman, 1998; Lesser et al., 1999; Benjamin & Simon, 2002; Simon & 
Benjamin, 2000, 2001; Juergensmeyer, 2003).
3
 
Ideology can be used as a basis to define other humans, including civilians, as the ―other‖ 
and dehumanized (Gressang IV., 2001) (Crenshaw, 1988; Tilly, 2003, p. 21). Drawing on 
Gressang and Juergensmeyer and others, Asal and Rethemeyer posit that ideology can lead to 
organizations focusing on either supernatural audiences or human audiences as well as lead to a 
strong or weak othering of potential targets, where ―othering‖4 is defined based on various on-
line sources as ―securing one‘s own positive identity through the stigmatization of an other‖ on 
the basis of racial, geographic, ethnic, economic or ideological social differentiation.  The 
hypothesis is that the combination of strong othering and a supernatural audience can be 
particularly dangerous (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008b).  
3
Part of this increase has been tied to the use by religious organizations of suicide terrorism that had been proven to 
be particularly lethal. 
4 See Melanie Ulrich‘s webpage at //www.cwrl.utexas.edu 
 
 
Table 1. Audience and Othering (Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008b) 
 Strong Othering Weak Othering 
Supernatural 
audience 
Religions – especially 
those correlated with 
ethnicity 
Religions without clear 
ethnic affiliations 
Human 
audience  
Ethnonationalism Leftist 
Rightist 
Environmentalism 
Communism 
Anarchism 
 
Much of the literature on terrorism supports the argument that a nationalist ideology will 
be a strong evidence for causation of terrorism by organizations  (Zimmermann, 1987) (Lia & 
Skjolberg, 2004; Engene, 2004; Crenshaw, 1981, p. 383, Ross, 1993).  ―If national or cultural 
autonomy is denied or endangered, the likelihood of violence increases (Zimmermann, 1987, p. 
349 ).‖  As noted above, the same argument has been made about religious ideology.  As 
Hoffman argues, speaking of the intensity of terrorism:   
 
―… religious terrorism tends to be more lethal than secular terrorism because of the 
radically different value systems, mechanisms of legitimization and justification, 
concepts of morality, and Manichean world views that directly affect the ―holy 
terrorists‘‖ motivation. For the religious terrorist, violence is a sacramental act or divine 
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duty, executed in direct response to some theological demand or imperative and justified 
by scripture. (Hoffman 1999, VII)..‖ see also (Hoffman 1995) 
 
It is important to note that ideology can also act as a constraint against targeting 
civilians.  Norms can be both negative (Gressang IV., 2001) and positive (Keck & Sikkink, 
1998). In the same way that democratic institutions can make democracies less likely to go to 
war with each other (Deudney, 2004; Oneal et al., 1996), organizations with a democratic 
ideology may be less likely to use terrorism as a tool. Democratic norms encourage nonviolent 
conflict resolution (Huth & Allee, 2003) and political inclusion (Ramirez & Soysal, 1997; 
Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Finnemore, 1996).  Both of these features may encourage groups 
not to use violence and if they do use violence to chose to not be indiscriminate in their targeting 
thus moving them away from terrorist behavior.  Religious norms can also promote or act as a 
constraint to targeting civilians depending upon the interpretation of the religion. 
Capabilities and Resources  
Ideology can serve as a cause of terrorism by providing organizations a motivation for 
their behavior.  Motivation alone though is insufficient because terrorist attacks require certain 
levels of capability and resources.  Many researchers argue that capabilities and resources are the 
key factors in determining how organizations behave (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; McCammon et 
al., 2001; Alimi, 2003, p. 117).  Different capabilities may lead to different choices about 
whether to use terrorism or what types of terrorist tactics are used (Pape, 2003; Merari, 1993).   
 In the existing literature there is a strong disagreement about how the level of popular 
support an organization has will impact the choice of terrorism. Some argue that fringe groups 
are more likely to choose terrorism because they cannot compete with other stronger 
organizations and are too weak to target military personnel  (Blomberg et al., 2004; Engene, 
2004; Zimmermann, 1987; Carr, 1997). ―… [T]errorism is the strategy of a minority that by its 
own judgment lacks other means. When the group perceives its options as limited, terrorism is 
attractive because it is a relatively inexpensive and simple alternative, and because its potential 
reward is high (Crenshaw, 1981, p. 387)." Terrorism is thus seen as a ―poor man‘s air force 
(Hoffman, 1998, p. 34).‖  
On the other hand, it is possible that popular organizations have more resources to pursue 
various strategies, including terrorism, and that given certain types of conflicts, terrorism will be 
an option that is popular with the target audience of a terrorist organization  (Boyns & Ballard, 
2004). Cronin, for example, argues that ethnonationalist terrorist organizations like Hamas are 
long lived precisely because of their popularity (Cronin 2003, p. 40).  
 Another key resource that an organization might possess is external support. External 
support by states can provide organizations with a great deal of resources they otherwise would 
not be able to obtain like ―… firepower, funding, training and intelligence… safe havens and 
bases … (Wilkinson 2000, p. 64, Byman, 2005b, 2005a; Quillen, 2002; Hoffman, 1999, p. 15).‖ 
     Zimmermann goes so far as to argue that this support can approach having a root cause type 
of impact for political violence when he says that:  
―Outside economic, military and ideological support might also lead an opposition 
movement in protracted political violence.  The contras in Nicaragua or Savimbi‘s rebels 
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in Angola provide two recent examples. Such outside support may provide opportunities 
to adopt violence as an opposition strategy or to intensify the level of violence 
(Zimmermann 1987, 349).‖  
State Behavior towards the Organization  
 Political organizations are often created in order to change the polices of states and thus 
state behavior towards the organization is likely to be a strong factor in determining if and when 
an organization might turn to indiscriminate targeting of civilians (Kydd & Walter, 2002; Bueno 
de Mesquita, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c).  When states repress indiscriminately they may be inviting 
the same behavior in return (Crenshaw, 1981, p. 383; Byman, 1998; Feldmann & Perala, 2004).  
Juergensmeyer argues that, in addition to ideology,  oppression  by a state encourages groups to 
dehumanize the enemy and use terrorism (Juergensmeyer, 2003).  Waldman says that violence 
by the government leads to a desire for revenge based on governmental behavior (Waldmann, 
2001).  
 On the other hand, states can also behave in conciliatory ways towards organizations.  
Sederberg suggests that concessions to organizations can promote peaceful behavior by 
organizations (Sederberg, 1995, p. 295).  Other researchers, though, suggest that concessions 
may make the government seem weak and encourage organizations to use terrorism to get more 
out of governments (Kydd & Walter, 2002; Bueno de Mesquita, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c; ).  An 
example would be the recent expansion of the Taliban in Pakistan.   
Testing Hypotheses about Organizational Causes  
The problem, though, with much of the theorizing cited above is that it is based primarily  
on single case studies or small case study efforts that are limited in their ability to control for 
other possible explanations or to support broad generalizations.  Recent work using a new data 
set that tracks yearly the behavior of over 100 ethnopolitical organizations in the Middle East for 
the years 1980-2004 allows for some empirical testing of some of these arguments about the 
organizational correlates (and evidence for causation) of terrorism (Asal, 2008).  The  Minorities 
at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) dataset builds on the existing Minorities at Risk 
Project (MAR) (Minorities at Risk (MAR); Gurr, 2000, 2005).  The MAROB project codes 
every organization in existence for at least three years that claims to represent the interests of one 
or more ethnic groups or that contains members from a specific ethnic minority.  It is important 
to caveat that the testing of these arguments is limited because the analysis looks only at risk 
ethnopolitical organizations in the Middle East and does not have variables that capture all of the 
factors posited as causes of terrorism.  This analysis found that organizations that rhetorically 
justify attacks against civilians, that are advocating for a separate state, that are getting foreign 
support and being strongly repressed by the host state are more likely to use terrorism, while 
organizations that profess a democratic ideology are less likely to use terrorism. 
Bearing this caveat in mind, the data set does allow for comparative testing of various 
explanations and the findings are interesting.  When controlling for other factors, no one causal 
factor by itself is deterministic. Rather, different factors incrementally make terrorism more 
likely and when combined together have a large impact on an organization‘s choice of terrorism.  
Ideology, particularly nationalist ideology, makes the use of terrorism more likely.  
Organizations that have foreign support are also more likely to use terrorism as the resulting 
resources and backing is less likely to be impacted by retaliation from the government.  State 
repression and state refusal to make any concessions also increase the likelihood that an 
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organization will embrace the use of terrorist tactics, whereas organizations that embrace a 
democratic ideology are less likely to do so.  
 An analysis using the same (MAR) data which focused on identifying the factors, which 
make it more likely that an organization will specifically target the military, found similar but 
not the same factors as those that make it more likely that an organization will target civilians 
(MAR).  For example, organizations that are patriarchal and control territory are much more 
likely to target soldiers but these organizational features have no impact whatsoever on the 
likelihood of whether organizations will target civilians.   
Ways Ahead 
 Currently, a great deal of excellent work has been done theoretically about the 
organizational causes of terrorism and there is an important body of qualitative literature on the 
subject.  This effort along with limited quantitative analysis identifies several key factors leading 
organizations towards the choice of terrorism.  Organizations that embrace ideologies that 
dehumanize the ―other‖ and organizations that are marginal or have foreign state support are 
more likely to choose terrorism.  Governments that use harsh repression are more likely to move 
organizations towards terrorism. All of these findings though have to be seriously caveated.  Like 
the study of terrorism, at both the individual level and the societal level, there is a desperate need 
to collect more and more comprehensive data on terrorist behavior and the possible factors that 
explain terrorist behavior. The collection of data only on terrorist incidents or only on terrorist 
organizations does not allow us to compare those organizations that use terrorism and those that 
do not – and thus does not allow us to analyze with any rigor those factors that make it more or 
less likely for an organization to move from one of these groups to the other.    
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2.6. Organizational Profiling (James David Ballard) 
Author:  James David Ballard, Ph.D. 
Organization:  California State University Northridge 
Contact Information:  ballard@csun.edu 
Some experts suggest that terrorism will continue to evolve into more violent forms 
(Stern, 1999; Hoffman, 1999). This paper would propose that terrorist tactics will evolve toward 
Weapons of Mass Victimization (WMV), typically referred to in the literature as Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD) (Magid, 2003; Ballard & Mullendore, 2003; Zimmer, 2002; Levi & 
Kelly, 2002; Ballard, 2000; Schwartau, 2000). Given historical trends toward greater violence, 
the question should be posed:  Under what circumstances would a group or terrorist organization 
seek to employ a WMV? As an example, this paper will discuss what organizational 
characteristics are necessary for a group to feel ready, capable, and willing to use radiological 
materials as a terrorism tactic?  
IKMASS 
One technique for the assessment of this risk profile is codified by the acronym IKMASS: 
 Ideology, 
 Knowledge,  
 Management,  
 Audience,  
 Social distance, and  
 Symbolic value.  
After reviewing the literature, this project identified six factors as the analysis frame for the 
various types of groups who are involved in, or could become involved in, WMV terrorism. Use 
of this schema may offer a chance to predict who will use certain weapons, proactively address 
the threat they pose, and ultimately offer nation states an opportunity to more effectively target 
resources towards the most relevant threats. Individually these six factors do not represent an 
exhaustive or mutually exclusive delineation of the characteristics that could be assigned to a 
terrorist organization, but they do represent a collective thought process on how such 
organizations need to be distinguished from the larger mass of groups that use political violence 
to gain some type of social goal. The discussion below is loosely focused on one form of WMV, 
the radiological dispersal devise (RDD), merely to show how this schema would work on a 
particular form of weapon.  
 Ideology  
Generally, the term ―ideology‖ refers to the set of beliefs, values, folkways, norms, and 
attitudes that underlie the existing social order, or an alternative to that order (Apter, 1964; 
Mannheim, 1952). Social movements, even violent ones, that are in opposition to the dominant 
culture, for example a reform movement or a resistance movement, are defined as a sustainable 
collective movement that seeks some degree of social change within the dominate culture 
(Turner & Killian, 1987). These movements embody an ideology, as does the culture they reside 
within.  
Ideology in the context of terrorist organizational analysis refers to the intellectual or 
theoretical structure of the violent political and/or terrorist organization. As is typical of social 
movements, this philosophy is used to gain or maintain a variety of goals. For example, the 
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terrorist organization could expose a violent rhetoric as a means to gain new members from the 
disenfranchised among their target recruitment population. Organizations have a working set of 
assumptions, their working philosophy if you will, and it has a usefulness that transcends its 
rhetorical value for that organization. These could be non-violent movements (Ackermann & 
Duvall, 2000) or more sinister groups with a propensity to violence (Bainbridge, 1997; Saliba, 
1995). These oppositional groups, what Gramsci (1971) called ―counter hegemonic‖ social 
groups, will in very visible ways embody the arguments the organization has against the 
governing social order. In the case of terrorist organization potential, the key may well be to 
identify the splintering of the terrorist organization along differential philosophical beliefs. Such 
ideological fracture lines are critical to assess since they may be the first indicators of increased 
violence potential.
1
  
Knowledge  
Knowledge is generally understood in sociology to be what humans perceive to be real 
and true in the social world (Mannheim, 1936; Mannheim, 1952; Schutz, 1972). It is a socially 
created construct and humans depend on it for their sense of self, sense of placement in the 
universe, and most importantly they depend on it for a sense of reality. Knowledge allows 
humans to participate in social interactions, even those that are socially unacceptable or deviant, 
like terrorism.
2
 It may include ideology (discussed above) but most important for this assessment 
technique is operational knowledge, which is critical to assess for a terrorist organization 
including the tactical, technical, and strategic information held within the group. More 
specifically, it is essential to try and understand if the organization can gather and comprehend 
the necessary information on the deployability of WMV.  
Regarding radiological weapons, the first major area of concern may well be the 
worldwide diffusion of weapon and nuclear fuel cycle knowledge (Slavin, 2003; Cordesman, 
2000). The problems posed by such widespread use of nuclear technology, be it for weapons or 
power generation, is that the minimal skill set necessary for the construction of a radiological 
dispersion device (RDD) can be augmented by expert knowledge of the types of radioisotopes 
that are available, which materials have the most harmful effects on humans, and many other 
areas of very technical expertise, which could make the difference between an organization 
                                                 
1
 WMV, like all terrorist and oppositional tactics, could be addressed with the idea of a spectrum of 
effects that they can produce, if only as an organization device. The use of a thermonuclear device can be 
seen on the highest end of the spectrum, an RDD somewhere towards that end of the spectrum, and lesser 
tactics like mass protests on the lower end of the spectrum. Chemical and biological weapons would 
likewise be able to be situated on such a spectrum as are more mundane terrorist tactics like bombing, 
kidnapping, etc. The problem with such simplifications is that they fail to address the very real 
differentials in the consequences of such weapons and the varying degrees that they may be effective. See 
Bremer-Maerli (2003) for more details on each type of weapons and their effects.  
2
 Knowledge can also be viewed in many different ways. Some consider the acquisition of knowledge a 
primary focus of debate. They would ask questions like:  Is human knowledge constructed or realized in 
daily interactions? Knowledge can also be categorized as technical, propositional, situational, internal, 
external, foundational, coherent, and many other ideas discussed in the debates on epistemology. 
Cognitive and perceptual psychological scholarship also abound. Even a partial enumeration of them is 
beyond the scope of this article. The transition to a discussion on specific knowledge in the next 
paragraph is designed to focus the reader on certain types of knowledge that groups possess and that are 
relevant to this RDD discussion.  
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merely capable of deploying a RDD and an organization that can effectively use an RDD for 
mass victimization. For example, ―orphan‖ sources may prove to be more critical than actualized 
weapons subject to much more stringent controls, at least with respect to RDD (Ferguson, Kazi 
& Perera, 2003).
3
 Lastly, an understanding by someone within the terrorist organization of 
sources like spent nuclear fuel (SNF) may offer an additional source for potential RDD raw 
materials.
4
 Such insider knowledge could allow the organization to plan an attack on fixed sites 
(for example a nuclear power plant and corresponding spent fuel storage pools) or mobile 
transported materials (for example shipments to a reprocessing plant or geologic repository).  
Assessment of this knowledge entails knowing information on the backgrounds of the 
members of the terrorist organization. Intelligence on the types of experts familiar with 
radiological issues that the terrorists have contacted, how and if they have shared relevant 
knowledge, the presence of such information in terrorist training manuals, and other indicators 
would be the primary focus of such an examination. A social network analysis of the 
organization can reveal this critical assessment. 
Management 
The management of large scale terrorist organizations has been examined and seems to 
follow what Weber (1958) suggests are identifiable bureaucratic structures (Paz, 2000; Brackett, 
1996). The groups have rules, follow procedures, and embody the idea of a division of labor 
within their structures. Some of the specific characteristics of terrorist organizations noted in the 
literature include the limited longevity of the group, the variations in the size of the group and its 
level of effectiveness, and its ability to gain and/or maintain funding (Stohl, 1988; Pisano, 1987; 
Adams, 1986). Research on the management of terrorist organizations also shows the importance 
of focusing in on the inspirational or charismatic leader of certain groups (Burke, 2001; Stern, 
2000; Brackett, 1996).  
Operational success for the group rests on the ability to solicit financial support as well as 
the related organizational ability to provide logistic support for operations. In order to assess this 
aspect of the management factor, the key is what can be termed the ―operations‖ manager. The 
operations manager is critical to identify and analyze because this person is one of the linchpins 
of the organization and physically represents its ability to be effective on tasks, as an operational 
entity, and ultimately as an organization. For example, managers like Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri or 
Muhammad Atef from the al-Qaeda organization illustrate how effective non-charismatic 
                                                 
3
 Commercial sources have been studied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (Gonzales, 2002, 
41-42) and include medical sources (Cobalt 60 and Cesium 137 used in treatment) and industrial sources 
(Cobalt 60, Iridium 192 and maybe the most concerning radioisotope, Cesium Chloride in powder form).  
4
 Many discussions on RDD assume that the adversary would need to divert the radioactive source from 
its safeguarded environment and only then could it be used as fuel for a device. Typically the means 
designed to thwart the use of such materials revolve around denial of the opportunity to transport the 
materials. Some scholarship has developed that asserts that the use of the materials in place, for example a 
direct attack on transported radioactive materials, does not require the terrorist to physically acquire the 
materials, rather they could initiate an attack on the materials where they are located, especially in an 
urban center, and create widespread panic and social disruption (Halstead & Ballard, 1997; Ballard, 
2002). 
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leaders can control the overall operations of a group and affect perpetration of the organization 
even after an all out military campaign designed to obliterate the organizational leaders.
5
 
Audience  
The audience for the terrorist act is another factor that should be considered when 
assessing a terrorist organization‘s propensity to commit a WMV attack. It is important to ask 
and answer the question: What message is the organization communicating by planning and/or 
by committing such an attack? Likewise, it is critical to understand the organization‘s audience, 
where they are located, and for what purposes the attack is being perpetrated. Purposes could 
include recruitment of members, solicitation of funding, and/or encompass a variety of 
organizational motives, potentially each with different risk or threat profile.  
Organizations, just like everyday humans, exhibit behavior that they wish others to 
observe and/or engage in behavior that would be less than desirable if made public. Goffman 
(1959) refers to this role bifurcation as frontstage and backstage behavior, and this idea 
specifically addresses what roles a social actor plays and their relationship to various audiences. 
In Goffman‘s dramaturgical terms, keeping the audiences ignorant of the totality of the roles you 
could adopt is audience segregation. These same dynamics apply to organizations. For example, 
commentators note how a terrorist group is ―talking‖ to a sub-population within a nation state, 
sometimes trying to incite violence against a government, possibly with the intent to overthrow 
that government. What is emerging is the recognition that extra organizational audiences (not 
defined necessarily by geographic boundaries or political entities like a state) can be the focus.
6
 
For example, these audiences could be in another country or culture or half way around the 
world. The point is that terrorists have a message and it is directed towards an audience, 
territorially defined in some cases, extra-territorial in others, and even intra-organizationally 
defined in some cases.  
Social Distance 
Social distance is the degree to which humans seek to associate or disassociate 
themselves from other groups (Bogardus, 1959). Analytically, it is similar to the process of 
social segregation, where conditions of inequality and power imbalances are perpetrated by one 
group and opposed by the other (Massey & Denton, 1993; Bogardus, 1928). Such social 
distancing can be based on physical distance from where the ―other‖ lives in a different physical 
location, emotional distance where the separation is more internal than external (for example 
between sub-cultural groups), and/or based on perceptions of differences that allow for the 
dehumanization of one group by another.   
                                                 
5
 The most contemporary example is the war on the Taliban and Afghanistan. Shortly after the September 
11, 2001 attacks, the United States government launched a massive military strike against the Taliban for 
harboring terrorists suspected of committing the attacks. In the weeks that followed, the United States and 
collation forces were able to attack the infrastructure of one terrorist organization in Afghanistan and still 
others in various places around the world. Never-the-less, the remnants of the organization remain as of 
the writing of this essay and are of concern for counterterrorist specialists.  
6
 Morton Bremer Maerli has written extensively on the subject, but the most salient work is in Norwegian. 
The author‘s knowledge of these arguments is based on personal interactions with this researcher over the 
last several years and similar interests in this area of terrorist scholarship. 
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Perpetrators of WMV events must come to a place where in their social distance from 
their target population is increased. They act in such a way that the victim‘s humanity is negated. 
The measurement of social distance is a much researched area within the social sciences. In an 
effort to understand the effects of this distancing, researchers have looked at social distance and 
associated various social factors: age (Eisenstadt, 1956), nationality (Grace & Neuhaus, 1952), 
social classes (Halbwachs, 1958; Kahl, 1957), and race (Westie, 1953).  
The assessment of social distance and terrorist organizations includes four specific areas: 
potential social distance based on perceived religious differences; social distance based on 
perceived racial and/or ethnic differences; social distance based on perceived differences in 
cultures; and social distance based on perceived socio economic differentials. These four 
dimensions offer an opportunity to analyze the degree to which an organization vilifies the other 
and represent one dimension viable in the assessment of a group and its propensity to commit 
mass victimization.  
Symbolic Value 
The Interactionist paradigm in sociology is a theoretical perspective that seeks to 
understand how humans use and interpret symbols in the process of communication, as well as in 
creating and maintaining impressions. Integrationist theory informs, in part, how humans use 
symbols to forge a sense of identity and experience everyday life within a social system (Blumer, 
1969; Cooley, 1964; Kuhn, 1964; Mead, 1934; Simmel, 1950). This process applies to 
organizations who seek to use symbolic targets to convey a message of anger, dissociation, 
dehumanization, or any other justifications the terrorist organization could use for violence. It 
can apply to the victims of the organizations violence, the target site itself, or even the tactic used 
for the attack.  
The choice of an RDD attack may have symbolic value in and of itself, as suggested by 
an attack on nuclear waste shipments.
7
 The perpetrators of such an attack could be targeting 
these shipments in opposition to nuclear power; or perceived arrogance on the part of the 
government in promoting this program; and/or because it would offer an opportunity to create an 
environmental disaster with radioactive materials, a potentially symbolic gesture in and of itself. 
For other adversaries, such hypothesized attacks could be used as a warning, or as a means to 
demonstrate power to the opposition, in the case of the United States the last remaining ―super‖ 
power in the global community.  
Conclusion 
This argument has emphasized that intelligence agencies and terrorism scholars should 
engage in direct analysis of the threats organizations pose in an integrated global community, 
with particular attention paid to radiological dispersal devices. The approach is a simple 
approach for applying organizational resources to gather the necessary information. The 
IKMASS process suggested herein can be illustrated by the diagram that follows. 
                                                 
7
 The protests in Germany regarding the transportation of nuclear waste are helpful in illustrating this 
discussion. The groups who opposed transporting nuclear materials by rail used large scale protests and 
various methods of violent and non-violent confrontation to halt the shipments, even during a time when 
this particular country was attempting to phase out nuclear power. 
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The actual assessment of the six factors or dimensions will vary depending on the group 
under consideration, the weapon or tactic they may be contemplating using, and/or the level of 
intelligence that is available on the group. Each of the six factors or dimensions should be 
normalized on a grading scale (i.e., 100 point scale) so that changes in each dimension can be 
compared. One specific suggestion is that the terrorist organization be charted over time 
(longitudinally) and on each of these factors (see charts above for a sample of how such an 
analysis would look). In this way, a quasi time series analysis design, changes in the six risk 
factors can be tracked and by the imposition of a trend line representing the summation of these 
changes, the risk potential for this particular organization could be assessed, updated, or 
downsized as appropriate. The analysis could also focus on single indicators, but this may not be 
the best strategy since it is generally understood that multiple measures are a more robust 
analytical choice. For example, spikes in any one indicator could be indicative of new 
intelligence on the group, could be the result of a temporary change in the organization, and/or 
could be the first indicators of a higher risk of an attack. The bottom line is that the combination 
of the six factors noted herein offers a more robust profile of the organization and its potential to 
conduct an attack using WMV.  
The process suggested in this essay would necessitate the use of non-publicly available 
knowledge of the terrorist organization.
8
 Some of the material for this analysis would be from 
public or open sources, but the expectation is that such a process would best be served by the 
inclusion of secure data. This suggested analytical approach is offered as a ―straw man‖ analysis 
mechanism for academic study and debate since it is not currently possible to verify the validity 
or reliability of such a methodology.  
At the same time it is easy to envision that if such a process, in modified form, were to be 
applied to actual public and secure data, it could represent a resource allocation mechanism for 
antiterrorism and counterterrorism agencies and their activities. Such a method may also act as a 
prediction or risk assessment tool when considering threat remediation efforts, initiatives 
designed to counteract such threats, and counterterrorism related policies. Using a form of 
organizational analysis, would enable the prioritization of threats that need the most immediate 
attention and this approach could provide some semblance of order to the process of 
counterterrorism analysis. Likewise, adjustment of the dimensions noted above could allow for a 
similar assessment process relative to nuclear, chemical, and biological terrorism. As noted 
earlier, these tactics are distinctly different from RDD and must be analyzed accordingly. If the 
IKMASS protocol, or variants thereof, is shown to be a viable option in assessment of the risk of 
RDD terrorism, such an extension of the protocol to other tactics would be prudent.  
back to top 
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The advent of methods and tools for network analysis has brought about a paradigm shift 
in the way we examine data concerning terrorists, terrorist organizations and violent non-state 
actors in general.  Relational data such as individual contacts, group membership, financial 
transactions, telephone calls, and web site links all provide information about social structure for 
the study of political extremism, violence, transnational crime, and terrorism.  And indeed, the 
examination of terrorist networks has emerged as a prominent field of study in recent years 
(Sageman, 2004, 2008).  
Recent work in Social Network Analysis (SNA) has shown that it provides the analyst 
with the means to describe and visualize the social structures of violent actors as networks.  We 
can use SNA to infer both properties of the network as a whole, as well as internal characteristics 
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that would not be apparent simply by examining the data with tallies, spreadsheets, or statistical 
programs.  A number of notable relationships and structures among the actors that have been 
studied have emerged from the complex ways in which they are linked.  Most importantly, 
network analysis has produced significant knowledge while examining a limited class of data 
that simply identifies some form of contact, relationship or linkage between the subjects of 
interest. 
Network analysis has emerged to prominence for several reasons.  First, the increasing 
reliance on computer science for large scale data collection, processing, and mining leads readily 
to the adoption of the network model.  The same terminology and methods that ascertain where 
bottlenecks exist in a local area computer network serve to identify and describe the central 
actors and vulnerabilities in terrorist networks.  Social network analysis, while originally finding 
occasional use in sociology, increasingly appears in a broader range of academic disciplines as a 
state-of-the-art methodology.  The power of new visualization methods, data collection 
strategies, and innovative means to conjoin further data with the relational structures in the 
networks leads us to a powerful tool set for research and, ultimately, tactical and policy 
decisions.  
But perhaps network analysis has arrived primarily because of recent successes.  Network 
analysis, or in its investigatory guise, link analysis, played a significant role in the capture of 
Saddam Hussein (Reed, 2006) and the prosecution of the ―Virginia Jihad‖ (Surface, 2007). 
Network analysis was instrumental in focusing the hunt for Saddam Hussein by tracing the 
linkages of his ties to family members, Sunni tribal loyalists, and former protégés in Iraq.  And in 
a notable direct success, the ―Virginia Jihad Network‖ was investigated and prosecuted by link 
analysis based on the network of relationships among the 11 defendants.  Ali al-Timimi‘s central 
role was revealed by the analysis of communications traffic.  Recent congressional testimony 
highlighting the link between the ―Virginia Jihad Network‖ and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba training 
camps in Pakistan, where the Mumbai terrorists were believed to have trained, provides further 
indication of its current importance in counterterrorism (Van Duyn, 2009). 
One of the most widely discussed examples of network analysis of terrorist activity is 
Krebs‘ now classic analysis of the 9/11 hijackers (2002).  Through the use of public sources that 
identified contacts between an initial pair of the hijackers known to the FBI in 2000, Nawaf 
Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar, a picture of the network emerges that indicates the prominence 
of Mohammad Atta as the local leader and broker in communications within the group.  In the 
process of expansion of the network from all contacts within one step of the initial pair, it is with 
the inclusion of secondary steps or contacts that Atta emerges as having maximum closeness and 
betweenness for the network.  Atta‘s closeness score indicates that he had the greatest access to 
others in his network, and his betweenness score indicates that he had the greatest ability to 
influence the flow of information in the network.  In addition, all 19 hijackers are within two 
steps of the initial known pair.  Krebs‘ work is post hoc analysis, yet it has pointed the way since 
it not only identifies the social structure of the hijacker‘s network, it also reveals the channels of 
communication flows, prototyping our understanding of terrorist network behavior. 
While it is by no means certain that network analysis and monitoring of this particular 
pair would have revealed the plot in time to disrupt it, the findings are suggestive that network 
analysis as a research tool provides promise as a monitoring and detection tool as well.  As 
noted, the use of networks to examine the personal relationship structures in Sunni tribes played 
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a significant role in the capture of Saddam Hussein and is being implemented in tracking the 
development of the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Iraq (McFate, 2005).  And in 
an earlier post-hoc analysis of the transnational activities of Aum Shinrikyo, Picarelli (1998) 
suggests that network analysis could have revealed the increasing WMD threat that the cult 
eventually realized. 
This chapter briefly describes the state-of-the-art in social network analysis of VNSAs 
with a discussion of what we are learning about these organizations.  This is followed by an 
overview of the key elements for characterization and visualization of social networks and how 
they provide us new knowledge about VNSAs.  A description of the limitations and constraints 
of existing techniques will be provided.  Lastly, a discussion of several significant innovations 
and discoveries that shows where SNA research on VNSAs is headed along with discussion of 
desired developments is used to summarize our examination. 
What We Have Learned from Network Analysis 
 Social networks provide a mechanism for the analysis and display of structural variables, 
as measured by contacts or connections between two or more actors, and composition variables, 
which are based on actor specific traits (Wasserman & Faust 1994, 29; Scott, 2000, 2-3).  These 
variables comprise the actors, their attributes, and ties between the actors, which make up the 
social network.  These are also referred to as nodes and edges in mathematical graph theory. 
The primary application of SNA to the study of violent actors or groups is to identify 
their social structure, ascertaining which actors are central, and who belongs to what ―cliques‖ or 
subgroups (Reed, 2007).  These data are then be used to generate a variety of actor and graph 
specific statistics.  Similarly, these data may also be used identify and examine sub-group 
characteristics as well.  An analyst may choose to represent multiple aspects of social structure 
quickly and effectively using tools such as multi-dimensional scaling or clustering techniques to 
classify groups of actors, potentially identifying cells and less compliant groups within larger 
networks or movements (Sageman, 2004).  This affords the analyst a powerful means for 
visualization and discovery of new information.  Such information is at the heart of battlefield 
tactical intelligence and Reed (2007) makes a strong case that the incorporation of network 
analysis into the Intelligence Preparation for Battle is a crucial step for modern warfare.  
As we are concerned with VNSAs, it is useful to note that there are many types 
(Williams, 2008), and that network analysis has been used to reveal significant findings about a 
number of them: terrorist organizations (Sageman, 2004), militias (Zhou et al., 2005), warlords 
and cartels (Milward & Raab, 2006), insurgencies (Reed, 2006), gangs (Xu & Chen, 2003), and 
organized crime (Ferrara et al., 2008).  And these actors relate to each other through contacts, 
meetings, activities, training, financial transactions, authority relationships, and many other 
structural relationships.  All represent social systems that have close kinship, tribal or regional 
proximity affiliations that foster the growth of network structures.  In addition, their violent 
nature means that they are usually clandestine, and thus must trade organizational effectiveness 
for operational security (Clark, 2005).  This results in the reliance on pre-existing social 
networks, and constrains both operational detection on the part of state actors, and recruitment on 
the part of the VNSA.  
Central to current analysis on VNSAs is the ability to ascertain organizational structure 
and identify avenues of recruitment.  Sageman‘s (2004) seminal work provided one of the first 
glimpses into the organizational structure of Al Qaeda identifying several substructures, or 
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organizational cliques: the Central Staff, the Southeast Asians, the Maghreb Arabs, and the Core 
Arabs.  Also from his limited network analysis, we came to understand recruitment to Al Qaeda 
as a more complex, and less demographically determined process.  The realization that many 
members were middle class and married flew in the face of Western presuppositions.  As we 
increase our ethnographic base for analyses such as these, our understanding of the components 
of recruitment and organizational structure will grow as well (Renzi, 2006; Conway & 
McInerney, 2008). 
One of the more visible groups studying network analysis and a range of violent actors is 
the Dark Web Portal at the University of Arizona (Chen et al., 2004).  This large-scale open 
source project has produced a large body of work on the use of the Internet by extremist groups 
and terrorist organizations, both domestic and international.  The Dark Web project points to the 
utility of network analysis in ascertaining community structures or groupings.  Analysis of 
linkages between sites has produced network clustering that matches substantive expertise with 
substantial understanding of the topic.  When the organization structure of movements can be 
modeled on data that can be updated readily and frequently, we can move beyond from our 
previous sole reliance on post hoc analysis and move to real time monitoring.  The Dark Web 
project has done extensive examination of extremists on the Web, with network analyses 
focusing on network extraction, group identification and clustering, subgroup detection and the 
discovery of network interaction patterns (Chen et al., 2003). 
Network analysis of violent actors has been conducted over many diverse types of 
networks.  Reed‘s analysis of trust networks involved immediate and extended family ties as 
well as friendships and bodyguards, while strategy and goals mapping utilized financial 
transactions and insurgency operations (Reed, 2006).  These mappings led to the inference that 
members of the Iraqi insurgency built upon their trust ties, leading ultimately to U.S. operations 
that resulted in Saddam‘s capture.  
Networks are also of interest because of their novel methods for engaging calls for action.  
Recent attention has been focused on swarming behavior, where networks of resisters or 
protesters are mobilized on very short time scales via mobile phones and other electronic 
communications devices.  The ―Battle in Seattle‖ protest at the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 1999 was a precursor to swarming as a tactic in social protests (Ronfeldt & Arquilla, 
2001). Such swarming behaviors and the rise of the mini-blogs such as Twitter make this an 
important area of SNA that needs to expand and be monitored for extremist and terrorist 
utilization. 
Increasingly, network analysis suggests that network reach is a key factor.  The ―Small 
World‖ or ―Six Degrees of Separation‖ descriptions of the networked society may be too large to 
be of utility for network detection.  Initial research suggests that two to three steps is all that is 
required to uncover the essential network structure (Surface, 2007). 
Recent Developments in Network Analysis 
SNA provides a useful medium for exploring the behavior of actors in a variety of 
environments.  Current research concerning the study of violent non-state actors and their use of 
the Internet has been focused on two key areas of study.  The first major area of literature is 
rooted in sociology and has been particularly focused on content analysis and ethnographic 
research (for example, Blee, 2007; Bertlet, 2004; Adams & Roscigno, 2005; Gerstenfeld et al. 
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2003).  These studies typically provide excellent analyses of segments of the domestic extremist 
groups, but are limited by the inability to link these groups effectively.  
 There has also been considerable work in the computer science literature devoted to the 
taxonomic study of Internet extremist groups based on content analysis.  Qin et al. (2007) 
provide an excellent example of this strategy via the use of software tools and an analyst to 
locate, collect, and rate the technical sophistication of Middle Eastern extremist websites.   
There are several applications of social network analysis that study violent non-state 
actors engaging in activities on the Internet.  First, social network analysis has been used 
effectively to assist in assigning roles for individuals engaged in online discussion forums 
(Welser et al., 2008).  Similarly, social network analysis was used to detect and monitor 
activities of individuals who commented on jihadist videos placed on YouTube (Conway & 
McInerney, 2008).   These two studies provide clear examples of network analysis being used to 
classify and link behavior of individuals within a defined space on the Internet showing how 
individuals or groups spread extremist messages and which individuals may be receptive to 
potential inducements.   
Another excellent example of social network analysis being used to study extremist 
behavior on the Internet was conducted by Zhou, Chen, and colleagues at the University of 
Arizona (2005).  This group focused their work on a semi-automated collection of web sites in 
which collection software, referred to as a spider, traced linkage data.  These sites were then 
coded and classified using the clustering techniques of SNA.  This study shows the unique 
applications of both automated and human interactions to analyze data to produce complex but 
easily understandable sets of visualizations and clusters.  
Violent non-state actors‘ use of the Internet is increasingly important to study because of 
its use as a medium for communication, recruitment, and resource mobilization.  Social network 
analysis provides a key tool that provides analysts the ability to quickly visualize networked 
structures and identify clusters based on characteristics or ties among suspect persons or groups.  
In addition to the ability to define and classify group boundaries, the ability to further analyze 
individual activity using Web 2.0 features such as social networking or media sites may provide 
critical support in combating online propaganda and recruitment activities.  Additionally, this 
will help analysts isolate and monitor key individuals who may become sympathetic to these 
activities.    
Visualization is an exceedingly important aspect of SNA.  And with large numbers of 
actors and their linkages, information can quickly overwhelm the analyst, even with graphic 
display of the link structure.  The incorporation of self-organizing, or Kohonen, maps is one 
approach to reducing visual noise and displaying multidimensional data in two dimensional 
representations facilitating network visualization.  These have been utilized to cluster groups for 
network displays of extremist and terrorist groups by the Dark Web portal (Chen et al., 2004).  
Bayesian Belief Networks can also be used to produce graphical knowledge representations 
(Ferrara et al., 2008). 
Among the enhancements in SNA of significance is increased attention to weighted 
graphs.  The community structures uncovered by unweighted directed graphs are being refined 
by incorporating weights for the edges or relations between network actors.  Weights can come 
from a variety of sources, with text, commentary, or description providing valuable sources of 
contextual information to refine community or organizational structure.  In an analysis with clear 
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ramifications for open source monitoring efforts, Newman (2004) reports the power of weighted 
graphs in extracting community structure in news reports.  The separation of community 
structure in media content on the Anthrax attacks in Washington and New York shows the 
relevance for topics of concerning reports about violent actors in media reports.  And in one of 
the clearer expositions of SNA on real data, Koschade (2006) is able to effectively parse 
interactions among the Jemaah Islamiyah participants in the 2002 Bali bombing into two distinct 
clusters or cells that closely match investigatory reports. 
The ability to examine network structure and ascertain the characteristics of the nodes 
leads to tactical considerations.  If we know what nodes are most central, we may be able to 
disrupt network operations through removal or interdiction of the node.  Likewise, when we see 
nodes that are closer to many other nodes, they represent targets for influence or misinformation 
approach.  Quite simply, knowledge of network characteristics gives us information about 
tactical options.  
Networks, as diffuse structures, grow unpredictably and heal after damage (Cunningham, 
2003).  Alternate communication routes are established through existing sets of actors, and new 
actors are recruited to provide additional pathways, not merely as replacements for nodes that 
have been removed.  Networks are resilient due to the differentiation, which emerges from 
confrontation and the need to adapt to operational conditions (Raab & Milward 2003).  The 
robustness of network structures lies in the interconnectedness of the nodes.  Rigidly hierarchical 
structures are vulnerable; diffuse networks are robust.  Hierarchical structures have specialized 
paths that represent the only communications channels between the nodes, providing a 
formalized chain of command.  In networks, additional connections provide redundancy through 
alternate paths, control is diffuse, and information channels are robust. The result is that VNSAs 
have evolved networks rather than organized military organizations because their flexible 
command structures make them hardier than conventional force structures.  These networks are 
organizationally resilient and adapt both organizational structure and operational tactics based 
upon their environment (Milward & Raab 2006). 
As a result, SNA identifies who is important and where network vulnerabilities lie.  
Selected properties of networks become of great interest when we assemble the structures from 
the available relational data.  We are interested in properties such as centrality, with particular 
interest in ―closeness‖ and ―betweenness.‖  Nodes with greater ―closeness‖ are connected to 
more individuals.  They are rapid disseminators of information and other communications.  
Nodes with greater ―betweenness‖ are the linkages between subgroups that otherwise may have 
little contact with each other.  They are essential to communicate with different areas of the 
network and act as boundary spanners bringing ideas and innovation to both subgroups to whom 
they connect.  Often these two assessments result in different tactics and different targeting 
strategies.  In fact, research on disrupting networks suggests that while removal of emerging 
leaders is a desirable second-best strategy, random node removal is the best strategy for network 
destabilization (Carley et al., 2001). 
Interest in destabilizing networks has spurned interest in the analytic community.  
Memon and Larson (2006) have developed a Dependence Centrality score that facilitates 
designation of the key player(s) in an organization.  By accounting for frequency of 
communication between and through nodes, Dependence Centrality gives us a refined view of 
network vulnerabilities and appropriate chokepoints for destabilization.   
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Counterterrorism efforts are clearly aided by the ability to look for vulnerabilities on the 
organizational structure of violent groups and their members. And in a complementary fashion, 
network analysis is providing valuable support for counterterrorism by identifying vulnerabilities 
in critical infrastructure.  Network analysis of target vulnerability of gas pipelines, electricity 
grids and water supplies provides useful complementary information that while not describing 
the behavior of VNSAs, may well provide insight into VNSA targets, given an understanding of 
motivations and past behaviors (Apostolakis & Lemon, 2005). 
Limitations of Social Network Analysis 
Social network analysis suffers from a number of limitations that must be kept in mind by 
any analyst using this methodology.  These critiques stem from the data and techniques used in 
network analysis generally and from the social sciences more broadly.  They deal with central 
issues of validity, data, and visualization as key areas for discussion.   
One of the first things we must note is that on occasion, the data can be overwhelming.  
The reported collection of telephone records by the NSA represents a staggering assemblage of 
network relations.  And yet such data is always potentially incomplete.  Too much data 
confounds our ability to discern patterns, and too little keeps the pattern from emerging at all.  
And the fact that we do not always know all of our targets of interest means that we must attempt 
to achieve a balance between the two.  The ability to account for the effects of missing, 
incomplete, or uncertain data is a much needed area of research. 
One fundamental limitation of social network analysis is our difficulty in critiquing the 
underlying methodology presented in the analysis.  Existing studies including (Zhou et al., 2005) 
note that their analysis of domestic extremist organizations used semi-automated collections of 
Internet based materials.  This method develops a clear and coherent method for developing 
social network structures based on web linkage data.  However, a key concern regarding the 
development of the model and subsequent analysis is the inability to question the basis on which 
it is developed.  Essentially, it can be very difficult to explain the complex procedures that are 
used to process or develop the data in the social network.  Similarly, once the data are visualized, 
it is even less transparent.  It is extremely important to note that social network analysis is most 
effective in the hands of a well-trained analyst.  Failure to utilize well-trained human expertise 
may result in imprecise or flawed conclusions.   
Social network analysis indeed provides a series of powerful analytic tools.  The data 
sources needed for both actor and structural variables in many examples require some form of 
machine coded content analysis to detect either the relationships themselves or additional 
contextual information to weight the relationship ties.  This can pose serious challenges for 
research projects if computer assisted methods are used for these techniques simply due to the 
costs associated with human coding.  This problem is further exacerbated in an online 
environment based upon the constantly changing nature of social interaction on the Internet and 
the current lack of a coherent system that links content analysis to dynamic social network 
analysis.  Data collection and analysis with this type of research must be carefully managed to 
ensure that the scope of the project remains feasible for the analyst. 
Similar concerns regarding the validity of representation are also present when discussing 
the nature and construction of network diagrams.  First, the use of any spatial or cartographic 
visualization produces a sense of permanence about the structure that must be given particular 
attention by the analyst.  The underlying assumptions of these models suggest a degree of 
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permanency in the structures that may not be present, particularly given assumptions about 
underlying data.  Second, the use of visualization to provide exploration of data is a valuable tool 
for any analyst (Brandes et al., 2006).  The ability to do this is, however, premised on the 
underlying assumptions of the information being incorporated into the model.  Pictures drawn on 
incomplete data may appear much different than those produced with relatively little additional 
data. 
As we expand our data collection to multi-modal and multiplex sources, where we have 
data from more than one type of actor or transaction, analysis becomes more complex as well.  
The collection of attribute data to weight the edges or ties is a potentially significant 
enhancement, but one that is subject to the concerns already stated. 
Conclusion: The Promise of SNA  
The expansion of the network analysis tool set is imperative for future research.  A 
number of developments will greatly enhance its use in the analytic community.   
We must ultimately extend Operations Research concepts to SNA to move from 
description to actionable analysis (Clark, 2005).  As we examine networks, we come to 
understand the linkages.  By turning our structures into systems models and analyze the inputs, 
outputs, and communication flows, we can take steps to influence their behavior.  The network 
tells us the structure and the important nodes and channels.  Then operations research can ground 
that structure in actions based on known or assumed metrics concerning the structural variables 
calibrating the process.  Social network analysis gives us the fundamental map of the process. 
The growth in data collection efforts is leading to new conceptualizations of network 
analysis.  For instance, while the Novel Intelligence from Massive Data program initiated in 2002 
has not resulted in publicly visible developments, the subject of massive data analysis remains an 
area of future growth.  There are a considerable number of large databases of interest for 
monitoring and network analysis: the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System II 
(CAPPS II), The Multi-state Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange (MATRIX), the Able Danger 
Program, the Automated Targeting System, and the Terrorism Information Awareness  (TIA) 
program (Surface, 2007). The establishment of patterns of behavior across a broad class of 
interactions required massive amounts of data to establish adequate baseline probabilities, and 
programs at the Department of Defense (DoD) and the National Security Agency (NSA) are 
frequently mentioned in the media as being under development.  Our ability to process massive 
quantities of relational data and search for subgraph isomorphisms, or specific interaction 
patterns will be central to this endeavor (Coffman et al., 2004). The need to process massive 
information flows is critical need for future development and one which likewise gives rise to 
significant discussion of privacy issues. 
Network structures evolve.  Relatively small changes in staff or personnel can radically 
alter the structure of the network.  Our current low level of ability to track changes in network 
structure produces a significant limitation, as we know that organizations evolve, especially as a 
result of both success and failure. 
Almost all network analysis is static.  Yet people are not.  The evolution of the behavior 
of violent groups is all too apparent in the post 9/11 world.  Thus network analysis that captures 
the dynamics of actor linkages is one direction that promises to inform us (Breiger & Carley, 
2003).  Initial work on the topic indicates this promise.  In a segmented analysis of Al Qaeda 
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communications in annual snapshots from 1988 to 2004, McCulloh and Carley (2008) find that 
1997 is a critical year in which the network structure changed.  This coincides with public 
statements about the reuniting of Bin Laden and Zawahiri, and is followed by increasing activity 
against the U.S. six months later with the bombing of the U.S. Embassies in Tanzania and 
Kenya.  
Stepping back from direct network analyses of VNSAs, we can also see that the growth 
of networked data and applications indicates future needs at a meta-level of network analysis.  
As network studies increase, analytic tools are refined, and data collection methods expanded, 
the integration of network analyses will be facilitated by the evolution of the Semantic Web 
(Golbeck et al., 2005).  The publication of data and tools that allow for the ready discovery, 
collection, and integration will greatly improve the analysis of these organizations.  The concern 
for secure data integration across intelligence organizations parallels this need for an integrated 
approach to network studies on the organizational level.   
In addition, current analytic methods are largely static models of a single network.  The 
development of layered network analysis, where properties in one network can be linked or tied 
to properties in a related network at a different layer of abstraction will become important.  Such 
mixed-mode developments will give increasing capability to both explanation and description, 
but increasingly suggest means for providing tools for network disruption.  Ultimately, SNA is a 
tool to guide in the implementation of policy, for it is through our understanding of these 
networks of violent actors that we may understand who they are, how they operate, what they are 
doing, and what we may do about them. 
back to top 
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One of Professor David Rapoport‟s contributions to the academic inquiries into terrorism is his 
theory of waves of international terrorism.  Rapoport argues that there have been four waves in 
the history of modern terrorism where an idea has spurred violence across the world.  Although 
his idea has become mainstream, there is no research on how ideas actually spread.  This article 
attempts to bridge this important gap by combining recent advances in the fields of business, 
advertisement, and mass communication with research on terrorism.  In this process, I stress the 
importance of the political entrepreneurs. I argue that understanding the process by which these 
ideas spread across the world can provide us with the tool to manage future waves of 
international terrorism. 
Introduction 
The world is susceptible to the flooding of ideas. New ideas of fads, fashion, culture, and 
even political aspirations and philosophy periodically inundate the world. The process is perhaps 
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similar to the spread of infectious diseases.  For instance, there are many types of bugs that ail us 
and are then transmitted from one host to another by various means.  Some of these, such as the 
Ebola virus, are not only extremely infectious but also are absolutely lethal.  Yet, only a few of 
these bugs actually spread among a sizeable population and, even among them, a handful, such 
as the influenza epidemic of 1918 and the current AIDS epidemic, turn out to become 
pandemics.  In the area of violent political dissent, we see a similar pattern.  In this article, I 
would like to explore how some ideas become paramount and influence the course of history.  
Toward this goal, I will explain the ―wave theory‖ of international terrorism in the following 
section.  Section three will ask the question, ―What is it about human nature that makes the 
global flooding of a single idea possible?‖. The fourth section will present a case for the process 
by which the ―waves‖ are formed, which ultimately inundate the entire world.  The final section 
looks into the future and seeks appropriate policies to deal with the new waves that may threaten 
the world. 
Waves of Ideas and Modern Terrorism  
By carefully studying the history of terrorism, UCLA political scientist David Rapoport 
asserts (2006) that since the 1880s, the world has experienced four distinct waves of terrorism. 
Rapoport (2006, p. 10) defines waves with three characteristics: a) a cycle of activities 
characterized by expansion and contraction phases, b) covering multiple nations, and c) ―driven 
by a common predominant energy that shapes the participating groups‘ characteristics and 
mutual relationships.‖ Rapoport identifies four distinct waves fueled by common ideological 
fervor emanating from anarchism, anti-colonialism, socialism, and religious fundamentalism 
respectively since 1880.  The first three waves lasted roughly 40 years each.  Rapoport argues 
that we are currently in the fourth wave of global terrorism inspired by religious fundamentalism, 
which started in the early 1990s.  
Although the ―wave‖ theory has gained a firm footing in the extant literature on terrorism 
(Sageman, 2008a), not much effort has gone into the examination of the causes of and the 
process by which mega ideas saturate nearly every corner of the earth.  By drawing upon some of 
the current research in the areas of business, advertisement, and marketing, we can discern some 
patterns that can shed important light onto why certain ideas seem to ―infect‖ a large number of 
people across history, culture, and geography. However, before we delve into the question of 
how, let me address the question of why people follow these mega-trends of ideas.  
The Why of the Mega-trends 
If the global spread of political ideas seems surprising, we should note how other ideas 
freely flow and inundate our societies.  From fashions to toys -- bellbottom pants to cabbage 
patch dolls -- trends suddenly appear from nowhere.  In the Western cultural ethos, the idea of 
individualism is pervasive.  In our daily affairs, the assumption of self-utility maximizing 
individuals as islands of rational calculation, independent of community, culture, or creed, 
becomes self-evident truth. Despite this conscious and unconscious acceptance of basic human 
nature, current advancements in the fields of experimental psychology (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1984; Haidt, 2006), evolutionary biology (de Waal, 2006), and cognitive sciences (Damasio, 
1994; Pinker, 2002) clearly demonstrate the importance of group behavior in our decision-
making processes.  Even economists, the primary proponents of the assumption of self-utility 
maximization, who typically are disdainful of those who might contaminate the concept of 
human rationality with history, culture, or psychology (Becker, 1996; Lerner, 2007), are 
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becoming cognizant of the importance of group psychology and interdependent utility functions 
(Frank, 1998).  This diverse body of research clearly demonstrates that as social beings, we all 
crave to belong to groups and, when we do, we derive great satisfaction by adhering to their 
explicit rules and implicit norms. In fact, in the Maslovian (Maslow, 1968) hierarchy of needs, 
the need to belong is second only to the physical needs of keeping our bodies and soul together. 
Furthermore, people follow cultural dictates not only because they generate personal 
utility, but also because through their ―doing‖ they ―become‖ somebody (Schuessler, 2000). 
Therefore, Hoffman (1998, p. 43) is correct in asserting that when people join dissident 
organizations and take part in collective violence, which we now commonly define as 
―terrorism,‖ they act not so much upon their private motivations, but out of a broad community 
concern.  In other words, in their own minds, all political terrorists are altruists.  This 
fundamental difference in motivation distinguishes terrorists from ordinary criminals who are 
motivated only by their personal gratification (Gupta, 2008).  Those who join street gangs do 
indeed work for the group, but they typically define the group‘s boundary extremely narrowly, 
which includes only the immediate members.
2
 Our natural proclivity to form groups and work 
for their collective welfare is biologically imprinted in us, which accounts for the human need to 
join global trends of all sorts, including waves of international terrorism.    
How Do Ideas Spread? 
Journalist Malcolm Gladwell, in his bestselling book (2002) asks an important question: 
How do ideas spread?  How do we arrive at the tipping point, after which, a new idea, a fad, a 
fashion, or an ideology floods the world?  Gladwell studied the success of businesses like the 
popular footwear, Hush Puppies, and children‘s shows like Sesame Street. When we examine the 
process by which a wave of international terrorism spreads throughout the globe, we find that 
this is the same process by which ideas spread, some ending up being global, others remaining 
localized, some making great impacts, most others disappearing within a very short time. 
Gladwell‘s analysis of the processes by which little things can make a big difference discerns the 
workings of three broad forces: i) the messenger(s), ii) the message, and iii) the context.   
The messenger(s): 
The social theories of terrorism and political violence argue that gross imbalances within 
the social structure, such as poverty, income inequality, and asymmetry in power lead to violence 
(Gurr, 1970; Smelser, 1963; Tilly, 1978).  However, when these factors are put to empirical tests 
they, despite the age-old assertion of their salience, produce only ambiguous results or weak 
correlations (Hibbs, 1973; Gupta 1990; Krueger & Maleckova, 2003; Keefer & Loyaza, 2008). 
The reason for these puzzling results rests with the fact that the factors of deprivation – absolute 
or relative – only serve as the necessary conditions for social unrest.  For the sufficient reason, 
we must look into the role that ―political entrepreneurs‖ play to translate the grievances into 
concrete actions by framing the issues in a way that clearly identifies the boundaries of the 
aggrieved community and its offending group (Gupta, 2008).  The clear identification of the ―us‖ 
and ―them‖ creates conditions to overcome the natural bias toward free-riding and overcome the 
collective action problem (Olson, 1968).   
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 In economic terms, this is not an example of a public good that motivates a terrorist, but a quasi-public 
good or a club good.  For an extensive discussion, see Gupta (2008, 146-60). 
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Gladwell, for instance, makes a finer distinction within the category of ―political 
entrepreneurs‖ whom he calls the connectors, the mavens, and the salesmen.  The connectors are 
the primary nodes of a communication network.   These are the people who know a lot of people 
and are known by a lot of people by dint of who they are (position, power, money, etc.).  The 
maven is a Yiddish word meaning the ―accumulator of knowledge.‖  The mavens are the so-
called ―theoreticians‖ of a movement, the pundits and gurus, who can provide a cogent 
explanation of the current crisis based on their knowledge and observations.  The salesmen are 
those, who through their power of persuasion can attract groups of followers.  Although there are 
no specific boundaries separating these three groups of key individuals, any analysis of a global 
movement will clearly identify people with characteristics of all three.   
In this article, I am going to concentrate on only one movement within the fourth wave, 
al-Qaeda.  However, a careful look at all the other previous waves will clearly indicate the same 
pattern. 
The grievances of the Muslim community (ummah) have been acute for at least a century 
since the days when the last Islamic Empire in Istanbul slipped into the pages of history books.  
After an impressive run that lasted over a thousand years and saw the conquest of almost the two 
thirds of the ―known world,‖ beginning with the expulsion of the Moors in 1492 by the Spanish 
monarchy of Ferdinand and Isabella, the Islamic Empires started to experience defeat for the first 
time.  The following half millennium saw a steady decline of the Islamic Empire, which was 
completed after WWI with the break-up of the Ottoman Empire.  Yet this widespread realization 
did not immediately create violent rebellion along the lines of religious fundamentalism.  The 
collective frustration and anger felt in the Muslim world found its expression mostly through 
nationalistic yearnings, primarily as a result of the second wave (anti-colonialism) of 
international terrorism.  The so-called ―jihadi‖ movement took shape slowly through the writings 
of the mavens, such as Hasaan al-Bannah and Sayyid Qutb.
3
  Although they failed to make much 
political impact outside of Egypt during their lifetimes, their writings inspired the scion of one of 
the wealthiest Arab families, Osama bin Laden.  If we examine bin Laden‘s life, we can clearly 
see why he would be the Great Connector.  As a student in the King Abdulaziz University in 
Jeddah, young bin Laden was greatly influenced by his teachers, Abdallah Azzam and 
Muhammad Qutb, the younger brother of the fiery Islamist.  His vast wealth and his connections 
to the Saudi royal family gave bin Laden a ready platform, which an ordinary person would not 
have had.  As a result, when the Afghan war started, with his influence and familiarity with the 
rich and the powerful, he could establish al-Qaeda, ―the base,‖ which served as the bridge 
between the Arab mujahideens fighting the Soviet army in Afghanistan and their families in the 
Arab countries.  Furthermore, he quickly established linkages with the Pakistani military 
intelligence service, the Inter service Intelligence Agency (ISI), which served as the conduit for 
the CIA to deliver money and weapons to the Afghan fighters.   Apart from his personal wealth, 
bin Laden was also able to tap into the vast amount of charity money (zakat) generated within 
the Arab world, particularly in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf nations.  Through his immense 
connections and seemingly inexhaustible funds, bin Laden was able to attract a large number of 
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 The word jihad has a specific religious connotation.  Not all Muslims accept the way the radicals have 
used the term.  By accepting the term to label radical Islam, we may actually give it more legitimacy than 
it deserves.  However, since all other alternatives to the expression, such as ―Salafis,‖ ―fundamentalists,‖ 
―extremists,‖ or ―literalists‖ carry their own limitations, I will use the term ―jihadi‖ in this article being 
mindful of its political and religious limitations.    
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Most, including the likes of Ayman al-Zawahiri and many others who served as the salesmen of 
his jihadi ideology.  Together, the mavens, the connectors, and the salesmen began the 
foundation of the fourth wave of international terrorism. 
The message: 
The information age literally bombards us with innumerable pieces of information every 
single day of our lives.  As we see, listen, and/or read them, very few get our conscious attention.  
You may, for example, see a billboard while driving, a commercial while watching television, or 
listen to a lecture, yet may recall absolutely nothing about the specific message they contain only 
a minute later.  On the other hand, you may recall something you have heard, seen, or read many 
years ago.  The question is, what causes some messages to stick?  The secrets of stickiness have 
been the focus of research done by psychologists, communications specialists, and scholars from 
diverse disciplines.  Heath and Heath (2002), for instance, identify six factors that cause 
messages to stick.  They argue that a memorable message must be simple, concrete, credible, and 
have contents that are unexpected, they must appeal to our emotions, and should contain a 
compelling storyline.   
Simplicity is one of the foremost requirements of a ―sticky‖ message.  In the area of 
political communication, where a leader attempts to inspire a large number of people, sticky 
messages depend on the simplicity of thought.  When we look at the messages of bin Laden, we 
can clearly understand that in his vision Islam is under threat from the infidel West, the Jews, 
and their collaborators in the Muslim world.  Most of his communications, long and short, 
contain this message (Lawrence, 2005). 
These messages are not simply a litany of grievances, but are concrete in their action 
plan: It is the religious duty of every Muslim to join the jihad against those who are putting the 
followers of the Prophet in peril.  
The ―unexpected‖ part of a memorable message comes when, to the listeners, the leader 
―connects the dots‖ and explains clearly the confusing world in which they live.  To many in the 
Arab/Muslim world, the message must come as a revelation where they begin to see how the 
unbelievers have been undermining their rightful place in history. Through extreme cunning, the 
infidels not only sapped the energy of the Islamic Empire, but also are plotting to destroy it 
militarily, politically, financially, and even spiritually.  This sudden realization often lies at the 
core of recruiting of new believers to the cause. 
Coming from the son of one of the wealthiest families, living an ascetic life, waging war 
against injustice, bin Laden cuts a God-like image in the minds of many in the Arab/Muslim 
world.  These images, often carefully chosen by al-Qaeda, give his messages an immense and 
immediate credibility.  
As human beings, we remember messages that evoke emotions, particularly those that 
paint the portrait of an impending threat.  Fear is most often the primary motivator for collective 
action.  Evolutionary biologists bolster the findings of Prospect Theory offered by Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979).  Prospect theory simply states that in the process of evaluating benefits and 
costs of an action, human beings often place a far greater weight on the fear of a loss than the 
prospect of a gain (Heidt, 2007; McDermott, Fowler, & Smirnov, 2008). Therefore, fear moves 
us in a profound way.  Hence, it should come as little surprise that the messages of bin Laden 
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would be strewn with dire predictions of a destroyed Islamic world, which are sure to pass when 
the believers fail to act (Olsson, 2008). 
Finally, memorable messages come with stories.  Experimental studies (Heath & Heath, 
2007) show that when two similar messages are presented to an audience, one with supporting 
statistics and the other with a suitable story, the latter inevitably sticks more than the former. 
Similar to all other political communicators, bin Laden‘s speeches are chalk full of analogies of 
stories from Islamic history.  Thus, when he calls the Westerners, ―the Crusaders,‖ or George W. 
Bush, ―Hulagu Khan,‖ their implications leave little doubt in the minds of his intended audience.   
Thus, throughout history, the mavens have concocted coherent stories by borrowing from 
religion, history, and mythology with complete set of heroes and villains, good and evil, allies 
and enemies that have resonance with the masses.  The connectors have spread it far and wide, 
and the salesmen have recruited eager volunteers. 
The Context: 
There may be great messengers, but the stickiness of their message depends on their 
sociopolitical, historical, and cultural context.  Rapoport (2006) himself points out three 
historical and cultural factors for the spread of at least one form of religious wave: Islamic 
fundamentalism.  He argues that the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the beginning of a new Islamic 
century, and the Afghan War paved the way for it.  The success of the Ayatollah Khomeini is 
bringing about a fundamental change in Iran by driving out the Shah, the closest U.S. ally in the 
Islamic World, which gave a tremendous impetus to many Muslim radicals to choose the path of 
violent revolution to drive out the infidels and the apostates.  Second, millenarian beliefs in the 
arrival of a redeemer were seemingly realized with the Iranian Revolution, giving the 
fundamentalists one more sign of a propitious time to rise up in the name of Allah.  Finally, the 
Afghan War saw a victory for the Mujahideen against the mighty Soviet military.  In their 
victory, the religiously inspired totally disregarded the role that the covert U.S. and Pakistani aid 
played.  They simply took it as yet another sign of their inevitable victory. 
In contrast to Rapoport‘s emphasis on historical and cultural factors, social science 
analyses of social movements in general, and terrorism in particular, concentrate on the macro 
level social, economic, and political variables (Keefer & Loayza, 2008).  The presence of a large 
number of factors related to structural imbalances, such as poverty, unemployment, income 
inequality, and lack of opportunities for political expression provided the youth in the Islamic 
world and those living in the Western nations the context within which the messages of bin laden 
could be retained. 
Finally, terrorism does not happen in a vacuum.  The evolution of a violent movement is 
the outcome of a dynamic interaction between the target government and the dissident group.  
Being guided by the same process of over emphasizing the actual threat (Mueller, 2006), time 
and again governments fall into the trap of overreaction, which only reinforces the movement.  
Inspiration and Opportunity: Looking at the Future 
While ideas spread and many get inspired, only a few individuals actually join radical 
groups.  Literature (Horgan, 2005; Sageman, 2008b) shows that regardless how inspired they are, 
few people who join violent dissident groups as a result of epiphany; most join slowly over time 
through friendship and kinship.  When people get deeply affected by the sights of suffering of 
their own people and/or listening to inspiring speeches etc., they seek common friends or 
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relatives through whom they get involved in political activism.  O‘Duffy (2008) narrates the 
process of radicalization of Muslim youths in the UK.  Yet, one curious phenomenon has 
generally escaped the notice of most researchers: there is a significant difference in the rates of 
actual activism among the various national groups.  Thus, while many young men and women 
from Pakistani background join these movements, few from Bangladeshi or Indian communities 
do so.  On the other hand, young men and women from the Magreb community, similar to the 
Pakistanis, find ways to become active in such movements.  This differential rate may be the 
outcome of opportunity.   
Pakistan was created with a deep scar in its collective memory.  Apart from the trauma of 
horrific mass killings that preceded a partition, it also inherited the persistent problem of 
Kashmir.  The inherent logic of the partition based on religion might have dictated that the 
former princely state would join Pakistan, history did not go that way.  As a result, the Pakistani 
leaders from the beginning framed the issue of ―liberation‖ of Kashmir as an integral part of its 
national identity.  Facing a much stronger enemy, Pakistan turned to the jihadis and, in effect, 
privatized its war of attrition (Swami, 2007).  Since these terrorist training camps were 
established and administered with the full support of the Pakistani government and its 
intelligence service, the ISI (Stern, 2003), they operated in the open; those who wanted to join 
them had full knowledge of their location.  Similar training camps, built around extreme versions 
of Islam, flourished in the North West Frontier provinces with blessings and resources from the 
United States, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf States. During the Afghan War against the Soviet 
military, these camps became the ready destination of all the ―wannabe‖ jihadis.  These camps 
provided unprecedented opportunities for the inspired all over the world.  Apart from the jihadi 
training camps, radicalism blossomed in Islamic schools, the madrassahs, which were financially 
supported by Saudi Arabia as a part of their war of religious hegemony (Fair, 2008).  By 
providing opportunity to the inspired, Pakistan quickly became known as the ―most dangerous 
place on earth.‖ 
Sageman (2008b, p. 85) finds, from his dataset of terrorist profiles, that most of the 
violent activists not only are of Pakistani background, but also a disproportionate percentage 
come from Mirpur district, a small area in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir.  These findings are 
consistent with his earlier (2004) ―bunch of guys‖ hypothesis, where a group of (mostly) men, by 
heeding the call of an inspirational leader, create a cell.  In their devotion to the cause, they 
create their own set of norms, which at times may even require them to sacrifice their own lives.  
These sorts of groupings are common in all social settings.  However, if these radicalized 
members find a way to act upon their conviction, a terror cell is born.  As groups are formed, 
leaders emerge.  In the network process, they act as the nodes by making contact with other 
groups or the central core of a movement.  As ideas spread, inspiration meets opportunity to 
produce terrorist attacks.  This is why the establishment of a strong Taliban-dominated region in 
Pakistan poses a great security threat to the rest of the world (Hoffman, 2008; McConnel, 2008). 
The conclusion that we can draw from this discussion is that the intelligence community 
needs to pay particular attention as to where groups can form such as mosques, discussion 
groups, student unions, etc.  Unfortunately, in a rapidly changing world, this task is likely to get 
harder, which will enable future waves to develop and spread far more quickly and, in turn, be 
more difficult to manage because of the pervasive nature of electronic communication.  Today, 
ideas can spread instantly and networks amongst like-minded people are rapidly developing 
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around the world (Weimann, 2006).  As Robb (2007) points out, the nodes of communication 
networks not only become sources of information exchange, they, in effect, become ―small 
worlds‖ of virtual communities on the web.  Through their interactions, they develop social 
capital, provide ideological and emotional support to their members, raise money, disseminate 
dangerous information regarding explosives, and keep the fire of hatred burning.  Nearly three 
decades ago, when bin Laden began his jihad, his power to connect was limited by his physical 
ability to meet with influential people in the disaffected parts of the Arab/Muslim world.   The 
next generation of connectors will increase this capacity infinitely through the rapid advance of 
communication technologies.  More importantly, these new connectors may not even need the 
large sums of money and family connections that helped bin Laden to establish al-Qaeda.  
Currently, there is a debate among terrorism experts on how significant al-Qaeda as an 
organization actually is (Sageman, 2008; McConnel, 2008; Hoffman, 2008).   Regardless where 
the truth lies, however, experts of all stripes clearly warn us that when the next wave comes, or 
as this wave continues, the ―jihadis‖, whether completely leaderless or part of a hierarchical 
organization, will continue to pose an unprecedented threat to the global security.  The essence 
of human nature will continue to cause us to form groups and fight against others.  In the open 
savanna, humanity survived by banding together.  Our future survival will depend on how well 
we can manage the destructive power of groups. 
back to top 
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One of the key changes in human interaction since the end of the cold war is the rise of 
non-state actor political violence. Of particular and growing concern is the use of political 
violence against civilians by smaller non-state groups. The number of fatalities from such attacks 
has risen steeply in the last few decades. As a result, states today spend billions of dollars to 
protect themselves against acts of terrorism. While many studies have analyzed how terrorist 
behavior develops and how it responds to government efforts, most of this work is qualitative in 
nature (Abrahms, 2006; Adams, 1986; Addison & Murshed 2005; Alexander, 2005; Bartley, 
2005; Bloom, 2005; Carter, 2001; Crenshaw, 1987; Crenshaw, 1990; Desker, 2003; Eland, 1998; 
Harb & Leenders, 2005; Harmon, 2001; Hoffman, 1998; Kilcullen, 2005; McCulloch & 
Pickering, 2005; Merari, 1993). While some work has focused on international terrorism
1
 
(Barros & Proenca, 2005; Enders & Sandler 2000; Enders & Sandler 1993; Eubank & Weinberg, 
2001), there is still a lack of work focused on domestic terror and or all terror. Quantitative 
transnational terrorism research has increased our understanding of the systematic trends and 
effects of terrorism and counterterrorism (CT), but we lack an understanding of such phenomena 
in the domestic arena.  
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Figure 1. International & Domestic Events 1998-2006 (MIPT 2007) 
                                                 
1 Terrorism is transnational in nature when, according to Mickolus, Sandler, Murdock, and Fleming (1989) and the international 
terrorism database (ITERATE), the nationality of its perpetrators, location, institutions, human victims, mechanics of resolution, 
or ramifications transcend national boundaries. On the other hand, ―domestic terrorism is homegrown and has consequences for 
just the host country its institutions, citizens, property, and policies…the perpetrators, victims, and audience are all from the host 
country‖ (Enders & Sandler, 2006b, 6).   
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Based on a few years of recent data, Figure 1 demonstrates that domestic terrorist events 
are far more frequent than international terrorist events. Moreover, it seems that domestic 
terrorism is on the rise.  According to the limited domestic terrorism data available from the 
Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) from 1998 to 2006, 123 countries 
experienced F,442 domestic terrorist events yielding more than 31,000 deaths and almost 60,000 
injuries. In contrast, during the same period international terrorism plagued 108 countries, where 
only 2,035 events caused almost 7,000 deaths and 17,000 injuries. Only about 9% of all the 
terrorist events in this period are transnational in nature, of which, yield only about 18% of the 
total deaths caused by both kinds of terrorism (MIPT, 2007). Not only is domestic terrorism 
more frequent, it is also more lethal. 
Crenshaw, Dugan and La Free (2006, p. 5) argue that:   
if there is a continuum between local and international levels of terrorism, then 
understanding international terrorism requires knowledge of ―domestic‖ as well as 
―international‖ incidents.  However, most analyses of terrorism … consider it in 
the exclusive context of actions defined as international—occurring outside the 
boundaries of the country where the organization is primarily located or attacking 
foreign targets in the home country.  Thus … the picture they give is … 
incomplete.  
While international terrorism garners quite a bit of attention in various literatures, 
domestic terrorism has largely been ignored. As a result, our understanding of the causes of 
terrorism and the interaction of terrorism and counterterrorism is clearly myopic and potentially 
flawed by our sole focus on transnational terrorism. In short, much more work must be done in 
the realm of domestic terror as well as the linkages between domestic and international terror. 
For the purposes of this section of the paper, we review the empirical work completed on both 
international and domestic terrorism, point out the strengths of such work and what we know, 
and highlight the lacunae we need to fill – what we do not know!  
The Social Science Literature on This Topic: 
Two major schools of thought – structure/systems and behavioral/process – dominate the 
literature on political conflict.  Most of the empirical work in political science, sociology, and 
economics focuses on the correlates of conflict in a given country in a given year. While such 
studies can aid in explaining spatial patterns at the country level, they fail to explain the timing 
and dynamics of conflict. Variables like mountains, ethnic fractionalization, and GDP stand out 
as key variables (e.g., Fearon & Laitin, 2003). More recently, Li and Schaub (2004) show the 
dampening indirect effects that economic globalization has on transnational terror. Other work 
by Li (2005) reveals that democracy has mixed effects on international terror. Specifically, his 
study illustrates that democratic participation reduces transnational terrorist incidents in a 
country, while government constraints increase the number of those incidents. Yet such 
structural variables do not change much over time if at all with ―globalization‖ perhaps being an 
exception. More recently, Walsh & Piazza (2010) show in a cross-national study that that abuse 
of physical integrity rights promotes terrorism. Structural and environmental variables can 
explain why there is more violent conflict in India than Japan, but they cannot explain why there 
is more terror and political violence in Punjab in 1990‘s than in the 2000‘s. That is ―the factors 
analyzed in country level analyses are the same for a given country during war and peace, and 
are therefore incapable of predicting shifts from one period to the other‖ (Butler et al., 2005). 
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Very little in terms of geography and economy have changed much across that time period. 
Moore and Shellman (2008) write:  
While studying the political, economic, and social attributes of countries is a 
useful approach for understanding and highlighting general patterns of conflict, it 
is ill-suited to address conflict processes because such approaches ―are essentially 
static ‗input-output‘ or ‗stimulus-response‘ type models, not dynamic models of 
interaction‖ (Moore, 1995). Charles Tilly argues that because ―collective action is 
dynamic… its outcomes depend very strongly on the course of interaction‖ (Tilly, 
1985). 
A second approach focuses on the behavioral dynamics, processes, and linked decisions 
associated with political violence, armed conflict, terrorism and even criminal activities. 
Essentially, actors‘ decisions are based on the decisions of their opponents and this strategic 
inter-dependence can more effectively explain conflict processes. This work focuses on 
competition between governments and various dissident groups over policy, control of the state, 
and - especially - the support of the population (see Shellman, 2004a, 2004b, 2006a, 2006b). 
Moore and Shellman (2008) write: 
This shift is critically important because it means that theory becomes much more 
useful to policy makers: the emphasis on parties to the conflict leads this research 
to develop hypotheses about the conflictual behavior of dissidents in response to 
government behavior and vice versa.  By moving away from thinking about the 
impact of democratic v. autocratic institutions, the size of GNP/capita, and the 
ethnic composition of society these scholars have begun to ask the following sorts 
of questions: 
 When does repression work?  When does it backfire? 
 Why are some dissident groups so much more violent than others? 
 What explains varying levels of discrimination in targeting across time and 
space? 
 What event sequences lead to conflict escalation?  
 What are the effects of government countermeasures on the tactical choices 
of dissidents? 
Information about political institutions, economic output, and ethnic composition are of 
limited usefulness for answering these questions because they don‘t change much over 
time.  
Criminal justice, sociology, and political science literatures generate testable 
hypotheses concerning the frequency and severity of various event types such as crimes, 
violent political clashes, and terrorist attacks based on how authorities, governments, 
and/or international players act. A similar empirical puzzle emerges throughout most of 
these studies. For example, some criminology literature shows that aggressive policing to 
increase arrest rates yields lower crime rates as potential criminals are deterred from the 
increased probability of being arrested (Wilson & Boland 1978, 1981; Sherman 1986; 
Cook 1980). Other studies show that such policies fail to deter criminals from committing 
crimes (Jacob and Rich 1981; Chilton 1982; Decker and Kohfield 1985) in that crime 
levels do not change as a function of such policies.  
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Political science and sociology studies of repression and dissent yield their own 
conflicting results. Some argue that hostile government behavior discourages hostile dissident 
behavior and encourages dissident cooperation (Snyder & Tilly, 1972; Moore, 1998; Francisco, 
1995; 1996; Lichbach, 1987), while others contend that hostile government behavior encourages 
dissident hostility (Gurr, 1970; Hibbs, 1973; Francisco, 1995; 1996). Still others posit that 
government cooperation encourages dissident hostility (e.g., Rasler, 1996), while in contrast, still 
others counter that government cooperation encourages dissident cooperation (e.g., Krain, 2000; 
Carey, 2004). The major critique of the work above in criminology, political science, and 
sociology is the level of aggregation scholars work at in their models. Most of this work 
aggregates all actions by governments and all actions by dissidents together or all actions by 
criminals and all actions by police together into simple two-actor models of police-criminal and 
government-dissident dynamics. Yet, the world is not so simple. It is often the case multiple 
actors and groups of actors are competing for resources. A forthcoming study by Shellman et.  al. 
(2010) shows that aggregation of actions into gross single actor conglomerates can yield serious 
threats to inference.   
The same deterrence debate permeates the terrorism literature but with much less 
frequency and with systematic empirical inquiry. To begin, Ginges (1997) argues that the Israeli 
hard-line approach is less effective at combating terrorism than the more conciliatory Italian 
approach utilized during the 1980‘s. He argues that harsh government policies breed more 
activity and lead to cycles of violence, while conciliatory policies lead to negotiations, 
settlements, and fewer terrorist events. On the other hand, Miller (2004) argues that governments 
develop reputations based on how they deal with terrorists and different reputations yield 
different effects on terrorism. If governments are harsh on terrorism, they develop reputations for 
being tough on terror, which deters future attacks. Likewise, if governments are more 
conciliatory towards terrorists, they develop reputations for being soft on terrorism, which invites 
future attacks. Yet, as stated before, much of this work in the CT arena is lacking rigorous 
empirical testing.   
The seminal empirical work in the counter-terrorism (CT) area is by Walter Enders and 
Todd Sandler (Enders & Sandler, 1993; Enders & Sandler, 1999; Enders & Sandler 2000; Enders 
& Sandler 2002; Enders & Sandler 2004a; Enders & Sandler 2004b; Enders & Sandler 2006a 
Enders & Sandler 2006b). The major theoretical and empirical contributions of their work hinge 
on the ideas of substitutes and compliments. Essentially, they argue that terrorists are rational 
actors attempting to maximize a shared goal, subject to a resource constraint that ―limits the 
terrorist group‘s expenditures not to exceed its resources‖ (Enders & Sandler, 1993, 830 and 
833). This shared goal is produced from a number of commodities such as media coverage, 
political instability, the generation of fear, etc. Terrorists employ various terrorist (e.g., 
bombings) and non-terrorist tactics (e.g., compete in elections) to produce the same basic 
commodities. As governments impose restrictions (i.e., CT actions, and policies) on terrorists, 
terrorists will substitute or compliment their previous actions. For example, in their work on 
airline skyjackings, they show that metal detectors have a suppressant effect on skyjackings, but 
other types of terror attacks increase. That is, metal detectors do not decrease terror attacks 
across the board, but rather yield an unintended consequence. While the overall number of 
attacks more or less remains constant over time, other attack modes like kidnappings increase, 
while skyjackings decrease.  
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The basic logic of Enders and Sandler‘s should transfer well into other domains of 
inquiry. For example, theorists and modelers should be able to apply the logic to other types of 
CT domains in order to think about and empirically study how CT policies and actions yield 
intended and unintended consequences. Asal & Shellman (2006, 2007) applied this logic to 
terror and CT in India and Shellman has applied the model to the Philippines and Russia. For 
example, Asal & Shellman (2006) show that Indian CT policies such as the Disruptive Areas Act 
and the Prevention of Terrorism Act increase bombings while decreasing armed attacks. The 
increased powers of police and military as well as their increased presence in the streets 
decreases more overt acts and increases covert actions. Their other work on regional terror in 
India (Asal, Shellman, & Stewart 2007) shows that while structural variables may increase the 
probability of terror in a given region, behavioral process variables and state CT actions tends to 
explain and predict when we will observe terror in a given region. Piazza‘s (2008) qualitative 
work on India supports Asal and Shellman‘s finding in that Piazza argues that terror in India is 
not the product of poor economic conditions, but is manifested in the government‘s poor 
management of ethnic conflict and protracted political problems.   
Current Work on Political Dynamics of Terror & Political Violence 
One of the primary pitfalls of previous work on repression-dissent and terror-CT 
dynamics was a lack of the necessary data to examine the intended and unintended consequences 
of government policies and actions.  
We argue that to complete research on the intended and unintended consequences of CT 
actions, one needs chronological data on the acts of violence as well as on the actions of 
governments, NGOs, and IGOs take on a daily basis. Such data are difficult to obtain, but strides 
in automated entity extraction have made the generation of such data less daunting.  The first 
ingredient necessary to produce such data is text containing such events, actions, and outcomes. 
Naturally, one is drawn to electronic news reports. Previous work in the area concentrated on 
analyzing one source, yet research by Schrodt et. al. (2001) and Shellman et. al. (2007) reveals 
that there is a bias in different media outlets and that collecting data from a single source can 
lead to bias in statistical findings. Shellman et. al. showed empirically that combining a sample 
of representative sources helps to average out the bias and allows one to draw more valid and 
reliable inferences from statistical models. Recently, Shellman collected political events data for 
10 South East Asian countries and with the help of Schrodt expanded the coverage to 29 
countries in the U.S.  Pacific Command area of responsibility (PACOM AOR).
2
  The data 
contain information from 6-million news reports from 75 distinct local, national, and 
international sources. The effort is two orders of magnitude greater than any other event data 
collection effort in history. The data were recently expanded by Shellman and Lockheed Martin 
to cover U.S. Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) actions in the region. 
Such data can and will be used to explain, model, and forecast political dynamics among various 
state and nonstate actors between and across countries.  The data are hierarchically coded and 
can be disaggregated by actor (group, individual, state, etc.), target (actor, place name, and/or 
physical entity such as bus, railway, café, etc.), and event (bombing, negotiation, agreement, 
armed attack, giving of aid, cooperative actions, etc.). It is also possible to spatially disaggregate 
                                                 
2
 Shellman‘s original data collection was funded by the National Science Foundation (NSF), while the 
data expansion effort with Schrodt was funded by the Defense Advanced Research Programs Agency 
(DARPA).  
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some of the data by region. Some research projects were carried out spatially disaggregating 
events in Cambodia, India, and Russia in particular. For example, Figure 2 shows the model 
fitted values overlaid on the actual terrorist attacks by Chechen Rebels in Chechnya, while 
Figure 26 shows regional terror attacks in Russia. Note how darkly shaded the Chechen region is 
in the South-Western part of the country. 
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Figure 2. In-sample Forecasts of Terrorism in Chechnya 
 
 
Figure 3. Frequency of Russia Terrorist Attacks by Region, 1995-2005 (light/low to 
dark/high) 
In both analyses, government repression proved to be an important explanatory variable 
for terror attacks. We found evidence that low and high levels of repression have weaker effects 
on terror than moderate levels of repression. Moreover, criminal activities were also important 
predictors of terrorist attacks.  
Most of the previous literature treats terrorism separately from other violent political 
tactics and considers it as a distinct area of inquiry. More recently, other scholars have even gone 
further, treating ―suicide terror‖ separately from other terrorist and non-terrorist tactics (e.g., 
Bloom, 2005; Pape, 2005). Yet, terrorist tactics are often utilized within an array of other violent, 
non-violent, and cooperative means. The study of terrorism should not be segregated from the 
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larger study of political conflict and instead we argue that studies focused on explanations of 
terror should be discussed within the broader field of contentious politics. By adopting a 
particularistic conceptualization of conflict behavior (e.g., terror) we limit our ability to 
understand the full repertoire and behavior of state and nonstate actors. If a group uses multiple 
strategies and tactics to achieve their objectives (e.g., Hamas competes in elections, provides 
social services to the public, and engages in violent activities), yet we concentrate on attempting 
to model and explain one of them (terror activities) while ignoring the rest, our inferences will be 
biased and our results rather useless. While the work of Enders and Sandler lead us down the 
right path, the models are incomplete ignoring other activities on both sides of the conflict.  
A recent study by Shellman et al. (2008) categorized various actions on separate 
Diplomatic (D), Information (I), Military (M), and Economic (E) continuums and used such data 
to evaluate how such actions affected the ebb and flow of nonviolent, violent, and terrorist 
actions by dissident groups like the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines. Figure 4 
shows a plot of DIME, terror attacks, violent dissent, and nonviolent dissent from 1991-2005 in 
the Philippines. The findings from that study showed that economic and diplomatic tactics did 
not quell violent dissident actions while they did give rise to nonviolent actions. Moreover, the 
analyses illustrated that government military strategies and tactics exacerbated violent dissident 
tactics and strategies. Such a study while still having its pitfalls, moves us closer to 
understanding a more complete picture containing the various groups involved and their tactical 
choices sets and how such tactical choices are dependent on one another.  
 
Figure 4. Frequency of DIME, Terror, Nonviolent, and Violent Activities in the Philippines, 
1991-2005 
 
Future Questions We Need to Address 
We must build on these literatures by systematically empirically modeling and testing 
competing hypotheses with new data containing information on a variety of CT policies and 
terrorist and non-terrorist strategies and tactics. We should begin to design studies that evaluate 
when and why violent, non-violent, terrorist, and non-terrorist strategies are interchanged during 
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a conflict. We propose studies that model the substitution of terrorist, non-terrorist, violent, non-
violent and cooperative tactics and strategies as well as different government counter-efforts 
(e.g., DIME). Asal and Shellman are moving in this direction and have begun to collect 
information on governments and their tactics and strategies more uniformly in addition to 
collecting the chronological information on dissident tactics and strategies. Asal is also leading 
the charge on collecting group attribute data, which will inform how organizational and group 
characteristics affect choices (See the Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) 
data effort).
3
  
In terms of our CT data collection efforts, our future research seeks to explore how both a 
government‘s policies and tactics affect dissidents‘ tactical choices.  We define CT policies as 
plans of action for tackling terrorism-related issues. It sets in motion a process (e.g., aggressive 
sentencing of convicted terrorists by increasing the powers of courts) for dealing with the threat 
and its consequences. In contrast, government tactics refer to actual actions (e.g., adjudicating a 
case) taken by actors (e.g., judges, etc.) responsible for carrying out the policy. CT policies and 
tactics fall into several subcategories including but not limited to using force, defending targets 
against attack, granting political concessions, improving socio-economic-political conditions and 
winning hearts and minds, and/or doing nothing. Such policies and actions can also be classified 
into DIME actions and policies. To our knowledge, no quantitative empirical studies examine the 
consequences of each of these different kinds of policies.  Aside from alternative policies 
affecting resource pools and yielding substitution effects, each group may be affected differently 
given their diverse characteristics and motivations. For example, the threat of being killed may 
not deter a religious terrorist from carrying out attacks since they are willing to die for the cause. 
Similarly, some conciliatory policies may decrease the frequency of terrorist activities if the 
concession moves the group closer to its pre-determined policy objectives. As such, future 
studies should control for group motivations and norms
4
 when analyzing the effects of various 
CT policies on different terrorist attack modes and tactics.  
Conclusion 
Harry Eckstein (1980) wrote over 25 years ago that we can distinguish between 
―contingency‖ and ―inherency‖ approaches to the study of violent conflict. The first perspective 
assumes that conflict is contingent on unusual or irregular conditions that cause disruptions in 
conventional politics.  The contingent approach leads one to study the political, economic and 
social attributes of countries to explain variation in their conflict experiences. The inherent 
perspective assumes that violent political conflict emerges out of low-level contentious 
interactions among a set of political players.  This approach leads researchers to focus on the 
conditional behavior of parties to conflict and how that behavior changes over time. While 
Eckstein laid out these two approaches in 1980 until recently, few scholars have taken the latter 
path. Currently, the literature is moving past the structural-systems oriented approaches and 
towards the more behavioral-process oriented approaches to studying political violence. Such a 
shift has enabled us to examine and learn the consequences of behavioral interactions. We are 
now connecting the behavioral approaches to the study of terrorism. For example, we have begun 
to be able to answer questions like: how do different levels of repression affect levels of terror? 
                                                 
3
 See www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/ for more information on the MAROB project 
4
 Wintrobe (2002) argues that suicidal terrorists engage in such acts to obtain the group benefit of 
solidarity. 
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What government actions and policies decrease levels of terrorism or cause shifts in terror 
tactics? We have found so far that certain policies can have unintended consequences such as 
increasing one type of terror tactic (e.g., bombings) while decreasing another type (e.g., armed 
attacks). Moreover, by combining the structural and behavioral process approaches, we have 
found that structure can set the stage for terror, but the timing of terror is often best understood 
as a function of joint tactical decisions and behavioral interactions among a set of actors party to 
the conflict. Additionally, we have been able to disaggregate and isolate the effects that different 
foreign policies and actions (e.g., DIME) have on levels of nonviolence, violence short of terror, 
and terror. Finally, through our recent analyses, we found empirical links between terror and 
criminal activities that should be explored in future analyses.  
We think that there is enormous potential value in leveraging the new political process 
school‘s insights to inform policy makers on the utility of strategies and tactics to quell terror.  
We are on the cusp of being able to say very interesting things about the violent behavior of 
dissidents and governments as the outcome of dynamic processes that vary over time and space 
across the countries in which such conflicts take place.  In sum, the future of this work can aid 
the policy and operational community better understand the ebb and flow of political violence 
and terrorism and how best to combat it. 
back to top 
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Introduction 
According to Schmid, Jongman and Horowitz (1988), the various definitions of terrorism 
that have been articulated in contemporary times usually refer to the politically motivated use or 
threat of violence against civilians, fear and induced terror, intentional and planned action, 
asymmetric warfare, psychological effects and social reactions, coercion, and immorality.  The 
concept of terrorism remains a social-political construct and its definition continues to be widely 
accepted by numerous researchers, governments, and interest groups (European Union, 2002; 
Jenkins, 2006; Laqueur, 2001; United Nations, 2004). This conventional approach considers the 
funding of terrorism as leverage to support logistical and operational expenditures.  Terrorist 
financing activities can be categorized at two different levels of analysis: (1) operational and (2) 
strategic (Ehrenfeld, 2003).  Short term funding sources are usually exploited for operational 
purposes and represent a flexible ―means-end financing‖ (low profile activities, undetectable to 
police and banking systems, limited competence). First, operational financing is largely task 
oriented and does not require sophisticated funding sources to support disorganized local entities 
or decentralized structures such as sleeping cells.
1
  Expenditures related to terrorist attacks 
generally require modest investment and most of them have been funded through legal and 
illegal ―soft financing activities.‖  Second, strategic financing aims to support the long term 
activities of more structured organizations including the recruitment, training, propaganda, 
sustainment of their constituency, and maintenance of their facilities such as terrorist training 
camp and also community infrastructures (schools, hospitals, associations, and cult institutions). 
                                                 
1
 According to governmental officials, expenses related to bombings like those which happened in Dar Es Salam 
(1998), Nairobi (1998), Aden (2000), Bali (2002), Madrid (2004), London (2005), and Glasgow (2007) are 
estimated at less than $80,000.  Moreover, some estimation pointed out kamikaze operations, which happened 
frequently in Israel, cost less than $200 per attack, including the preparation, crude material, and the execution.  All 
of those cost-efficient operations were attributed to religious-extremist movements and were accomplished by 
terrorist cells composed of locals who participated in financing deadly operations (Warde, 2008). 
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However, conventional wisdom lends little consideration to concepts such as economic 
development, capital investment, and entrepreneurship - all possible components of the goal of 
terrorism. According to Napoleoni (2005), the funding sources of terrorists have evolved in three 
main phases throughout the 20
th
 century: 1) state sponsors during the Cold War period; 2) 
privatization of funding by exploiting valuable resources in failed states wedged in a war 
economy in the early 1990s (terrorists for hire); and 3) utilization of global financial and trade 
markets after the establishment of free trade zones and the globalized economy in the past 
decade.  However, this framework does not necessarily capture the significant shifts that suggest 
that financial resources can be also understood a potential sources of power.  Radical and violent 
movements need sustainable economic projects to keep their political/religious causes viable.  In 
fact, economic analysis has shown that terrorists are rational actors who maximize their payoffs 
from target selection and possible reactions of governments (Landes, 1978).   In addition, 
terrorist organizations profit from political destabilization by taking control of national and 
international supply chains as well as maximizing financial gains from a shortage of basic 
commodities (Enders & Sandler, 1993). 
This paper aims to revisit the existing literature and apply some of the findings to further  
our understanding of how terrorist movements can generate profits and create wealth by taking 
advantage of local, national, and global economical structures. I explore how terrorist groups can 
adopt financial strategies that reflect economic and political choices made to maximize benefits 
associated with their political/religious goals. Conceptualizing terrorism financing merely as a 
means to wage terror campaigns and achieve political ends comes shorts in helping us 
understand the critical importance of the funding of terrorism. Further, this approach fails to 
capture a reality in which the legitimacy and political message of terrorists can only be effective 
when they fill a gap left by government weakness. Our current perception of the financing of 
terrorism underestimates the fact that terrorist fundraising capabilities far exceed their 
operational costs and that they heavily invest in economic development to maintain the 
allegiance of the community. 
Strategic Funding and Social Entrepreneurship  
The size and organizational structure of a terrorist organization can influence the way 
these actors raise money to sustain themselves.  Smaller and ephemeral terrorist organizations 
like cells or unstructured groups rely on less sophisticated licit and illicit sources of revenue to 
face operational expenditures (Rapoport, 1992).  Alternatively, structured terrorism organizations 
spend considerable time and money to support diverse essential activities such as recruitment, 
training camps, housing and food, forging identities, intelligence gathering, and communications.  
The structural complexity (coordination), sophisticated management (communication), and the 
scope activity (specialization) of a terrorist organization inevitably shape the financial needs and 
affect the viability of a group and its capacity to carry out violent actions.
2
 
                                                 
2
 The case of the London and the Madrid bombings illustrates that strategic funding is a prerequisite to 
deploy effective terror campaigns carried out by local cells. In both cases, operational costs and logistical 
expenditures required a modest investment, an estimated $15,000 each (Warde, 2008).  Interestingly, 
British authorities found that one of the suicide bombers resided in a $240,000 apartment in London 
where he had prepared explosives. He worked as a part-time employee in a restaurant and the police 
found no evidence explaining the origin of the money that had been used to pay for this residence 
(Intelligence and Security Committee, 2006).  In the case of the Madrid bombing, Spanish authorities 
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According to Hoffman (2006), the endurance of terrorist groups is connected to the level 
of sustenance and financial support they receive from an existing constituency (for example, 
ethnic community, faithful religious members, etc.). The author suggests that some organizations 
have a better chance to survive longer than others do.  Indeed, religious movements and ethno-
separatists groups enjoy the devotion of faithful members and the loyalty of community 
members.  Moreover, recent studies have proposed a different theoretical framework based on 
the ―club model‖ rejecting ideological and theological explanations.  This framework emphasizes 
the function of voluntary organizations as efficient providers of local public goods in the face of 
government failure to do so (Berman & Laitin, 2008).  These ―violent clubs‖ are prosperous 
enough to enable them to be well suited to solve the financial problems that their constituents 
face. They are powerful political actors that rely on a large membership and support network 
from their community.   
Acting as clubs, well-established terrorism organizations like Basque Fatherland and 
Liberty (ETA), Hamas, Hezbollah, and Irish Republican Army (IRA) have access to financial 
assistance programs or economical privileges, which support most of their active constituents 
and combatants‘ families. In fact, the conception of terrorist clubs structure should not only 
consider the number of operatives but must also include peripheral members who comprise 
radical constituents and influence the leadership.  For example, the structure of an established 
terrorist organization can be divided into three clusters: 1) extended network of movement 
radicals, who share goals; 2) sympathizers, who provide essential support and act as facilitators 
(bank accounts and estate); 3) and the terrorists, who are engaged in violent operations (Lake, 
2002).   One of the best-known sources of financing of the violent clubs is through the collection 
of funds via donations from an extended network and sympathizers.
3
 Other commercial activities 
were managed by terrorist organizations to support communities facing difficult economic 
conditions and in some cases severe deprivation of basic commodities and public services.
4
  
These elements represent the foundation of the social entrepreneurship approach that is raised 
throughout this section. 
                                                                                                                                                             
indicated that the terrorists were a part of an international drug trafficking ring possessing more than two 
million dollars in hashish and other drugs (Whitlock, 2008). 
3
 In a recent trial, members of Holy Land, an international Muslim charity, were convicted of giving more 
than twelve million dollars to support the non-violent activities of Hamas.  The Texas-based charity 
financed schools, hospitals, and social welfare programs controlled by Hamas in areas ravaged by the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. According to prosecutors, Holy Land's benefactors were terrorist recruiting 
pools and the charity spread violent ideology and generated support among Palestinians.  Hamas as well 
as Hezbollah are also associated with reselling stolen infant formula and illegally redeeming grocery 
coupons in their respective countries. 
4
 The IRA had a monopoly on transportation companies in the Catholic areas of Northern Ireland.  During 
the 1970s and 1980s, the IRA was the owner of 350 taxis employing more than 800 catholic drivers in a 
region where this population was struggling financially.  The IRA has owned also co-ops, supermarkets, 
and commodities shops supporting the catholic community in large cities of Northern Ireland. As Gerry 
Adams, a former Irish Republican Army volunteer, stated in 1976: ―[…] I take a course of action as a 
means to bringing about a situation in which I believe the people of my country will prosper […]‖ 
(Hoffman, 2006, p. 233). 
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Globalized Funding Strategies and Business Entrepreneurship 
Despite the importance of understanding and responding to economical needs of their 
constituents, terrorist groups are required to develop financial stratagems and acquire 
entrepreneur skills and values to maintain their financing capacity.  The funding strategies of 
terrorists have transitioned over the past decades, capitalizing on business opportunities from 
emerging markets, the trend of globalization, and structural transformations of financing 
networks. The globalized economy can facilitate the trade of legal and illegal goods and services 
into several markets without discriminating between the actors involved and regardless of the 
nature of what is traded. Recently, western counter-terrorism agencies have linked terrorist legal 
and illegal international trades, like currency and commodities smuggling (gems, drugs, tobacco, 
food, luxury goods, etc.), as they represent an underestimated strategic source of revenues.  
Those sources of financing are highly integrated into western economies and rely on existing 
economic interdependencies between national financial systems and illegal supply routes, global 
markets and extra-national economies, and legal entities and criminal organizations (Napoleoni, 
2005; Nordstrom, 2007). In such conceptual framework, illicit and licit lose their sense and only 
economic survival or development prevails. 
The adoption of new finance strategies have changed the values and the structure of 
terrorist groups by requiring leaders to acquire more sophisticated managerial and 
entrepreneurial skills in order to innovate in a globalized environment rather than focus on 
violence (Napoleoni, 2005).  Alexander (2004) suggests that terrorists have the capacity to 
exploit economic systems by acquiring and operating companies and nonprofit organizations 
around the world. Opportunities are available in the global economy to facilitate the market for 
licit and illicit commodities or services in unauthorized and underground extra-national 
economies (international trade systems).   
Religious movements and ethno-separatists groups have now reached financial 
emancipation from state sponsors by exploiting diverse financing strategies. One strategy is the 
appropriation of existing business activities to replicate operational and tactical funding methods.  
For example, several terrorist groups are involved in cigarette smuggling as a means of 
financing, funneling profits from a multimillion-dollar cigarette-smuggling operation to 
Hezbollah.
5
 This particular example illustrates how a terrorist organization based in Lebanon 
was able to take advantage of fiscal breaches within U.S. legal market structure. Also, according 
to Hutchinson and O‘Malley (2007), well-structured terrorist groups have developed in-house 
fundraising capacity and their own business strategies to respond to the specific needs of the 
organization.   
In some particular groups, like the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), specialized 
sub-groups are working within the organization on particular forms of financing and adapting 
their strategies to regional characteristics where they have infiltrated. Terrorist organizations can 
also be successful in licit business sectors. According to Alexander (2004), Hamas owned textile 
                                                 
5
 In North America, the most famous case involved a North Carolina-based Hezbollah cell which used 
cigarette smuggling to raise money for a terrorist organization in Lebanon (Melzer & Shelley, 2006).  A 
ring of eighteen smugglers related to Hezbollah made noticeable profits from the disparity between state 
taxation of tobacco products along with the discounted prices to certain populations such as Native 
Americans.  
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businesses and cattle ranches to fund their organization. The Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine has proved to be in possession of metal works in Lebanon, and the ETA group owned 
furniture stores in France.  Finally, and more recently, Al Qaeda‘s leader was reputed to own 
several companies involved in various economic sectors doing business around the world such 
construction, manufacturing, currency trading, import-export, and agricultural enterprises 
(Hoffman, 2006).  Usually conventional wisdom considers these businesses as front companies, 
although this example highlight the fact terrorist organizations generate work for local 
communities and can supply regional or national markets. 
Another terrorist strategy is developing cooperative relationships with legal and illegal 
groups to increase gains or exploit new fundraising sources.  According to Makarenko (2002, 
2004), criminal groups and terrorists are frequently engaged in strategic alliances in order to 
secure access to particular goods and services, which cannot be reached by legal trade channels 
without being detected by official authorities. These alliances are momentarily ―tolerated‖ and 
take the form of illegal trade involving drugs, weapons and diamonds. These three products can 
be exchanged as informal currency for any services or goods without trace in the formal banking 
systems (Mili, 2006).
6
  Consequently, weapons, narcotics, and precious gems form a triangular 
informal currency system that terrorists exploit to substitute official currencies and hide their 
transactions from enforcement agencies. 
A third approach is organizational hybridization between a terrorist group and for-profit 
entity (usually criminal groups). The strong penetration of illegal markets during post conflict 
reconstruction in the aftermath of Bosnia war while under NATO surveillance is a pertinent 
example (Andreas, 2004).  During this period, collaboration between ethno-separatist groups and 
local mafias resulted in a merge of radical political goals and the necessity of financial gains to 
reconstruct the new country.  In this particular case, interdependencies between terrorists and 
illegal actors led to the creation of economic structures that ensured domestic and international 
trade (Mincheva & Gurr, 2007).   As a result, pervasive influences from illegal markets during 
the reconstruction of the country contributed directly to the reinsertion of ―criminal combatants‖ 
and separatists into the new national economy.  The underground economy and its loose 
financial structure became formal, and illegitimate revenues were absorbed by the national 
financial system introducing extra national trades into the GDP (Napoleoni, 2005). 
Finally, we find the configuration of a ―nexus‖ in which economic exchanges are 
established between legal and illegal entities have economic significance for terrorists. Terrorist 
separatists, rebels and extremist groups interested in acquiring money and valuable assets are 
more willing to do business with established illegal actors than open a new battle front within 
markets where trade shares are already set up and controlled by powerful individuals (Schmid, 
1996).  A similar argument can be made for smuggling other valuable commodities like drugs, 
diamonds, and oil in which organized crime and the military have developed a high level of 
expertise allotting little place for terrorists to become serious competitors (Hutchinson & 
O‘Malley, 2007).  This is particularly true if members of local mafias or armed forces are a part 
of constituents for which terrorist groups are fighting. 
                                                 
6
 By introducing ―cocaine-for-weapons‖ trade with rebels groups, Hezbollah is able to exchange what 
they have in large quantities (weapons) for goods easily resold (drugs) in countries where Hezbollah is 
not able to make formal transactions or resell Iranian weapons to gain access to illegal or legal goods and 
services. 
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Weak States and Financing Opportunities  
Countries affected by intensive domestic terrorism are also engaged in an ―economic 
fight‖ in which governments compete with terrorist organizations for the control of regional 
resources and profitable markets (Naylor, 2002).  In other words, taking over the control of 
natural resources and penetrating international trade and supply chains represent key aspects for 
several structured terrorist groups as they establish a solid financial base (e.g., Angola, 
Columbia, Peru, and Sri Lanka). The access and control of lootable (i.e., drugs and gems) and 
unlootable (i.e., natural gas and oil) resources considerably affect the capacity of a terrorist group 
to survive and combat intensity.  According to Ross (2003), there are several findings showing 
that diamonds, drugs, and oil are strongly associated with civil wars and domestic terrorism over 
the two past decades.  Moreover, the author demonstrates that lootable resources are linked to 
rebellion conflicts and unlootable resources tend to ignite separatist conflicts, which are both 
considerably difficult to resolve.  Also, lootable resources, like drugs and gems, will create 
discipline problems inside police and army apparatus of a given producer country, increasing 
opportunities for corruption and transnational trafficking. Finally, the author pointed out that 
lootable, illegal, and unobstructable resources will more likely to benefit terrorist groups than 
unlootable, legal, and obstructable resources which will tend to benefit the government (Ross, 
2003). 
Moreover, Mace (2007) suggests that illicit markets and illegal commodities supply chain 
support and strengthen terrorist organizations.  Weak states and transition countries apparently 
offer loopholes, ineffective law enforcement, lack of border control, and absence of follow up on 
shipment routes. Even under the pressure of western countries, weak or failed states choose 
illegal markets due to the lack of viable, long term, legal economic opportunities to trade their 
products and services with industrialized countries. The work of Goredema (2005) provides an 
interesting framework that formalizes the impact of terrorism on failed states and highlights three 
major stages, presenting a pathway in which terrorist groups can take over a national economy.  
The first stage is characterised by the ability of a terrorist group to extend its influence and 
discredit the political apparatus as well as its members having an influence on the economic 
system.
7
  
In the second stage, terrorist groups are able to expand on the territory and establish a 
parallel financial system. Terrorists have the capacity to infiltrate several economic sectors and 
provoke destabilization in order to block foreign investment, which will affect inflation and 
unemployment rates.  In Africa, the existence of numerous ―failed states‖ has engendered 
regional political instability, providing a wide range of intertwined collaborations between 1) 
private and illegal actors responsible for transnational smuggling (including drugs, foods, and 
commodities) and 2) separatists/rebels groups controlling territories where smuggled goods are 
transiting (Goredema, 2005). Diamonds, as a natural resource, offer numerous advantages as 
currency: high and stable value on international markets; anonymity in business relations; easy to 
smuggle; and provide a good refuge value to consolidate illegal funds.
8
 Hezbollah is an example 
                                                 
7
 The former Taliban regime and the marble extraction industry in Pakistan show how insurgent and 
affiliated terrorists groups can control local resources and profit from the international marble market 
(Shah & Perlez, 2008). 
8
 Since 1993, terrorist groups have implemented illegal diamond drilling companies in Tanzania and 
Kenya. In Sierra Leone, Revolutionary United Front‘s chiefs are responsible of diamond transportation to 
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of a group who relied on Lebanese merchant‘s network in the Congo to provide millions of 
dollars in diamonds for buying weapons and other critical commodities (Peduzzi, 2006). 
In Columbia, for example, criminal organizations are in charge of the growing and 
distributing of cocaine.  Indeed, they pay share revenues generated by drug trafficking to the 
FARC in exchange for services or materials.  In Europe, business relations between ETA and the 
Neapolitan mafia are well known.  Cocaine is traded in exchange for heavy weaponry, bombs, 
and explosives coming from Pakistan and Uzbekistan transiting through the Czech Republic, 
where military officials acted as facilitators (Curtis & Karacan, 2002).  
Finally, in the third stage, the government has lost power in many socio-economic 
spheres, the underground economy is rampant, and the state has no choice than to trade with 
terrorists and/or local mafias to stabilize the fragile new financial system.  Terrorist groups 
become a powerful political and financial actor at the national level.  A study conducted by 
Nordstrom (2007) revealed collaborative business relations between military and ethno-separatist 
group in Africa.
9
 Actually, trade in regions affected by conflicts are apt to be conquered and 
territorialised by criminal organizations and terrorists groups under the protection of temporary 
government structures (Curtis, 2002).  In these regions, terrorists, criminal groups, and local 
politicians work together to reach their own objectives, to respectively support the fight, make 
money, and save the country from ruin.  To do so, they rely on underground economic channels, 
informal banking systems, and private suppliers using humanitarian air bridges in which private 
cargo airliners are looking to increase their profit margins. 
Business as Usual?  
Economics, Ethics, and Terrorism 
According to several authors, violent terrorism attacks could slow down the volume of 
international trade and provoke panic in global capital markets (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003; 
Nitsch & Schumacher, 2004). In this regard, the globalization of the economy and free trade has 
also been linked to terrorism by providing motivation and causing grievances against states 
profiting from world economy success, globalization offers opportunity for terrorists to penetrate 
porous borders, thus providing economical structures to wage terror campaigns (Barbieri & 
Pathak, 2007).   
The economical impacts of terror will vary in regards to the intensity of terrorism. In 
North America and Western Europe, where the intensity of terrorism is low, capital markets are 
more resilient and recover sooner compared to other capital markets in the world because 
banking systems and financial sectors provide sufficient liquidity to sustain market stability and 
                                                                                                                                                             
Monrovia‘s transit zone, Liberia‘s capital. From there, transactions occurred under the surveillance and 
protection of the Liberian government in exchange for generous pay offs. Usually, diamonds are traded 
for money, weapons, and critical commodities like food and medicine (Goredema, 2005; Peduzzi, 2006; 
Global Witness, 2003). 
9
 According to the author‘s interviews with European government officials in Angola, despite the 
existence of an embargo on fuel to the rebels, military tanker convoys stop many times on their way to 
transact with rebels, trading fuel for valuable currency.  In this way, militaries are able to establish a 
lucrative fuel business which compensates for their poor salary.  In addition, rebels can continue to fight 
against the government.   
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neutralize panic movements (Chen & Siems, 2004).   Alternatively, for countries that face higher 
levels of terrorist risks (e.g., domestic terrorism: rebellion or separatism), the impact on the 
economy is more important as  foreign investment is more limited and can cause large 
movements of international capital across other countries‘ borders to diversify risks (Abadie & 
Gardeazabal, 2008).  Finally, there is also evidence that countries facing constant aggression 
from international terrorism demonstrate less of an effect on growth, stock and foreign exchange 
market (Blomberg, Hess, & Orphanides 2004; Eldor & Melnick, 2004).  This distinction is very 
interesting but not surprising if we agree that the impact of terrorism on the economy differs 
according to the ―battle ground‖ and the motivation of terrorists. The previous results suggest 
that countries facing constant aggression from international terrorism, but showing a relatively 
strong socio-political cohesion, are more likely able to diversify domestic economy and enable 
international investments in financial key sectors (Larocque, Lincourt, & Normandin, 2008). 
Furthermore, separatist and religious terrorist organizations play an active role in several 
legitimate and illicit business sectors. They are also gatekeepers in commodity supply chains 
passing through failed and/or in-transition countries experiencing insurrection. As economic 
actors, violent groups are trading with a wide range of business partners such as military, local 
politicians, transportation brokers, national and international nongovernmental organizations, 
and criminal groups. The extensive ring of constituents and supporters provides terrorists a vast 
social capital in which they can work out financial alliances (government officials, local/regional 
criminal groups), develop or maintain trade relations in lucrative businesses (diamonds, drugs, 
marble, oil, silk textile), and exploit loose economical structures by utilizing the experience and 
expertise of well connected businessmen supporting the cause.  Even extremist terrorist or 
religious groups like Hezbollah have resolved the religious dilemma of been involved in drug 
trafficking by convincing their constituents that drug smuggling through western countries is a 
part of the whole strategy to ―intoxicate‖ infidels (Chevalerias, 2008). In Lebanon the production 
of opiates, heroin for instance, was acquired through a business partnership among Syria, 
Hezbollah, and the Druze community.
10
 
Indeed, doing business with terrorists, at least directly, seems morally inconceivable from 
the point of view of western companies and governmental institutions. However, the main 
concern about not trading with ―evil‖ is that most profit-driven actors do not necessarily know 
how to identify terrorists since they are not dealing directly with ―kamikazes‖ (i.e., reckless 
people) but with men and women sharing similar concerns about profit margins, payoffs, and on-
time delivery of legal/illegal goods. These services are provided or exploited by unsuspected 
supporters of a violent political cause.  The relocation of corporations in developing countries, 
outsourcing contracts with foreign entities, and extraction and exploitation of natural resources in 
complex environments like failed states represent a few examples of day-to-day business 
operations in which terrorist sympathizers can be involved without any possibility of early 
detection. 
                                                 
10
 According to Clutterback (1994), Syria has stimulated considerably opiate production in Lebanon 
during the 1980s; increasing from 100 tons in 1975 to 2,000 tons in 1985 (the production of opiate fell 
down to 1000 tons in 1989). Hezbollah received subsidies from Syria to cultivate opiates in the Bekaa 
Valley. The opiate proceeded through the transformation into industrial complexes controlled by the 
Druze community. Druze is religious group believing in Islam mostly present in Lebanon and Syria 
(Albani, 2001). 
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Common sense suggests that western countries have several security and surveillance 
processes in place to make sure that they do not trade with terrorists and their supporters. At 
some point, common sense is incorrect on this issue; businesses do not rely on morality or 
loyalty to setup trade agendas. As mentioned earlier, markets do not discriminate; business 
decisions rest only on the nature and scope of opportunities, demand, and offer. Moreover, this is 
not about security breaches in economic systems or market surveillance; this is about the nature 
of conflicts and the vital role of trade for all opponents.   
This paradox can lead to unexpected economic exchanges between enemies.  Indeed, 
governments do not disclose information relating to trading with the enemy since these 
exchanges are, most of the time, illegal and prohibited by the state itself.  However, during the 
so-called ―War on Terror‖ and a year after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. Department of 
Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control disclosed information on ninety U.S. companies doing 
business with enemy nations (terrorism supporters) that were in violation of the Trading With the 
Enemy Act - 12 U.S.C. § 95a enacted in 1917 (Alexander, 2004). This inconvenient truth 
emanates from ethical flaws in economical values system.  The asymmetric morality between 
political discourse and economical pragmatism reveals how delicate securing and monitoring 
international trade activities can be, largely because business morality does not necessarily 
follow political agendas and can be flexible in regards to the ever-shifting legitimacy of 
economic actors. This is particularly true at the international level where the definition of 
terrorism, enemy of the state, criminal combatants or any other appellation is so volatile 
according to specific national political timing and also to the nature of market‘s demand within a 
specific country. At this level, formal and informal rules, legal and illegal actors, recorded and 
underground financial activities are difficult to differentiate. Also, legitimate companies do not 
necessarily know with whom they are doing business especially in failed and in-transition states 
where official authorities have sometimes no choice other than to deal with terrorist 
organizations or tolerate their business in the underground economies. 
Conclusion 
Western countries engaged in the war on terror face the challenge of conceptualizing 
terrorists as violent political actors, possessing more than the mere aptitude to destroy, and 
having the capacity to develop and exploit economic structures. First, picturing terrorists with 
entrepreneurial and business characteristics does not match the western conception of the 
funding capacity of terrorist organizations, which is more limited and negative, describing it as 
illegal, parasitic, predatory, and unsophisticated.  Second, the current misconception about 
―funding evil‖ has led to the implementation of inappropriate enforcement measures that target 
suspicious money transfers, which are difficult to detect among all the transactions in the whole 
banking system.  Tracking systems deployed to monitor financial transactions from potential 
terrorist groups are only partially effective in most western countries.  In some cases, they are so 
inappropriate that even government agencies do not use them because the investigative process is 
too unwieldy and previous investigations along the same lines have produced no or little results 
(Whitlock, 2008).  Even international prohibition and bans on blood diamonds or narcotics are 
not really effective and they continue to be used as a source of financing. However, Saudi Arabia 
and other Middle Eastern countries seem to have more success in tracking money, disrupting 
financial montages of terrorist organizations, and prohibiting fundraising in mosques (Blanchard 
& Prados, 2007).  
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Nonetheless, these security measures are questionable regarding the infringement of civil 
rights and have ignited more hostility or resentment from targeted communities. Focusing on the 
financing of terrorist organizations by conceptualizing this activity as a ―means-end‖ is certainly 
falling short without any sustainable policy. In fact, there is a lack of strategic articulation 
between political, financial, and non-profit actors in addressing the root causes of several 
terrorism movements around the world. Sustainable economic development policies in failed or 
in-transition states would certainly eliminate or delay the conversion of antagonistic social 
movements into violent political groups. These types of initiatives can reduce or even prevent the 
adhesion and the support by fragile communities of the cause of terrorist organizations by 
providing economic and social alternatives.
11
 Such alternatives can be implemented by credible 
and respected regional actors who can design adapted, integrative solutions to counter the 
exclusive and dogmatic causes of terrorists.  Indeed, the implementation of these initiatives will 
require a strong leadership from the international community, which seems more inclined to 
enforce and to use coercive means since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
back to top 
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Overview 
Despite the fact that terrorism and more ordinary forms of crime are usually investigated 
separately, there is a great deal of overlap in the worlds of violent non-state actors (VSNAs) and 
criminals. The greater our understanding of this overlap, the better equipped we will be for 
devising effective law-enforcement strategies to counter both threats.   
In studying terrorism, the emphasis tends very much to be upon the role of ideology and 
the perpetration of acts of violence and destruction. But ideology is not necessarily the central 
                                                 
1
 This article has been adapted from Mullins (2009). 
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driving force for individual terrorists, and bombings and other forms of attack represent only the 
tip of the iceberg of day to day activities of terrorist organizations.  
Terrorists are frequently charged under ‗ordinary‘ criminal law (LaFree & Dugan, 2004) 
and in reality there are often very close relationships between terrorism and everyday crime. 
There are numerous instances of cooperation between terrorists and criminals at different levels, 
and the pathways into both kinds of activity exhibit many similarities. There are similar systems 
of social influence and organisation and a convergence in terms of methods, motives, and 
profiles. These issues are described in greater detail, focusing in particular on contemporary 
Islamist terrorism in the West, and implications for law-enforcement and counter-terrorism (CT) 
approaches are discussed. 
Violent Non-State Actors & Organised Crime 
Organised crime groups and terrorists have been known to collaborate since at least the 
1970‘s and 80‘s. For example, Makarenko (2002) notes that drug ‗cartels‘ in South America 
would regularly employ members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and 
M19 to guard cocaine plantations. Such opportunistic, mutually beneficial arrangements foster 
inter-organisational learning and are thought to have become more common as a result of 
increasing globalisation. Collaboration between organised terrorists and criminals is occurring in 
a range of activities, including the trafficking of weapons, drugs and people, as well as money 
laundering and credit card fraud (Curtis & Karacan, 2002).  
Many terrorist organisations –including the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), 
the Basque Fatherland & Liberty (ETA), the Kurdistan Worker‘s Party (PKK), Hamas, 
Hizballah, the FARC, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and others- are now directly 
involved in organised crime, effectively cutting out the middleman (Ibid; Hutchinson & 
O‘Malley, 2007). In some cases, criminal activities for profit may eventually eclipse the group‘s 
original ideological aspirations. An example of this might be the Abu Sayyaf group of the 
Philippines, which is known for extortion rackets and kidnappings (Contreras, 2005). 
The current consensus appears to be that the type of relationships that emerge between 
criminal and terrorist organisations are flexible and idiosyncratic depending on the particular 
groups involved and their circumstances. Relationships so far have been characterised as 
opportunistic or even ‗parasitic‘, and are not seen as enduring alliances (Hutchinson & 
O‘Malley, 2007; Oehme, 2008). It is also crucial that terrorists‘ criminal activities generally 
remain geared towards furthering their political objectives (Ibid). Organisations are, however, 
dynamic, and some authors have suggested that greater contact between mid- to low-level 
criminal and terrorist leaders (facilitated by informal, ‗decentralised‘ network structures) may 
lead to longer-term strategic alliances (Dishman, 2005). 
Violent Non-State Actors & Petty Crime 
Terrorists are also involved in low-level criminal activity. For example, Shelley (2002) 
notes that al-Qaeda, the Taliban, the FARC, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and others are 
involved in street-level drug distribution as well as cultivation and trafficking. Over the years 
Islamist terrorists in the West have frequently been involved in various forms of relatively petty 
crime including various forms of fraud, thievery, small-scale drug-dealing and other offences. 
For instance, in the 1990‘s Fateh Kamel‘s network of radicals in Montreal was heavily involved 
in theft and passport forgery (Bernton, Carter, Heath, & Neff, 2002).  The 2004 Madrid train 
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bombers financed the operation by way of drug-dealing and robberies, and even acquired 
explosives in exchange for drugs thereby avoiding using cash that could be tracked back to them 
(Jordan, Mañas, & Horsburgh, 2008). Eleven of 22 jihadi networks in Spain detected between 
2004 and 2007 have been involved in ―common organised delinquency‖ (Jordan, 2007).  
Many Islamist militants have had backgrounds of petty criminality and drug abuse, and 
prisons are a fertile recruiting ground. Sageman (2008) found evidence of  many Islamist recruits 
with criminal records which may be evidence of increasing numbers involved in criminality, 
although those with records may also be those most apparent in open source materials. The most 
recent wave of ‗home-grown‘ Islamist terrorists also appears on average to be younger and less 
well off than previous generations (Ibid). This may be indicative of increasing similarity in the 
average terrorist and criminal profile, and of shared pathways into both types of activity 
(Mullins, 2009). Accordingly, Roy (2008) asserts that while there is a strong link in the West 
between militant Islamism and common delinquency, there is no such common involvement in 
‗high end‘ crime. It is even possible that ―[w]hen second-generation migrants join organised 
crime, they are less tempted by political radicalisation‖ (p.18).  
This does not necessarily contradict the fact that various Islamist and other terrorist 
groups are involved in organised crime. While involvement in high-end crime might generally 
preclude radicalisation, becoming radicalised does not appear to rule out organised criminal 
activity. Also, large-scale criminal operations might only be possible for those terrorists who 
have the necessary connections or organisational affiliations. The general consensus at present is 
that the majority of Islamist militants in the West are largely autonomous- as a result, they may 
have to support themselves through crime but are less likely to be able to expand beyond 
relatively small-scale, local operations. 
Involvement in petty crime has several implications. Firstly, it means that terrorists must 
learn the requisite skills to perform these roles. It is also likely to put terrorists in contact with 
ordinary criminals, necessary for obtaining various resources or achieving particular goals. As 
part of a broader criminal network, the chances of intermittent or even sustained contact with 
other types of offenders and with the criminal justice system (CJS) are greatly increased (hence 
terrorists may frequently appear on the law-enforcement radar as seemingly insignificant 
fraudsters, thieves, or drug-dealers). The heavy overlap in activities of terrorists and criminals 
thus suggests shared knowledge, skills and social contacts. They may be useful to one another 
financially (avoiding traceable transactions), and may often share other short-term goals. 
Methods 
Terrorists are involved in large and small-scale crime, varying in levels of sophistication. 
In carrying out these activities they employ similar methods to organised crime groups. Shelley 
(2002) notes that both terrorists and criminals raise funds through legitimate or semi-legitimate 
means in addition to fraud, money-laundering, counterfeiting, and smuggling. In addition, they 
are often organised in similar networked structures that sometimes intersect, they communicate 
in similar ways utilising modern technology and sometimes use tactics of corruption to achieve 
goals (Shelley, 2002). Makarenko (2002) adds that both terrorists and criminal networks are 
often transnational in nature and utilise diaspora communities; they use sophisticated intelligence 
and counter-intelligence techniques and similar target-deployment in the form of small teams or 
cells. Hence terrorists and criminals do the same things, sometimes know the same people, and 
are organised in similar ways. Kenney (2003) thus uses his knowledge of Colombian drug 
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networks to inform counter-terrorism strategies, and warns that targeting leaders alone may 
prove ineffectual since mid- to low-level organisational elements are able to reorganise and 
continue to function. 
   Motives 
In the short term, terrorists and criminals commit the same crimes for the same reasons, 
i.e., to profit financially. However, for criminals, this is generally an end in itself, while for 
terrorists it is a means to achieve political/ ideological goals. Broadly speaking, these represent 
two fundamentally different strategies: violence-for-profit versus profit-for-violence. As a result, 
criminal motivations may fluctuate according to market-opportunities while terrorist motivations 
are likely to be affected by other factors, such as political or world events (Kenney, 2003). 
Having described motivational differences at the organisational level it is important to note that 
at the individual and group level, motivations for initial and continued involvement in both 
criminal and terrorist activity are complex. Both are special cases of co-offending - relying on 
networks of people to achieve goals. As such there are very powerful social rewards for 
involvement (Weerman, 2003), which for individuals may be at least as important as overall 
organisational aims. Hence at the level of the group, terrorist and criminal motivations have more 
in common than is commonly assumed.   
Profiles 
Silke (2008) points out that generally speaking, young males are responsible for the 
majority of crime and terrorism. However, there are also important differences in their profiles. 
Silke (2008) concludes that terrorists are distinct from criminals based upon the fact that factors 
which are thought to ‗protect‘ against involvement in crime (such as higher educational 
achievement, better occupation or social standing, and successful marriage) do not seem to 
prevent against becoming a terrorist. However, the statistics on criminal backgrounds may reflect 
biases in the criminal justice system (McNeill & Chapman, 2005). They also tend to be 
generalised and undifferentiated by type of crime, and there appears to be more diversity in the 
criminal population than is implied. Hate crime, for instance, shares a number of ‗unique‘ 
features with terrorism. It is a largely group-activity where targets are chosen symbolically, with 
intended psychological repercussions (Craig, 2002). What is more, in contrast to the typical 
view, these offenders are not generally impoverished or unemployed (Ibid).  
Terrorist populations are perhaps even more diverse as no typical profile of much use 
exists. Even within specific terrorist organisations or types there is a wide range of people 
involved. In conflict zones especially, there may be a significant number of operatives who are 
driven by trauma and revenge (Speckhard, 2007), however, terrorists on the whole appear to be 
psychologically ‗normal‘ (Horgan, 2005). Nevertheless, certain trends according to geographic 
region and time can be identified. In the case of Islamist terrorists in the West, on average there 
appears to have been a gradual decrease in age and in socioeconomic status, as well as an 
increase in backgrounds of common criminality (Sageman, 2008). As mentioned above this may 
reflect growing financial independence from any ‗parent‘ organisation (Sageman, 2008), but may 
be more indicative of increasingly blurred lines between criminal and terrorist activity. Examples 
of this kind of phenomenon are becoming more apparent. For instance, gangs such as the 
‗Muslim Boys‘ of London utilise aspects of the Islamist identity whilst being heavily involved in 
serious criminal offences (Malik, 2005). They have given rise to the concept of ‗criminal jihad‘, 
leading to the question of whether they are more criminal or more terrorist (Malik, 2005).     
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Becoming Involved in Crime & Terrorism 
Social affiliations are a vitally important route into various criminal and terrorist 
activities (e.g., Henry, Tolan, & Gorman-Smith, 2001; Horgan, 2005). Family members as well 
as peer groups often facilitate involvement in both, and this effect can be seen as recruitment by 
routine association. Friends select one another based on similarities, and over time, come to 
share attitudes and beliefs as they engage in the same behaviours together. As per Weerman‘s 
(2003) model of co-offending, as social exchange, they provide mutual acceptance and 
appreciation, which secures participation in the group. Hence, initial involvement in crime and 
terrorism can be a matter of circumstance and is not necessarily driven by a pre-existing desire to 
commit crime or to pursue radical change or destruction. Accordingly, Nesser (2006) describes 
the majority of Islamist terrorists based in Europe as ‗drifters‘ who join the jihad almost 
unconsciously via circumstantial acquaintanceships. And in support of this it is being realised 
that, like crime, becoming involved in terrorism is not all about ideology. Instead, behavioural 
participation in the group may often precede ideological commitment (Horgan, 2005, p.138; 
Sageman, 2008, p.75).  
Within criminal/ radical social milieus, status is also extremely important. More 
experienced individuals are generally more influential, and greater ‗premium‘ is attached to roles 
of heightened commitment (Matsueda et al, 1992; Horgan, 2005). Traditionally, status 
differentials within terrorism have been seen as evidence of brainwashing and manipulation. 
These days, bottom-up processes of self-radicalisation and self-recruitment are increasingly 
emphasised (e.g., Sageman, 2008). Nevertheless there may still be active recruiters who 
encourage others to join them (Nesser, 2006). Likewise there are criminal mentors who guide 
and encourage their less experienced counterparts (Morselli, Tremblay, & McCarthy, 2006). 
Thus criminal and terrorist involvement and development both appear to progress through a 
combination of routine association, bottom-up desire of new recruits, and top-down guidance. 
Criminal & Terrorist Identities 
A sense of shared identity is often important for initial and continuing involvement in 
various group crimes (e.g., gang activity) and terrorism. A major difference however, is that 
criminals do not look beyond their immediate group, whilst terrorists come to identify very 
strongly with a much larger collective (e.g. ‗Irish‘, ‗Muslims‘ or ‗Tamils‘). Such identification 
enhances, and is fueled by, feelings of empathy. Hence, many Islamists report getting involved 
after becoming outraged from watching videos of atrocities against Muslims in Chechnya and 
elsewhere. In turn, this affects altruistic motivations, which does not seem to be the case with 
criminals (LaFree & Dugan, 2004). It is this perceived ‗nobility‘ of the terrorists‘ cause which 
helps create an all-important identity, whereby almost no sacrifice is too great in the pursuit of 
their goals.  
Social Organisation 
As mentioned already, criminals and terrorists show similar systems of social influence 
and organisation. Both organised crime and terrorism have been seen as traditionally 
hierarchically organised, and although this may depend very much on the particular organisation 
and context, today they are often described as fluid and informal networks characterised by local 
autonomy, flexibility and resistance to law-enforcement (Kenney, 2007). In the case of Islamist 
terrorism, this arrangement is seen as the consequence of the crippling of al-Qaeda as a central, 
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coordinating organisation after 9/11. For criminals, it appears to be taken for granted that this 
represents a ‗natural‘ informal system of organisation. 
A major difference is that criminal groups –both youth and adult- are generally thought to 
be highly transient, with a great deal of desistance and turnover (Reiss, 1988; Warr, 1996). 
Terrorist groups, on the other hand, are said to involve intense interactions and ―exceptional 
degrees of internal pressure‖ (Horgan, 2005, p.133), which are only possible through sustained 
membership and stability. Group stability thus appears to be the mechanism by which terrorist 
identities are able to consume individuals.  
Yet as a network, Islamist terrorism is still described as fluid and amorphous, seeming to 
imply that individuals can move around and participate according to individual ability, 
constraints and desire. This implies that levels of stability are likely to vary, perhaps according to 
tasks performed or ‗network location.‘ Stability may be highest during periods of initial 
radicalisation (at least for those who stay the course), and during operational planning when 
there is a high need for secrecy. Varying terrorist support groups –including those involved in 
regular commission of crime- might be more akin to ordinary criminal groups in terms of 
turnover and permeability.  
Desistance, Disengagement, & Deradicalisation 
The majority of all crime is committed by a small, persistent minority, and desistance 
from criminal activity is common (e.g., Petersilia, 1980; Shover & Thompson, 1992). 
Comparatively little is known about desistance or disengagement (D&D) from terrorism (see 
Horgan, 2005; Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009a). Nevertheless, comparable ideas are being explored and 
similar issues have so far been identified.  
Bjørgo & Horgan (2009b) usefully distinguish between ‗push‘ factors (negative 
consequences of continued participation) and ‗pull‘ factors (attractive alternatives). These are 
relevant both to the decision to desist from crime as well as decisions to disengage from 
terrorism. Disengagement research has highlighted common themes in salient factors including 
stress caused by the pressure of involvement or the risk of punishment, reduced time spent 
associating with radical/delinquent peers, increased time spent in legitimate social interaction 
(law-abiding family, friends, and work), a combination of disillusionment with current activities 
and increased acceptance of existing social and legal institutions, and reduced physical 
opportunities (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009b; LaFree & Miller, 2009).  
It is vital to note that some factors affecting desistance/disengagement are structural, and 
some are more psychological. As a reflection of this, it is crucial to distinguish between actual 
behaviour and individual propensity. In the study of terrorism, this is expressed as the difference 
between disengagement (behavioural) and deradicalisation (psychological). This in turn has quite 
profound implications for programs aimed at facilitating sustained disengagement and de-
radicalisation. Given the amount of common ground shared by criminals and terrorists, in 
particular the importance of social bonds and behavioural participation, it seems that a vital part 
of counter-terrorism and disengagement and de-radicalisation programs must be to address 
social, non-ideological elements of involvement. Indeed, a number of current approaches in 
different parts of the world (most notably Saudi Arabia and Singapore) are holistic in nature, 
addressing a variety of social and educational needs in addition to trying to dissuade individuals 
from their religiously-framed ideology (see Barrett & Bokhari, 2009). 
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Summary & Implications for Counter-Terrorism 
VSNAs sometimes collaborate with organised criminals, and are also routinely involved 
in the commission of large- and also small-scale crime. As such terrorists and ordinary criminals 
often do the same things, know the same people, and are organised in similar ways. Indeed 
terrorism has ―a great deal in common with more conventional types of crime‖ (LaFree & Miller, 
2009, p.17). This applies to methods, social motives, short-term goals, and to some extent, 
profiles. There are similar pathways into crime and terrorism via routine association, and social 
bonds appear to be a highly significant source of motivation. The role of terrorist ideology is 
sometimes over-emphasised and, as in crime, there is a strong behavioural component to initial 
involvement as newcomers become absorbed in subcultural status systems. Finally, similar 
factors, both structural and psychological, seem to affect decisions to withdraw from criminal or 
terrorist activities. Perhaps the most significant differences between terrorists and ordinary 
criminals are in their specific senses of identity and their (ostensible) ultimate goals.  
There are a number of implications for law-enforcement efforts in the fight against 
terrorism. Firstly, since terrorists may frequently come into contact with the criminal justice 
system as common criminals and since radicalisation can also occur in prisons, there is a need to 
try to identify radical individuals at the point of arrest or when they come under suspicion of 
criminal activity. This might be possible, for example, via known associates or geographical 
profiling according to radical locales. Where terrorists are apprehended for petty crimes there is 
an opportunity to gather intelligence as well as potentially affect their future behaviour and 
exposure to other radicals in detention. Along similar lines it seems prudent to sufficiently 
educate ‗ordinary‘ police officers about terrorists‘ criminal activities and to maintain lines of 
communication between ‗beat cops‘, criminal investigations departments, counter-terrorism units 
and security services. Equally, this may apply for enlisting the help of members of the public. 
Recognition of parallels between crime and terrorism also urges greater use of 
criminological research to inform our understanding of similar processes in terrorism. As well as 
enhancing our comprehension of how people become involved in the first place, this will 
improve our understanding of how and why people disengage and deradicalise. In particular, 
systematic study of criminal desistance and rehabilitation programs may be used to inform D&D 
programs. Early implications are that to focus solely on trying to change (religious) ideological 
beliefs would be a misuse of time and energy. Likewise, Roy (2008) asserts that the battle for the 
hearts and minds of populations targeted by Islamists (male youth, particularly Muslims) should 
not be about ‗good‘ versus ‗bad‘ Islam because the fundamental issue at hand is not religion. 
Delegitimizing and stifling terrorism may therefore be even more complex than is sometimes 
assumed, especially so given increasingly blurred boundaries with common crime. Hence 
counter-terrorism must be flexible and adapt as does its adversary. 
back to top 
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VNSA Use of Communication 
Terrorist and insurgent groups use three forms of communication: a) discursive—in other 
words, language, expressed through a variety of mediums from the most simple (e.g., letters 
nailed to doors) to the most technologically sophisticated (e.g., Internet websites and chat 
rooms); b) visual--in other words images, also presented across a wide variety and range of 
mediums; and c) symbolic acts, including the use of violence itself as a communicative act, 
structured and designed to send a message. 
Discursive Communication 
Like others who use words in an effort to persuade, terrorists and insurgents (in whatever 
language they are using) make use of rhetoric and argument, as well as the choice of particular 
narrative frames. Scholars evaluating the use of persuasive appeals made by terrorist and 
insurgent groups need to understand the language in which the appeal is being made and the 
cultural referents that ground the appeal (Doran, 2001). Also, these scholars increasingly need a 
working knowledge of the forms of communication enabled by the newest technologies 
(Kimmage & Ridolfo, 2007; Paz, n.d.). 
The analysis of discursive communication of VNSA groups is available in a growing 
scholarly literature. For example, one of the most important Islamist works, a 1500-page book 
frequently cited in debates in chat rooms and other Internet sources (Lacey, 2008), is explored in 
detail in a biography of its author (Lia, 2008). The narratives presented in ―martyr videos,‖ the 
videos filmed by suicide bombers the day before their detonation, are analyzed in a book- length 
study on the topic of suicide bombers (Hafez, 2007). But due to the dynamic nature of this field, 
with new texts being produced so quickly and in such volume (and, for the most part, on the 
Internet), some of the most important sources of scholarly communication analysis are available 
on the Internet. West Point‘s Combating Terrorism Center makes captured and translated 
primary documents widely available (CTC‘s Harmony Document Database, n.d.), as well as 
simultaneously posting a series of reports analyzing the documents found in the database (CTC‘s 
Harmony Reports, n.d.). Reuven Paz, an Israeli expert in Islamist use of the Internet, posts 
frequent short reports on his group‘s website (Project for the Research of Islamist Movements, 
n.d.), while a group of mostly Norwegian scholars posts frequent updates on their research into 
the chatrooms and other uses of the web at jihadica.com. 
The Visual Image  
The power of the visual. In a war against an enemy choosing to employ terrorist attacks 
as a tactic, the strategic objective of the terrorist organization may be for the host government to 
fail, and consequently their operational objective may be to have the counterinsurgent pull out 
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(Naji, 2005). This outcome would require actions designed to shift domestic public opinion in 
the counterinsurgent‘s home country. Terrorists, therefore, often attempt to change their enemy‘s 
will (something they cannot accomplish through achievements on the battlefield) through 
indirect means, by changing public opinion. They battle to shape the perceptions and attitudes of 
the public—whether the indigenous public terrorists seek to intimidate or the domestic American 
public they seek to influence—so as to force counterinsurgents to withdraw from the battlefield 
prematurely.   
Thus, the emphasis is on operations which, while they will not alter the direct balance of 
power on the battlefield, will alter the enemy population‘s commitment--its will to fight. 
Certainly, this has been the case in Iraq, where those groups fighting the United States 
understood they had no hope of defeating American forces on the battlefield. The global 
counterinsurgency is fought, therefore, not over territory, population, or material resources, but 
over popular will—theirs, ours, or both. Terrorist attacks are staged with an audience in mind, 
one beyond those directly involved in the attack. The point is to achieve a psychological effect of 
a specific kind (i.e., terror) and it is impossible to have a psychological effect on the dead, while, 
no matter how profound the effect on the survivors, their numbers relative to the rest of society 
will always be negligible.  The bottom line is that those injured or killed in an attack function, 
from the point of view of those planning and executing the attack, as stage props (Weimann & 
Winn, 1994). The ultimate target will always be the larger audience, for whom the attack 
functions as a message of one kind or another. This is, of necessity, a battle to shape media 
coverage. In a modern world, an event staged for a larger audience inevitably will be an event 
staged for the media, since it is through the mass media that one is able to reach a mass audience. 
Saying an attack, like any other event, is designed for an audience, or for the media, 
means two distinct things. First, it means the attackers intend it to be heard about by others (i.e., 
read about or ―heard about‖ through their contact with the print press). In other words, people 
learn of the event through language—words and discourse. Second, attackers intend for the 
events to be seen (although most will ―see it‖ only in a mediated sense, through media coverage.) 
Between the two ways of finding out about an attack, hearing (or reading–i.e., becoming 
informed through language) or seeing, the visual medium is by far the more powerful, for several 
reasons. First, unlike words, we absorb visual images all at once, in a non-linear fashion. Thus, 
visual information is much harder to unpack, to explicate and critique as we are being exposed to 
it, and that its impact is much more visceral and powerfully emotional (although this is obviously 
a generalization) (Goldberg, 1993). 
The second reason that visual images are often more powerful than words, at least in the 
context of news coverage, is that we approach news images in a different way than we approach 
images in other contexts (e.g., advertisements), as if these images show us an objective truth. We 
treat them as if what they provide is indisputable evidence, ―because a photographer‘s 
interpretation of events relies on a mechanical instrument, photographs have been considered to 
be more accurate than their verbal counterparts ... as the closest one can come to an 
unimpeachable witness to war‖ (Moeller, 1989). We behave almost as if the camera serves as a 
kind of magic eye, through which the photojournalist is able to show us what we would have 
been able to see if we had been there, standing right in the spot he or she had been standing, no 
more and no less (Liebes & First, 2003).   
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There has been a great deal of discussion of the need for a ―counternarrative‖ in fighting 
counterinsurgent warfare.  Undoubtedly, this is a useful and important concept, but it may only 
get us so far without counter-images. Images will trump words almost every time, and the most 
effective response to an image, even a doctored or staged one, is often another image (Dauber, 
2009). 
Visual images in the news. In the context of news stories in a moving image format, 
images are accompanied by a verbal narration, the reporter‘s ―voice over.‖ These news stories 
traditionally were equated with ―broadcast news,‖ but now include cable television, unaired 
stories prepared for television networks‘ websites, print outlets in a streaming video format, 
stories prepared for download onto viewers and iPods, and stories prepared and uploaded to the 
web by independent or ―amateur‖ news producers, such as bloggers. In television news (where 
the standard format was created), the news story is produced for a medium that is 
overwhelmingly visual. In that format, every idea mentioned by the reporter must also be 
represented visually, if only for a few seconds. Watch a news story closely—unless it is live 
coverage of an ongoing event, the specific event being reported will represent only one of many 
visual images composing the entire story. The other images come from the ―B-roll,‖ or file 
footage, flowing one after the other as the reporter‘s words move from one idea to the next. In 
short, the visual elements of the news story are built from a visual language that parallels, but 
differs from, the verbal language the reporter speaks. Thus, the phrase, ―the war in Afghanistan‖ 
might be represented by an American soldier walking down a street near a woman in a burka, 
while the phrase ―the collapse on Wall Street‖ might be illustrated by a scene of traders on the 
floor, or by a street in a typical American town with a row of ―For Sale‖ signs in front of several 
consecutive homes.  
We all ―read‖ this visual language, or the stories would not work; they would not make 
sense to us. But in another sense, we are not trained to properly interpret this language. We are 
not trained to be critical readers of it, unpacking the assumptions that drive the choices being 
made and the way particular images are linked to particular phrases, ideas, or concepts. In other 
words, the image is fleeting; it is gone as soon as you see it, so you either critique it in real time 
or, most likely, not at all. 
Many terrorists understand the conventions of Western press coverage, and in particular 
the visual conventions. They understand them well enough to game the system to attempt to 
maximize the amount of coverage they receive. They can design attacks in such a way as to draw 
cameras, and within limits, to ensure that the visual coverage is the way they want it.  
Nonetheless, terrorists do not in any sense control the press or the coverage they will receive. All 
they can do is exploit the conventions determining what is likely to be considered a newsworthy 
event, what will be considered a ―good visual,‖ and so forth, and like a staged event during a 
presidential campaign, hope for the coverage to be as close to what they desire as possible 
(Dauber, 2009). 
Terrorists are able to exert this influence with some degree of precision today, of course, 
because the Internet has provided new ways for the conventions of American journalism to be 
studied from thousands of miles away. The fact that television news stories are available via 
streaming video and newspapers are available in online format means that they are available to 
anyone who is anywhere with an Internet connection.   
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There is little doubt, on the part of American military officers interviewed for this 
research, that terrorists and insurgents in Iraq closely follow the American media. This is an 
advantage the Internet offers to international terrorists that is surely as important as any other. 
Terrorists now can review the way their attacks are covered virtually in real-time, and adjust 
their attacks accordingly, especially as Internet access grows rapidly around the world (Wheeler, 
2006). Of course, the ability to study the visual aspect of coverage also transcends any language 
barrier. Prior to most media outlets going onto the web, terrorist groups based in another country, 
and targeting American interests in that country, would at best have been able to ―jury rig‖ a 
method for examining the way their handy work was being covered in the United States.  
The Symbolic Act 
Terrorist attacks are, themselves, often ―symbolic acts.‖ The act itself, in other words, is 
intended to be interpreted or ―read,‖ in the same manner as one would normally read or interpret 
any other symbolic text. Analysts previously have discussed terrorism‘s nature as theater 
(Weimann & Winn, 1994), but the current assessment goes beyond that discussion. Along a 
variety of registers, attacks are complex actions designed by sophisticated messengers using the 
act as a way to send messages, often to multiple audiences simultaneously. 
The images that result from attacks are the consequence, in other words, of conscious 
thought and planning. Evidence, never intended for the public, to that effect has been discovered 
material that clearly was not intended for propaganda purposes. It is, by now, well known that 
Osama bin Laden wrote to Mullah Omar that, “it is obvious that the media war in this century is 
one of the strongest methods; in fact its ratio may reach 90% of the total preparation for the 
battles” (bin Laden, trans. 2002). In a document found on a laptop titled, “The Bali Project,” and 
intended as an internal playbook, ‟Why Bali?,‟ the planner of the second Bali nightclub bombing 
wrote, “Because it will have a „global impact,‟ ... Bali is known around the world, better than 
Indonesia itself, ... An attack in Bali will be covered by the international media” (Bonner, 2006). 
To be sure, aspects of the time and place of any terrorist attack are purely pragmatic.  
Terrorists attack in urban areas – like Baghdad – because the press congregate there, which 
means the cameras are clustered there (an element of terrorist strategy that can be traced back to 
the Algerians fighting the French in the 1950s) (Hoffman, 1998). Terrorists learned from the 
attack during the Munich Olympics that there is a tremendous benefit to attacking at the same 
time as major international events. Such timing means that ready-made audiences can be 
―hijacked,‖ and (perhaps equally importantly) the originally scheduled event may be largely 
ignored, its audience deflected as the press corps turns its attention to what seems a larger story.  
Consider the impact on the G-8 summit of the 2005 subway attacks in London, with the result 
being the summit was largely forgotten when the attention of the Western media was diverted 
entirely to London (Frey & Rohner, 2006). 
It is also the case that the date and location of an attack can be of symbolic value. The 
American embassies in East Africa were bombed on August 9
th
, the anniversary of the date the 
first American troops stepped foot on Saudi Arabian soil after Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait in 
1990. The Bali nightclub bombing, the largest attack after September 11
th 
to that date, took place 
on October 12
th
, the anniversary of the bombing of the USS Cole. This is not only true for 
Islamists, either. The Federal Building in Oklahoma City was bombed on the anniversary of the 
disastrous federal attempt to detain the Branch Davidians in Waco, a date of great importance to 
a segment of anti-government extremists in the United States. 
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While those dates are primarily of importance to the attackers, it is well known that it has 
been part of al Qaeda doctrine from the beginning that targets should be selected, in part, based 
on their symbolic value to the victims. This emphasis has been a common feature of militant 
Islamist terrorism. In December 1994, for example, Algerian terrorists had planned to fly a plane 
they had hijacked into the Eiffel Tower, thus causing massive destruction over the heart of Paris, 
but also destroying a symbol as important to the French as the Statue of Liberty or the 
Washington Monument is to Americans (Gunaratna, 2003).   
Often it is symbols of government power that are attacked, as with the Pentagon, the 
ultimate symbol of American military might. In Iraq, this has translated directly into attacks on 
army and police recruits, training facilities, and wherever possible, personnel. This has sent the 
obvious message that those who ―collaborate‖ with the government or with coalition forces will 
be targeted, including those who work as translators or secretaries. It also communicates (as it 
certainly does when symbols of American power are targeted) that, if the government cannot 
protect itself, it cannot protect the average citizen. For this reason, this tactic has been an 
approach of terrorists around the world. For example, as Nacos notes, when MI-6 headquarters 
was attacked in London in 2000, it: 
 
... was as costly in terms of its effects on the psyche of the British people, who 
were horrified by the spectacle of someone hurling a rocket from a handheld 
launcher and [sic] a distance of only a few hundred yards onto Britain‘s foreign 
intelligence center (Nacos, 2002). 
 
Tactics can be powerfully symbolic and therefore communicative as well. As Mia Bloom 
explains, virtually every society has some sort of taboo against self-destruction (Bloom, 2005).  
There is, therefore, a visceral horror at the image of the terrorist willing to take his (and recently, 
also her) own life in order to kill others. And, by definition, the suicide bomber conveys to the 
targeted society that the organization the terrorist represents is willing to use any means by 
which to achieve its ends, and has operatives willing to go to any lengths. Since these terrorists 
are already willing, perhaps even eager, to die, they also are sending the clear message that it will 
be almost impossible to deter them. The anthrax attacks in the United States immediately after 
September 11
th 
clearly demonstrated that a delivery mechanism for an attack could serve to send 
a powerful message, one that makes the attack itself far more successful as a terrorist operation 
than it would otherwise have been. The lone terrorist targeted important politicians and major 
media figures – prominent individuals, and thus logical targets of this kind of violence. Had the 
terrorist used a high-powered sniper rifle and attempted to assassinate the same people, it 
probably would have attracted as much attention, but would not have had the same emotional 
resonance. Had the terrorist used the exact same weapon – anthrax –via a different delivery 
mechanism, placing the anthrax in the targets‘ cars or directly in their offices, their actions likely 
would have been more frightening, but still would not have had as much emotional impact.   
What made the attacks so profoundly frightening to so many people was the delivery 
mechanism. The terrorist sent the anthrax through the mail. People could understand the 
rationale of targeting prominent individuals, but they also knew that they themselves were not as 
prominent, and therefore believed that they were not at risk. But everyone gets mail. Therefore, 
the attacks, by virtue of their use of the quotidian, made everyone feel as if they also were at risk. 
This is the likely cause behind 44% of Americans reporting at the time that they had begun to 
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exercise caution while opening their mail, with another 17% considering doing so (ABC News 
Poll, 2001). This attack killed five people and made 22 sick in total, but those numbers cannot 
account for the impact this event had on the country—with 47% percent of the public reporting 
that they were following news reports regarding the attacks closely (Project for Excellence in 
Journalism, 2006). The visuals used to represent this attack – business envelopes and 
government agents in bio-hazard suits going through Post Offices no different from the ones you 
and I use every day – served only to underscore and emphasize precisely what was so frightening 
about the attack. 
Purposes Communication Serves 
Communication serves a variety of purposes for these groups. Whether discursive, visual, 
or symbolic, they communicate in order to recruit, fundraise, and ―rally the troops.‖ This is 
particularly important after an event that will be seen as impacting the group negatively.  After a 
key leader has been ―martyred‖ so publicly that denials will not work, the leadership needs to 
make sure that the rank and file believe the group can survive and even continue more strongly 
than before. Whether directly or in ―mediated‖ forms (i.e., experienced through the filter of some 
form of technological media), communication also can be used to demoralize or intimidate – or 
perhaps persuade – the so called ―swing vote‖ into passive or soft support. Of course, the 
communicators also hope to demoralize the population of the enemy state. 
Use of New Media 
Throughout history, terrorists (and insurgents) have gravitated toward the newest and 
most sophisticated communication technologies available. They have often seen the potential in 
such technologies very quickly, and have proven adept at rapidly developing new, flexible, and 
creative applications to capitalize on them. In particular, they have used communication 
technologies to sidestep the traditional media, which has made it possible for such groups to get 
their message out to their followers in a direct, unfiltered fashion. 
In Iran, the Shah might have controlled the media, and the Ayatollah Khomeni might 
have been exiled to Paris, but personal cassette tapes had been developed and become widely 
available for personal use by the late 1970s. They were perfect for the Ayatollah‘s supporters, at 
the time an anti-government insurgency. After a sermon had been recorded by him, copies could 
be made with little difficulty, for little cost, at which point each copy was easily portable, easily 
hidden on the person of a supporter, and easily passed from one supporter to the next after it had 
been heard. In this fashion, the exiled Ayatollah‘s message was spread, despite his lack of access 
to traditional media within the country, which was a smart use of pre-Internet technology 
(Tehranian, 1995). Today, al Qaeda and its affiliated groups use online video-sharing sites such 
as YouTube and Liveleak, as well as Google Earth to provide precise targeting and mapping for 
operations. They also continue to aggressively explore the potential of such new applications as 
Twitter (304
th
 MI Bn OSINT Team, 2008) – even discussing the possibilities for an ―invasion‖ 
of the social networking site Facebook. 
What is new today is that a confluence of new technologies has all come to relative 
maturity relatively simultaneously. An information or communication technology becomes 
―mature‖ when it meets several criteria. First, it must be available ―off-the-shelf,‖ that is to say; 
it must be commercially available to the general public. Second, it must be relatively affordable, 
something within reach of a decent percentage of the population. Third and critically, it must be 
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small enough to be easily portable. Fourth, it must be available in most of the world, not just in 
developed countries.   
In the last few years, several key technologies have met these criteria. Cameras of 
increasing quality (even high-definition) continue to become cheaper and smaller, even in 
countries without dependable electricity. Similarly, laptop computers are available worldwide, at 
increasingly lower prices and higher quality. Software that permits images to be edited and 
manipulated also is available worldwide and requires no training beyond the instructions that 
come with the software itself. In fact, while software such as Moviemaker 3 is easily available 
around the world, and easily mastered without special training, it is not really necessary to 
purchase software with even that relatively low level of sophistication. Someone with even a low 
level of computer savvy (which likely characterizes a good number of the world‘s young people) 
can download free ―shareware‖ at zero cost. Or those with a great deal of computer savvy can 
hack something for free. Alternatively, they can acquire what they need from the hacker or 
criminal communities (304th MI Bn OSINT Team, 2008). The Internet alone is a powerful, even 
revolutionary, tool the Internet in combination with these other technologies can be an even more 
powerful weapon. 
The twist added by the groups active in Iraq, evident fairly early in that conflict, was the 
tactic of  filming individual attacks as short video segments, perhaps lasting only as long as a few 
seconds. For example, many attacks on American convoys have been filmed by terrorists hiding 
in what amount to duck blinds. The terrorists then upload these segments individually to the web, 
rather than waiting until they have assembled a large collection. This practice likely started in 
Iraq as a result of the conjunction of technology, (i.e., easily available portable digital cameras 
and laptops) with opportunity (i.e., a combat theater where attacks on American soldiers were 
taking place regularly). Once uploaded, these videos become available to anyone who cares to 
download them. This maximizes the videos‘ impact since, once they are on the web, they can 
become the building blocks for much longer videos. These new videos may have higher 
production values and be made by individuals outside the combat zone with more sophisticated 
computer skills and access to better computers and software (Kimmage & Ridolfo, 2007). 
There is a clear and notable evolution in the technology being used in the generation of 
propaganda, based on what has been being captured in the Iraqi battlespace: 
Over time technology has gone bigger and bigger. We have seen more hard drives, 
as time goes on, hard drives coming off the battlefield have become more 
advanced, bigger hard drives, [with] more capability. Earlier in the fight [there 
were] 20 gig hard drives, now 40, some are 80, even 120. So we have seen an 
advancement as technology across the world has increased (LTC A. Jenkins, 
Director of Operations for the Combined Media Processing Center, Qatar, personal 
communication, December 3, 2007). 
The size of drives (particularly portable drives) is critical, given the enormous size of even the 
most primitive video files.   
In fairness, it remains the case that most of the equipment recovered typically has been 
three to five years old (A. Jenkins, personal communication, December 3, 2007). There could be 
any number of reasons for this finding, starting with the fact that, given the difficulty of gaining 
access to computers in the country during Saddam‘s time, the technology baseline was probably 
far behind the standard in developed countries, even compared to the rest of the region. 
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Despite the fact that the technology itself is not advanced but instead several generations 
behind, it is being used to access cutting edge techniques, and to constantly push the envelope in 
terms of creative applications of what technology allows. For example, the British have 
complained that insurgents have been using Google Earth in order to plan their attacks more 
precisely on British compounds in Iraq (Harding, 2007). The terrorists attacking Mumbai used 
Google Earth in a similar way, albeit they had access to Blackberries, a far more advanced 
platform and one that permitted them to follow the press coverage as the attack unfolded. This is 
an advanced, creative application of technology that requires Internet access, but not necessarily 
the most advanced platform on the market. The change in sophistication was expressed 
succinctly, ―...al Qaeda [in Iraq] and other terrorist organizations used to articulate their battle 
plan with rocks and stones and sticks, now we see them using power points with laptops and 
projectors on a wall. So overall their [use of] technology has improved‖ (A. Jenkins, personal 
communication, December 3, 2007). Media labs are decentralized, apparently intentionally, even 
as media strategies seem to be centralized, and the labs themselves are never connected to the 
Internet. Rather, any editing, production, and video compression is done in the labs. Once 
complete, videos are downloaded to thumb drives or, more likely, given the size of video files, 
portable hard drives, and then taken elsewhere to be uploaded to the web (COL. D. Bacon, Chief 
of Plans for Special Operations and Intelligence working Public Affairs  Matters in the Strategic 
Communication Department of Multi-National Forces – Iraq (MNF-I), personal communication, 
10 November 2007). This set-up is known in the vernacular as ―sneaker net.‖   
So many attacks have been filmed, whether IED attacks on convoys, the detonation of 
suicide bombers, the execution of hostages, or sniper attacks on soldiers, that it has been 
suggested that attacks are staged in order to provide material that can be filmed, rather than the 
filming being an afterthought, incidental to the point of the attack and added after the planning is 
complete. As Army Lieutenant Colonel Terry Guild explained, ―It is part of their Tactics, 
Techniques, and Procedures‖ (personal communication, MacDill AFB, August 15, 2006). 
How important was this approach to the efforts of the insurgency in Iraq?  Between June 
and roughly November of 2007 (in other words, roughly the period corresponding to the surge of 
additional forces to Baghdad), American forces captured and destroyed eight media labs 
belonging to al Qaeda in Iraq. In the eight labs, they found a total of 23 terabytes of material that 
had not yet been uploaded to the web.  Although in some cases the labs were discovered in the 
course of other operations, coalition forces: 
made going after these media labs or propaganda labs a priority because we know 
how important these things are to al Qaeda operations, we know that they use 
these videos and put them on the web to recruit and to get funding, so to attack its 
livelihood we have to go after these things, so we have targeted them 
[specifically] (D. Bacon, personal communication, November 10, 2007).  
The loss of these eight labs, according to MNF-I, resulted in more than an eighty percent 
degradation of al Qaeda in Iraq‘s capacity to get new material on the web, as of September 2007.   
That said, while visual material (and specific claims that accompany it) can provide these 
groups with a new and powerful means of attacking their target population‘s will to continue 
fighting, the groups still need to find some way for the material to reach the traditional media for 
the visual product to be fully effective. It is highly unlikely that sufficient numbers of people in 
the West will find this material simply by surfing the web for it to have enough of an impact to 
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meet a terrorist group‘s needs, or for the material‘s full potential to be unleashed. While some 
terrorist group material indeed does find its way to the increasingly popular YouTube and similar 
sites, YouTube offers only so much potential coverage.   
But the irony here is that traditional (―legacy‖) American media outlets now depend on 
the terrorists and insurgents for content so that, by uploading this material to the Internet and 
making it available to anyone who finds it, these groups ensure that it will find its way onto a 
American television network news shows as well. Because it has been impossible for the 
networks to consistently acquire visually compelling combat footage of either the fighting in Iraq 
or Afghanistan, for any variety of reasons, all six news networks and news divisions – ABC, 
CBS, NBC, CNN, MSNBC (the cable partner of NBC), and Fox News – have made it a regular 
practice to download footage from terrorist and insurgent web sites. These outlets then integrate 
these visual products into their broadcasts, almost never with any indication that could be used 
by the audience to determine the actual provenance of the footage. This is the case despite the 
fact that, if the networks truly believe they have no choice but to continue using this footage, 
there are several options available to them that would clearly and unmistakably distinguish this 
footage from that taken by professional photojournalists or by ―amateurs‖ (the new category 
used by all the networks now that the probability is high that witnesses to an event will have a 
camera of some sort on their person) (Dauber, 2009). 
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Executive Summary 
There are potentially multiple audiences for any act of strategic communication by a Violent Non 
State Actor (VNSA).  Before deciphering the importance of any given message or series of 
messages from a VNSA, the first analytical task is to determine the intended audience.  Most 
messages purport to address a specific individual or group (e.g., videos addressed to both 
external groups such as “the American people” or to internal groups such as the call to jihad in 
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a January 2009 video tape purportedly released by bin Laden).  However, those statements are 
not always reliable indicators of the true intended audience.  This paper discusses the 
importance of determining the audience of a communicative act at the beginning of the analytic 
process.  Audiences might include foreign publics, foreign policymakers, domestic audiences, 
existing group members, and potential recruits.  Many VNSA messages are likely intended for 
internal consumption regardless of who the stated audience is.  The decentralized nature of 
typical VNSAs and a complicated decision-making model leave these groups little choice other 
than to communicate through public messages. 
The failure of U.S. strategic communication programs has been widely noted with the 
recent study by Paul (2009) highlighting some of the problems.  As Goodall, Trethewey, and 
McDonald (2006) note, this failure may be due at least in part to a one-way model of 
communication, which assumes that we send messages, which are received exactly as intended.  
Unfortunately, this ―hypodermic‖ model of communication—one that assumes that senders can 
simply inject receivers with messages—can be problematic in reverse when analysts assume that 
any message they happen to view was intended for them.  This tendency presents a particular 
analytic problem for the U.S.: inadequate study of the strategic messages of Violent Non-State 
Actors (VNSAs) may cause western analysts to assume that we are the intended audience for 
messages that may be, at least in part, internal communications. 
Campbell and Huxman (2009, p. 192-193) draw a useful distinction between the 
―empirical audience‖ and the ―target audience.‖  The empirical audience is any person or group 
of people who happen to hear a message.  The target audience, on the other hand, is that person 
or group of people at whom a rhetorical act is directed.  The phrase ―rhetorical act‖ is not meant 
here in any derogatory way—Campbell and Huxman (2009, p. 7) take it to mean ―an intentional, 
created, polished attempt to overcome the challenges in a given situation with a specific audience 
on a given issue to achieve a particular end.‖  This paper is concerned with the target audiences 
at whom rhetorical acts are directed.  Analysts viewing a message will always be part of the 
empirical audience, but it is a mistake to assume the analyst‘s country or some element of 
government (e.g., the United States) is the target audience in the absence of specific evidence to 
the contrary.  While it is true that today‘s empirical audience may become tomorrow‘s target 
audience, or simply tomorrow‘s target, that distinction is not useful to the immediate analytic 
challenge of determining the intent or value of a message. 
Unfortunately, there is a tendency for a listener to assume that they are part of the target 
audience even when they are not.  Any audience is first going to be concerned with their own 
needs (Lucas, 2009) and that applies regardless of whether they are the target, empirical, or other 
type of audience.  If the analyst assumes that a message is directed towards him or herself, the 
meaning of the message might be lost entirely.  That point is crucial; that is, if someone does not 
know who the audience was intended to be, they cannot reasonably interpret the message.  Not 
knowing the target audience is akin to tapping a phone line without knowing either the recipient 
of the call or their response to the message—what is received will be badly out of context, 
difficult to interpret, and almost impossible to act on. 
In discussing audiences, it is important to remember that there might be more than one 
intended audience for the same message.  Determining the audience is particularly complex 
when the sender originates a message in a language that allows for or encourages multiple 
simultaneous interpretations.  The sender is potentially aware that others can intercept and view 
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the message.  Indeed, there may be some (strategic) benefit to having a message seen by 
someone other than the intended audience.  That said, the important thing for determining the 
strategic intent of the speaker is knowing to whom he or she intended to send their message.  
There are at least five such possible audiences: 
1) Foreign publics 
2) Foreign policymakers 
3) Domestic audiences 
4) Existing members of the VNSA 
5) Potential recruits to the VNSA 
Some messages are directed to foreign publics. For example, Al Jazeera (2007) reported that 
Osama bin Laden issued a video in early September 2007 with the banner ―A message from 
Sheikh Osama bin Laden to the American people,‖ and that message instructed Americans who 
were not Muslim to embrace Islam in order to end the war in Iraq by removing popular support 
(including financial support).  It is likely that bin Laden was trying to communicate with 
Americans or other westerners in a general sense. 
In that video, however, the person purporting to be bin Laden refers to (then) President Bush.  
The ostensible audience was the public at large, but the most significant policy maker of a 
foreign power was also addressed.  Presuming that the audiences addressed were really the 
intended targets, the same message potentially reached at least two groups. 
Strategic communicative acts by a VNSA can also be directed at a domestic audience.  For 
example, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC in Spanish) claim that their acts 
of violence are conducted on behalf of the Columbian people.  In a July 2008 statement issued 
after a string of defeats by Government of Columbia (GOC) forces, FARC leader Alfonso Cano 
claimed that his group would continue fighting to build a ―new Columbia.‖  This message 
promised a series of social benefits for Columbian citizens and said they would continue fighting 
despite the setbacks.  Messages such as the one issued by FARC could be designed for any 
number of domestic purposes, from gaining tacit support of the populace to ensuring the overt 
compliance of or lack of interference from local authorities. 
Included in those domestic audiences could be existing members of the VNSA sending the 
message.  The January 2009 bin Laden video referenced earlier appears to be directed to group 
members or others supporting the same cause, possibly the true (intended) target audience.  The 
(typically) decentralized organizational structure and illegal nature of terrorist groups means they 
(due to risk of capture, etc.) are unlikely to exchange messages in large public meetings (e.g., by 
holding annual conferences).  Thus, video or other acts of public communication can be an 
effective way to pass needed messages, sometimes through codes or by simply delivering more 
general themes. 
Finally, potential recruits to the cause may be included in those domestic audiences.  The 
dangerous nature of VNSA operations requires a constant stream of new ―talent‖ willing to 
undertake missions ranging from difficult to suicidal as well as serve other important functions.  
Since security forces are often surveilling or actively looking for known leaders of a VNSA, 
strategic communication via acts of public communication serve as a potential means of outreach 
to new recruits.  Disaffected individuals may respond to these messages based on identification 
with a cause.   
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While it certainly happens that a VNSA directly or indirectly targets some part of a country 
or government (e.g., the United States or the United States Government) in a rhetorical act, two 
interesting phenomena happen in small groups, which suggest that these last two audiences—the 
existing and potential members of the VNSA delivering the message—are often the true target 
audience.  First, the ―bona fide groups‖ perspective suggests that groups have fuzzy edges that 
are best negotiated by public communication.  Second, the multiple sequence model describing 
group decision making suggests that the occasional large-scale message broadcast to all group 
members may be the most efficient way to handle some communication needs. 
While it does not specifically address VNSAs, the bona fide groups perspective offered by 
Putnam and Stohl (1990) helps explain why public messages may be the most effective means of 
communication for a VNSA.  Putnam and Stohl (1996, p. 148) explain that the ―bona fide group 
approach is a theoretical perspective that treats a group as a social system linked to its context, 
shaped by fluid boundaries, and altering its environment.‖  A group both changes in membership 
and constantly interacts with its environment.  Stohl and Putnam (1994) suggested that their 
perspective should be applied to naturally emerging groups (those outside the laboratory), and 
VNSAs, such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), fit this 
description.  Putnam and Stohl (1996, p. 150) identified four ways in which groups constantly 
negotiate their borders: 
1) Multiple group membership and conflicting role identities,  
2) Representative roles, 
3) Fluctuations in membership, and 
4) Group identity formation. 
MEND, a VNSA operating in the oil-rich Niger Delta of southeastern Nigeria, illustrates this 
concept.  MEND carries out attacks on Western oil interests and Government of Nigeria (GON) 
facilities and sometimes claims credit for attacks with a statement saying they did so to secure a 
larger share of locally extracted oil wealth for ethnic groups from the area.  MEND members, 
however, also have multiple group memberships and conflicting role identities—they participate 
in other organizations such as religious or community groups at the same time.  Membership in 
the VNSA does not suddenly make them quit participating in the other organizations or in the 
other roles they serve in their communities. Thus, the organization has to find a way to 
communicate with people who are sometimes engaged in other activities.  The representative 
roles played by each member of MEND means that they are expected to continue representing 
the organization to their communities and vice versa.  There are also fluctuations in membership 
as some members die, others leave to begin another occupation, and new members join.  Like 
other VNSAs, MEND also has a problem with group identity formation.  Statements issued in 
May 2009, in response to a conflict with GON forces, indicated MEND trying to define why they 
were engaged in conflict and what the putative benefit would be for the local population.  A 
VNSA such as MEND is a bona fide group because it clearly exists while having boundaries that 
cannot easily be defined, and that makes large-scale public messages a convenient way to 
communicate with the largest number of group members. 
This problem is further complicated by the convoluted decision making process that many 
VNSAs may be compelled to use due to their decentralized natures.  While various scholars in 
Communication, Business, and other fields have proposed models of the phases that groups go 
through when making decisions, it is a mistake to assume that any given model accurately 
describes the process for all groups.  This is all the more true with a decentralized group such as 
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a typical VNSA.  As Poole (1981) explains, groups have to be responsive to their environments 
in making decisions, and different groups will follow different decision-making models at 
different times.  This makes it crucial to find a way to effectively communicate with group 
members. 
Poole (1983) offers a better way to think of the decision making process that groups use.  His 
multisequence model of decision development holds that, rather than following a straightforward 
or ―unitary‖ process, groups go through three types of activities in reaching any decision.  They 
can go through these activities in any order and may return to each activity many times before a 
final decision is made.  Both the time involved in reaching a decision this way, as well as the 
decentralized nature of the process, make it all the more important to find an effective tool for 
strategic internal communication, and large scale public messages can be an important part of 
that process. 
In Poole‘s multisequence model, the first type of activity a group undertakes are task 
processes.  These are any activities that help the group get work done.  VNSA discussion of 
training regimes, finances, or potential targets would all be examples of task processes.  The 
second group activity type is relational activities.  These are any activities that build or reinforce 
the relationships between group members.  If a VNSA group leader needs to assert his authority 
or convince people that he is alive, a large-scale public broadcast released on Al Jazeera or a 
known website would suffice.  Large-scale public broadcasts can also build relationships with 
VNSA recruits by showing them that the group is active and pursuing a shared goal.  Since most 
members of a large VNSA will never meet their senior leadership, broadcasts are the only way to 
maintain those relationships on a large scale.  Finally, the third activity type typical of groups 
trying to make a decision is topical focus activities.  These activities focus on the general themes 
or major issues facing a group, and large broadcasts are ideally suited to maximize the number of 
group members involved.  In the aforementioned video from 2007, someone claiming to be bin 
Laden said he wanted the U.S. out of Iraq.  The Iraq war would have been a significant theme for 
group members, and this broadcast was an efficient way to discuss it and demonstrate to group 
members that the senior leadership was engaged in the task at hand.  The three groups of 
activities proposed by Poole represent one method of making decisions when constrained by the 
inability to operate freely.  While this does not have to mean that broadcasts from terrorist 
leaders are always internal communications, it does reinforce that those broadcasts are an 
incredibly efficient way of conducting normal group activities. 
In summary, an understanding of the multiple intended audiences and the nature of VNSA 
groups informs the development of strategies for dealing with them.  Determining the true target 
audience will help in understanding the actual intent, necessary for designing disruptive actions.  
It is likely that internal audiences are frequently the target audience for VNSA public messages.  
Even if there is a nominal head of the group, the decentralized nature of many VNSA operations 
makes public messaging an attractive choice for internal communication, and some of the 
literature from the field of communication studies explains why this may be true.  First, VNSA‘s 
have fuzzy boundaries.  As Putnam and Stohl explained in their bona fide groups perspective, 
groups struggle to negotiate their identity due to membership in competing groups, the roles 
taken by group members, and changes in group membership.  Thus, public broadcasts are a 
logical choice for strategic internal communication.  Second, Poole‘s multisequence model of 
group decision development posits that groups frequently do not follow orderly decision-making 
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processes.  Public messages enable VNSA‘s to conduct necessary task, relational, and process 
activities. 
One final thought about the nature of VNSAs as bona fide groups – because their boundaries 
are so fluid and the decision making process so decentralized, their strategic communications 
will be incredibly hard to disrupt.  Even if disruption is impossible, it is important to attempt to 
properly understand the messages and that requires knowledge of the target audience(s).  The 
literature on group communication helps explain who those audiences might be. 
back to top 
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Introduction 
In recent years, the term ‗soft power‘ has been widely used in relation to the war of minds 
within the global war against global [militant jihadi] terrorism. Soft power is the ability to 
achieve your goals by attracting and persuading others to adopt them (Wikipedia, soft power).  It 
differs from ‗hard power‘ -- the ability to use economic and military steps and might to impose 
your will. Both hard and soft power is important in the war against terrorism, but attraction is 
much cheaper than coercion and is an asset that needs to be nurtured and exercised. Attraction, 
by both sides, depends on credibility. However, contrary to the use of soft power in the context 
of the war against the militant jihadis, few scholars deal with the other side – the goals and 
credibility of the soft power of the jihadi militants. Most security services, intelligence 
communities, and most other experts tend to occupy themselves with the militant jihadi hard 
power – terrorism.  
The credibility of information obtained from open sources has always been an issue for 
intelligence and security communities. Intelligence communities—some of which served 
totalitarian regimes such as Nazi Germany or Stalinist Soviet Union—were often known as 
‗masters of disinformation.‘ Western intelligence communities and security services have not 
always granted much more credibility to open sources than the KGB and its former Eastern bloc 
sister services. Not only were Western agencies well aware of the complicated relations between 
intelligence and the media, but they frequently utilized the media for psychological warfare. 
Hence, they too were suspicious of the credibility of open sources, as well as of the tricky 
process of distinguishing between information and disinformation.   
Militant Jihadi Soft Power 
The culture of militant global jihad is a young phenomenon in the Islamic world, which 
thus far is advocated only by a small minority of Muslim groups, movements, scholars, and 
individual sympathizers. However, various factors have widened the rank and file of supporters 
and sympathizers of this culture. These include the extensive use of terrorist tactics, primarily 
suicide-martyrdom operations; the insurgency in Iraq; the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; growing 
anti-American and anti-Western sentiment; social and economic frustrations among Muslims; 
and growing multinational integration between Muslim communities in the West or in regions of 
conflict in the Muslim world. Global militant jihad is deeply rooted in interpretations of the 
earliest sources of Islam and Islamic history and adheres to the strictest doctrines of Salafist 
scholars; it is primarily a doctrinal development that requires legitimacy on the part of clerics 
and scholars in the form of interpretations, rulings, and preaching. It embodies the Islamists‘ 
struggle to revive the Islamic civilization through global united solidarity and brotherhood on the 
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one hand and the demonization of whoever the current version of the ―eternal enemy‖ is on the 
other. Most importantly, however, this process takes place publicly.  Since we deal with 
movements and groups that are persecuted everywhere, and since they have no access to formal 
media, the Internet is their only alternative, and they use it in the most efficient way they can.  
In the past decade, the ―global war on terrorism‖ and the exceedingly easy access to 
Islamic and Islamist media through the Internet have produced a synergy that has affected the 
attitude towards open sources of information. The highly intensive and efficient use of the 
Internet by Islamic movements and groups in general, and the wide scope of Islamist terrorist 
groups in particular, provide us with an extremely wide range of information - information that 
also affects intelligence communities. In addition, the Western media relies on information from 
the militant jihadi web sites as well and, thus, provides them with an enormous exposure. Yet it 
seems that Western intelligence and security services have still a long way to go before they can 
fully rely on the information available in militant jihadi web sites. Two main obstacles stand in 
their way of exploiting the information available on these web sites: 
First, the global militant jihadi phenomenon is relatively new and unfamiliar to many 
Western analysts. The number of Western analysts who can fully understand this phenomenon is 
still quite small, even though there are many so-called ―experts‖ on terrorism. Furthermore, it is a 
very dynamic phenomenon and controversial even among the various militant jihadi groups 
themselves. It is admittedly very difficult to understand the differences, disputes, 
argumentations, and mindset of the militant jihadis in all their complexities. The modern militant 
jihad movement is more an ―ideological umbrella‖ than a homogeneous movement, which makes 
swimming in this deep ocean a challenging task. The dynamic nature of the militant jihadi 
phenomenon is also a function of the militant jihadists‘ ―relationship‖ with the ―enemy‖—whose 
definition is flexible—and a response to its ―aggressive nature,‖ especially since 2001. In the 
eyes of most of the militant jihadis, theirs is a struggle within an asymmetric war of self-
defense.  
Secondly, despite its global nature and aspirations, the militant jihadi phenomenon 
developed within the Arab world and is being exported to the larger Muslim world. The militant 
jihad is, therefore, almost entirely conducted in Arabic and its content is intimately tied to the 
socio-political context of the Arab world. The American and Western occupation of Iraq and the 
militant jihadi insurgency that followed increased the importance of the Arab element in this 
phenomenon. Likewise, most of the supporters of global militant jihad groups involved in 
various forms of terrorism among Muslim communities in the West are Arabs or of Arab origin. 
Most Western intelligence and security analysts are still unable to read the information in the 
original Arabic language and lack the knowledge, insights, and tools required to analyze Islamist 
radical groups and their mindset.  
Militant Jihadi Use of the Internet: The Open University for Militant Jihadi Studies  
There are several main reasons why militant jihadi movements, groups, clerics, and 
scholars turned the Internet into their main, and sometimes only, soft power vehicle for 
propaganda, indoctrination, publicity, and teaching of their messages. Besides the known 
advantages of this medium of communication, several additional factors should be noted: 
Most Arab and Muslim countries face jihadist extremist opposition groups that are 
oppressed and persecuted, rendering the Internet their only alternative to spread their messages. 
Most extremist citizens or groups are prevented from freely publishing books and newspapers or 
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from giving open lectures. Moreover, in most Arab and Muslim countries, these elements have 
no access to the traditional means of Islamic religious indoctrination such as mosques, Friday 
sermons, religious universities and colleges, or religious ceremonies.  
The nature of militant jihadist ideology and doctrines, as well as a core militant jihadi 
mission, is to create a transnational global solidarity and brotherhood within the entire Muslim 
nation (Ummah). To that end, the Internet is currently the best means to promote this goal 
cheaply and rapidly while reaching the broadest possible audience.  The Internet is the best 
means available to these groups to create and consolidate a spectrum of doctrines, new 
interpretations, and a multitude of new groups, but also to create an image of a large volume of 
activity.  In addition, the Internet is intensively surfed and read by the global media. Every 
militant jihadi event or message is instantly exposed to the world, circulated by news agencies, 
and cited in Muslim countries whose populations may not read Arabic.  
The past decade has witnessed a rise in the significance and weight given to this medium 
in the eyes of militant jihadis due to a number of highly important events including the 9/11 
attacks and the subsequent ―global war on terrorism,‖ the occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq, 
and militant jihadi terrorist operations all over the globe. These events reinforce the image of a 
global clash of religions and civilizations; the sense among large segments of the Muslim public 
that they face ―a war against Islam‖ disguised under the cover of fighting global terrorism; and 
the rise of militant jihadi terrorism as a global strategic factor in the West.  The dynamic of the 
mutual relationship between the militant jihadi groups that use the Internet and the global media 
is growing.  
The first strategic priority of global militant jihadi doctrines is to target the Arab and 
Muslim youth—the largest, most educated and, in terms of the Internet, most connected segment 
of Muslim societies. Besides, the use of the Internet for various goals, and the access to it in 
many Arab and Muslim countries, are growing rapidly, alongside growing developments in 
education for many of these audiences including females.  
These groups are, above all, targeting their own societies, not Western regimes, and their 
citizens. The Internet may be used to intimidate the Western public, given their wide exposure to 
the global media and the huge effect that exposure has upon the sense of security in the West. 
Militant jihadis know that the widely circulated video clips of beheaded and executed foreigners 
and Muslims in Iraq, Pakistan, or Afghanistan terrorize Western audiences. Even so, the main 
reason why militant jihadis circulate these clips, photos, audio material, books, articles, or 
military manuals is to indoctrinate their own Arab and Muslim audiences; plant feelings of 
pride, a sense of belonging, and a new identity in their minds; and recruit their support. The 
Internet provides, by far, the best means to achieve the desired goal of virtual nation-building of 
the Muslim nation—Ummah—an aspiration anchored in the doctrines of the militant jihadi-
Salafi currents. In other words, the Internet is the global Open University for Militant Jihad 
Studies.   
One of the documents of indoctrination published in 2003, and recently re-circulated by 
the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF),
1
 talks about the nature of the university of global 
                                                 
1
 An organ of Al-Qaeda and global Jihad with a growing intensive virtual activity in the past two years.   
 246 
UNCLASSIFIED 
militant jihad.
2
  The author, using the pseudonym Ahmad al-Wathiq bi-Allah, then deputy 
director of GIMF, presents Al-Qaeda as an ―organization, state, and university‖:  
―Since the operation of USS Cole [November 2000] and the glorious events of Manhattan 
[September 2001] until the present events of this blessed month, [Ramadan 2005] 
hundreds of Muslims from all over the world join this global militant jihadi university, in 
which they study all the studies of the militant jihad, its rules and disciplines… This is a 
non-central university, with no geographic borders, which has its presence everywhere 
and each person zealous for his religion and nation can join it… This university has its 
own presidency, whose role is to incite, guide, indoctrinate, and encourage the awareness 
of the Mujahidin. Its presidency is the leadership of the Mujahidin headed by Osama bin 
Laden… The university includes several faculties, among them electronic militant jihad, 
martyrdom, and the technology of side bombs and car bombs.‖  
The article bears propagandist overtones, but it clearly summarizes the indoctrinative 
nature of global militant jihad, and thus, the center of gravity of this phenomenon i.e., the 
Muslim audience. If this is the main audience, then there is almost no room for disinformation. 
An intensive reading of these web sites, and especially of the most radical 15-25 militant jihadi 
forums,
3
 and dozens of message groups reveals a highly serious approach and attitude of their 
participants, i.e., those who are targeted by this global indoctrination. In some Muslim 
communities in the West, but especially in the Arab world, we can assess the growing role of this 
indoctrination in the increasing willingness to support, justify, and volunteer to join militant 
jihadi terrorist groups. Since 2001, these militant jihadi web sites have gradually replaced the 
institution of the Madrassa as a tool for the recruitment of the first generation of militant jihadis 
in the 1980-90s. The Internet, in fact, has become one global madrassa.  
Another example of a publication by GIMF—an analysis of the global strategy of Al-
Qaeda—is even more lucid. Under the title, ―Al-Qaeda‘s War is Economic not Military,‖ the 
author, a Saudi scholar and supporter of global militant jihad (al-Najdi, 2005), analyzes the 
significant role that indoctrination plays in the global movement:  
―We should direct some of these efforts to other targets that could serve another goal, 
namely to promote the glory of the Muslims, especially among the youth, who are 
swimming in the oceans of pleasures and lust. Those youth are in fact unused petrol, 
while many efforts are dedicated to confront those clerics who are selling their minds to 
the dictatorships, and who are useless too. These moral attacks would have a tremendous 
impact on the souls of the defeated youth. 
Many idle youth were motivated to join the [militant] jihad by photos or videos such as of 
the USS Cole, or Badr al-Riyadh, or by watching the crash of the planes into the high 
buildings of Manhattan. Those youth, even though they were not fully aware of the 
impact of the attacks upon them, turned their minds and bodies towards the [militant] 
jihad. Here comes the role of indoctrination and developing the thinking of these people. 
                                                 
2
 The article was published in most of the Jihadi forums. See on-line in:  
http://www.al-farouq.com/vb/showthread.php?t=2682  
3
 The number varies since these forums are often closed by security services, Western hosting companies, 
or as a result of technical problems and reappear in other addresses or names.   
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It is a mistake to leave these youth with their superficial understanding of the nature of 
the war.  
Whoever listens to the calls of Osama bin Laden senses in his words his care for the 
indoctrination of the supporters of the [militant] jihadi current, like for example in the 
Gulf States, in order to target the oil fields. Bin Laden could direct the Mujahidin through 
personal secret messages. However, he wanted the indoctrination to be public, in order 
that the crowds of people, who wait for his speeches through the TV channels or the 
Internet, would internalize his targets and follow them. If these messages would be 
clandestine and then the oil fields would be attacked, the masses of sympathizers might 
not approve it and might even turn to the opposite side and withdraw their support. Public 
statements by the Sheikh or the many videos of the Mujahidin can avoid such a negative 
impact of such an attack.‖ 
The huge number of new interpretations, doctrines, and debates with other Islamic Sunni 
groups or scholars - Salafis, Brotherhood, Wahhabi reformists, and others - innovations in the 
terrorist modi operandi, and their widespread public presence on the Internet,  brought about two 
contradictory developments. The first was a tendency for militant jihadis—scholars or laymen 
supporters—to view the swell of opinions and intellectual dialogue as a current, or movement, in 
the process of consolidation with the unifying goal, doctrines, and means of Tawhid.
4
  The other 
represented the emergence of a growing number of internal debates emerging either against a 
background of intensive, controversial terrorist/jihadi activity or, as the result of external 
pressures by Islamic establishments and institutions, governments or parts of Muslim societies.  
Since September 11, 2001, this contradiction has been present in the public opinion of 
many a Muslim public, and even government. On the one hand, there was a growing anti-
American sentiment, which emerged as a result of events in Iraq. It led to the support of many 
Islamic scholars, Arab officials, and a majority of the Muslim public for the jihad in Iraq. This 
was in addition to negative sentiment related to Israel and Palestine, which was a traditional 
axiom. On the other hand, many innocent elements of Arab and Muslim populations suffered 
from indiscriminate terrorism on the part of some militant jihadis, which received total 
legitimacy from most of the militant jihadi-Salafi scholars.  
The emergence of the Internet as ―the open university for militant jihad studies‖ with 
dozens of thousands of students, inflamed two significant processes: 
• The emergence of a militant jihadi community with growing signs of solidarity and 
brotherhood. This community was extensively encouraged to take part in the debates, as 
the ―virtual jihad‖ became a legitimate branch of the ―militant jihadi war for minds.‖ 
• The emergence of a set of militant jihadi ―Internet scholars‖ whose main target was to 
indoctrinate the militant jihadi-Salafis, direct them, and consolidate the militant jihadi 
current.  
                                                 
4
 Tawhid in general refers to the Muslim belief in the oneness of God, expressed in the central statement 
of ―There is no God but Allah‖ and implies a strict moral and social structure based on the Quran as 
God‘s final word. In the Wahhabi terminology, it is the unique reference to monotheism as the primary 
element of Islam. 
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Both groups of scholars and ―students‖ developed a strong belief in an apocalyptic future, 
which effectively ―hotwires‖ the militant jihadi-Salafi arena. This continuously stokes  
expectations of the defeat of the United States in Iraq; the fall of the U.S. as an empire in the 
same fashion as the Afghan defeat of the Soviet Union and contribution to its subsequent fall; 
support for new spectacular terrorist attacks on American soil; terrorist attacks in Europe against 
countries that take part in the fight in Iraq and Afghanistan, support Israel, or are supposedly 
―oppressing‖ the Muslim communities in Europe by imposing new laws (the veil, immigration, 
limiting civil rights in the name of the ―war against terrorism,‖ outlawing Muslim charities, or by 
publishing anti-Muslim cartoons); the use of WMD; the collapse of Arab and Muslim apostate 
governments; the establishment of Shari‘ah-ruled Islamic states; and so on and so forth. Through 
this hotwiring of the sense of an apocalypse, and the growth in the number of militant jihadi 
groups, scholars, supporters and sympathizers, self-radicalized youth and laymen whose 
knowledge of Islam is poor, the arena is broadened and inflamed with debates, competitions, and 
an appeal to basic desires.  
In past years, the development of a growing number of topics under public debate within 
the militant jihadi-Salafi current has been prominent. During 2007, one of the most significant 
controversial topics among jihadi-Salafi scholars and groups has been the existence of the 
Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), the state declared in the al-Anbar area controlled by Al Qaeda and its 
affiliates. Another ongoing debate is over the killing of Muslims in general and innocent ones in 
particular. The phenomenon of debates over ―sacred and untouchable topics‖ including serious 
militant jihadi-Salafi scholars started about two years ago. The latter likely exploited the fact that 
the killing of Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi in June 2006 created a new situation in Iraq, which is still 
the most significant model of militant jihadi struggle. Zarqawi became a model-myth that paved 
the way to the establishment of the ISI. However, the absence of his authoritarian personality 
from the scene opened the door to increasing criticism over some of his violent doctrines and 
further inner debates.  
Of note here, is the diversity of the origins of the militant jihadi-Salafi current, the 
flexibility of its development, and the transition from a very marginal Islamic trend to the 
frontline of the face of Islam, primarily in the Western societies. Many in the West now view 
Islam as a religion whose ideology is supposed to be moderate and peaceful, but which in fact is 
moving towards the most extremist and violent end of the spectrum, making a clash inevitable.  
The Doctrinal Sources of Militant Jihadi-Salafism 
The doctrinal sources require a separate presentation. Nevertheless, their diversity is part 
of the issue at stake. They include three different branches whose connection to classical, pure, 
political, or reformist Salafism can be scrutinized: 
Egypt, through the more extremist parts of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood—mainly 
Sayyid Qutb and Abd al-Qader bin Abd al-Aziz (aka Dr. Fadl), Egyptian exiles in Saudi 
Arabia—and the self radicalized fathers of the Egyptian Jihad and Gama`at Islamiyyah—the 
Palestinian Saleh Sariyyah, the Engineers Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj and Shukri Ibrahim, 
and in a later period the physician Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri.  
Saudi Arabia, through its modern Wahhabi Tawhid led by the prominent Sheykh Abd al-
Aziz ibn Baz and a huge class of his disciples created, among other issues, the ―Movement of 
Awakening‖ (Harakat al-Sahwah), led by the two ―twin‖ Sheykhs Salman al-Awdah and Safar 
al-Hawali. During the 1990s, they were legitimized by two other classes of Neo-Wahhabi 
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scholars. Some were older clerics, such as Muhammad bin `Uthaymin, Abd al-Aziz bin Jarbou`, 
or Saleh al-Fawzan; and younger ones, who in part participated in the Jihad in Afghanistan, such 
as Ahmad al-Khaledi, Naser al-Fahd, Yousef al-Uyeri, Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin, Abu Jandal al-
Azdi, and many others.  
Palestine, led by the ―Palestinian Trio‖ of Abdallah Azzam, Omar Abu Omar ‗Abu 
Qutadah‘ and, above all, Issam al-Burqawi ‗Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi‘. The latter is the 
spiritual father of the fusion between the Wahhabi Tawhid and the violent Takfiri Jihad. This 
branch consists primarily of Jordanian-Palestinians, such as Abu Omar Seyf or Abu Anas al-
Shami, whose role has been significant in both Chechnya and Iraq. They were an inspiration to a 
new generation of militant jihadi clerics who graduated from Saudi Islamic universities.  
The most important element of this militant jihadi ―texture‖ of principles and doctrines is 
that they lost any sign or traces of the original reformist Salafism. They turned the militant jihad 
into a dynamic that claims to purify  the Muslim society through the actions of a small elitist 
fighting group and by claiming to attempt to follow the exact steps of the Prophet and his 
companions—the ―Pious Generation‖ (Al-Salaf al-Saleh). Being a militant jihadi-Salafi means, 
above all, creating the ―best‖ approximation of the first ideal generation of Muslims, primarily in 
the militant dimension.  However, this created another greenhouse of militant jihadi doctrines – 
the principle of takfir (ex-communication) of every infidel whatsoever, but also of every Muslim 
who does not follow the militant jihadi-Salafi doctrines. There is a kind of a Marxist-Leninist 
revolutionary touch to it all, with the signs of the destruction of the ―old society‖, while building 
the new type of Muslims and Muslim society. It very much has the flavor of ―New Soviet 
Society‖ and ―Soviet Man‖. Such a society is bound to remain in a permanent state of war with a 
diverse group of enemies. These enemies are an ever growing list of ―others,‖ all of whom do not 
approve of the present-day militant jihadi doctrines. This takfiri element comes primarily from 
the teachings of Abdallah Azzam, but also from the original Wahhabi zealotry, which dominates 
the Saudi sources of militant jihadi-Salafism and many of the militant jihadi scholars and 
terrorists. 
The apostasy of the rest of the Muslim society, in militant jihadi eyes, created a situation 
in which, in the short time between 1995 and 2005, the definition of the ―enemy‖ of Islam and 
the ―true believers‖ was widened to include even the vast majority of the Muslim society. 
Doctrines used to develop some of the ideas of militant jihadi-Salafism, such as the social justice 
of Sayyid Qutb, were neglected in favor of the ―magic touch‖ of violent jihad. The takfiri 
element of the militant jihadi-Salafis is the primary source of diversity and controversy between 
those who support the search for unity/Tawhid and those who support the purification of society 
from apostate elements even by killing innocent Muslims, or Shi‘is, Sufis, Yazidis, or Sunni 
Muslims whose sole sin is being employed by companies that provide services to Americans in 
Iraq or the Iraqi and Afghan governments.   
During 2005-2006, there were several instances of harsh criticism of Zarqawi himself, his 
anti-Shi`ah policy, and his violent and extremist takfir. Some of this criticism came from leading 
scholars of Al-Qaeda and global militant jihad, such as Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Basir al-
Tartousi in London, and Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdesi, Zarqawi‘s mentor in Jordan. In the 
case of the latter (currently imprisoned) individual, the criticism was made in public. However, 
Zarqawi and his followers in Iraq enjoyed such prestige and popularity as to receive full support 
in militant jihadi forums based on the principle that ―the Mujahidin in the field know best how 
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they should act.‖ It was almost like the Islamic principle of ―Allahu A`lam‖—Allah knows 
best—and in this case – ―the Mujahidin know best.‖ The so-called, but respected, ―Saloon 
scholars,‖ were asked politely to keep silent and respect the wishes and strategy of the fighters in 
the field. The killing of Zarqawi in June 2006 did not change the strategy of Al-Qaeda in Iraq 
substantially, especially in terms of anti-Shi`ah actions, the terrible violence against civilians, 
and the continued espousing of the principle of takfir.   
However, despite the success of Zarqawi‘s violent anti-Shi`ah policy and operations and 
its ongoing application by his successors, there appears to be a decline in the religious position, 
prestige, and legitimacy of this policy. The shift from ―Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers‖ 
to the ―Islamic State in Iraq‖ in October 2006 increased the anonymity of the present leadership 
of the Iraqi Al-Qaeda on the one hand and the independence of other militant jihadi insurgent 
groups on the other. Zarqawi‘s successor ―Abu Hamza al-Muhajir‖ is in fact totally anonymous, 
the same as the ―Imam‖ of the ISI, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. His prestige, if at all, comes from his 
so-called Qurayshi-Hashemite origin. The other prominent ―Amir al-Mu‘minin‖—Mulla Omar 
in Afghanistan—is not regarded as a serious religious cleric or scholar, despite his success or that 
of his commanders since early 2006 in leading the Taliban and supporters of Al-Qaeda into a 
growing insurgency in Afghanistan using the same modus operandi as the Iraqi Al-Qaeda. For 
the vast majority of supporters of global militant jihad on the net, Mullah Omar is more a symbol 
of the sense of the militant jihadi apocalypse, similar to Osama bin Laden, who still owes his 
loyalty to Omar.   
In the absence of dominant personalities such as Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi in Iraq, and due 
to the anonymity of his successors who refrain from any public appearances, some of the other 
militant jihadi or Islamic groups of the Sunni insurgency allowed criticism of Al-Qaeda or even 
entered into clashes with its members, which were followed by retaliatory violent attacks by Al-
Qaeda. The position of Al-Qaeda as the leading force of the militant jihadi insurgency has been 
challenged and the attempt to impose the ISI upon all Iraqi Sunni militant jihadis, has, thus far, 
failed.  
The absence of dominant scholars such as the late Saudi Yousef al-Uyeri, the Jordanian 
Abu Omar Seyf, or the Saudi Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin, who are all dead, and the Saudi Abu Jandal 
al-Azdi, the Jordanian/Palestinian Abu Qutada, and the Jordanian/ Palestinian Abu Muhammad 
al-Maqdesi, who are or were for a long time imprisoned, created a big vacuum. This vacuum 
opens the door for increasing public criticism and debates within the militant jihadi-Salafists on 
the one hand as well as making them more vulnerable to outside criticism and attacks by Saudi 
Salafists and affiliated scholars on the other.  
Towards Militant Jihadi-Salafi Pluralism? 
These debates and criticism find fertile ground in the virtual jihad on the net. It should be 
noted that supervisors of the various militant jihadi forums do nothing to block or hide them, 
allowing the development of a sense of greater pluralism among the community of the E-Jihad 
and a kind of ―virtual democracy‖ within this growing community. This sense of pluralism 
also enables the emergence of ―semi-parties‖ of pro- and anti- positions on very significant 
issues crucial for the militant jihadi global arena: the ISI, Sunni-Shi`ah conflict, Iran, Hamas, the 
Muslim Brotherhood, Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradawi, suicide bombings outside of Iraq or against 
civilian Muslims, Saudi Arabia, extremist takfir, other trends of Salafism, and the authority of 
Islamist scholars, including militant jihadi-Salafi ones.  
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It is hard to say if there is a direct hand behind this ―pluralism‖ -- is it a result of the 
growing use of the Internet, or of the ―competition‖ between different militant jihadi forums, 
which want to serve as greenhouses for broad platforms for militant jihadi ideas?  In some cases, 
it might also be the result of confusion and a lack of a clear position on the part of the web 
supervisors themselves. From a few cases of supervisors and webmasters who were arrested—
such as the Moroccan Younis al-Tsouli in London (Irhabi 007), or the Tunisian Mohamed Ben El 
Hadi Messahel (Tunisian Admirer of the two Shaykhs – Muhibb al-Shaykhayn al-Tunisi, who 
was sentenced in March 2007 in Morocco to 12 years in prison for a terrorist plot) —we can see 
that their religious knowledge was poor. They were mainly devoted to the cause, self-radicalized, 
and proud to be militant jihadis, but had a poor understanding of militant jihadi doctrines. 
However, Saudi webmasters such as the late Yousef al-Uyeri or the one referred to as ―Al-
Muhtasib,‖ who was recently released from a two-year prison term in Saudi Arabia, were serious 
Islamic scholars, even though they had no formal Islamic education. It is difficult to say if this 
phenomenon is harmful for the Mujahidin in the long run or not.  
Furthermore, from reading between the lines of some posts in militant jihadi forums, we 
can come to the conclusion that many of these supervisors know each other, if not in person, at 
least through email links. We can view personal comments or greetings that demonstrate a level 
of familiarity, beyond mere affiliation, brotherhood or solidarity. Hence, it appears there could 
be a guiding hand behind the policy of pluralism. It is obvious that, at least in the field of 
publishing statements, declarations, video and audiotapes, and other material of a propagandistic 
nature, a well-organized order has emerged, manifesting an absence of competition or rivalry, 
but rather respect for each other and cooperation under the leadership of the Global Islamic 
Media Front (GIMF). This order might also be a result of the fact that there is a growing 
awareness of the importance of this mission in the militant jihadi ―war of the minds‖ and its 
recognized legitimacy as an integral part of militant jihad.  
It seems that effective and easy use of the E-Jihad helps in creating a kind of ―militant 
jihadi virtual state‖ that is open to a pluralistic views and positions within the joint militant jihadi 
mission of tawhid.  
Internet Militant Jihadi Scholars 
Against the above-mentioned background, there is also the evolving phenomenon of 
―Internet militant jihadi scholars‖ who appear by their real names or pseudonyms but gain a 
growing respect from their virtual audience. This is also a new phenomenon, which seems to 
exert more influence upon the ―laymen‖ supporters of global militant jihad.  
As mentioned above, the E-Jihad, or the widespread use of the Internet by militant jihadis 
and their sympathizers, seems to create a process of pluralism, which results in an increasing 
number of topics being debated, even those of a ―sacred cow‖ nature, within a framework that is 
seeking maximal doctrinal unity. However, this pluralism has so far remained ―within the 
family‖ and has not been causing splits or gaps in the ideological umbrella of the militant jihadi-
Salafi current. This may well go on for as long as the fight looks promising and successful, 
driven by the characteristic sense of the apocalypse.  
Conclusion 
In the final analysis, global militant jihad must use open indoctrination in order to sustain 
and broaden its audience in general, especially for its younger generations. Open indoctrination 
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is incompatible with disinformation. Therefore, even though we should be selective and careful 
in our selection of which information on militant jihadi web sites we follow, once we have 
established the authenticity of a militant jihadi web site, we can be reasonably certain that the 
words we read ―from their lips‖ are credible. Such an authenticity may be established by 
information provided by material from arrested webmasters or the content and details of debates 
over these sites. The militant jihadist instigators cannot allow themselves to mislead the ―Solid 
Base‖—Al-Qaeda al-Sulbah—the base of the future pioneering militant jihadi generations. 
Furthermore, we should understand the role in the militant jihad played by the present 
ideological umbrella. This role is not merely one of terrorism but, and perhaps more importantly 
so, as a crucial pillar in building the current solidarity among Arabs and Muslims, as well as in 
the nation-building process of the future Muslim Caliphate. In April 1988, Dr. Abdallah Azzam, 
the spiritual father of modern global militant jihad, wrote very clearly in the article in which he 
established the idea of Al-Qaeda (Al-Qa‘idah al-Sulbah) (Azzam, 1988, p. 46-49):  5 
―The Islamic society cannot be established without an Islamic movement that undergoes 
the fire of tests. Its members need to mature in the fire of trials. This movement will 
represent the spark that ignites the potential of the nation. It will carry out a long Jihad in 
which the Islamic movement will provide the leadership, and the spiritual guidance. The 
long Jihad will bring people‘s qualities to the fore and highlight their potentials. It will 
define their positions and have their leaders assume their roles, to direct the march and 
channel it…  
Possession of arms by the group of believers before having undergone this long educating 
training and indoctrination—Tarbiyyah—is forbidden, because those carrying arms could 
turn into bandits that might threaten people‘s security and do not let them live in peace.‖ 
Militant jihadi terrorism in Muslim lands and against Muslims is one of the ―Achilles 
heels‖ of Al-Qaeda and global militant jihad and a good reason for criticism, sometimes by 
militant jihadi scholars.  Since the bombings in London and Amman in 2005, and due to the 
murderous attacks against Shi‘i civilians in Iraq, there is growing debate and criticism between 
two schools within Al-Qaeda or global militant jihad.  These two schools are centered around, on 
one hand, older scholars such as Abu Basir al-Tartousi and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdesi, and on 
the other hand, the group of Saudi militant jihadi-Salafi scholars, who fully support what we may 
call the ―Zarqawi doctrine‖ – the indiscriminate violence against everyone who does not support 
the militant jihadi-Salafi ideas. The ―Zarqawi doctrine‖ is quite similar to the Algerian Takfir of 
the 1990s hence, the debate between Al-Omar and Al-Libi on the Algerian background is 
significant. It is also important since Iran and the Shi‘a were ―upgraded‖ to the status of ―top 
enemies‖ by the successors of Zarqawi in Iraq who are backed by Arabian militant jihadi-Salafi 
scholars, such as the Kuwaiti Hamed al-Ali and several ―Internet scholars‖ such the present 
ideologue of Al-Qaeda, Abu Yahya al-Libi.  
The question of what the position is of the old central leadership of ―Mainstream Al-
Qaeda,‖ especially Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, the ―Amir‖ of the Islamic 
State in Iraq, who is anonymous to the militant jihadi audience, seems so far to follow the 
―Zarqawi doctrine.‖ On 8 July 2007, in his last videotaped speech on the militant jihadi Internet, 
he even threatened the Iranian government—the ―Persian dogs‖ as he called them—and gave 
                                                 
5
 Azzam was much influenced in developing this issue by the two Egyptian Jihadi scholars Sayyid and 
Muhammad Qutb, who were the first to use this term.  
 253 
UNCLASSIFIED 
Iran an ultimatum of two months to withdraw its support from the Iraqi Shi‘is, and ―to stop 
interfering directly and indirectly in the affairs of the Iraqi State of Islam.‖ His call was aimed at 
―all Sunnis, and the Salafi-militant jihadist youths in particular in all parts of the world to get 
ready for this war and make the preparations for it. I ask you not to spare any effort once our 
instructions are given to you.‖ Abu Omar was talking as a self-appointed ―Amir‖ of an entire 
Islamic Caliphate in all parts of the Muslim world, not just the Islamic state in Iraq. This was the 
first time that such pretentiousness was manifested by a leader recognized by Al-Qaeda and 
raises another question as to the control of ―mainstream Al-Qaeda‖ over the militant jihadi 
insurgency in Iraq or in other regions such as the Maghreb, Lebanon, or Somalia.     
Al-Baghdadi has recently diverged from past speeches about the Iraqi Shi‘as, trying to 
distinguish between the Shi‘a leadership and the public. In the meantime, we are witnessing a 
growing use of indiscriminate suicide bombings and attacks against Muslims in other parts of the 
Muslim world in Algeria, Somalia, Pakistan, and most recently in Libya. Algeria has 
traditionally been a model for Arab movements, both nationalist and Islamist, and several of the 
leading militant jihadi-Salafi scholars (Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri, Abu Qutadah al-Filastini, Abu Basir 
al-Tartousi) were deeply involved with its militant jihadi groups and their internal conflicts and 
debates. It seems that, out of all the militant jihadi insurgencies and terrorism, Algeria is still 
held as a model and supporters of Al-Qaeda proudly point to the renewed militant jihad there as 
a great achievement. On 8 August 2007, a member of a militant jihadi forum posted a statement 
issued by the Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb, in which the group claimed 
responsibility for attacking a patrol of the Algerian police in northeast Algeria. A 13-minute and 
27-second video, which is part of the "Under the Shadow of the Swords" series, was provided 
and showed the attackers without masks as well as the terrain, the equipment used, and the 
equipment gained. One of the striking things about this video was the self-confidence shown by 
the Algerian group. The Algerian model is also important when viewed against the background 
of the recent failure of Al-Qaeda and global militant jihad to find a model similar to Algeria and 
gain a foothold in Palestine. Hamas is not only a ―thorn‖ in the face of Al-Qaeda‘s ambitions, but 
is also criticized a lot by al-Qaeda‘s scholars for many of its ―sins.‖ One of the harshest critics 
was Abu Yahya al-Libi himself, in a long videotape in April 2007.  
In the past two years, Abu Yahya al-Libi has played a significant role in not only 
defending and promoting the positions of Al-Qaeda and global militant jihad, but also as one of 
the ―theologians‖ of global militant jihad responding to attacks by opposing Muslim clerics. The 
fact that he belongs to the first generation of Al-Qaeda members grants him more influence with 
the supporters of global militant jihad, especially through the Internet. In the two years since his 
escape from prison, he joined the ranks of the militant jihadi-Salafi scholars that advocate the 
―Total Jihad‖ – the focus on permanent violent jihad in every region of conflict between 
Muslims and ―infidels.‖  The extent of his formal Islamic education is not at all clear. 
Nevertheless, his readers on the Internet do not pay attention to his academic credentials, but 
only at the bottom line of his conclusions – the legitimacy for the ―total Takfiri Militant Jihad,‖ 
where the rules of engagement permit any action that promotes the militant jihadi target, or 
―catch as much as you can and do not miss any opportunity to fight.‖  
However, it should be noted that for those who try to understand the mindset of the 
militant jihadi scholars through their indoctrination over the Internet, Abu Yahya al-Libi and his 
colleagues make it an easier task than the ambivalent and double-language writings of their 
scholar counterparts, especially the Saudis. The role of the ―Internet scholars,‖ either well-known 
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ones who appear by their real names, or those who hide in militant jihadi forums behind 
pseudonyms, is to back and legitimize the extreme positions, which their audience wants to hear. 
Such writings are an integral part of what has recently become a legitimate branch of militant 
jihad—the militant jihadi propaganda underpinning a sense of identity and belonging to a 
growing number of ―students‖ in the Open University for Militant Jihad Studies. Zealot scholars 
like Al-Libi, model topics like Algeria, or numerous videotapes from Iraq or elsewhere are part 
of a system that hotwires the imagination of radicalized youth who can join militant jihad from 
home. They are no longer regarded as dodgers from jihad or Mutaqa`idin, the term first coined 
by Sayyid Qutb for those who do not join the military jihad. The ―total jihad‖ of al-Libi, 
including that in Muslim countries and against Muslim ―apostates,‖ enables them to channel their 
emotions of frustration, personal or social stress, hatred, and fears into a legitimate jihad, 
religiously approved by real or false scholars.  
The long-term jihad, which the West—and indeed much of the world—is currently 
facing, uses the Internet to provide both militant jihadists and the rest of the world a wide 
spectrum of diversified information. Western intelligence and security analysts can learn a great 
deal about modern militant jihad by reading the lips of jihadi clerics, scholars, operatives, 
commanders, leaders, as well as the response of their growing audience. Improving their ability 
to do so, and above all in the original language, must be a priority. 
back to top 
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 Hizbut Tahrir (HT) is transnational movement intent on mobilizing Muslim populations 
toward the goal of reestablishing the Islamic Caliph as the political authority, first over Islamic 
countries, then worldwide (Baran, 2004a, 2004b; Tahrir, 2003). For the time being, this 
organization is non-violent, but it does not rule out the use of violence to achieve political goals 
in the future, particularly in the event that the reestablishment of the caliphate becomes a 
possibility (Schneider, 2006; Whine, 2006). The historical precedent for this potential switch is 
that of Muhammed who, while in Medina, was restrained and waited until Mecca, when he had 
sufficient strength, to attack his enemies. (Baran, 2004; Habeck, 2006). HT members have been 
known to have connections to terrorist organizations, though HT itself is not listed as a terrorist 
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organization because of its current non-violent stance (Malik, 2005; Yunanto, 2003). Habeck 
(2006) argues HT‘s non-violent stance is an Arabic ―sleight of hand‖ regarding the definition of 
―jihad,‖ because when a Caliph is established, or has the possibility of being established, they 
will switch into a violent posture to promote their radical agenda as allowed for in Islamic 
scriptures. 
Based on our research, which has included personal observations and interviews with 
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) leaders, this paper will assess the strategic communication 
techniques used by this organization to accomplish its objective of mobilizing an Islamic 
population toward the goal of establishing the caliphate.  
Background  
The Indonesian branch of Hizbut Tahrir began in Bogor, West Java in 1982. Because the 
Hizbut Tahrir strategy was to overthrow the government and establish a pan-Islamic nation under 
the Caliph, it chose to remain ―nameless‖ and clandestine until 1990 when it felt it had sufficient 
organizational strength to become an active mobilization organization. Recruits first came from 
the secular universities in Bogor and Bandung where they met in small groups (halaqa) to study 
books written by al-Banna, Qutb, and al-Nabhani. In Arabic, halaqa means ―circle‖, but has a 
powerful connotation in the Muslim psyche as a study group (Hairgrove & McLeod, 2008).  
Wiktorowicz (2006) observed, ―...various Salafi factions are all tied to the same educational 
network, which explains their commonly understood religious creed.  The key...is the critical role 
of student-scholar relationships (i.e., halaqa).‖  Meeting locations varied from week to week, and 
those attending arrived and departed at staggered intervals to avoid detection. Membership grew 
steadily through the 1990s and early 2000s, as members proceeded though the recruitment and 
training process (Bruinessen, 2003; Collins, 2004; Salim, 2005). Today, Indonesia has one of 
HT‘s most active branches, currently numbering 13,000 core cadre and 37,000 associates for a 
total organizational size of 50,000. 
Media Use Theories Employed by the Hizbut Tahrir Organization 
 Hizbut Tahrir is well known for incorporating innovations into the traditional Islamic 
milieu. They utilize websites, publications, four-color magazines, cell phones, international 
conferences, music, demonstrations, and television programs by embracing technologies for the 
purpose of Islamizing a population. Their ideological justification comes from 19
th
 century 
Islamic thinkers such as Rashid Rida and Muhammad Abduh, who felt Muslims must 
incorporate modern ideas into fundamental practice for Muslims to survive the modern world 
(Habeck, 2006; Hourani, 1983). For this reason, Hizbut Tahrir, more than most any other radical 
Islamic groups, applies media technology in their approach to strategic communication and 
persuasion (Ahnaf, 2009; Habeck, 2006).  
 Some researchers have argued that the Internet is being used by terrorist organizations as 
weapon for persuading discontented populations to join jihad, and as a central weapon in their 
arsenal of terror (Bunt, 2000, 2003; Conway, 2006; Paz & Prism, 2006; Weimann, 2004a, 2006). 
Though there is some evidence of the Internet being used in this manner, these exaggerated 
threats have hidden the power of the mundane, yet more typical, use of the Internet - that of 
providing for the exchange of information (Weimann, 2004a). 
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Hizbut Tahrir‟s Impact in Indonesia  
Hizbut Tahrir-Indonesia launched its first Internet site in March of 2004 after first 
publishing pamphlets in early 2000 and subsequently added translated books and then later a 
magazine (Salim, 2005). Currently, it produces a million weekly flyers called al Islam, which are 
sold for 200 rupiah each (or about $.025) and distributed by local HT members at their mosques 
each Friday (Ismail Yusanto, Spokesperson for Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, personal interviews, 
August 2007). The files for the weekly flyers are sent via email to networks that produce them 
locally via low cost and low quality methods. HT-I also produces a monthly 72-page magazine 
with glossy full color cover called al-wa‟ie, whose 40,000 copies are distributed through various 
venues and sell for 5,500 rupiah each – ($.60).1 HT-I‘s media strategy also includes a daily 
updated website called Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. Hits on the website http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id 
averaged 1,089 hits per day in late 2006,
1
 but after a change in the site layout in March 2007, hits 
and web page views have made it the fourth most popular Indonesian language Islamic website 
in Indonesia. The communications network is so well organized that Ismail Yusanto, 
spokesperson for Hizbut Tahrir, noted he could implement a nationwide demonstration within 
two hours by using email and phone text messages (Ismail Yusanto, personal interview, August 
2007).  
Evaluating the organizational strength of HT-I is difficult as it remains a secretive 
organization. Sidney Jones, an expert on Indonesian radical groups with International Crisis 
Group Indonesia, estimates that Hizbut Tahrir-Indonesia has about 13,000 committed cadre 
actively participating in weekly halaqa meetings and twice that amount in associate status (i.e., 
not active in halaqa studies) for a total of nearly 50,000 members (Sidney Jones with 
International Crisis Groups and Fajri [last name withheld] - a former ranking member of Hizbut 
Tahrir, personal interviews, August 2007). The Third International Caliphate Conference 
sponsored by HT-I and held in Jakarta on August 12, 2007 drew 90,000 participants, most of 
whom were Indonesians in their 20s.
2
  
Measuring Internet Effectiveness 
In any media marketing campaign, decision makers seek to position their message in 
combination with other messages in a ―media mix‖ so as to capitalize on the synergistic power of 
messages that reinforce each other across different media (Arens & Bovee, 1994; Belch & Belch, 
1995).
 
In the media mix, each message and each medium has a specialized persuasive function 
and may even be targeted to different audiences in a manner that is coordinated to maximize 
campaign effectiveness (Perloff, 2003). The confluence of the media mix makes it difficult to 
isolate the influence of one particular medium without considering its specific role and influence 
as part of the synergistic persuasive campaign. Without this broader context, as well as the 
interpersonal and cultural situations in which the messages are received, one is bound to 
underestimate message influence (Rogers, 2002).  
 An appropriate approach to measure effectiveness would observe how users interact with 
the Internet and how this correlates with use of other communication behaviors, both mass media 
and interpersonal. Here, we take a multi-methods approach to observe Hizbut Tahrir‘s Internet 
                                                 
1
 Personally monitoring of website  October to December 2006. 
2
 Personally attending the International Caliphate Conference in Jakarta, August 2007 and counting the 
stadium seating. Media reports estimated between 90,000 and 100,000. 
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use by looking at quantitative data of website activity from various sources, combined with a 
qualitative analysis of topics posted and discussion on those topics. By correlating these different 
data, one can infer the intentions of Internet site designers and assess strategic effectiveness.  
Influence of Hizbut Tahrir-Indonesia‟s Internet Activities 
HT-I‘s Internet site was fairly simple prior to March of 2007. The site posted articles by a 
range of authors, many were full text or abridged versions of articles found in the al-Islam 
newsletter or al-wa-ie magazine. Links along the left side of the web page allowed visitors to go 
to Hizbut Tahrir websites in other languages or to online versions the al-Islam newsletter and al-
aw‟ie magazine. We tracked website activity from September 2006 until December 2006, a time 
span that included the high Islamic holiday Ramadan. We observed weekdays as being heavier 
than weekends, with Mondays having the most traffic. We also observed that a significant 
increase in postings and activity surrounding an incident when the Pope made disparaging 
comments about Islam and again following the announcement of President Bush‘s visit to 
Indonesia. 
After the website was updated in March of 2007, it was less glitzy, but easier to navigate. 
Like the old site, it offered links to the other nineteen Hizbut Tahrir sites in various languages, as 
well as archived ―online‖ versions of al-Islam and al-wa‟ie. The greatest advantage to the new 
site was the added interactivity allowing users to post comments. Comments from March 2007 
through September 2007 were grouped under twelve themes based upon article headings. In 
total, there were 70 articles and 812 comment postings, with an average of 11.6 postings per 
article. The top four categories of postings were the Caliphate conference (held August 12, 
2007), hegemony (by governments suppressing or oppressing Muslims), topics related to the 
establishment of the Caliphate, and issues related to Israel. The largest proportion of articles 
posted (24%) addressed the theme of Dakwah (outreach meeting announcements), followed by 
the Caliphate (with 14% of all articles posted). 
 To determine whether the postings were from a few enthusiasts or from diverse users, we 
investigated the diffusion of postings. For the month of September, there were 96 postings, of 
which 35 were from sources who contributed multiple postings. One person had 10 postings, one 
had 5 postings, two had 3 postings each, and seven had 2 postings each. If one excludes the one 
unique user with 10 postings, the data reflect a diverse group of users.  
Were visitors who posted comments actually engaging in dialogue by adding to the 
intellectual content, or were they merely registering support? Two researchers fluent in 
Indonesian reviewed the comments to determine into which of two categories the comments fell: 
intellectual argument or only support. Results show that 47% of the comments were from people 
who were engaging in dialogue, with the rest merely posting words supportive of the article. Of 
those who engaged in dialogue, none were critical of HT-I‘s position, expressing pro-HT-I 
rhetoric instead. Most of the topics followed this pattern, half engaging in dialogue and half 
expressing support.  
One interesting feature of the comment posting was the date and time of day of the 
posting. From this one could determine when visitors posted the comments according to the 
following categories: typical office hours (8am-5pm except lunch), lunch (11am-1pm), travel 
home (5pm-7pm) and night (7pm-5am). Postings followed this pattern: 70% of the postings were 
during office hours, 14% were done during lunch, 8% were made at home or on the way home 
possibly at an Internet kiosk, with 5% posting at night and 3% measuring early morning hours, 
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most likely from home. Clearly, 84% of HT-I posters did their postings during office hours 
(office and lunch), presumably using office computers. 
Finally, we examined how the HT-I site was ranked by an independent Internet ranking 
organization, Alexa (http://www.alexa.com), recognized as the leading authority by the 
advertising industry in Indonesia (CDA Advertising group in Jakarta, personal interview, August 
2007). By observing Alexa site rankings, as of October 2, 2007, HT-I was ranked fifth in 
Indonesia among Islamic religion websites, and ranked 2,006th among all websites in Indonesia. 
Of those logging on to HT-I, 84% were from Indonesia, 10% were from Palestine, and the rest 
were from a variety of places. Average views by each visitor were 3.8 pages, which is below the 
average of 4.7 among the top five sites. Eramuslim.com was ranked the top Islamic website and 
ranked 151st among all Indonesian websites. Of those logging into eramuslim.com, 87% were 
from Indonesia, 4.2% were from Malaysia, with the remainder being from various places. The 
average visitor viewed 4.4 pages. According to the Alexa data, web traffic has doubled or tripled 
since the measurement was taken in 2006. Based on a conservative estimate, the HT-I website 
experiences at least 2,000 hits per day and 3.8 web pages per visitor. 
Discussion 
Two of the most popular articles posted on HT-I‘s website were related to the Caliph, a 
theme that was preeminent with Taqiuddin al-Nabhani‘s founding of HT. Criticism of U.S. 
policies and Israel‘s oppression of Palestine are among the top four issues. All posters supported 
HT-I propositions, with over half extending the discussion by adding supporting material. It is 
safe to assume that the website functions to support HT-I ideology for its members. Unlike 
Weimann‘s (2006) description of terrorist groups‘ use of the Internet, which posits that the 
Internet is used mainly for communication, propaganda, marketing, and fund-raising, HT-I 
appears to use the Internet for reinforcement and solidify membership in HT-I ideology, rather 
than as a recruitment tool. 
From the postings that appeared on the HT-I website, most visitors were not regular 
contributors (only a few people posted multiple responses). Rather, visitors posted supportive 
comments over the course of a month. Experts deduce that there are about 50,000 HT-I 
followers, both hard-core cadre or committed sympathizers. Other research among radical groups 
observes that content online is further disseminated to friends in halaqa groups who do not have 
Internet connections (Lim, 2005). With HT-I‘s website having daily hits of over 2,000 visitors, it 
is safe to assume that diffusion of HT-I‘s message occurs among core cadre, associates, and 
sympathizers. Ismail Yusanto‘s statement of being able to mobilize cadre nationally within a few 
hours testifies to the efficiency and density of electronic connections within HT-I.  
But with the daily numbers being so low, is HT-I‘s reach considered relevant? Merlyna 
Lim reported that Indonesia‘s Laskar Jihad group‘s Internet site likewise had a small reach (Lim, 
2005). At that time, Alexa ranked Laskar Jihad fifth among Islamic religion websites, and it also 
ranked above 2,000 among all Indonesia websites; however, its reach and effectiveness were 
demonstrated by mobilizing a jihad against the Christians on the Muluku islands, a multi-
religious archipelago located on the eastern side of Indonesia. The sectarian conflict inflamed by 
jihad incursions left as many as 10,000 dead and 700,000 refugees. (ICG, 2000; Lim, 2005). 
The combination of Internet use and halaqa participation makes for a potentially 
powerful ideological force. In research conducted in Indonesia in December of 2006 by the 
Program in International Policy Initiatives (PIPA) for the U.S. Department of Homeland 
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Security, the only significant correlation with attitudes supporting suicide bombings was Internet 
use and discussing the material with associates. This is consistent with previous persuasion 
research that investigated small group influence on attitude changes (Brinol & Petty, 2005; 
Hairgrove & McLeod, 2008; McCauley & Segal, 1987). 
Judging by the postings on HT-I‘s core issues—the Caliph, Hegemony, and Israel—the 
Internet serves alongside other media to reinforce ideology for what Rogers (2002) calls strong 
media effects, especially among radicals engaged in the HT struggle. According to the Alexa 
data on HT-I, the second largest visitor population was from Palestine, whereas Malaysia, much 
closer to Indonesia in language and culture, was the second largest population for all the other 
Muslim websites, which reinforces the nature of the transnational audience that the HT-I site has 
within the greater HT movement.  
A final observation is that those who post do so from their offices. This leads to several 
additional insights. One is that many of the HT-I population hold white-collar jobs that provide 
computer access. This is logical since HT-I has recruited from colleges, and it appears these 
recruits have moved on and now hold influential jobs. This model is consistent with Carrie 
Wickham‘s observations of the growth of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt, where 
organizational leaders were groomed from college chapters (Wickham, 2002). This also reflects 
the fact that ownership of personal computers is limited, which raises questions about the use of 
work resources for non-work-related purposes, such as religious pursuits. Interviews with 
members of the ―myquran‖ blog community revealed that nearly all participants acknowledged 
that they access religious websites from work. Many stated (unsolicited) that they made sure 
their work was done before going online for personal use.  
Conclusion 
This case study investigated how Hizbut Tahrir-Indonesia uses the Internet to accomplish 
its mobilization goals. Data came from personal interviews, observation of their site during two 
periods in 2006 and 2007, and independent evaluations from Alexa. Results show that HT-I uses 
the Internet mainly for indoctrinating recruits into HT-I ideology. From extrapolation, it appears 
HT-I is effective at reaching its target audience both online and offline, with members 
downloading material for distribution among compatriots who are involved with halaqa study 
groups. 
 Since it appears that HT-I is using Internet not for recruitment, but for grounding cadre in 
basic ideological propositions of HT, HT-I is solidifying its leadership. Schneider (2006) argues 
this should not come as a surprise since this follows the three stage plan propagated by Hizbut 
Tahrir whereby in stage two it consolidates the cadre before implementing stage three of jihad in 
overthrowing governments. Habeck (2006) likewise argues that Hizbut Tahrir current posturing 
supports a jihadi intentionality that when they mobilize after the establishment of a Caliph in 
some location will come as  a surprise to governments not associated with the newly formed 
Caliphate.  
All media, including the Internet, are used intentionally in the halaqa to establish its 
grassroots leadership base. Success of this approach can be observed from the organizational 
growth in terms of numbers – currently 50,000 members, success of its visitors to its web sites, 
and success of its outreaches. The first Caliphate conference in May 2000 had 5000 participants, 
whereas the 2007 conference exceeded 90,000, reflective of substantial growth in a few short 
years (Ismail Yusanto, personal interview, 2007).  HT-I shows healthy signs in both solidifying 
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its leadership and increasing its influence heading toward its final goal of establishing a Caliph 
who has the authority to pronounce a jihad fatwa. 
 Schneider (2006) and Habeck  (2006) argue that HT will remain below the radar screen 
until they establish a Caliphate somewhere, be it Indonesia, or any of the mid-Asia ―stans.‖ But 
when they do, it will most likely be fairly quiet. Yet the newly established Caliph will then be 
authorized to issue a jihadi fatwa, much like Osama bin Laden did in 2000, leading to the 9-11 
attacks. HT‘s rise as a potential player in the war on terror should not be underestimated, 
especially as al Qaeda‘s influence wanes. Policy makers in countries where HT operates openly 
such as England and Holland should take this group‘s potential and intentions seriously.  
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Introduction 
Despite its seemingly extreme ideology and its even more extreme use of political 
violence, al-Qaida has been able to elicit sympathy and support from a surprisingly large number 
of people. Suspected al-Qaida members have been arrested in dozens of countries around the 
world, and opinion polls in both Western and Middle Eastern countries have showed that 
relatively large numbers of young Muslims express sympathy with al-Qaida. In other words, we 
have a situation where al-Qaida has killed civilians on a massive scale, including a large number 
of Muslims, but it still seems to enjoy relatively widespread support. How can we explain this 
apparent conundrum?  
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I argue in this paper that al-Qaida‘s continuing appeal is a result of three key factors.  
 Firstly, al-Qaida propagates a simple popular message, which resonates strongly with 
deeply held grievances in the Muslim world. The organisation strives to follow the 
popular mood in many respects.  
 Secondly, al-Qaida has created for itself a powerful and captivating image. It has become 
the world‘s most feared terrorist organisation, which exerts an immense attraction on 
young people. In some countries in Europe, it has become ―cool‖ to be a jihadi. 
 Thirdly, the strength of al-Qaida‘s appeal lies in its global character; unlike most terrorist 
groups of today, membership in al-Qaida is open for virtually everyone, irrespective of 
ethnicity and nationality. As long as one is willing to accept its extremist ideology, 
anyone can in principle become an al-Qaida member. 
These three factors: simple message, powerful image and global character lie at the very core of 
al-Qaida‘s appeal today. By studying these factors in more detail, we may also find clues to 
identifying al-Qaida‘s inherent weaknesses. I will return to these weaknesses at the end of my 
talk. 
Al-Qaida‟s Simple Populist Message 
Al-Qaida‘s core message is so powerful and resonates strongly among young Muslims in 
most parts of the world because of the simplicity of its message and its linkages with real-world 
grievances. During the 1970s, 80s, and early 90s, militant Islamist groups condemned the rulers 
in Muslim countries as apostates, hypocrites, and collaborators. They called for overturning 
Muslim regimes and preached the need for an Islamic state. Their theoreticians talked about 
abstract notions such as excommunication (in Arabic: takfir) and God‘s sovereignty on earth (in 
Arabic: hakimiyya), concepts which were formulated by Sayyid Qutb back in the 1960s. The 
problem for these militants, however, was that this message did not resonate with ordinary 
Muslims. Very few Muslims were ready to sacrifice their lives for the abstract notion of an 
Islamic state. Furthermore, there is a religious taboo against internal strife among Muslims, (in 
Arabic: fitna), and militant Islamists who justified the killing of other Muslims, often found 
themselves isolated and marginalised.  
Al-Qaida has so far shrewdly avoided ideological missteps and failures of previous 
Muslim extremist groups. It has not propagated the revolutionary anti-regime Qutbist ideology of 
previous jihadi groups. Instead, al-Qaida has consistently rallied its followers around a simple 
populist pan-Islamic message, which is that ―Islam is under attack,‖ militarily, religiously, and 
economically. Al-Qaida has focused almost exclusively on the foreign or ―Crusader‖ occupation 
of Muslim lands, foreign desecration of Islam‘s holiest places, and how foreigners plunder the 
Islamic world‘s natural resources, especially oil. (However, as we shall see, this ―far enemy‖-
focus seems to be changing.) 
This choice of focus on foreign occupation, religious desecration and economic 
imperialism is not coincidental. Al-Qaida strategist Abu Musab al-Suri has written extensively 
on why this choice of focus is so important for al-Qaida. He correctly observes that very few 
Muslim youth will sacrifice their lives for the abstract notion of an Islamic utopian state. Many 
more, however, are willing to die for al-Aqsa, and to sacrifice themselves for liberating Palestine 
or other countries under occupation such as Afghanistan or Iraq. Al-Suri‘s conclusion is that 
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Muslims are deeply touched by anything that smacks of foreign occupation. Hence, he urges al-
Qaida to harness the power of pan-Islamic sentiments and the strength of popular Muslim 
solidarity in order to rally a mass following.  
These identities are key to understanding the power of al-Qaida‘s propaganda. Al-Qaida‘s 
simple message of foreign occupation, desecration and exploitation resonates deeply among 
Muslims today. The reason for this is simple: there is some truth to it. The Western world, led by 
the United States, has a strong and visible presence in this part of the world militarily, 
economically and politically. There are U.S.-led military coalitions occupying Iraq and 
Afghanistan; the United States supports Israel militarily and economically and politically even if 
the latter continues to maintain an illegal occupation of the Palestinian territories. The ruling 
elites in many Muslim countries are not elected, corruption is widespread, and there is a 
widespread belief – right or wrong – that the United States keeps these regimes in power to 
secure its access to the region‘s oil reserves. The list of widely shared popular grievances against 
the United States‘ foreign policies in the Islamic world is very long. Hence, it is very easy for al-
Qaida to find good arguments for its propaganda messages. 
Al-Qaida‟s Image 
Let me turn to al-Qaida‘s second key selling point, namely its image. Today, new 
information technologies are revolutionising our lives, at least in the way we communicate and 
socialise. Especially young people seem to live a considerable part of their lives in the virtual 
world of Facebook or in other cyber communities. Furthermore, the new information 
technologies allow more and more people to disseminate their message to a global audience. In 
other words, the mass media is changing rapidly. The major news agencies face competitors and 
the battle for capturing people‘s attention is tougher than ever. Hence, image and branding have 
become absolutely vital components in any marketing campaign that aims at promoting a 
product or an idea through mass media. 
Terrorism and violence has always attracted the media‘s attention, but al-Qaida has 
succeeded more than any other terrorist group in modern history in captivating and thrilling the 
world by its acts of violence. From its very inception, al-Qaida has given top priority to carrying 
out spectacular and unprecedented attacks. Until al-Qaida gained a foothold in Iraq, its total 
number of attacks was actually very small. Its operations were, however, audacious, and almost 
mind-boggling in devastation. Al-Qaida is very innovative in the art of terrorism. Its bombing of 
the USS Cole warship in Yemen and the September 11
th
 attacks on America were unprecedented 
acts of terrorism. The attacks on America made al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden a household 
name all over the world, and a powerful media image of al-Qaida was created. Overnight, al-
Qaida succeeded it elevating itself to a ―vanguard‖ among Muslim extremist groups, and 
managed to outbid groups with more limited regional objectives. 
Al-Qaida‘s acts of violence provoked massive countermeasures by the United States and 
its allies. You will recall that the Bush Administration stated that 9/11 was not an act of 
terrorism; it was ―an act of war‖. By using the word ―war‖ about 9/11, the U.S. President de 
facto declared that al-Qaida was its main counterpart in the ensuing global confrontation, which 
became known as ―the Global War on Terror‖. In other words, the whole world witnessed a new 
drama unfolding. And it was al-Qaida and the United States who starred in this drama, nobody 
else. Needless to say, this contributed immensely to al-Qaida‘s popularity skyrocketing and 
making its brand name the strongest on the market. 
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The ensuing U.S.-led military interventions on Afghanistan and Iraq further elevated al-
Qaida‘s status to almost mythical proportions. Not only did these invasions serve as ―evidence‖ 
that al-Qaida‘s rhetoric about the aggressive Western world was true, the invasions also 
demonstrated the power of al-Qaida to provoke the sole remaining super power to drain its 
military and human resources in endless and costly occupation. The invasion of Afghanistan also 
had the effect of weakening many of al-Qaida‘s potential competitors, who had regional agendas 
and had opposed an attack on the United States. These groups lost their sanctuaries in 
Afghanistan and their remnants gravitated towards al-Qaida. 
Al-Qaida‟s Global Outreach 
Let us now turn to al-Qaida‘s third selling point, namely its global outreach. Hardly any 
terrorist group of today is truly multinational with branches all over the world. Most violent 
extremist groups are diehard nationalist extremists who would never accept foreigners in their 
ranks. Al-Qaida is an exception. From its very inception, al-Qaida has been a multinational and 
multiethnic enterprise, even if Arabs, especially Saudis and Egyptians, have always dominated 
the upper echelons of the organisation. The fact that membership in al-Qaida is open for virtually 
everyone, irrespective of ethnicity and nationality, is a key selling point for al-Qaida, because it 
strengthens the credibility of its pan-Islamic rhetoric. It greatly expands the recruitment base for 
the organisation. As long as one is willing to accept its extremist ideology, anyone can, in 
principle, become an al-Qaida member. Hence, al-Qaida has succeeded in recruiting Muslim 
followers from Mauretania to Indonesia. Furthermore, a substantial number of Western converts 
have played a role in al-Qaida, the American Adam Gadahn being the most famous example.  
However, al-Qaida‘s global outreach goes beyond its appeal to Muslims of every shade 
and origin. The organisation has also worked consistently over the past two decades to establish 
cooperative networks with other groups of Muslims extremists in many parts of the world, from 
South-East Asia to Northern Africa. Some of these groups have merged with al-Qaida like the 
Islamic Jihad Group in Egypt. Others have renamed their organisations in order to become ―al-
Qaida‘s branches‖ such as the Algerian Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat, and yet others, 
maintain close collaborative relationships such as the Taleban movement in Afghanistan and the 
Pakistan. This vast array of cooperative relationships underscores how important such alliances 
are to al-Qaida. It is precisely this ability to find reliable local partners that is al-Qaida‘s strength 
and weakness. In the past, al-Qaida succeeded in finding local partners by offering training 
facilities, military expertise, and financial support. In recent years, the organisation also offers 
media services and increasingly also its brand name to local groups who are willing to work with 
al-Qaida. Al-Qaida‘s ability to sustain cooperative relationships with local partners and insert 
itself as a relevant actor in local and regional contexts is key to its survival. 
A final aspect of al-Qaida‘s image building is its exploitation of the Internet. I believe that 
al-Qaida‘s appeal owes a great deal to its shrewd media strategies. The importance of ―the jihadi 
web‖ for al-Qaida‘s widespread appeal cannot be overstated. The organisation has demonstrated 
an ability to exploit the potential of the Internet for a wide variety of purposes. Al-Qaida and its 
numerous online sympathisers are producing enormous amounts of material on the Internet. The 
scope of this material is far too extensive and variegated to be discussed in this short paper. 
Suffice it to state that al-Qaida‘s Internet resources include thousands of audiovisual products, 
tens of thousands of audio-files, and probably millions of written documents. They span a wide 
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range of genres, all designed to cater to the needs of jihadi sympathisers, recruits, operatives, and 
not the least, the recruiters. 
Al-Qaida‟s Weaknesses  
Let me conclude this paper by offering a few thoughts on al-Qaida‘s current and future 
weaknesses, especially in terms of its appeal. A major weakness of groups like al-Qaida is that it 
is always difficult to justify the killing of civilians. You will recall that there were mass 
demonstrations in Jordan and Morocco against al-Qaida following terrorist attacks by al-Qaida-
related groups. A number of leading militant ideologues, from Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi in 
Jordan and Sayyid Imam al-Sharif in Egypt to Salman al-Awda in Saudi Arabia, have severely 
censured al-Qaida for its acts of violence. Such criticism does not go unheeded. Ayman al-
Zawahiri felt compelled to respond to al-Sharif‘s criticism in a 200 page document that was 
posted on the Internet last year. Al-Zawahiri even described the document as the most painful 
text he had ever written. 
Such schisms are not new to al-Qaida. In fact, the Combating Terrorism Center at West 
Point (CTC) study Cracks in the Foundation (Brown, 2007), based on declassified al-Qaida 
documents retrieved from Afghanistan reveals that there has been far more internal dissent in al-
Qaida than has hitherto been acknowledged. These internal tensions started right after al-Qaida‘s 
foundation, and have been a recurrent feature of al-Qaida. Interestingly, over the past few years, 
we have seen signs of policy disagreements between al-Zawahiri and bin Ladin on al-Qaida‘s 
future course of action. The first such disagreement was evident in statements following the Lal-
Masjid showdown in Pakistan during the summer of 2007 when bin Ladin called for a jihadi 
uprising in Pakistan while al-Zawahiri urged that all efforts be concentrated on supporting the 
Afghan Taleban. In general, bin Ladin appears to push for jihad against the ―near enemy‖ far 
more aggressively than al-Zawahiri. Al-Qaida‘s second-in-command has also called upon his 
followers to explore ways of non-violent activism, in particular in Egypt, while bin Ladin 
dismisses demonstrations and protest campaigns as a diversion and a waste of time. 
This brings us to another inherent weakness of al-Qaida: namely its unwillingness to 
prepare for a future transition to politics. Al-Qaida‘s appeal is totally dependent on the 
continuation of violence. Its brand-name is simultaneous car bomb attacks with suicide bombers, 
not state building and party politics. Bin Ladin has said that al-Qaida‘s victory is simply to inflict 
pain and economic losses on the enemy and undermine his political resolve. As a religiously 
linked ideological movement, al-Qaida clearly finds it difficult to articulate political strategies. 
While al-Zawahiri and other al-Qaida strategists have outlined rational strategies for liberating 
Islamic territory and building a state-like entity, other ideological voices in al-Qaida dismisses 
the term strategy as a Western invention. For them, the strategy of al-Qaida is simply to please 
God through its continued destruction of its named enemies.  
At some point, al-Qaida‘s image will inevitably fade; all extremist ideologies have a 
limited life span, so does al-Qaida‘s extremist interpretation of Islam. Sometime in the future, al-
Qaida will lose its attraction among the youth, and to pose as a jihadist will no longer be ―cool.‖ 
Already, al-Qaida is slowly but steadily becoming yesterday‘s enemy. Bin Ladin statements are 
no longer top news stories, and even fewer journalist pour over the contents of al-Zawahiri‘s 
most recent speeches. At the same time, the ‗Obama factor‘ has greatly improved the image of 
the United States internationally and undermines the credibility of al-Qaida‘s hate propaganda. 
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It may be that the lack of political visions in al-Qaida will doom the organisation before it 
loses its captivating image. Already, we find that opinion polls in the Middle Eastern countries 
show that people only support al-Qaida because it is anti-American. Very few people would like 
to see Osama bin Laden as their ruler. Hence, it is not very likely that al-Qaida should be willing 
to negotiate seriously with the United States, nor is it likely that the U.S. would negotiate with al-
Qaida, although the issue has now been raised in Britain. However, al-Qaida‘s biggest problem is 
that several of its key regional partners in Iraq and Afghanistan are contemplating the idea of 
negotiating a political solution with their enemies. This spells trouble for al-Qaida. If the Taleban 
movement agrees to a ceasefire and enters into serious negotiations with the Karzai government, 
al-Qaida will no longer be useful to the Taleban. On the contrary, the Taleban might consider al-
Qaida a major liability, which it needs to get rid of. Or alternatively, the Taleban might begin to 
view individual al-Qaida fighters as bargaining chips, which can be handed over for a suitable 
price. Both outcomes are of course very bad for al-Qaida‘s future. 
For now, however, this is still an unlikely scenario. Even if the sympathy for al-Qaida 
appears to be on the wane and its ideological message has come under attacks, the organisation 
will continue to enjoy a degree of support. The Gaza war earlier this year was clearly a vitamin 
injection to al-Qaida‘s propaganda campaign. More generally, as long as the United States and 
its Western allies continue to maintain a strong and high-profile military, political and economic 
presence in the Islamic world, al-Qaida is ensured a certain minimum level of support. 
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Background 
 Approaches to counter violent Islamic extremism predate 9/11 and, since then, have 
traversed an all-encompassing critique of Islamic thought and practice. Recently, we have seen 
views that de-emphasize ideological, historical, and political reasons for violence. These 
approaches wield epidemiological and criminological concepts and treat networking and 
terrorism in universalist and mechanistic terms, as if Mexican and Columbian gangs, liberal left-
wing global activists, and Islamic extremists are more similar than they are different 
(Manwaring, 2009; Wiest, 2007; Williams, 2009). At the same time, Islamism continues to be 
treated as a sectarian and cultural problem, rather than as a political response to Western policies 
in the Muslim world (Burgat, 2009). Determining whether organizations are hierarchical, chain, 
hub or star, or all-channel networks (Springer, Regens, & Edger, 2008) may identify 
vulnerabilities, but does not provide an antidote to the replication and spread of violent jihadist 
discourse. Orienting analyses to the network or movement level, rather than to the individual or 
global political level, has some advantages, but by no means produces predictable, universal, or 
reliable patterns. Such analyses may present useful conclusions about the state counter-response 
to terror tending to spread Islamic terrorism (Wiest, 2007; Wiktorowicz, 2004) or by theorizing 
about the existence of a war in Clausewitzian terms. However, these analyses are likely to miss 
subtle distinctions in the goals, ideology, and modus operandi of al-Qaida and other groups.  
Further, these analyses do not address the connection between a movement and its popular 
support or, in important cases, its status as an ―insurgency.‖     
That connection depends on linkages forged at the individual and community level, 
which are in turn dependent on psychological, religious, political, and social factors. These 
linkages cannot be essentialized to a particular ―cultural model,‖ nor do they exemplify a 
universally applicable process. Despite a good deal of attention to recruitment, or attraction via 
the Internet, interpersonal connections are extremely strong and compelling in the Muslim world 
(as in the Middle East). Communities, families, and friendship or business alliances, circles, and 
sets have a power beyond the reach of the government or the ―strategic messaging‖ of external 
powers like the United States.  
Governments hope to interrupt the ideological or tactical diffusion of movements, kill or 
imprison their leadership, prevent them from freely acting, and if possible, disempower these 
movements altogether. Those responding to these movements, especially the United States, have 
not always understood which aspects of movement counter-reactions are free of influences at 
other levels. They also may discount these issues and the significance of secondary effects on the 
communities in which these movements operate, as well as the differences between movements. 
Some current recommendations that use a movement/network focus suggest buy-out type 
strategies rather than ideological deradicalization, or selective inducements with some 
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ideological component, as when the Nasser regime co-opted Muslim Brotherhood and Special 
Apparatus leaders (Ashour, 2009). These recommendations may work in the short term, but the 
future is unclear because of the power of Muslim discourse both as a response to identity crisis 
(Burgat, 2008) and to Western political influence or military force.    
A willingness to abandon the idea of ―turf‖ may also be found in certain anthropological 
or sociological approaches that essentially revive 1960s and 1970s-era development theory 
approaches,
1
 recasting them in the ―failing state‖ format. That ―failing state‖ format has been 
applied to many states in no danger of imminent collapse (Pakistan, Egypt, and even Saudi 
Arabia) as well as to more apt cases (Somalia). Some note that the model of the failed or failing 
state is too broad (Call, 2008) and unhelpful, as it is used to rationalize intervention, which 
provokes the counter-rationale for jihad. However states are measured, treatment of jihadist 
recruits as ―accidental‖ phenomena and proposals for state-building as if it can be devoid of 
ideology are profoundly troubling. We see this in the new emphasis on state building and 
provision of services in Iraq, Afghanistan, and more generally in the developing world. As a 
general goal, providing better services is theoretically a public good (by definition addressing 
those who are excluded and when these do not create rivalries), but difficult to extend to all the 
poor, and insufficient in staving off recruitment to extremism. We should remember that all the 
previous decades of enlarging and legitimizing state governments, and even efforts to 
democratize, have not served as a counter to jihadism in the 1990s, or since 9/11.    
A deep concern over the ideological strength of Islamic extremism is appropriate. There 
were excesses and mistakes in the first seven years of the War on Terror, when various voices 
demonized the beliefs of Muslims well beyond the violent radicals (thus leading to a ‗second-
effect‘ of creating more anti-Americanism, or more support for the radicals) or were too 
imprecise (Zuhur, 2008). Ultimately, where radical views may be shared by more than one 
organization (e.g. in Afghanistan), what is crucial is whether such organizations will relinquish 
violence or not.   
The debate continues about how best to dampen enthusiasm for violent radicalism 
confronting the Near Enemy (local governments) and the Far Enemy (the U.S. and other Western 
nations) in the Islamic world and in immigrant communities. Both the pervasive indictment of 
Islamic ideas and the ‗new‘ answer – refocusing away from ideology – will do little to 
deradicalize those committed to these movements. We must remember that large numbers of 
violent radicals are not necessary to wreak havoc; a relatively small number can do so. 
Not all extremist groups are identical, nor do they emerge from the same intellectual or 
political sources, even though some common themes exist in the histories of older and newer 
groups (Paz, 2003). Movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Front Islamique du 
Salvation fought repression at the hands of secular Western-style Muslim governments and 
Islamist student movements in Iran confronted Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Early Islamist 
                                                 
1
 Comprehensive analysis of development theories may be found in Binder, L. (1998). Islamic 
liberalism:  A critique of development ideologies. Chicago:  University of Chicago; and as a 
‗self-deceptive rational planning device,‘ in Mitchell, T. (2002). Rule of experts: Egypt, techno-
politics, modernity. Berkeley: University of California Press;  also see Anderson, L. (1990). 
Policy-making and theory building: American political science and the Islamic Middle East. in 
H. Sharabi (Ed.), Theory, politics and the Arab world. NY: Routledge.  
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militants like the Qassam Brigades in the 1930s or Tahrir al-Islam, established in 1953, also 
confronted different types of opponents, but not the West. Newer radical Islamist groups like 
Takfir wa al-Higrah, the Military Academy Group, the Jihad Islami, and the Gama`at Islamiyya 
in Egypt opposed Muslim leaders they believed to be misdirecting their societies; the latter two 
groups represented a very large movement that fought a low-level war with the Egyptian 
government in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In Saudi Arabia, an ultra- or neo-Wahhabi 
movement emerged in 1979, and more definitively since the Gulf War, while in Tunisia, Turkey, 
Morocco, Yemen, and Syria other radical Islamist groups emerged as well. In the late 1990s and 
since 9/11, many other cells, groups, and clusters of groups have formed and engaged in 
destabilizing acts of violence, while also intensifying their own commitment to jihad and 
formalizing this commitment on the Internet.   
Many discussions of the emergence of militant jihadi radicalism draw on different causal 
theories. Multiple factors were at work: underlying political circumstances, the appeal of 
ideology, and the often violent responses by states in the region, or,  since 2001, outside the 
region. All of these factors have contributed to the growth and dissemination of violent 
radicalism. For instance, we can find explanations that focus on:   
a) resistance to Western political domination; 
b) resistance to Western ideological and cultural domination; 
c) reactions to the end of clerical influence in education and law in modern states 
(Feldman, 2008; Kelsay, 2007; Messick, 1992); 
d) the failures of modern, Western-style, non-Islamist, and even religious Islamic (as in 
Saudi Arabia) governments to create deep national loyalties (Okruhlik, 2005; Zuhur, 
2005); 
e) the social shock of modernization, rural-urban migration, persistent poverty, and 
failure of national governments to meet popular needs;   
f) the failure of revolutionary, leftist, Arab-nationalist, and other political movements to 
achieve social and political change, and right grievances such as the dispossession of 
the Palestinians; and 
g) the failure of local governments to democratize or significantly increase political 
pluralism.       
Some of the above-mentioned factors actually pushed citizens away from other loyalties 
(to their governments, for example) and simultaneously enhanced recruitment by Islamist 
radicals, because no other political or social entities were meeting their needs. At the same time, 
radicals attracted followers for other ideological reasons; for example, in arguments against the 
`ulama of the sulta [establishment clerics] (Zuhur, 2005) and for the `ulama of jihad. Meanwhile, 
the defining slogan of Islamist moderates who forswore violence, the Muslim Brotherhood, 
―Islam huwwa al-hal!‖ (Islam is the solution!) actually became a mainstream idea in many other 
contexts, countries, and communities. Now, following thirty to forty years of Islamic awakening, 
or re-Islamization, this slogan is not objectionable and claimed by non-violent conservatives and 
salafists as well.   
The necessity of imminent and militant jihad was the unique priority of radicals emerging 
from experiences of state oppression, and resulted from their analysis of both Western positions 
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and their local government‘s positions. Radicals thoroughly believed they were impelled into 
activism or militancy, and they exerted ideological pressure on Muslim publics.  Then, due to the 
failures of local governments and earlier nationalist movements and the efficacy of Islamist 
movements, in combination with their compelling messages, other Islamist movements were 
challenged. An example is the slow but steady base-building activities of groups like the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The failure of the earlier nationalist, leftist, or non-Islamist radical movements also 
led to the sense that the radical Islamist path was timely and appropriate, and catastrophic 
conditions – like the wars in Lebanon and Afghanistan – provided reasons for its emergence and 
support. All of this background helps to explain variations in recruitment in different 
communities and from one geographic area or political setting to another.  The ideology would 
not be as attractive (or alternatives so unappealing) without the compelling nature of these 
circumstances. Thus any discussion of ideology and its role in deradicalization efforts should 
proceed by first understanding that radicalization is a multi-directional process in which 
extremist ideology attracts adherents concomitant with other available ―ideologies‖ or social and 
political memberships repelling or failing to attract adherence. Radicalization also is multi-
directional in its interaction with local political, social, or movement situations or events. For 
example, radicalization can be intensified even when its governmental opponents mount an 
energetic campaign against it either by conceding that Islamic values are intrinsic to the society 
and trying to out-Islamize the radicals (e.g., as in Egypt and Saudi Arabia) or appearing to leave 
Islamic primacy to radicals (e.g., as in Afghanistan and Pakistan). This inherent complexity and 
multi-dimensionality is the reason deradicalization may not be effective if it calls for too broad a 
range of relinquished beliefs or if all it does is address ―improper aspects of belief‖ or create a 
new orthodoxy. 
With this context in mind, let us address the aspects of ideology contained in the New 
Jihad as expressed in several waves of thought since 1979, the late 1980s, early 1990s, or later, 
depending on which group we consider.   
Fighting the West When It Bolsters the Near Enemy   
The determination to fight Western attacks on Islam by fighting their representatives or 
alleged pawns in local governments, or to attack Westerners more directly was a  ―new‖ aspect 
of an extant Islamic extremism. It is not that Western intentions had not previously been 
challenged, but movements had focused their opposition on their primary enemy – local 
governments, the near enemy. Ultimately, it is the West‘s global hegemony and policies that are 
protested. Other Muslims are not the enemy, but local leaders who bend to Western intent  
represent ―those so-called Muslims … who don‘t have their own will,‖ according to  Mohammad 
Ilyas Kashmiri, a key al-Qa‘ida field commander (Shahzad, 2009).  
The radical groups claim that they are fighting infidelization, co-optation, and the moral 
bankruptcy that accompanies it. Other groups oppose the material, cultural, and ideological 
impact of the West, as well as specific political and military actions, but choose not to target 
Western actors for various reasons. This distinction still sets some groups apart from others, but 
it is important to realize that the West is not opposed for what it is, but for what it is doing in the 
Muslim world. Other ideas are shared more widely, and these will now be reviewed.  
Hakmiyya  
Extremists have (along with conservative Muslims) defended the true sovereignty of 
Allah (God) (hakmiyya) as compared to the nation-state and its civil laws. The main problem 
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here is the distinction between true Islamic practice and the lifestyle, laws, or license encouraged 
or permitted by the local government. Extremists call for a restoration of God‘s sovereignty, and 
thus their movement is one of purist reform. This principle was emphasized by Abu al-A`la 
Mawdudi in his arguments for Pakistan to become an Islamic state, and also appeared early on in 
the discourse of Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The 1970s-
era Islamic radicals determined that the only way to bring about the sovereignty of God was to 
first overthrow local governments (fighting the near enemy via jihad), which had secularized 
laws, education, and society, as well as compromised nations politically through dealings with 
the West. These radicals deemed their rulers apostates using the mechanism of takfir (calling or 
considering a Muslim to be a renegade or a non-believer).    They use takfir because they are 
concerned with the restoration or purification of Islamic law (shari‟ah) and establishment of the 
form as well as intent of an Islamic state.   
Confronting this emphasis on hakmiyya is not easy, for it is a core value in Islam.   The 
secularization and renewed call for assimilation of Muslims, as urged by Western governments, 
many scholars, agencies, and think tanks, will not work in today‘s Islamic world, which is 
impacted by Islamic revival and devoid of counter ideologies. The best strategy is to emphasize 
the history of temporal (as opposed to divine) power throughout Islamic history, as well as the 
need for moderation. Since temporal power essentially has been acknowledged since the 
Ummayad caliphate, there is no reason to sacrifice prosperity and public order for the chaos of 
full-scale jihad today. Emphasizing moderation is key because, in this way, the imperfect status 
of society can be acknowledged, but its desired transformation can be gradual and non-violent.  
Islamic Society  
  All actions taken by radical violent Islamic actors are intended to re-Islamize or Islamize 
society. A truly Islamic society will uphold the hisba (commanding the good and forbidding the 
evil) by following shari`ah. There is no dispute that the hisba is an Islamic principle; however, 
the question has to do with the responsibility of the state or non-state authority to enforce the 
hisba in requiring observance of shari‟ah. According to Islamist reformers and salafists, Islamic 
society must also cleanse itself of practices that are not truly Islamic and, in the modern period, 
of unbridled materialism that has led Muslims to stress wealth and status rather than piety. It is 
important to note that many non-radical Muslim authorities also criticize the contemporary 
materialism, but call for individuals to take part in healing the social malaise by focusing on 
piety and actions that help the Muslim community. These authorities do not require a program 
that enforces extreme change in the socioeconomic order. The mainstream position is that 
differences in wealth may exist, but the wealthy should aid others.      
The aim for a more authentically Islamic society is the deeper purpose of jihad; 
extremists battling to consolidate power in a neighborhood, village, or larger area insist on social 
and legal changes in the territory they rule, ensuring more pious behavior, rules, and laws, 
according to the group‘s interpretation. One can argue that enforced norms instituted in the Swat 
Valley by the Taliban or by Somali groups are shari`ah-based, just as the mutawa‟in (volunteer 
―morals police‖) in Saudi Arabia also strive to impose their understanding of shari`ah.  
However, in the latter case, the government actually has intervened in mutawa behavior on 
occasion, and does so on the basis of Islamic principles that support moderation (Ansary, 2008).  
I do not agree with those who paint the extremists (along with the so-called ‗Wahhabis‘) as 
totatalitarians (Khosrokhavar, 2008; MacDonald, 2006). These arguments confound the beliefs 
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of ordinary Muslims with the ideals and preoccupations of radicals (Zuhur, 2008). The 
counterargument from within the Islamic tradition is that, ―compulsion to religion is forbidden.‖  
The longing for a truly Islamic society means that deradicalization of ideas that have been 
accepted by the local population as ―Muslim,‖ or that are in fact a part of the historical legacy of 
Islamic thought, is an arduous process. Thus,  state interventionism, movement-initiated 
deradicalization, or some other means of directly addressing the ideological issue to be reformed, 
is necessary. 
Necessity for Jihad  
Jihad‘s purpose is described above. The most important development for contemporary 
Islamic extremism was its declaration insisting that jihad is inevitable and necessary, as is 
martyrdom, because of the heightening of global conflict – the West‘s intolerance for Islam and 
its military and political attacks on Muslims. Even so, the New Mujahidin have focused rather 
exclusively on militarism, in a parallel to the leftist militarists who emulated Castro and Che 
Guevara by emphasizing focoism (―foco‖ meaning to battle; Zabel, 2006), almost for its own 
sake, or to trap external powers in countries like Afghanistan (Kashmiri in Shahnaz, 2009). This 
focus on militarism also is a way of distinguishing themselves from the qa‟iduna (those Muslims 
who sit on the sidelines and refuse to fight (Zuhur, 2006), such as the more moderate Muslim 
Brotherhood. The insistence on jihad, and discourse of a perennial and generational jihad, 
distinguishes actors willing to moderate violence, in return for pursuing political participation in 
the existing system, like Hizbullah or Hamas, from others who continue to emphasize jihad 
without qualifications or truces. These latter ‗al-Qa‘idist‘ radicals describe a jihad that is 
revolutionary, Trotskyist in its ―eternal‖ quality. Ironically, much of their discourse is appealing 
because of the rhetoric of the actual ongoing revolution that was propagated by governments 
including the Syrian, Egyptian, and Iraqi ones, and left-wing parties from the middle of the 20
th
 
century.  
Battles between activists and those willing to compromise are recurring themes in 
Muslim history, dating back to the early conflict when  the `Alids and Khawarij fought the 
Ummayads and a Khariji murdered `Ali ibn Abi Talib for daring to agree to mediation. Jihad 
movements have recurred over and over; a few well-known early modern ones were the 
Mahdiyya of the Sudan, the Senussiyya of North Africa, and the Ikhwan, followers of 
Muhammad abd al-Wahhab and warriors of the first Saudi ―state‖ who battled the Egyptian-
Ottoman forces, and their descendents who fought for Ibn Sa‘ud in the early 20th century.      
Newly Urgent Jihad. So what is ‗new‘ about jihad? Abd al-Salam al-Faraj of the Gama`at 
Islamiyya explained the necessity for jihad in a crucially influential pamphlet in an argument not 
unlike Muhammad abd al-Wahhab‘s. As an aside, current scholars debate whether the radical 
Egyptians influenced bin Laden or the Saudi thinkers, who have influenced groups from the 
Muslim Brotherhood in exile to Usama bin Laden. For instance, some  blame ―Qutbism‖  for 
terrorism and what Americans have called ―Islamic fascism‖ (Eikmeier, 2007). This is a 
historical exaggeration (as is the entire description of ‗Islamofascism‘), for Sayyid Qutb actually 
was an important force in Islamic thought, with a much broader impact than his posthumous 
identification with radical groups. He influenced both groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and 
Hamas who do not engage in takfir, as well as takfiri extremists (Kepel, 2006). Earlier in his life, 
he called for a da`wah (the mission of Islamizing society and energizing Muslims or returning 
them to their Islamic identity), and then a social and political ―earthquake‖ (implying a radical 
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but not necessarily violent change of the social and governmental order), rather than violence or 
jihad as the means of changing Islamic society (Qutb, 1975; Qutb, 1974). It was Qutb‘s own 
martyrdom more than anything else that made his book Ma`lim fi Tariq, which alluded to the 
martyrs of early Islam, so influential (Zuhur, 2008). The book, interpreted in the historical 
context of the vilification of the Muslim Brotherhood by pro-government sources, led to the 
narrow focus on his conclusion that jihad and martyrdom were inevitable.  
Radicals argue that jihad is a religious requirement forgotten by Muslims – al-farida al-
gha‟iba, or literally, the forgotten duty (Peters, 1996; Zuhur & Aboul-Enein, 2004). Indeed, early 
Muslim reformers like Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan argued that the general struggle to be a ―good‖ 
Muslim (the ―great jihad‖) could supplant jihad-as-warfighting. That argument was made in the 
wake of the 1857 Mutiny in India blamed on a Muhammadan conspiracy to spare Muslims from 
bloodshed. Khan proceeded with the logic that the lesser jihad (‗war-fighting‘) was not 
necessarily appropriate in modern times when there is no authorized Muslim leader. Others had 
already expanded on the possibility that Muslims could support jihad financially, instead of 
actually traveling to fight. Activists, including some radicalized through state torture and 
imprisonment (as in Egypt), with inspired strategic messages and attainable local military goals 
(like Ibn Sa`ud), awakened the call to ‗war-fighting‘ jihad.   
The corrective ―recanting‖ literature and ideas produced by the Egyptian radical group, 
Gama‘at al-Islamiyya, attempts by Jihad leaders to dissuade their movement from fighting that 
helped effect a 1999 truce (al-Awwa, 2006;Ashour, 2009), and Saudi deradicalization  
campaigns (since 2004) argue that jihadists have been on the wrong path. The arguments 
highlight doctrinal differences between ‗classical jihad‘ and its interpretation in the new fiqh al-
jihad (jurisprudence of jihad) by contemporary extremists (Aboul-Enein & Zuhur, 2004; Kelsay, 
2007). However, texts explaining jihad and siyar (Islam‘s ‗law of nations‘) not only demonstrate 
rules and limitations (Khadduri, 2002), but also that the boundaries of jihad (or just causes for 
war) were under dispute, even in medieval times.   Both the militants and those seeking to defuse 
violence have textual references on their side.  Jihad most definitely was authorized for Muslims 
in the Qur‘an, although verses of peacemaking may likewise be found. Jihad‘s appropriate 
participants, objects, and rules are carefully explained by scholars, and jihad has been an 
important factor in determining Islam‘s response to attack as well as a cause for its expansion. 
Bin Laden and Zawahiri effectively countered Saudi governmental arguments about the 
exclusivity of Islamic knowledge (Zuhur, 2006) that would limit jihad and their claim that jihad 
can only be led by a proper Muslim leader. Al-Qa‘ida challenged the Saudi leadership, accusing 
the Saudi rulers of compromising their stewardship of the Holy Places by allying with the West, 
and pointing to the official `ulama as being tamed servants of the state.   
A very important distinction concerns the respective conditions under which jihad can be 
waged, either as an individual or as a collective duty. When it is an individual duty, then every 
Muslim –man, woman, and child—can participate in jihad, and discouragement of participants 
with debts or dependents is nullified. Because Muslims are interpreting today‘s crisis as just such 
a situation, we have seen women‘s participation in jihad and a general fever of volunteerism 
resulting in teenagers and persons with dependents that want to sacrifice themselves in jihad. 
Rather than stating that only collective jihad is doctrinally valid, as do some scholars (e.g., 
Kelsay, 2007) and governmental spokespersons, it would be better to engage in open discussions 
with those intent on jihad, with the goal of determining practical solutions to crises in various 
nations. These types of open debates about jihad are central to Saudi Arabia‘s Tranquility 
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(Sakinah) Program, conducted over the Internet, and aimed at discouraging recruitment (Boucek, 
2007; Zuhur, 2009).   
Occupation of Muslim Lands and Onslaught on Muslim Practices  
The occupation of historically Muslim dominated lands, the dar al-Islam, direct attacks 
on the lives and livelihoods of particular individuals and groups, and restrictions on religious 
rights provide the rationale for jihad as an individual duty. The War in Iraq and Afghanistan 
were an impetus for this reaction, as were the Soviets and their proxies in Afghanistan, and the 
Indians in Kashmir. Some claim that Muslim governments have been complicit in the increased 
popularity and pervasiveness of these views on occupation and neo-colonialism. Other sources of 
complaint have developed; for instance, the oil companies have maintained large blocks of 
Western expatriate employees (and other nationalities) in Saudi Arabia for many years.   
However, the idea that Westerners should not be present anywhere on the Arabian peninsula, 
land of the two holy sites, Mecca and Medina, was primarily preached in response to the first 
Gulf War when Westerners were stationed in Saudi Arabia (Fandy, 1991; Zuhur, 2005). By 
supporting a total American military withdrawal from the Kingdom, both the U.S. and the Saudi 
governments inadvertently strengthened the public impression that Western presence – either 
commercial or military – constitutes ‗occupation.‘ This was essentially a U.S. decision that took 
several years to enact once alternative basing was in place in Qatar, which inadvertently served 
to strengthen the extremists‘ position, and subsequently was extended to refer to the entire 
Arabian Peninsula and all dar al-Islam (lands governed by Muslims).   
Some distinctions need to be made. Since the nineteenth century, Western colonialism 
and imperialism did indeed expose Muslims to direct and indirect forms of oppression, 
occupation, expropriation, and exploitation. Muslim extremists deny the Western supremacy of 
civilization that is asserted by Samuel Huntington or Bernard Lewis. They are not trying to 
conquer the world and they do not feel inferior to or wish to defeat Western civilization, but seek 
to prevent Muslims from falling prey completely to its ―sicknesses,‖ particularly infection by the 
West‘s social immorality in their own society.  
In Iraq, we can admit there was a military seizure of power, and a military occupation. 
No one convinced Iraqi or Saudi extremists otherwise. Rather, they were either overwhelmed by 
coalition forces, or accepted an offer in which they relinquished their armed struggle in return for 
promised influence, cash (as with the al-Anbar Awakening groups), or representation. These 
groups did not acknowledge that war-fighting jihad is wrong. This is similar to the leadership of 
the Gama`at Islamiyya, which expressed in its books of recantation  that jihad is not sinful, but 
nonetheless cannot be undertaken under particular conditions nor at the expense of the broader 
population (al-Awwa, 2006; Hafidh & Mohammed, 2002).  
Likewise, the continued presence of Western military operations and troops in 
Afghanistan, and the air campaigns in Pakistan, provide a focus for militarist, or militant, jihad.  
Martyrdom  
  According to the new militant jihad, the linkage of jihad to martyrdom is key. In the 
classical treatises on jihad, such as al-Shaybani (Khadduri, 2002), Muslims are exhorted never to 
set out deliberately to become martyrs, but rather to fight jihad as avidly as possible. However, in 
the movements of New Jihad, a reverence for martyrdom has been emphasized through 
recruiting videos, speech, poetry, songs, and Internet-posted histories of ‗martyrs,‘ so that 
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fighting and martyrdom are equated at a new level. This comparison has helped to rationalize 
suicide operations, even though suicide is anathemaand in fact forbidden, to Muslims.  
Sayyid Qutb, often named as the inspiration for pursuing martyrdom, shifted from a focus 
on gradual Islamization to an acceptance of martyrdom, which – like his own – was experienced 
at the hands of the state, not by choice or by suicide bombing. He only came to see martyrdom as 
inevitable because of the Egyptian government‘s brutality and determination to execute those 
like himself, whose voices and writings were influential (personal interview with al-Ghazali, 
1988).   
When recruits believe that they will be martyrs, a powerful psychological component is 
operating, for even in today‘s non-extremist salafi thought, one is constantly reminded that this 
world (dunya) is not the abode of Muslims; their true life begins only at the grave. The doubts 
and fears of the recruit drop away when he is assured of martyrdom by the organization.  
Takfir  
Because many Muslims are, or perceive that they are, embroiled in a global conflict 
(though Western governments argue that attacks are aimed solely at radicals or that massive 
military campaigns as in Iraq were only temporary), the New Jihad has correctly identified local 
Muslim governments as being influenced, and subservient to, Western powers (Gerges, 2005). 
The radicals also believe these rulers to have acted against Islam in their national programs, 
through actions such as the peace treaties with Israel (for Egypt and Jordan), promotion of legal 
reforms not in accord with shari`ah, and failure to address poverty, corruption, and Western 
interference. Takfir, referred to above, is the action of calling a Muslim an infidel, or non-
believer, and as such, he may be the object of jihad (i.e., he may be killed for offenses to Islam). 
Most of the actors in the New Jihad engaged in takfir against their local Muslim governments, 
thus legitimizing violence on authorities, police, judges, or other agents.  The Sunni extremists in 
Iraq also takfir, or infidelize, the Shi`a Muslims – drawing on historical arguments against them 
that are influenced by contemporary fears of their dominance in the new Iraqi government. This 
is why the Shi‘a were called apostates, or renegade (rafidhi)-apostates (because apostates are 
subject to death) and their specific religious characteristics were mocked and identified as un-
Islamic.   
Paradoxically, attacks in the West are not the primary aim of extremists. These attacks 
typically are engaged in as terrorism, in order to demonstrate capability, which ultimately cannot 
be sustained. However, the extremists primarily focus on their ―near enemies,‖ and targeting and 
enraging the ―far enemy‖ is a secondary aim.  
Non-Muslims  
The Qur‘an defines Jews and Christians as ―Peoples of the Book‖, meaning that they 
have special rights, are fellow monotheists, and can reside in an Islamic state so long as they pay 
the jizya, a variant of a poll tax. However, extremist groups have emphasized certain historic 
claims that Jews and Christians seek to trick Muslims into not following their faith; that Jews and 
Christians themselves rejected their Message after believing (Quran 3: 105, 106); or that they 
will betray Muslims (as certain Jewish figures in Madina did to the Prophet Muhammad). These 
scriptural references are mainly concerned with events in the seventh century, which have 
unfortunately been complicated by the modern-day conflict with Israel and Zionist forces.    
These antagonisms are intensified by the easy media access to accusations made by Western 
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figures who vilify Islam utilizing arguments derived from their Christian beliefs or movements,  
and who claim that the West is a Judeo-Christian culture inimically opposed to (and by) Islam.   
In areas such as Israel-Palestine, the antagonisms by groups center around religious rights and 
access, and have been aggravated by the continuous limitations on Muslim religious rights as 
well as fears of the Judaicization of Arab Jerusalem.   
One can argue that Muslim governments or schools must teach more tolerance toward 
Christians, Jews, or other Muslim sects. This is true, and indeed such a program was already 
underway in Saudi Arabia prior to 9/11 (Doumato & Starrett, 2007) and has been enhanced by 
King Abdullah‘s interfaith initiative. However, the prejudices stirred up by ignorant or intolerant 
figures are difficult to dispel when people have little or no contact with the other groups, and in 
the context of political conflicts like the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian crisis. During recent heightened 
anxieties over the al-Aqsa mosque, Israelis called for the leader of the Islamic Movement in 
Israel, Raed Saleh, to be put in prison and said Muslims were ―ungrateful‖ that they were 
permitted to pray during Ramadan. Yet, they overlooked the fact that the archaeological 
investigation at the base of al-Aqsa that set off the disturbance is being supervised by Ateret 
Cohanim, the politically-motivated group currently accused of judaicizing Jerusalem.  The 
political impact on religious issues might be unclear to the average American, but Muslims who 
witness first-hand nightly scenes of arrests and evictions during attacks, such as the attacks on 
Gaza in 2008-9, or those following the media, understandably believe that Israel oppresses 
Palestinians, and are doing so because they are Muslims, Arabs, and undesirable occupants. 
Similarly, with extensive coverage in the West highlighting Islamic terrorism and ridiculing 
many aspects of Muslim life and belief, strong fundamentalist Christian movements calling for 
evangelical activity in the Muslim world, and websites mocking aspects of Muslim thought and 
deriding moderates even more sharply than radicals, it is not unreasonable for Muslims to make 
assumptions that Western Christians hate and detest them on the basis of their religion. So, while 
it is true that Islamic extremists heighten religious tensions, there is a far more complicated 
ongoing interaction, in which Muslims, Christians, and Jews clash politically. They also fail to 
highlight the commonalities of their faiths, tending instead to stress their differences and see 
them as a basis for political decisions about confrontation.   
Implications for Ideological Responses   
Policy makers have focused on the incitement to violence provided by religious figures.  
Prison reeducation programs (in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Jordan), like movement efforts to call 
off violence in Egypt as published by Dr. Fadl (Sayyid al-Sharif) (Hafidh & Mohammad, 2002) 
and others, strive to de-couple violent Islamic ideology from the beliefs of program participants 
by emphasizing moderation, and delegitimizing takfir and the brutal actions of jihadists,  while 
challenging their claim to political leadership (Ansary, 2008; Bouchek, 2007; Zuhur,2009; 
Zuhur, in press). To interrupt the incitement, recruitment, and mobilization cycles, some 
community policing efforts (London, Indonesia) rely on their networks in mosque communities.   
The most effective voices in this counter-radicalization process are former movement 
members who have recanted, or desisted from violence, as opposed to governmental `ulama 
(clerics). There are some pitfalls in focusing on religious figures and their messages, since they 
may not be with the same as the actual operational leaders who can move these activities 
elsewhere.  A general danger is that too much importance will be granted to religious figures in 
the hopes that they will influence those attracted to extremist ideology, without also addressing 
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any of the root causes for radicalism. It is likely that religious figures, parties, and powers will 
retain dominance wherever they can (as in Iraq) if they are primary intermediaries. Perhaps this 
is a permanent fixture of the region, since non-religious, non-sectarian opposition parties are tiny 
and weak. Nevertheless, responding through this framework is important to interrupt the process 
by which terrorism moves from being a tool and a tactic, to a more routinized and volunteerist 
behavior.     
Clerics or other speakers who possess religious legitimacy can play an important role in 
backing the state to urge truces, to end violence, or in deradicalizing movements, but their appeal 
and influence varies. Where the opposition to a local Muslim government is strong, the state 
needs to gain the assistance of clerics and/or former movement leaders to deradicalize (Taylor, 
2007), and the opposite is true where the opposition has less popular support.   Governments may 
be tempted instead to use force through the military or security services, resulting in unintended 
consequences—either an upswing in violence ( Blom, Bucaille, & Martinez, 2007; Wiktorowicz, 
2004) or a broader underground, exile, ―transglobal,‖ or transnational phenomenon.    
One can extend Taylor‘s paradigm to a more general one about religious discourse, in 
that it continues to serve as an important source of legitimacy. This point – the importance of 
―Muslim-speak‖ – cannot be overstated (Burgat, 2009). However, a government-backed message 
cannot remain legitimate if it simply argues the opposite of the various aspects of ideological 
radicalism because, in many cases, these aspects overlap with mainstream principles and thus the 
―devil is in the details‖ of these arguments.    
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 I review five considerations regarding ideology and its place in the study of terrorism. 
First, I offer a concept of 'ideology' rooted in artificial intelligence and made practical through 
computational models. Second, a properly conceived 'ideology' (PCI) makes explicit connections 
to the conditions that foster violent non-state actors. Third, a PCI can explain many of the 
dynamics of violent non-state actors. Fourth, a PCI allows us to understand the real world 
consequences that flow from a war of translations (ideas) when participants are literally talking 
past one another. Fifth, a PCI may provide explicit program and policy guidance in the war on 
terrorism. 
  
A Conception of Ideology 
 Most people would agree that ideas play some role in the shaping and changing of human 
cultures, but this seemingly innocuous generalization confronts serious difficulties when people 
attempt to show how different belief systems lead to different political choices and modes of 
political action. The problem lies not in the notion that ideas play some role in the making of 
human history, but rather in the conceptualizations and measurements of how this dynamic 
works. 
 The French intelligentsia known as the Ideologues developed a theory of political 
authority based on a new and 'objective' theory of knowledge, but they ran afoul of Napoleon's 
quest for autocratic power. Responding to their criticisms, Napoleon derided their work as 
visionary moonshine and idealistic trash. Since that time, the term 'ideology' has come to mean 
thought that is rooted in a socio-historical context. Thus ideology, rather than being truth, is a 
form of knowledge that is biased and incomplete.  In this sense, ideologies are: (1) abstract 
pictures of man, society, and state as imagined by a given group in a concrete socio-historical 
position; (2) abstract pictures of how man, society and state ought to be, based on the perspective 
of a given group in its concrete socio-historical position; (3) vehicles used to explain human, 
social and political 'reality', however inadequate or inaccurate the explanation (Seitz, 1972).  
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 I also compare ideologies to Kuhn's notion of a paradigm (1970). Kuhn defines a 
'paradigm' as the entire set of beliefs, values, and techniques shared by the members of any given 
scientific community. (1) Ideologies reflect the 'consciousness' of certain groups in concrete 
socio-historical circumstances; paradigms reflect a large area of scientific experience at a given 
point in time. (2) Ideologies tell us something about man, society, and the state; paradigms tell 
scientists something about the entities that nature does and does not contain. (3) Both ideologies 
and paradigms provide standards and criteria of legitimacy. (4) Ideologies provide directions for 
political action; paradigms provide directions for research.  
 How do we put this conception of ideologies to practical use? Consider an 'ideology' as 
the equivalent of a computer program running in a robot. In this simple application of artificial 
intelligence, the 'ideology' or 'program' processes information inputs and makes inferences about 
the next action to take. Just as humans engage in selective perception, the programs can process 
some inputs but not all, and the programs construe information through its peculiar data 
structures.  The robot's 'understanding' of the environment into which it projects action is thus 
seriously constrained by the lens (data structures) and brain (inference engine for a particular 
ideology). We now have the basis for a computational model of ideology and each 'program' may 
represent a computational instantiation of a different ideology. 
Ideologies and Conditions that Foster Terrorism 
 The sociologist W.I. Thomas (Janowitz, 1969) famously observed: that which we 
perceive to be real has real consequences. Objective life situations are interpreted and filtered 
though ideologies (computer programs); hence, the assertion is that people with one type of 
ideology will not produce VNSAs (Violent Non-State Actors) while people with a different 
ideology in the same objective circumstances will produce VNSAs. Therefore we must 
understand the interaction between objective conditions and how they are 'interpreted' in order to 
understand why some are motivated to terrorism while others are not.  
 Consider severe deprivation. The medieval fusion of church and state taught that 
deprivation is a test imposed by God and that silent perseverance is the route to reward in the 
afterlife. A conspiratorial ideology, on the other hand, interprets deprivation as the result of 
exploitative forces that have denied me and mine my just due. The first produces no grievance, 
while the second identifies a target (the exploiter), what has been denied to me (the 'object' being 
exploited), and a potential course of action aimed at the target. 
 The proliferation of competing ideologies that may generate VNSAs is commonly found 
in the same arenas where pathological forms of nation- and state-building lead to weak or failed 
states. This co-occurrence may suggest that the two sets of problems share a common heritage. 
The commonalities might include (1) multiple objective conditions involving, (2) cumulative 
inequality of resources, (3) rapid changes in the division of labor occasioning, and (4) threats to 
older ways of thinking and acting. In these circumstances, we are likely to see fundamentalist 
(speaking to the present from a point in the past) and messianic (speaking to the present from a 
point in the future) ideologies. Both of these ideological forms have a higher probability of 
generating VNSAs. 
Ideologies and the Dynamics of VNSAs 
  If we think of ideologies in terms of computer programs, then reconstructing a 
group's perception of reality may help forecast or 'predict' VNSA dynamics. Unlike simple 
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games, the computational construction of ideologies permits one group's perceptions of other 
groups in the environment to become part of the calculus of action. That is, the ‗perceptions‘ of 
group B can be considered as if they were part of the objective situation of group A. In artificial 
intelligence terms, other groups are part of the field of action. Some constructions of reality (e.g., 
how group A views its field of action and how group B views its field) are close enough to share 
certain 'family' traits, while other constructions permit only fortuitous and transitory cooperation. 
The reverse also occurs; some constructions make groups A and B natural enemies. There can 
even be mixed fields of action, where groups A and B view each other incommensurately. Event 
streams can be thought of as inputs to these ‗computer programs‘ and the ‗carbon-based 
processors‘ transform the same stimuli into clearly related or seemingly unrelated reactions or 
outputs.  Knowing the transformational heuristics within these carbon-based computer programs 
help us understand and predict what triggers or inhibits VNSA. 
  The ideologies of terrorist groups also bear some direct relation to forms of 
leadership. Leadership that is based on more than the transfer of goods or resources (e.g., 
cronyism or corruption) or a ‗cult of the personal‘ typically involves some standard of legitimacy 
(Weber, 1997), and this standard is encapsulated in each ideology. In a fundamentalist ideology, 
for example, the person(s) claiming revealed truth inherit(s) the trust and legitimacy associated 
with the divine figure(s) from whom the revelation derives. Fundamentalist cults speak to the 
present from a point in the imagined past. Messianic or millennial cults speak to the present from 
some imagined point in the future. By way of contrast, a  solely charismatic leader, using the 
Weberian definition of non-institutionalized authority, has a  cult-of-the-personal  that speaks to 
the present from a point in the present, and the related charismatic ideology is often 
transformative in the sense that it seeks to bring a perceived 'reality' into line with supporters‘ 
contemporary notions of fairness or equity. (An 'eye for an eye' is still fair play in some 
ideological constructions.) 
  Funding of terrorist groups sometimes follows the simple patterns of ―a friend of 
my friend is my friend‖ (or ―a friend of my enemy is my enemy‖, or ―the enemy of my enemy is 
my friend‖), but conceiving of ideologies as the throughputs between environment and field of 
action (the environment as transformed by my actions) suggests a more complex problem. 
Terrorist funding activities may be better approximated by hyper-games among ideologues and 
non-ideologues, where ideologues are playing games with other ideologues and/or non-
ideologues who are also playing  games, except that the games each are playing may not be the 
same as that played by another. (Seitz, 1994).  
 
Ideologies and the War of Translations 
Karl Mannheim (1960) drew a distinction between partial and total conceptions of 
ideology. In the former, ideologues from various camps shared sufficient common premises that 
they could reason together even if they disagreed on the weights attached to different matters. In 
the latter or total conception of ideology, the premises were so disparate that there was no 
common ground for reasoning; the various camps literally saw the world in such 
incommensurable ways that communication was meaningless. The ideological type most 
conducive to VNSAs is the total ideology. Actors perceive different worlds with different forces 
at work and different strategies for addressing their problems. These are paradigms in collision.  
 282 
UNCLASSIFIED 
A battle of incommensurables cannot be a battle of ideas because there typically is no 
available way to translate from one to the other so as to encourage discourse. Each actor takes an 
action, misperceived by the other, and vice versa. In computational terms, different actors have 
fundamentally different portrayals of the field of action, use different data structures to filter 
information flows, and often even different inference engines. A universal translator may not be 
available, but good intelligence work requires the ability to map from the action taken by one 
ideologue to its perception by another, etc. The same holds for how one another perceive the 
inferencing (causal reasoning processes) performed by another, etc.  
Computational simulations of ideologues (Seitz, 1993) make such translations reasonably 
straight-forward because each 'instantiation' of an ideology contains a simulated field of action, 
inference engine, and filtering lens. This is the modern-day equivalent of 'getting into the mind 
of one's opponent', except that the computational simulation allows testing, reformulation, and 
validation. Simulations of total ideologies in action create a composite 'virtual field of action', or 
how the overall field of action would look to a research observer standing apart from the total 
ideologues, each acting from within its myopic constructions of reality. 
In his contribution to the Data Development in International Relations project entitled 
―Through Rose-Colored Glasses,‖ (Seitz, 1993) used the structure of extended metaphors to see 
how leaders construct an event sequence and communicate it to their followers. Saddam Hussein 
used a 'trials and tribulations' metaphor to prepare his people for the onslaught in the first Gulf 
War. A typical ‗trials and tribulations‘ narrative holds that a person or a people are continually 
confronted with problems and obstacles to test belief, dedication, and perseverance, and if the 
trials and tribulations are weathered without loss of faith, the person or people have 
demonstrated their worthiness and have thereby earned future divine favor or intervention. What 
the American press giddily dismissed as the mother of all battles speech was not an Armageddon 
speech, but rather a carefully crafted speech through which Hussein told his people that 
weathering this storm would earn them a FUTURE victory. These two metaphors, 
―Armageddon‖ and ―Trials and Tribulations‖, can have significantly different implications for 
the political survival of a leader after the battle is over and can have significant implications for 
the policies and strategies adopted by enemy. What the Iraqi people heard and what the 
American people thought they heard were rather different things with quite different 
consequences. 
Ideologies and Counter Radicalization, Disengagement and Deradicalization 
The pragmatic test of any conception of ideology (or any theory, for that matter) is the 
degree to which that conceptualization and its associated tools allow us to do more and do so 
more effectively or efficiently than those without that conceptual approach. More simply, does 
the approach have policy relevance? The conception of ideology offered here has a conceptual 
and instrumental dimension. Conceptually, ideology-qua-computer program specifies the field of 
action, how incoming information is given 'meaning', and how the inferencing engine leads to 
new actions. Instrumentally, the approach allows us to simulate the 'virtual field of action' or the 
concatenation of multiple fields of action; to introduce standard canons of scientific testing, 
verification, and validation; to add layers of completeness to our understanding of terrorist 
funding; and to understand the perceptual constructions of ideologues and even to communicate 
with them in their own vernacular. 
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I have made a deliberate effort to put ideology at the core of all components discussed in 
this white paper. Understood in traditional ways, ideology and its components are other factors 
entered into a long and variable regression equation. Understood in terms of modern 
computational simulation technology and the sciences of the artificial, ideologies are the 
blueprints of political action. We gain considerable policy leverage as a consequence. 
Social and political constructions of reality are, by their function, relatively impervious to 
simple information flows because one function of the ideology is to filter out and assign meaning 
to bits of information. Knowing how and why an ideologue is likely to act provides the 
foundation for counter action. But knowing what information is filtered out and what meaning is 
attached to information allowed into the ideologue sanctuary, or knowing how the ideologue 
constructs the field of action or how the ideologue makes inferences about the next course of 
action provide entry to vulnerabilities that are, by their nature, difficult to protect once identified.  
In the early 20
th
 century Harold Lasswell (1927) showed how propaganda could 
manipulate the suasive symbols used by friends, enemies, and even citizenries. In the early 21
st
 
century, we can give computational instantiations to the myriad of minds of many terrorist 
individuals, groups, and organizations. We can also instantiate the minds of uncommitted 
peoples to see what events, appeals, etc., might push them toward one side or another in the 
struggle for their hearts and minds. And, although the science is still in its infancy, the possibility 
of de-programming, de-bugging, or re-programming the data structures and inferencing engines 
of the ideologue opens new horizons in the war on terror. 
Summary Overview 
Ideologies are properly conceived as the functional equivalent of computer programs 
running in our human ‗wetware.‘ The diffusion of, and appeal for, competing ideologies bear 
patterned relations with the structure of power and leadership, socio-economic context, and rate 
of socio-cultural change, among others. These ideologies qua computer programs essentially 
construct what the world is, what constitutes meaningful signal (information) in the surrounding 
cacophony of noise, why things are the way they are, and what should and can be done about it. 
One subset of these ideologies defines the various ‗minds‘ and ‗behaviors‘ of violent non-state 
actors. 
Modern computational modeling permits the computational instantiation of ideologies-as-
programs-for-action and makes them accessible to scientific tools of verification and validation. 
The newer technology also allows the researcher to treat the ‗ideologies‘ of individuals and 
groups as part of an ‗objective environment,‘ allowing the researcher to trace through the real 
consequences of perceptions or social constructions of reality of actors in that environment, 
including situations where competing belief systems are incommensurate. These new tools and 
technologies open new strategic and policy vistas for counter radicalization, disengagement, and 
de-radicalization. 
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The commitment that people have to powerful ideas is only now beginning to be 
understood from the perspective of cognitive science and evolutionary psychology.  Much of the 
earlier work in the social sciences that attempted to explain the impact of such ideas on human 
behavior has been circular and redundant because scholars have attempted to explain social facts 
(such as violence against civilians) by social facts. In effect, such explanations simply state 
common sense notions in more complicated terms without getting beneath the surface.   
The reason for the circularity approach lies in the persistent belief that the social sciences 
are autonomous and have little need for including psychological and biological facts in their 
purview.  In fact, appealing to psychological and biological levels of explanation is frequently 
met with hostility.  
 This situation has now changed. A growing number of social scientists have 
acknowledged (Atran, 2002; Atran & Medin, 2008; Boyer, 2000) that in order to really account 
for problems such as terrorism or, more generally of violence against human beings, we need to 
find deeper explanations for such forms of human behavior than the seemingly obvious ones, 
such as appealing solely to the cultural context.  This is especially true when such violent acts 
(e.g., suicide bombings) appear to be motivated by religious ideas.  
 Significantly, what we have begun to understand is not the causal role of religious ideas, 
or more generally, the causal role of ideologies of any kind on human behavior.  Instead, we 
have begun to understand the deep psycho-biological roots of various human susceptibilities to 
various environmental cues or triggers that, under the right conditions, ―awaken‖ these 
susceptibilities and propel human beings to engage in violent acts.  For example, humans are 
particularly susceptible to identifying outgroup members by means of various perceptual cues 
such as skin color (Hirschfeld, 1996), facial features (Corenblum & Meissner, 2005), speaking 
accents (Kinzler et al., in press), as well as other culturally specific cues such as dress, diet, and 
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artifacts.  What is not as well known is how these readily made identifications may be linked to 
aggressive behaviors against outgroup members.  Various cognitive mechanisms are potentially 
complicit.  Human precautionary threat detection systems (Boyer & Liénard, 2007; Szechtman & 
Woody, 2004) may, in some cases, be triggered by such identifications (Kinzler & Shutts, 2008) 
making us vigilant against potential predation or aggression threats and generate precautionary 
strategies such as adopting aggressive attitudes and even engaging in violent acts against the 
members of outgroups.  Recent examples are Romanians in Belfast and Zimbabweans in South 
Africa.  Furthermore, these mechanisms also are capable of pathological development. In the 
case of threat detection systems, physical (brain) trauma and/or emotional trauma may result in 
changes in precautionary cognitive processing (e.g., problem solving, attention) and the resulting 
behavioral outputs (e.g., impulsivity, irritability, aggressive behavior) – in many cases without 
any awareness on the part of the person affected (McAllister, 2008).  Threat detection related 
disorders like post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) have been found to occur frequently in 
conflict zones including South Africa (Seedat et al., 2003) and have been correlated with violent 
criminal behavior, both in terms of a consequence of exposure to trauma and as a precursor to 
such behavior (Erlinder, 1984).  This is a darker picture of human nature, but also a more helpful 
one, because knowledge of such susceptibilities leads to new means for controlling them.  
 To talk of susceptibility is to talk of a tendency to behave in a certain way in the presence 
of certain cues. Whereas in the past behavioral psychologists tended to treat all cues as equally 
capable of precipitating or reinforcing certain forms of behavior, our picture of the human mind 
has now become much more interesting and complicated. Rather than being a ―black box‖ 
capable of responding to any stimulus in a mechanical and completely predictable manner, 
because of the modularity of mind, we have come to understand that not all cues are equal.  For 
example, in the course of psychological development the recognition of faces occurs at a 
different stage of cognitive development than the recognition of some of the complexities of 
human speech.  Face recognition capacity develops by age two months whereas some of the 
more complex speech recognition capacities are not in place until age five years (Nelson 2001).  
Responses to visual cues, responses to olfactory cues, and responses to sonic cues involve 
different mechanisms.  Furthermore, responses to imminent danger cues activate different 
mechanisms than response to potential danger cues (Boyer and Liénard 2007). 
 So what can we say about apparently religiously motivated violence? First of all, 
‗religion‘ causes nothing. It does not exist as a causal entity (Mort & Slone, 2006) despite the 
persistence of claims to the contrary in the social sciences in general (Whitehouse & Laidlaw, 
2007). It is important to maintain a clear distinction between cause and corollary rationalization, 
specifically when making motivational claims.  At one level it does seem that religious ideas are 
complicit in motivating various behaviors including violent behavior. Conventional wisdom 
suggests that religious conceptual schemes are very effective for doing so (as well as being 
optimally designed for transmission). However, while religious ideas are commonly appealed to 
when informants (and even perpetrators) explicitly rationalize their past or imminent actions, that 
these ideas can be viably claimed to be the actual causes of violent behavior is much more 
dubious, however popular.  Claims that religious ideas are the motivating/causal force for violent 
acts amount to cum hoc ergo propter hoc (with this, therefore, because of this) arguments, i.e., 
proposing causality because one thing, ‗religion,‘ accompanies another, ‗a violent act.‘  Such 
mere correlations do not count as causal explanations but at best as empirical generalizations 
(Boyer, 2005).  Rather, a more viable account is that violent behavior is the output of an 
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aggregate of evolutionarily ‗selected for‘ cognitive systems responsible for psychological 
stances concerning coalitions, mate guarding, hazard management, social information 
management, etc. – all stances that lend high adaptive value  and that suggest that there is an 
evolutionary advantage if humans are highly susceptible to the activation of the complicit 
cognitive systems. 
This proposed account indicates that even if ‗religious‘ conceptual schemes were to 
disappear as cultural artifacts, the relevant cognitive systems would still produce the violent 
behavior we study and alternative schemes would be used to rationalize them.  In other words, it 
is not the case that the conditions either necessary or optimal for triggering those cognitive 
systems, an aggregate of which result in a set of violent behavioral outputs, require or follow 
from a „religious‟ aspect. This claim is in direct opposition to the implied conventional wisdom 
that not only influences elected representatives and their constituents but also informs policy 
making, particularly when making judgments about adherents to religious systems and their 
tendencies toward terrorist activity (e.g., claims that some religious traditions are inherently 
more violent than others [e.g., Islam vs. Sikhism]).   
Religious ideas, particularly theological and ideological, ARE in fact handy post hoc 
rationalizations for violent behavior.  It is perhaps for this rationalization that the byproducts of 
various cognitive systems (e.g., religious representations) are well suited, rather than for 
promoting violence, increasing solidarity, group cohesion, etc.  Yet there exists a false 
dichotomy between so-called ‗traditional‘ or ‗primitive‘ religions and ‗world‘ religions.  The 
category of ‗traditional religion‘ usually includes religious systems with little or no written 
doctrine such as Zulu traditional religion (Lawson, 1984; Berglund, 1989) or the practices of the 
Pomio Kivung (Whitehouse, 1995).  World religions include those with a long and complex 
theological lore such as Christianity, Judaism, and Buddhism, each with many different strands 
or schools of thought.  Often the categorical lines are drawn between East and West or small 
scale groups and large civilizations.  However, this dichotomy is the result of mistaking 
theological religious ideas with folk religious ideas and behaviours, in other words, to use the 
language of Robert McCauley (2000), unnatural versus natural thoughts or acts.  Both ―natural‖ 
and ―unnatural‖ reference the notions of noncultural features and intuitive cognitive processing 
(McCauley, 2000; Boyer 1994).  Natural thoughts and acts do not rely on cultural scaffolding for 
processing or transmission whereas unnatural thoughts and acts are heavily dependent on 
counter-intuitive tools such as formal logic, reflective reasoning, literacy, etc.  For example, 
Christian theological notions such as the omnipotence, omnipresence, and omniscience of God, 
while taken by many to be part of the bedrock of Christianity are, in fact, very difficult to 
process, philosophical propositions that most people, even theologians, abandon when faced with 
real time tasks. Typically, these concepts are abandoned for behavioral outputs that reside within 
the actual domains of ordinary human cognitive processing: characterizing God as engaging in 
acts temporally, being in one place at a time, etc. (Barrett & Keil, 1996).  The explanatory 
significance of this tendency is twofold. 
First, it provides insight into the transmission of ideas, both how the transmission process 
works and what sorts of ideas are generated, survive, and persist.  If seen from this perspective, it 
is not surprising that theologians such as Paul Tillich (1957) often despaired of lay people (to 
whom his work was ostensibly directed) due to the fact that they persisted in clinging to so-
called superstitious ideas specifically refuted by theological precepts.  Theological ideas, like 
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scientific ideas, are (generally) outside of the proper domain of our ordinary cognitive systems 
while many superstitions are comfortably within those boundaries (McCauley, 2000). 
Second, the tendency of human cognition to lean toward thoughts and acts that depend 
less on cultural scaffolding and more on intuitive cognitive processing should (further) bolster 
the claim that the explanatory framework that accounts for human behavior in general, and 
religiously motivated violence in particular, should not be based on the explicit, often 
theological, reports of perpetrators or observers but rather on the ‗natural‘ domains of cognitive 
processing. Instead, focusing on the former is very common in both common sense thought, 
policy making and, somewhat surprisingly, scholarly thought.  That it exists in the latter is likely 
the result of a social scientific preoccupation with the formalized doctrinal trappings of religious 
systems (i.e., theological literature, codified rules, etc) coupled with the erroneous assumption 
that such explicit beliefs directly cause specific behavior (e.g. violence). 
Examples of apparently religiously motivated violence help to illustrate the prevalence of 
the often mistaken tendency to both identify religion as a causal factor for violent behavior and 
accept the explicit accounts for this behavior by actors and observers.  Pipe bombs in London, 
Dublin, Derry, and Belfast, often rationalized by religious rhetoric dividing Catholic and 
Protestant.  Car bombs in Iraq, the motivations for which have been suggested to be the gain of 
martyrdom rewards, fighting for the true faith, and cleansing the area of Western secularism.  
Suicide bombings in Israel, Gaza and the West Bank carried out in the name of Zionism, Islamic 
Jihad.  Car bombs in the USA, specifically Oklahoma City, included actors that were members of 
Christian militia groups whose ideologies vary but consistently appeal to religious precepts.  
Mass suicides – Jonestown, Heaven‘s Gate -- for explicitly religious reasons (e.g., the way to 
board a spaceship carrying Jesus).  A murder in the UK, seemingly motivated by religion, 
involving a recent immigrant to the UK from Lesotho who killed his mother-in-law (or 
stepmother) because, when she waved a red cloth, he felt she was evil and possessed by the devil 
or spirit and so he killed her.  New England, USA, where women accused of being  ―witches‖ 
were drowned or killed by hanging to cleanse the community of their evil or Lesotho where 
―witches‖ were barricaded in a rondavel and burnt alive.   
These examples are of violence that does not stem exclusively from pathology 
(Wrangham, 1996) even though often ―It is simpler to relegate these crimes to aberrant behavior 
than to imagine that we are living in a sacrificial climate.‖ (Perlmutter, 2007)  Admittedly, the 
impetus for some violent acts seemingly motivated by religious ideas may be a particular 
pathology – depression, schizophrenia, PTSD etc.  However, these instances are not 
representative of the majority of violent acts with a religious aspect, much like the religious 
experiences studied by William James are not representative of most religious thought and 
behavior.  James focused on religious ―experiences‖ such as trances, visions, or revelations.  
Even stipulating the veracity of such reports, such events account for a tiny fraction of human 
religious thought and action.  They are certainly not representative of the well-publicized 
terrorist acts that are often reported (by both victims and perpetrators) as being caused by 
something religious. 
More often, violence often merely correlates with reported or apparent beliefs, 
motivations, prescriptions, or rationalizations that have a ‗religious‘ component.  (e.g., ―I will 
kill myself because I want to be a martyr for [fill in the blank].‖)  The religious ideology 
involved is then thought to be the cause of the violent behavior.  A few types of evidence seem to 
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back up this stance:  (1) Models, such as the Sageman/Atran Madrid bombing network model 
(Atran, 2009; Sageman, 2004) or recent work done by Donald Braxton (2009),  give an after the 
fact description of events.  They are impressive in their detail and accuracy, in terms of the 
people involved, connections between them, timeline, materiel suppliers and use.  (2) 
Observations – indicators that religious systems are particularly good at providing markers for 
solidarity, confidence, and coalitions (ingredients necessary for violent behavior: Wrangham, 
2007).  (3) Informant reports – ―I want to be a martyr‖, ―She was evil so I killed her‖, ―I am 
protecting the holy land from infidels‖, etc. 
Despite these, there is no real evidence to indicate that religious beliefs actually cause 
violent behavior. On the other hand, a lot of evidence indicates that explicit beliefs are often by-
passed or undermined by low-level cognitive mechanisms.  Informant reports are unreliable for 
determining true explanations, even when the informants vehemently insist on the reasons for 
engaging in specific behaviors (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) and, anyway, it does not serve us well 
to rely on informants to do the science for us.  Often they are either wrong about the causes of 
their own behavior, engage in explicitly contradictory behavior, or they do not know why they 
do what they do.  For example, the Dorze cattle herder on an Orthodox fast day protecting his 
cattle from what he insists are devoutly Orthodox leopards who observe fast days (do not eat 
meat) (Sperber, 1975). 
Because the assumption that religion causes violence is so prevalent, one might ask, 
―Why is it so natural to think religion causes violence?‖  Attributing the cause of violent 
behavior to ‗religion‘ IS easy (i.e., appeals to our common sense), but sometimes the elephant in 
the room is not an elephant, much as we insist that it is.  The blindness is not in our mistaking the 
elephant for something else – greed, need, grievance (Tremlin, 2007) – but rather our insistence 
that it is an elephant, no matter what. 
Since religious ideas and practices are ‗present‘ or ‗engaged in‘ concurrent with (and sometimes 
are the explicitly reported impetus for) many kinds of situations including violent (as well as 
beneficent) acts, it nevertheless seems reasonable to hypothesize that there is some more 
fundamental explanation for the cause of such acts.  Therefore, cultural artifacts (like Jihadist 
ideologies) may be red herrings, in terms of explanations of, or predictors for, violent behavior. 
back to top 
References 
Atran, S. (2002).  In gods we trust:  The evolutionary landscape of religion.  New York:  Oxford 
University Press. 
Atran, S. (2009). AFOSR Review briefing. Arlington, VA. 
Atran, S., & Medin, D (2008). The native mind and the cultural construction of nature.  Cambridge:  MIT 
Press. 
Barrett, J. & Keil, F. (1996). Conceptualizing a non-natural entity: Anthropomorphism in God concepts. 
Cognitive Psychology. 31: 219-247. 
Berglund, I. (1989).  Zulu thought-patterns and symbolism.  Bloomington, IN:  Indiana University Press. 
Boyer, P. (1994).  The naturalness of religious ideas. Berkeley:  University of California Press. 
Boyer, P. (2000). Religion explained:  The evolutionary foundations of religious belief. New York: Basic 
Books. 
Boyer, P. (2003). Religious thought and behaviour as by-products of brain function. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences. 7(3): 119 -124. 
 289 
UNCLASSIFIED 
Boyer, P. (2005). A reductionistic model of distinct modes of religious transmission. Mind and Religion:  
Psychological and Cognitive Foundations of Religiosity (Whitehouse and McCauley eds.).  Walnut 
Creek, CA:  Alta Mira Press. 
Boyer, P. and Liénard, P. (2006). Why ritualized behavior? Precaution systems and action-parsing in 
developmental, pathological, and cultural rituals.  Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 29, 1-56. 
Braxton, D. (2009). Modeling triggers for religiously motivated violence. Invited Lecture at Queen‘s 
University – Belfast. 
Corenblum, B. & Meissner, C. (2005). Recognition of faces of ingroup and outgroup children and adults.  
Journal of Experimental Child Psychology. 93: 187–206. 
Dennett, D. (2006).  Breaking the spell:  Religion as a natural phenomenon.  New York:  Viking Adult. 
Erlinder, C. (1984). Paying the price for Vietnam: Posttraumatic stress disorder and criminal behavior. 
Boston College Law Review. 25: 305-347. 
Hirschfeld, L. (1996).  Race in the making: Cognition, culture, and the child's construction of human 
kinds.  Cambridge, MA:  MIT Press. 
James, W. (1902/1982).  The varieties of religious experience:  A study in human nature.  New York:  
Penguin Classics. 
Kinzler, K. & Shutts, K. (2008). Memory for ―mean‖ over ―nice‖:  The influence of threat on children‘s 
face memory.  Cognition. 107: 775-783. 
Kinzler, K., Shutts, K., DeJesus, J., & Spelke, E. (in press).  Accent trumps race in guiding children‘s 
social preferences.  Social Cognition. 
Lawson, E. (1984/1985). Religions of Africa: Traditions in transformation.  Long Grove, IL: Waveland 
Press. 
McAllister, T. (2008) Neurobehavioral seuelae of traumatic brain injury: evaluation and management. 
World Psychiatry. 7: 3-10. 
McCauley, R. (2000). The naturalness of religion and the unnaturalness of science. Explanation and 
Cognition. F. Keil and R. Wilson (eds.). Cambridge: MIT Press: pp 61-85. 
Mort, J. and Slone, D. (2006).  Considering the rationality of ritual behavior.  Method and Theory in the 
Study of Religion.  18(4): 424-439. 
Nelson, C. A. (2001). The development and neural bases of face recognition. Infant and Child 
Development. 10 (1-2): 3-18. 
Nisbett, R. and Wilson, T. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes. 
Psychological Review. 84: 231-259. 
Perlmutter, D. (2003).  Investigating religious terrorism and ritualistic crimes.  Boca Raton, FL:  CRC 
Press. 
Sageman, M. (2004).  Understanding terror networks. Philadelphia:  University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Seedat S., Le Roux, C., Stein, D. J. (2003). Prevalence and characteristics of trauma and posttraumatic 
stress symptoms in operational members of the South African National Defense Force. Military 
Medicine, 168:71-75. 
Slone, D. J. & Mort, J. (2004). On the epistemological magic of ethnographic analysis.  Method and 
Theory in the Study of Religion.  16(2):  149-163. 
Sperber, D. (1975). Rethinking symbolism. Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press. 
Szechtman, H. and Woody, E. (2004). Obsessive-compulsive disorder as a disturbance of security 
motivation. Psychological Review. 111(1): 111-127. 
Tillich, P. (1957). Dynamics of faith. New York: Harper and Row. 
Tremlin, T. (2007). Religion‘s dangerous dynamics: Connecting ideology and biology.  Religion and 
Violence Symposium: Evolutionary and Political Perspectives. St. Louis, MO. 
Whitehouse, H. (1995).  Inside the cult:  Religious innovation and transmission in Papua New Guinea.  
 290 
UNCLASSIFIED 
New York:  Oxford University Press. 
Whitehouse, H. & Laidlaw, J., eds. (2007). Religion, anthropology, and cognitive science.  Durham, NC: 
Carolina Academic Press. 
Wrangham, R. (2007). Religious violence and the demonic males hypothesis.  Religion and Violence 
Symposium: Evolutionary and Political Perspectives. St. Louis, MO. 
Wrangham, R. and Peterson, D. (1996). Demonic males: Apes and the origin of human violence. New 
York:  Mariner Books. 
 
 
3.9. Religious Ideology and Terrorism: Anthropological Considerations 
(Alan Sandstrom) 
 
Author:  Alan R. Sandstrom 
Organization:  Department of Anthropology, Indiana University-Purdue University Fort Wayne 
Contact information: sandstro@ipfw.edu 
 
Executive Summary 
 Ideology has often been implicated in violent, radical movements (Rapoport, 1984) and 
since 9/11, much attention has been devoted to the ideological underpinnings of violent Jihadist 
groups and others (Atran, Axelrod, & Davis, 2007; Habeck, 2006; Jurgensmeyer, 2004; 
Ranstorp, 2004; Schbley & McCauley, 2005; Stern, 2003). Scholars and other experts hardly 
agree on the role religious ideology plays in non-state violence. Is it cause or consequence, after-
the-fact justification, or simply a rhetorical rallying call? In this paper, I will examine how 
anthropologists have defined religion and ideology, and consider its role in violent movements.  
In this brief essay, I will make the case that the concept of religious ideology is imprecise and 
because of this analytical imprecision, its usefulness as an aid to understanding people's shared 
thoughts and values is severely limited.  Furthermore, I will assert that the concept should never 
be used to account for or to explain people's behavior.  I will suggest that a better way to think 
about different religious traditions and the groups of people immersed in them is derived from a 
research strategy in anthropology called "cultural materialism" (Harris 1979).  Cultural 
materialism avoids explanations based on ideology and concentrates instead on the pragmatic, 
day-to-day circumstances that condition people's actual behavior. 
 The phrase "religious ideology" is often used loosely in anthropology and in casual 
conversation to refer to the set of socially shared ideas associated with a given religion.  Thus, 
people talk and write about the religious ideology of Islam or Christianity as if a distinctive set of 
ideas or beliefs characterizes the one religion in opposition to the other.  Furthermore, these 
imputed characteristic ideas and beliefs are often used by analysts to account for certain forms of 
behavior engaged in by followers of a religious tradition.  For example, people often say that 
Catholics have more children than Protestants because their religious ideology leads them to 
regard birth control as sinful and it is therefore avoided.  Major world religions such as 
Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and Judaism have features that make them relatively easy to 
identify.  They are religions whose beliefs, rituals genealogies, stories and poetry are 
documented on sacred writings and they hold meetings in designated churches, mosques, 
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synagogues or temples, follow a yearly schedule of rituals, and have identifying symbols such as 
the cross or crescent moon.     
 Anthropologists have had a difficult time precisely defining religion in such a way that it 
applies to all of the nearly 6,000 cultures in the world.  Religions vary enormously and it has 
proven to be a great challenge to find common elements that distinguish the religious realm from 
other areas of life.  Anthropological expert on religion, Anthony F. C. Wallace, defines it as "a 
set of rituals, rationalized by myth, which mobilizes supernatural powers for the purpose of 
achieving or preventing transformations of state in man and nature" (1966:107).     In an effort to 
distinguish religion from other aspects of culture, he listed the minimal categories of religious 
behavior.  In any given culture, these behaviors are "combined into a pattern that is 
conventionally assigned the title 'religion'" (Wallace 1966:52).  Wallace's 13 categories 
(1966:53-67) include: 
(1)  Prayer: addressing the supernatural 
(2)  Music: dancing, singing, and playing instruments 
(3) Physiological exercise: the physical manipulation of psychological state (use of drugs, 
sensory deprivation, mortification of the flesh, deprivation of food, water, or air) 
(4)  Exhortation: addressing another human being 
(5)  Reciting the code: mythology, morality, and other aspects of the belief system 
(6)  Simulation: imitating things 
(7)  Mana: touching things 
(8)  Taboo: not touching things 
(9)  Feasts: eating and drinking 
(10)  Sacrifice: immolation, offerings, and fees  
(11)  Congregation: processions, meetings, and convocations 
(12)  Inspiration (revelation, conversion, possession, and mystical ecstasy) 
(13)  Symbolism: manufacture and use of symbolic objects 
  
 These elements are commonly found in the widest sample of religions throughout the 
world but there is no limit on how these individual behaviors may be expressed.  In all cases, a 
careful distinction must be made between the official doctrines of a religion and the actual 
behaviors and beliefs of people.  Not only do the behaviors vary widely, but religious ideology 
also varies enormously within a given religious system.  Many investigators, including some 
anthropologists, assume a regularity of belief and practice among members of a culture that is 
simply not the case.  For example, for the Nahua people, among whom I have conducted 
ethnographic research since 1970, there exists a wide range of beliefs and ritual practices 
connected to their religion (Sandstrom, 1991).  Some people are true believers who are literalists 
while others range from skeptics to outright atheists.  Like people anywhere, the Nahua love to 
discuss religious matters but no two people are in complete accord.  There are generally agreed-
upon principles, for example, that the earth is a sacred being that the sun provides the energy 
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animating the universe, and that corn is the basis of human life.  However, these are rather 
generalized beliefs that overlap with a Western scientific understanding of how nature works.  If 
people in small, remote villages exhibit such a wide range of beliefs, those in cultures following 
a world religion are even more diverse.  There is no reason to believe that people in other 
cultures are more uniform in their religious ideology than are the people in any Euro-American 
society.  Even in evangelical and fundamentalist Christian religions, great diversity of opinion 
and commitment should be assumed unless proven otherwise. The same is true for Islam, which 
is practiced under several major schools of thought with many variations within each. 
 Not only are religious ideologies diverse and their meanings varied, but religious as well 
as political ideologies are loaded with fail-safe, flexible definitions, appeals to authority, ad 
hominem arguments, tautologies, metaphysical leaps of faith, ranges of emotional responses, 
unproven - and unprovable - assumptions, and self-fulfilling prophesies.  The amorphous nature 
of these two ideological realms means that they can blend into one another such that a strictly 
political position can be linked to religious fervor and vice versa.  This is clearly the case with 
the use of religion by Islamic radicals and violent extremists (Sageman, 2008). Religious 
ideologies can be utilized to serve a number of social functions that have nothing to do with 
religion itself.  For example, religion may be claimed as the basis for class or ethnic identity, 
justification for racial oppression or, equally, civil rights movements, engagement with or escape 
from the world, saving or taking of human life, and the rationale for imperialist or anti-
imperialist movements.  In sum, religious ideology or, for that matter, any ideological system can 
used to serve any conceivable end. 
 People often attribute their own behavior or that of others to ideological motives.  
However, in general, people everywhere live their lives as a totality and do not distinguish 
among their activities and beliefs as being economic, political, or religious.  Activities and 
ideologies interpenetrate and it can be difficult to draw lines between them.  Most people have a 
clear idea of their religion and feel that it underlies everything they do.  They insist that religious 
values cannot be singled out from other aspects of their lives.  For example, many Protestants 
define meaningful work as kind of sacred enterprise that is linked to salvation.   
 Based on longstanding traditions in Western philosophy, ideas and ideologies are 
understood by people to have a saliency that transcends mere material conditions.  However, a 
tautology underlies this type of explanation.  Religious ideology is understood by what people 
say and do, and simultaneously, their behavior is explained as being the result of ideology.  
Based on my study of several world and traditional religions (Sandstrom, 1991), it is my 
contention that ideology is often so amorphous, flexible, unstable, and frankly incoherent that it 
has little explanatory power in and of itself.  What does explain behavior is reference to the daily 
and pragmatic material conditions that people face in their lives.  In this view, terrorism in the 
Middle East is not caused by the radical ideology of a sect of Islam but rather by the material 
conditions that people experience.  These conditions can include economic deprivation, military 
conquest, political repression, environmental degradation, market dynamics, blocked social 
mobility, or any number of on-the-ground, empirically verifiable, and measurable factors (Gurr 
& Moore, 1997; O'Neill, 2005; Thomas, Kiser, & Casebeer, 2005).  Outside analysts as well as 
the people who engage in terrorist acts may use religious ideology as an explanation or 
justification for their own behavior or to condemn a behavior in others.  As stated above, 
religious ideology can be and are used to justify almost any range of behaviors.  Islamic peace 
activists justify their actions using the same religious sources as the terrorists. What has caused 
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the ideology to be used in one particular manner rather than in some other way?  Analysts should 
look to material conditions to find the answer to this key question. 
 The perspective that ideology does not account for people‘s behavior (including 
collective violent behavior) but that their material conditions often do, derives from a research 
strategy developed by anthropologist Marvin Harris (1979) called cultural materialism.   Cultural 
materialists search for causative explanation of human behavior in the material conditions and 
context of people's lives.  One important theoretical contribution from cultural materialism is the 
critical distinction between so-called "emic" and "etic" perspectives.  The terms derive from the 
terms "phonemic" and "phonetic" employed by linguists to distinguish sounds recognized by 
speakers of a language from those recorded by scientifically trained outside observers of the 
language.  The emic perspective takes the point of view of people in the culture engaging in the 
behavior to be explained.  The etic perspective on the behavior takes the point of view of 
observers who abide by the internationally agreed-upon canons of scientific research. The etic 
perspective is verified by how well the explanation conforms to operational empirical scientific 
standards and is capable of generating additional hypotheses.  Emic and etic perspectives are 
often identical.  However, when they differ significantly, it is a sign of the degree to which 
people in the culture are mystified by the behavior in question.  Terrorists who use religious 
ideology to justify their actions and the analysts who agree with them are employing an emic 
explanation.  It is the responsibility of the social scientist to determine if there are etic conditions 
that better explain the causes of the behavior. Empirical research that is scientifically verifiable is 
accumulating, which uncovers these underlying conditions such as discrimination, political 
repression, relative deprivation, occupation, and political instability (Asal & Blum, 2005; Asal & 
Rethemeyer, 2008, 2009; Ivanova & Sandler, 2006; Kuznar, 2007; Kuznar, et al., 2009; LaFree, 
Dugan, & Franke, 2005).    
 In conclusion, anthropologists have learned a great deal about the world's religions but 
there is no common agreement about how best to understand or explain them.  The perspective 
brought by cultural materialism assigns causal priority to the material conditions in which people 
behave and live their lives.  In this perspective, religious ideology derives from the material 
context and should not be used to explain any specific kinds of behavior from terrorism to 
patriotism.  Idea systems associated with religions are flexible and capable of being used to 
justify any number of behavioral responses.  Thus, analysts should identify material causes that 
lead one interpretation of religious ideology to predominate over others at a specific time and 
place.  Religious ideology should be implicated in explanatory theories only after all materialist 
factors have been eliminated as causal factors.   
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4. Existing and Proposed Deradicalization Programs 
4.1. Radicalisation and Deradicalisation: Dutch Experiences (Albert 
Jongman)  
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Abstract: Since 9/11, the Netherlands has experienced a number of traumatic terrorist 
incidents that have shocked and polarised society. The incidents triggered a wave of 
investigations and studies by journalists, academics, government, NGOs, and think tanks, 
which have resulted in an extensive body of knowledge on radicalisation leading to 
terrorism. In 2003, the Dutch government reformed its counterterrorism structure, which 
resulted in the appointment of a National Coordinator for Counterterrorism tasked with 
the coordination of Dutch CT-policy. The Hofstad-group was a group emerging from the 
Moroccan community in the Netherlands and engaged in terrorist activities. Members 
were arrested and convicted to long prison sentences. While the current terrorist threat is 
still significant (one level below critical), the threat has gradually shifted from home-
grown groups to the danger of groups that may come from abroad. Salafist jihadi groups 
are likely to use the provocative video ―Fitna‖ produced by Minister of Parliament (MP) 
Geert Wilders to justify attacks directed against Dutch interests. Partly as a result of an 
extensive awareness campaign, the popular concern about terrorism has diminished and 
the feeling of security among the general public has improved. In general, Dutch society 
remains peaceful, with a far lower level of political violence than other European 
countries. Over the last three years there have been no terrorist incidents with a Salafist 
jihadi background, and in 2008, only four suspects were arrested.  
 
Keywords: Terrorism, radicalisation, deradicalisation, immigration, counterterrorism 
policy, internet, networks, threat assessment
 
Introduction 
Two assassinations of public figures said to be critical of Islam, one of a politician in 
2002 and the other of a journalist and film director in 2004, led to a situation that has been 
described by commentators as a ―pressure cooker.‖ Since then, the pressure has gone down, but 
it is still significant. Over the last few years, Dutch authorities have been specifically focused on 
the reduction of tensions in society and on improving relationships between groups with different 
ethnic backgrounds. This focus is consistent with the government‘s view that counterterrorism 
policy is much broader than just law enforcement. This approach is based on lessons learned 
from a short terror campaign involving the Moluccan community in the late 1970s. At that time, 
the Dutch authorities also chose to use psychological and socio-economic approaches to reduce 
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tensions and improve the situation of the Moluccan community in order to reduce their 
motivation for violence. 
A third assassination in 2005 received far less international media coverage. The victim 
was an activist who ran an investigative unit doing research on the behaviour of the Dutch police 
and intelligence services. The case was solved when the perpetrator was traced in Spain and 
arrested. It turned out that he had a personal grudge against the victim due to the fact that he was 
expelled from an activist group in the 1980s after being suspected of being a police informer. 
Personal problems also contributed to his motivation for revenge. 
In October 2007, Bilal Bajaka, a young Dutch Muslim of Moroccan descent, entered a 
police station in Amsterdam, pulled a knife, and stabbed two police officers. In self-defence, one 
of the officers shot the man, who died on the spot. It turned out that Bajaka was a suicidal 
schizophrenic who had just left a psychiatric clinic where he had been treated for mental 
problems. The incident triggered riots among young Muslims in immigrant neighbourhoods in 
Amsterdam and fuelled tensions between Muslims and non-Muslim communities in the 
Netherlands.  
The most lethal incident in the Netherlands since 9/11 occurred during the Queen‘s 
Birthday celebration (April 30, 2009), when a desperate man crashed his car through a watching 
crowd in an attempt to hit an open bus with the complete royal family. A total of eight people 
died, including the perpetrator. Sixteen others were injured. Several investigations are still 
ongoing. So far there are no indications that the perpetrator had a political motive. The incident 
will have far reaching consequences for security measures during future large scale public events 
involving royalty or other important public figures. 
The last three incidents illustrate how events unrelated to radicalisation or terrorism, but 
rather resulting from personal problems, can trigger intense public debate, fuel tensions between 
different communities, and lead to other types of violence. 
Public Awareness Campaign 
The increased tensions following the assassinations and a series of terrorist threats forced 
the government to initiate a public awareness campaign. It took quite some time before the 
decision was made, as the government wasn‘t sure such a campaign would be effective. After 
opinion polls and discussions in focus groups, the government finally agreed to organize a 
campaign under specific conditions. It did not want to have a one-off information campaign 
without any follow-up; thus, it decided on a three year campaign with a certain dynamic that 
should be evaluated. The results were to be used as a basis for refining the information strategy. 
The government also decided to focus and tailor the campaign for specific groups (e.g., youths) 
with message(s) translated for specific audiences and communicated via different channels. The 
campaign costs were 4.8 million euro over a period of three years. A special website was 
established: http://www.nederlandtegenterrorisme.nl. The first stage of the campaign focused on 
newspaper advertisements, radio commercials, and house-to-house pamphlets. In the second 
stage, the campaign was deepened by focussing on specific partner groups and a special focus on 
youths. In the third and last stage, new television and radio commercials will be focused on the 
results and the development of the campaign. In this stage, new strategic choices also will be 
debated. 
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Partly due to this campaign, the fear of terrorism has diminished from a peak in 2005 
when the Dutch population had the highest ratings in Europe. Further, the feeling of security 
among the general public in the Netherlands has improved. Nonetheless, thirteen percent of the 
population still fears a terrorist attack in the Netherlands. In 2008, 35 percent of the population 
felt secure everywhere in the Netherlands. This figure was a five percent improvement from 
2007. While overall fear levels have diminished, the Dutch still rank second highest in Europe, 
after the Spanish, in terms of feelings of fear regarding terrorism (Bakker, 2009). However, in 
general, people currently are more concerned about economic developments than about 
terrorism.  
People also started to think in a more nuanced way about the origin of terrorism and the 
consequences of radicalisation in the Netherlands. The majority of the survey respondents think 
that terrorists are not born as terrorists and radicalisation is not a unique characteristic of Islamist 
groups. The number of people concerned about radicalisation has decreased from 21 to 8 percent 
of the population, with estimates of radicalization in the Netherlands lower than in previous 
years. There is a general feeling that the terrorist threat is fuelled from abroad.  
Guidelines for Counterterrorism 
The launching of the public awareness campaign coincided with a symposium attended 
by local administrative authorities in 2006. Speakers from the city of London were invited to 
inform the Dutch authorities about the handling of the metro and bus bombings in July 2005. The 
threat in the Netherlands has convinced the government that counterterrorism policy warrants a 
broader approach than the traditional law enforcement approach. In an attempt to improve the 
integration of immigrants and provide a future perspective for an alienated and frustrated 2nd & 
3rd generation, existing policies have to be adapted. New ways of cooperation have to be 
developed, involving both cooperation and coordination between new organizations on different 
administrative levels. 
Traditionally, disaster management in the Netherlands is handled bottom-up. The scale of 
the disaster determines whether it should be handled on a higher (provincial) or even a national 
level. This approach does not work very well for terrorism. Depending on the type of terrorist 
attack (e.g., cross-border incidents), there should be immediate coordination at the national level. 
Also, the triggering of agencies to take action depending on an evolving scenario can be better 
managed using a top down approach. Effective public relations strategies should be ready for 
execution when a situation occurs.  
The Dutch government decided to focus its policies on the prevention of further 
radicalisation of Muslim youths and the abolishment of so-called ‗hot spots‘ of radicalization, 
including the development of new ways to communicate between Muslims and non-Muslims and 
the involvement of people on different administrative levels. This approach has been working; in 
its latest threat assessment, the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism concluded that four 
hot previously identified hot spots are no longer considered as such.  
The majority of the Dutch Muslims live in the four major big cities (Amsterdam, 
Rotterdam, Utrecht, and The Hague). These cities are currently involved in implementing 
various initiatives not only to improve the relationships between the various population groups, 
but also to deal with the social and economic problems related to specific groups. Some cities 
have been better than others in countering segregation. This has impacted the outcome of recent 
municipal elections. 
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The Dutch government identified 40 big city districts that were problematic. These 
districts were classified as ―backward‖ from a socio-economic point of view, based on a variety 
of criteria. This backward socio-economic situation creates a breeding ground that may 
contribute to future radicalisation. The assumption is that, by improving the living conditions in 
these city districts, radicalisation can be prevented. The local authorities decide on their own 
what kind of projects they will support, depending on local circumstances and budgets that face 
severe challenges in some cases. 
Shift in Voting during 2006 Municipal Elections 
A growing dissatisfaction of the general public with the national government has built up 
over the years and has affected the outcome of recent elections. The outcome of the March 2006 
municipal elections was viewed as a score card for the national government. The non-indigenous 
population did vote and showed a high voter turnout. This event was promising, as some radical 
Muslim clerics have argued that faithful Muslims should not participate in democratic elections. 
This activity is seen as a threat because of fears it may result in a parallel society.  
The outcome of the 2006 municipal elections was interpreted as a rejection of the 
national government. There were big losses for the parties of the governing coalition. The non-
indigenous population voted overwhelmingly (80%) for the left-wing Labour Party (Party van de 
Arbeid). Many non-indigenous voters cast their votes for non-indigenous candidates. In 39 cities, 
left-wing parties won an absolute majority. Despite these majorities, the PvdA formed coalitions 
with the Christian Democrats in many city councils. Commentators pointed to the danger of an 
ethnic division along party lines.  
New parties for the non-indigenous population have been established that will participate 
in the next parliamentary elections. Some of them hope to gain a significant number of seats in 
parliament. One party, the Party for Non-indigenous Dutch (PAN), includes in its party 
programme the following goals: the abolishment of the obligatory integration course, the 
establishment of a Ministry for Cultural Development, the introduction of school uniforms, a 
general pardon for asylum seekers who already have lived at least five years in the Netherlands, 
and the integration of Turkey into the EU. 
Many right-wing parties that fared well during the previous election were essentially 
punished in the election for their polarising policies during the prior years. Many voters were 
tired of this polarisation and were looking for a more democratic future focused on consensus. 
They expected that improved social conditions would be attained by voting for the left-wing 
parties.  
Since the assassinations of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh, many observers and 
commentators have spoken about a so-called gap between the government and the people. 
During the election, campaign politicians developed new ways to reach out to the people in an 
attempt to improve their political involvement. The gap still exists and the Party of Freedom 
(PVV) of PM Geert Wilders and the Proud on the Netherlands (TON)-movement of Rita 
Verdonk have tried to exploit the undercurrent of popular frustration about national politics. 
Geert Wilders, in particular, has been able to organize a new party focused on appealing to the 
right-wing of the political spectrum that has not fallen apart due to internal struggles and 
personal egos. Opinion polls indicate support for his party is increasing, and the party is seen as a 
threat to the governing coalition. The established political parties have difficulty in handling Mr. 
Wilders‘s provocative way of making politics.  
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The shift in voting was most clear for the ten major big cities in the Netherlands, and had 
consequences for coalition formation. There are substantial differences in the political climates 
in these big cities. This climate was very dependent on the polemics between the cultural 
approach of the integration problem and the social economic approach. Each city has its own 
accents in this debate. 
Quarterly Threat Assessment 
One of the outcomes of improved cooperation in the field of counterterrorism is the 
production of a national quarterly threat assessment. The assessments are based on the 
integration of contributions from the various intelligence agencies and the police based on 
relevant information concerning terrorism and radicalisation. On the basis of these contributions, 
the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism formulates a comprehensive national assessment. 
An unclassified version is presented to the parliament.  
Some of the highlights from the latest assessment follow. The international jihadi threat is 
still one of the main components of the terrorist threat against the Netherlands and Dutch 
interests abroad. Due to its military involvement in Afghanistan and alleged insults to Islam, the 
Netherlands and its interests are considered priority targets. The main theaters of the global jihad 
are the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area, Northern Africa, Yemen, Iraq, and Somalia. In these 
regions, organisations are active that support the global jihad. They are seen as a threat to 
Western, including Dutch interests. As the American surge in Afghanistan is building, a new 
peak of violence is expected in Afghanistan during the summer. This may result in increased 
levels of anxiety and retaliatory attacks against coalition partners, including the Netherlands. The 
probability of a jihadi attack against Dutch interests is the highest outside of the country, 
particularly in regions where international jihadi organisations have built up terrorist 
infrastructures and may exploit local circumstances. On several occasions, the Netherlands has 
been explicitly mentioned in threat videos and audio messages by jihadi organisations.  
The local Dutch jihadi networks have kept quiet for some time and activities are largely 
focused on situations abroad. During the last reporting period, no travel movements of Dutch 
jihadis to training camps abroad have been observed. Two Dutch jihadis remain in the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border area. It is assumed that the presence of Dutch jihadis in foreign training 
camps or theatres of the global jihad may result in strategic or tactical coordination of attacks in 
the Netherlands. This also may be true for nationals of other Schengen-countries.  
The presence of Salafis in the Netherlands is increasingly a topic of scientific research, 
including efforts to try to clarify how Salafi Muslims experience and practice their religion. 
Preliminary results indicate that it is important to differentiate Salafi Muslims from Muslims in 
general. In addition, results indicate that, apart from the group of intolerant ―purists,‖ there are 
many believers who are willing to adapt their religion to the daily life in a Western society 
(Samenvatting Dreigingsbeeld, 2009). 
Sentencing of the Hofstad Group 
The Hofstad group was seen as a local Islamist terrorist organization composed of nine 
persons, including Mohammed Bouyeri, Jason Theodore James Walters, Ismail Akhnikh, 
Mohammed Fahmi Boughabe, Nouredine el Fathni, Youssouf Ettoumi, Ahmed Hamdi, Zine 
Labine Aouraghe, and Mohammed el Morabit. The name ‗Hofstad‘ was a codename used by the 
Dutch domestic intelligence service (AIVD) as it started monitoring the group. Hofstad is the 
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popular name for the city of The Hague, where some of the members had been active. The group 
was influenced by the takfiri ideology. Key member Mohammed Bouyeri was responsible for the 
murder of the Dutch writer and filmmaker Theo van Gogh in November 2004. Bouyeri was 
convicted in July 2005 for planning and carrying out the attack. Thirteen other suspects were 
taken into custody on various charges in connection with the murder. Nine of the total fourteen 
suspects were convicted for membership in a terrorist organisation and are currently serving 
various sentences, from one year to life imprisonment (EU Commission, 2007). 
As a result of the introduction of new anti-terrorism legislation, the trial ended for the 
first time in a conviction. Although the general prosecutor was satisfied with the outcome, seven 
cases will be appealed. The prosecutor is seeking further clarification on a number of issues, 
including both a clarification of the concept of a terrorist organisation and a clarification of the 
distinction between the separate support activities and the terrorist purpose of the possession of 
weapons.  
The changes in penal law were the following:  
 Participation in an organization with a terrorist goal will become punishable. 
 The concept of participation was made more explicit and now includes financial and 
other forms of material support. 
 Preparation of severe crimes will become punishable, including the financing of 
terrorism. 
 Recruitment for the jihad will become punishable.  
 Conspiracy will become punishable as a terrorist crime.  
 The preaching of hate and incitement to violence will become punishable.1 
  
The judges indicated which evidence was convincing and legal. They also clarified that 
the freedom of religion and the freedom of expression are restricted at the moment that a violent 
act begins. The judges decided on a differentiated approach. Not everyone in the group received 
the same punishment. The judges decided that the Hofstad group was a criminal organisation 
with a terrorist purpose. 
Jason Walters was sentenced for attempted murder, but not for murder with a terrorist 
purpose. According to the judges, he didn‘t throw hand grenades to instil fear. Some 
commentators have criticised this ruling. Nouredine el Fahtni was deemed to be in possession of 
a weapon, but the judge was not convinced that it had a terrorist purpose. Some commentators 
have questioned how this can be reconciled with the ruling that he was a member of a criminal 
organisation with a terrorist purpose.  
Some observers did not agree with Mohammed Fahmi Boughabe‘s sentence for 
possessing radical documentation. In fact, these were Koran and Hadith texts. The sentence 
could be interpreted as an infringement on the right to freedom of expression. Members of 
parliament will investigate how the current law can be adapted in order to prevent situations in 
which possession of ordinary religious texts could end in convictions. 
                                                 
1
 For a discussion of Dutch counter terrorism legislation see: EU Commision. (2008, 19 December).The 
ethical justness of European counter-terrorism measures. Deliverable 12b, Work package 6 of the Citizens 
and governance in a knowdge-based society. Retrieved from www.transnationalterrorism.eu  
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In a recent assessment of Dutch anti-terrorism legislation, researchers pointed at several 
ethical bottlenecks in the Dutch approach. Dutch counter-terrorism policy exhibits a proactive 
approach to combat terrorism from its inception, in addition to its perpetration. Judicial, 
legislative, law enforcement, and intelligence reforms have been introduced in order to better 
tackle the threat of terrorism. Measures are no longer reactive by nature, as they used to be in the 
past. Pre-emption and anticipation of terrorism is in evidence when analysing the newly 
introduced counterterrorist legislation. According to the researchers, pre-emption and 
anticipation are an ethical bottleneck because they limit civil liberties, whether through 
legislation or through police action. The pro-active character of Dutch measures allows for an a 
priori limitation of civil liberties, and the manner in which these liberties can be taken away is 
not clear. Another trend is the lack of fair trials for those individuals who are detained on 
terrorism charges. Individuals have little recourse to defend themselves.   
The case of the Hofstad group received a lot of international attention. As an 
autonomously operating network of Muslim immigrants, the Hofstad group was an example of a 
relatively new development, which other countries were afraid could also occur on their territory. 
An analysis of this Dutch example was believed to be essential to improving counterterrorism 
policies in other countries.  
A number of persons with close ties to the convicted members of the Hofstad group 
network have not been convicted or were never arrested. Some of them are still under 
surveillance by Dutch authorities. As the most recent national threat assessment indicates, they 
have kept quiet and focus on activities outside the Netherlands. 
Obligatory Integration Course 
Currently, restrictive migration and asylum policies introduced by the government are 
being implemented. The policies created new obstacles for migrants to enter the country. The 
new policies try to provide the migrants with a better idea of what it means to become part of 
Dutch society. Following the policies of several other countries, the government introduced an 
obligatory naturalisation ceremony. The government declared the 24th of August as 
‗naturalisation day‘. The developments in the Netherlands are closely watched by other 
European countries. Some of them have already indicated that they want to introduce similar 
programs. One positive spin-off is the creation of new jobs in Morocco and Turkey. In these 
countries, new enterprises have emerged that help people prepare for the obligatory examination 
in order to increase their chances of passing the test. 
Asylum Figures and Population Projections for the Netherlands 
Asylum requests gradually increased since the mid-1970s. In the second half of the 1980s 
and in the early 1990s, the figures increased exponentially and reached a peak in 1994, with a 
total of more than 50,000 requests. Since 2000, the number of requests decreased to about 
10,000, partially due to a more restrictive policy. New requests are highly dependent on wars 
elsewhere in the world and on differences in national asylum legislation. Asylum seekers know 
about loopholes and find out about countries with the least restrictive policies.   
According to the latest population projections, the percentage of the non-indigenous 
population will rise in the coming years from 19 percent (3.1 million) to 30 percent (5 million) in 
2050. The overall population will only slightly increase (with 800,000) to a peak of 17 million in 
2050. Thereafter the population of the Netherlands is expected to decrease. The demographic 
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changes will cause a number of social and economic problems. The proportion of the elderly will 
significantly increase in the coming years, from 14 percent to a peak of 25 percent in 2040. 
Predictions indicate shortages on the labour market that will result in a demand for a more 
focused immigration policy. In the past decade, the number of Dutch with a double nationality 
has more than doubled, from 400,000 to 900,000. The previous government wanted to abolish 
the possibility of having two nationalities. The State Council, however, suggested that this is a 
bad idea, and has asked for support for the idea that citizens can have more than one identity. 
Illegal Entry and Permission of Migratory Labour 
The estimates of the number of illegals in the Netherlands vary from 46,000 to 225,000; 
however, if the East and South Europeans are not included, the estimate is 125,000. Most illegal 
immigrants in the Netherlands came from Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia. More restrictive 
entry policies usually result in increased number of illegals. Economists state that the presence of 
more people always results in more economic activity. They consider finding replacement 
workers as a temporary problem. In their view, more legal migration will result in less illegal 
jobs. Some experts say that closing the borders in Europe disturbs the self-regulating mechanism 
of emigration, allowing for high levels of exploitation, as well as increasing numbers of people 
imprisoned.  
Some say the Netherlands has the worst situation imaginable: closed borders and 
increasing pressure by a globalising economy. In 2006, the government decided to open the 
borders to admit workers from Eastern Europe. This decision was part of a larger trend; one 
million East Europeans already have been allowed into the European Union. The Netherlands 
handed out 30,000 work permits. Opening the borders is expected to increase that number to 
70,000. This decision can have important consequences for specific economic sectors (e.g., 
transport). The current economic crisis is reducing employment opportunities and has forced 
many East Europeans back to their home countries. 
Concentration of the Non-indigenous Population in the Major Cities 
The non-Western, non-indigenous population in the Netherlands comprises little more 
than ten percent of the total population. The migrants are mainly concentrated in the four major 
big cities: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht, and The Hague. Although there are variations among 
the cities, a disturbing trend is that the level of segregation is increasing. This trend is a major 
issue that city administrations are trying to counter, with some efforts more successful than 
others. Rotterdam succeeded in reducing the level of segregation, while segregation levels for 
Turks and Moroccans in both Amsterdam and Utrecht increased. People from Surinam and the 
Dutch Antilles tend to be less segregated than are Turkish and Moroccan people. 
Another disturbing trend has been coined the ‗white flight‘ from the big cities. The 
indigenous population is moving away and being replaced by non-indigenous people. High 
percentages of the indigenous population live on or below the poverty standard (Moroccans: 46 
percent Antillians: 43 percent, Turkish: 38 percent, Surinam: 36 percent). The big cities focus 
attention on the youths of the non-Western, non-indigenous population groups to try to reduce 
social problems. City councils try to improve the indicators for social problems, including school 
dropout rates, rates of youths without beginner‘s qualifications, poverty rates, rates of 
dependence on social security, segregation rates, and crime rates. 
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Muslims in the Netherlands 
Compared to other countries in Europe, the Netherlands has the highest concentration of 
Muslims (5 percent) after France (8-9 percent). By taking a closer look at the map of the 
Netherlands, we see that the strongest concentrations of the 857,000 Muslims are in the Western 
and Southern part of the country, especially in the big cities of Amsterdam, The Hague, Utrecht, 
and Rotterdam. The largest groups originate from Turkey (328,000) and Morocco (296,000). 
Other major groups come from Iraq (42,000), Afghanistan (36,000), Surinam (32,000), Iran 
(28,000) and Somalia (25,000). Surinam was a former colony of the Netherlands. Many people 
from Surinam decided to come to the Netherlands after their country became independent. The 
other four countries are theaters of the global jihad and have experienced prolonged periods of 
armed conflict, causing population displacement and refugees. According to the Dutch Minister 
of Integration, between 20,000 and 30,000 Muslims in the Netherlands are potentially attracted 
to Salafi ideologies, and 2,500 more might be susceptible to violent radicalisation. The latter 
figure represents only a mere 0.3 percent of the total Muslim population in the Netherlands 
(Veldhuis & Bakker, 2009). 
Tinka Veldhuis and Edwin Bakker describe the potentially violent tensions and conflicts 
in which Muslims are involved (both within and between social groups), and the underlying 
mechanisms that are responsible for causing inter-group conflicts. They focus on three different 
categories of events: a) Muslims ‗attacking‘ non-Muslims; b) non-Muslims ‗attacking‘ Muslims; 
and c) confrontations between or within Muslim communities. The authors describe the activities 
of a number of radical Muslim organisations that have a presence in the Netherlands, including 
the al-Jama‘a al-Islamiya (AJAI), Arab European League (AEL), Group Islamique Armé (GIA), 
Hamas/al-Aqsa Foundation, Hizb-al-Tahrir, Hofstad group, the Islami Büyükdogu Akincilar 
Cephesi (IBDA-C), Milli Görüs, Piranha group/Samir Azzouz, and the Teblig movement (Islami 
Cemiyet ve Cemaatlar Birligi).  
The fact that the release of the anti-Islam movie ‗Fitna‘ did not lead to angry responses 
by Muslim communities may indicate two things, according to these authors. Either the idea of 
intolerance and polarisation has been exaggerated, or Dutch society gradually has rediscovered 
its traditions and the importance of adhering to common rules and values, including showing a 
minimum level of respect and understanding.  
Africans in the Netherlands 
There is a large population of Africans in the Netherlands. Some came as migrants, others 
as refugees or asylum seekers. Their integration in the Dutch labor market is not very good. 
Unemployment is high and many work below their educational skill level. Indeed, the 
Netherlands has a number of well-known universities and schools that attract students from 
Africa. The distribution of distinct African communities throughout the Netherlands varies from 
one group to the next. The Angolese, Congolese, and Sudanese are more widely distributed 
throughout the country, whereas the Ethiopians/Eritreans and Nigerians mainly are concentrated 
in the four big cities. Due to better economic opportunities, large numbers of the Somalis moved 
to the UK during the past few years. In general, non-asylum groups (Ghanese, Nigerians) are 
much better integrated than are the asylum groups (Sudanese, Somali). The speed of the 
integration process very much depends on the motivation for migration. War and refugee trauma 
may hinder employment possibilities. Most African immigrants in the Netherlands have a 
stronger sense of community than is common in the indigenous population. For example, the 
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Somali community shows a higher level of organisation, which is possibly related to their clan 
structure. Nonetheless, many Africans in the Netherlands tend to feel quite lonely. Male Somali, 
Congole, and Angolese youths in the 10-25 age category exhibit higher crime rates than do other 
groups. This finding may be related to the lack of norms in their home country due to the 
perennial existence of armed conflict.  
Moluccan and Other Communities 
The real question after viewing the data on immigration and asylum is what these data 
mean in terms of a terrorist threat. The Netherlands had its first experiences in the 1970s with a 
problematic immigrant community that resulted in episodes of terrorism.
2
 At that time, the 
perpetrators were second generation South Moluccans. Their parents were given the choice in the 
1950s to come to the Netherlands after refusing to become part of the new independent 
Indonesian republic. They lived for a long time in poor housing conditions and were not very 
well integrated into Dutch society. The anger about their situation resulted in several terrorist 
attacks, including the occupation and hostaging of a school and the hijacking of a train. This was 
the first time the Dutch government had to decide about the deployment of military force in order 
to end the hostaging of passengers in a train, and this event had a traumatic impact on society. 
These experiences with terrorism within Dutch borders resulted in an extensive government 
program to improve the situation of the Moluccan community. This move turned out to be an 
effective approach, as no more serious violence occurred. However, a latent wish still exists for 
an independent Moluccan republic. The annual Moluccan demonstration in The Hague 
sometimes ends in limited clashes with the police no new terrorist attacks by Moluccans have 
been recorded since the late 1970s.  The lessons learned from this period are currently applied in 
dealing with the second and third generation of Moroccans. Government policies are 
implemented based on the assumption that social-economic and psychological approaches will 
reduce the motivation to engage in violence. 
Moroccan Community 
The Moroccan community currently is considered to be the most problematic. Many 
Moroccans came to the Netherlands in the 1960s and 1970s when there was a big labor shortage. 
They came as migrant workers and many believed that it would be a temporary affair and that 
they would return to their home country. However, many in fact decided to stay in the 
Netherlands and brought their families over. It is the second and third generation that is 
responsible for many of the current crime and violence problems. 
Many Moroccan youths reject both their parents and Dutch society, which, in their view, 
do not offer them a future. Thus, they have developed a kind of ‗counter culture.‘  In trying to 
develop a new kind of identity, some of them came into contact with radical jihadist ideology, 
which provides them with readymade answers for their problems. Contact with this ideology is 
facilitated by the Internet and other means of modern communication technology. Through 
webpages and chatrooms, they develop their own ideology that justifies violence and motivates 
them to engage in terrorist acts. The process of becoming radicalized to the point of engaging in 
collective violence can commence with self-recruitment; however, more and more research 
indicates that group dynamics and the role of so-called ―spiritual guides‖ play decisive roles in 
                                                 
2
 For a history of terrorism in the Netherlands, see: Siem Eikelenboom. Niet bang om te sterven. Dertig 
jaar terrorisme in Nederland. Amsterdam: Nieuw Amsterdam Uitgevers, 2007, 293p. 
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this outcome. Several radical networks with a multi-ethnic character have emerged in which 
Moroccans play a dominant role. Further radicalisation could cause one or more of these 
networks to engage in violent activities. 
Veldhuis and Bakker described the radicalisation process as follows:  
radicalisation is a gradual process that has no strictly specified beginning or end. It is a 
twofold process including a shift in thinking towards fundamentalism and a heightened 
readiness to act on behalf of a cause. Secondly, its gradual nature indicates that in most 
cases, the direct causes or triggers of radicalisation are unclear and can even be unknown 
to the radicalising person. Rather, radicalisation is the product of a combination of causal 
factors that interact and that is unique for every individual. People are drawn to radical 
movements or ideologies for different reasons, of which some are more conscious than 
others. Whereas some are primarily inspired by ideological or political motivations, 
others might simply be attracted by action and adventure or seek group membership to 
obtain a positive identity. Even more so, radicalisation can occur beyond the 
consciousness of the relevant person, who might not be aware that he or she is in a 
process of radicalisation (Veldhuis, Bakker, 2009, p.84).  
The European Commission‘s Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation also emphasized in 
its final report the diverse paths of radicalisation:  
What follows from the understanding that terrorist groups may consist of different types 
of individuals who undergo diverse paths of radicalisation is not that it is futile to develop 
strategies of prevention to target all these diverse types but rather that it is necessary to 
develop several specific measures which may fit each separate type of dimension and to 
be prepared to adapt to changes. Some of these types are affected by social and economic 
interventions, others by psycho-social factors and by ideological and political issues. 
Thus, preventive strategies have to be tailored to the specific drivers behind each main 
type of activist and the specifics of the various groups.
3
 
Expanded Definition of Terrorism 
Due to European pressure, the official Dutch definition of terrorism has been expanded in 
recent years. Traditionally, a distinction was made between terrorism and what was called 
politically motivated activism. Since the Netherlands for a long time had no home-grown 
terrorist movements, the authorities did not want to see activists who used a certain degree of 
violence immediately labelled as terrorists. The majority of Dutch activists stuck to the unspoken 
rule that no violence against persons would be used during their activities. There are, however, a 
number of cases where their activities could have ended in fatalities. The assumption in the 
1970s and 1980s was that calling activists ―terrorists‖ would drive them underground. Due to 
international pressure, it no longer is possible to maintain the distinction. For a long time, animal 
activism in the Netherlands was not called terrorism, as it is in some other European countries 
where activists are willing to cross the threshold of personal violence. As the activities of Dutch 
animal activists have become more violent, political pressure has been building to treat them as 
terrorists. The Dutch domestic intelligence agency was forced to spend more energy on the issue 
and to increase its investigative efforts. 
                                                 
3
 Radicalisation processes leading to acts of terrorism. A concise report prepared by the European 
Commission‘s Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation, 15 May, 2008, p.13. The report contains 13 
recommendations for further research on radicalisation leading to terrorism. 
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Recent Terrorist Incidents Involving the Dutch 
Those who consult the MIPT terrorism knowledge database will find very few terrorist 
incidents in the Netherlands. Dutch people have a higher chance of getting involved in terrorism 
when they are abroad. The Dutch like to travel and are very active abroad in all kind of activities, 
including NGO work. As Salafist jihadi terror organisations no longer consider relief 
organisations as neutral actors in the situation of armed conflict, relief workers have increasingly 
become targets of terrorism. In a rising number of occasions, Dutch citizens were targeted. Arjan 
Arkel worked for the NGO Doctors without Borders in Chechnya. He was kidnapped and held 
hostage for over a year. In the end, a ransom was paid after which he was released. A Dutch 
speedskating coach who had contacts in Moscow finally succeeded in speeding up the 
negotiations. Another Dutchman joined an international tourist group that traveled through the 
desert in northern Africa. The group was kidnapped and held hostage by the Algerian Salafist 
Group for Predication and Call (GSPC). Due to successful mediation by the son of Moammar 
Gaddafi, the German government paid a ransom, after which the group was released. Currently 
the successor of the GSPC, the Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is holding another 
group of European tourists hostage. They have threatened to kill a British citizen if the British 
government does not release from prison the radical cleric Abu Qatada al-Falastini. Over the 
years, jihadi organisations have discovered that the kidnapping of foreigners can be a profitable 
tactic and may help to finance their operations. Several jihadi organisations have introduced this 
tactic, causing a rise in kidnappings of foreigners.  
The first big shock after 9/11 for Dutch society was the assassination of politician Pim 
Fortuyn, just a few days before parliamentary elections in 2003.  It was likely that he would have 
become the leader of the party that won by a large margin. He was killed by a left-wing 
environmentalist. If it would have been a Muslim migrant, it could have caused a severe violent 
backlash against the Muslim community. The assassination was a big shock because many 
believed that this kind of violence was not possible in the Netherlands. For many people, Fortuyn 
was the personification of a new strong leader who would introduce new groundbreaking 
changes. Many people still believe that his death prevented important political change. Although 
his party won a significant victory in the elections, it fell apart quickly due to internal disputes.  
Assassination of Theo van Gogh 
Pim Fortuyn was one of the persons who put many important issues on the political 
agenda, resulting in heated debates about dealing with the social and economic problems related 
to the presence of the non-Western, non-indigenous population groups. Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a 
Somali refugee who studied political science in the Netherlands, became a member of 
parliament. She became the spokeswoman for the emancipation of Muslim women. In order to 
put this topic on the political agenda, she decided to make a short movie. Film director, Theo van 
Gogh, was asked to produce the short ten minute movie. They decided on a movie with a certain 
shock value. When it was broadcast, it led to angry reactions by Muslims. The anger over the 
film, in part, triggered the assassination of Theo van Gogh by Mohammed Bouyeri, a Dutchman 
of Moroccan origin who was thought to be well-integrated. Ayaan Hirsi Ali became an 
international celebrity and her movie and books have garnered many prizes. She has become a 
scapegoat for many radical Muslims who want to take revenge on her. Since the death of Theo 
van Gogh, she has been under 24/7 protection and can no longer move around in the country 
without bodyguards. She had plans to produce a second edition of the movie. As a result of the 
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commotion related to the Mohammed cartoons in Denmark, she postponed her plans and has 
focused on writing books that have been translated in many languages and sold very well. 
Since the murder of Theo van Gogh, there has been a lot of debate on whether the killing 
was an indication of a new trend. The question was posed as to whether radical Muslims would 
focus their attention on public figures that do play a role in public debates about 
immigration/asylum and integration issues. The tactic fits strategy papers of Islamist 
organisations that assume that by targeted killings of public figures, societies can be destabilised. 
This destabilisation would be the first phase of a struggle that has three stages. These strategy 
papers also suggest how targeted killings can be executed most effectively. It is not known if 
Mohammed Bouyeri read these suggestions, but the way he executed the murder of van Gogh 
was done in a very calm and controlled way. He left a last will stuck with a knife on the dead 
body and walked away in the direction of a park. He had expected to be killed by the police. He 
was shot in the leg and survived. From prison, he succeeded in writing a paper that was 
smuggled to friends who then placed it on the Internet. The text may inspire others to execute 
new attacks. 
New Phase of the Global Jihad in Europe 
According to the French historian and Islam expert, Gilles Kepel, three phases of the 
global jihad can be distinguished (Kepel, 2005). Whether jihadists focus on the ‗near‘ enemy or 
the ‗far‘ enemy is a continuing debate within the various jihadist organisations, including al-
Qa‘ida. Some of them focus on the ‗near‘ enemy, while others focus on the ‗far‘ enemy. 
According to observers, jihadists tend to shift from the ‗near‘ enemy to the ‗far‘ enemy if they 
come under severe pressure in their own home country. As this pressure varies from country to 
country, it is logical that we‘ll see great variation among various jihadist organisations.  
But after Madrid and London, the assassination of Van Gogh, and the various plots that 
have been prevented, it has become clear that Europe has become a theater for the jihad. The 
Norwegian researcher, Peter Nesser, studied jihadi plots and attacks in Europe. He categorised 
them in three periods and found that the plots and attacks have spread to an expanding circle of 
countries in Europe (Nesser, 2008). 
1994-1996: Europe functioned as an arena for local jihad, when GIA activists took 
their local, Algeria-based, struggle to France, in an attempt to deter the former 
colonial power from further involvement in the conflict between local Islamists and 
the secularist military regime. 
1998-2003/2004: Europe functioned as an arena for global jihad, when several terror 
networks linked to and trained by AQ planned and prepared mass casualty attacks 
against the interests and citizens of the U.S., Israel, and to a minor extent, France. 
2003/2004-2007: Europe became a target for global jihad, when AQ inspired Islamist 
militants planned, prepared, and executed attacks against European countries that 
contributed to the U.S.-led global war on terror (GWOT). Many of these militants 
were recruited and radicalised within Europe‘s jihadi underworld, and they appear to 
have been motivated principally by European participation in the invasion of Iraq. 
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Processes of Radicalisation in the Netherlands 
The Dutch government and the Dutch intelligence agencies have been very active in 
analysing the current threat from jihadist organisations in order to understand the process of 
radicalisation and in developing countermeasures. A number of key reports and policy 
memoranda were written with recommendations that currently are being implemented.
4
 One of 
the outcomes of these analyses was that countermeasures will only have effect when they are 
differentiated and multidisciplinary. This approach has been successful to a certain degree. 
Administrative countermeasures taken against a number of radical mosques have reduced 
radicalisation. Radical Muslims became more aware of the measures and have taken their own 
precautions. Recent reports indicate that mosques controlled by Salafis are very active in da‘wa 
(literally, ―invitation‖ or ―summons‖ to learn more about Islam) activities and try to influence 
other more moderate mosques and organisations. Another trend is that Moroccan groups have 
tried to persuade Turkish groups to fulfill their Muslim duties. This would be in line with the 
development we have seen in London, with attacks being executed by cells with varying ethnic 
backgrounds. 
The traumatic attacks and the tense situation in the Netherlands have resulted in a wave 
of academic research on radicalisation, terrorism, and counterterrorism. Muller, Rosenthal, and 
de Wijk have been responsible for the most interesting collection of nearly 1,000 pages of 
research results (Muller, Rosenthal, & de Wijk, 2008, p.996).  
Many Dutch researchers participated in a project financed by the European Commission 
under the Sixth Framework programme. The FP6-project Transnational Terrorism Security and 
the Rule of Law had its final conference in February 2009 in Brussels. During the two-day event, 
experts took part in seven plenary and discussion sessions, providing relevant insights in the 
current state of affairs. Topics included media and terrorism, radicalisation and counter-
radicalisation, and security and ethics of counter-terrorism measures, among others. A 
comprehensive final publication of the research findings will be released later in 2009. The 
project has its own website with all deliverables and background papers, including one on causal 
factors of radicalisation, containing two case studies on Mohammed Bouyeri and Samir Azzouz.   
The website also contains a concise report of the final conference. 
In one of the workshops, interesting insights were presented on the research of successful 
and failed terrorist plots in Europe. A quarter of the studied plots in some way involved al-
Qa‘ida. Furthermore, it was revealed that, while home-grown terrorism indeed is rising, the 
phenomenon is certainly complemented by ‗fly-in‘ terrorists. 5 
                                                 
4
 AIVD. From Dawa to Jihad‘ (2004); Ministery of Integratioon: ‗Resilience & Integration Policy‘(2006); 
Ministry of Justice: ‗Radicalism & Radicalisation‘(2006); NCTb: ‗Radicalisation in Broader Perspective 
(2007); AIVD:  `The Rise of Islamic Neo-radicalism in the Netherlands‘   (2007); NCTB: - ‗Salafism in 
the Netherlands‘ (2008). 
5
 For details about the project and its results see: www.transnationalterrorism.eu; Separately the European 
Commission established an expert group on violent radicalisation. This group published the report: 
Radicalisastion processes leading to acts of terrorism‘ in May 2008. 
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Dutch Debate about Counterterrorism 
In the fall of 2003, a memorandum of the Minister of Justice sketched the new counter 
terrorism approach of the Dutch government. He defined three counterterrorism goals:  
1) Prevention of terrorist attacks; 
2) Preparation of consequence management for attacks with large scale 
consequences;  
3) Increase attention to the causes of terrorism 
For each of these three goals, specific projects have been developed. A national coordinator for 
counterterrorism was appointed and tasked to structure the activities of the twenty different 
agencies involved in counterterrorism activities, divided over five different ministries.   
There has been a debate behind the scenes whether this coordinator and his new 
organisation should be developed into a separate homeland security department. No further 
developments in this direction have occurred since the last elections. 
The National Coordinator for Counterterrorism 
One of the main new features of Dutch counterterrorism policy is the development of the 
National Coordinator for Counterterrorism (NCTb). This development has forced the twenty 
involved agencies to cooperate in a national framework and has resulted in a national policy. 
Authority structures and responsibilities are now more clearly defined. Different generic attack 
scenarios have been developed in order to see at which moment certain measures have to be 
taken in the preventive sphere, in the crisis management sphere once an attack is ongoing, or in 
the investigative sphere once an attack has occurred. The scenarios are regularly updated as new 
assessments become available. 
In May 2009, the government published a National Risk Assessment, which includes 33 
disaster scenarios. The scenarios are divided in thematic sections, including climate change and 
polarisation and radicalisation.  
A number of specific projects have been formulated that are currently being 
implemented. The Dutch approach to terrorism is much broader than to traditional law 
enforcement. In order to reduce the terrorist threat, developments in the major big cities have to 
be closely watched. Further segregation has to be prevented, and more efforts should be made to 
integrate the non-indigenous population groups. More attractive alternatives should be provided 
to youths so that they no longer have to choose between crime and making a jihad. The 
government is fully aware that this progress is only possible when Muslim organisations are 
actively involved in tackling the existing problems. 
Priorities in Counterterrorism 
Intelligence and law enforcement agencies have been active in defining specific projects 
in order to focus their limited manpower capabilities on what they consider to be the most 
dangerous issues. A major innovation was the introduction of the so-called CT-infobox. This 
means that several agencies sit physically together in one building with their own information 
systems that are not connected. By sitting together, they can consult each other on suspect 
individuals in order to prepare comprehensive CVs of terrorist suspects. These files can be used 
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to make decisions regarding whether legal or administrative action can be taken against a 
specific person. The method was developed bottom-up and has been gradually expanded. 
Memorandums of Understanding (MOU‘s) have been developed with the aim of bringing in 
more government agencies. Also, specific research tools have been developed to analyse the 
information in the participating agencies‘ databases.  
The NCTb identified the internet as a hotspot of radicalisation. Research on the Hofstad 
group found that it acted as a virtual organisation and that it followed a multi-media strategy. 
The group provided foreign productions, including translations and subtitles, developed its own 
productions, developed its own web pages, distributed material via public websites, and made 
use of encryption. Most interestingly, research on the group revealed that internet-based material 
from the group contained clues about future terrorist attacks. This finding underlines the 
important of internet surveillance. After the arrest of Mohammed Bouyeri, his computer was 
confiscated. The documentation on his hard disk was submitted for analysis to an Islam expert 
from Utrecht University. Ruud Peters was able to identify important triggers and events that 
played a role in Bouyeri‘s radicalisation process. 6  
Another important investigation was conducted by Albert Benschop of the University of 
Amsterdam. As an internet researcher, he monitored developments on radical Muslim websites, 
and was able to analyse the development stages of jihadi webpages in the Netherlands. He 
identified three important shifts. In 2002, he saw a change in the terrorist threat from an 
exogenous to an endogenous threat. In 2003, he saw for the first time an explicit focus on the 
Netherlands as a target for attacks. In the third quarter of 2005, he identified the first independent 
Dutch jihadi web site. These developments resulted in three overlapping periods. The first period 
was dominated by foreign-oriented web pages in the Netherlands. In the second period, Dutch 
jihadi sites with a foreign orientation emerged. Finally, Dutch jihadi sites emerged with a focus 
on the Netherlands (Benschop, 2005, p. 140). 
 Over the last few years, the NCTb has coordinated an informal task group monitoring 
radical discourse on the internet and formulating policies to counter this form of communication. 
During its work, the task force has identified five categories of sources for radical discourse. For 
each category, different counter-approaches are necessary. The five categories are: a) interactive 
mainstream sites (e.g., Hyves, YouTube); b) opinion sites (e.g., Telegraaf, Elsevier, GeenStijl, 
Fok.nl, Marokko.nl); c) hot spots of radicalisation (e.g., thabaat.net, Stormfront, Holland 
Hardcore); d) radical/jihadi material sites (e.g., freewebs, geocities, tripod); and e)closed sections 
of radical websites (e.g., password protected virtual networks for insiders).  
 The NCTb has been involved in a number of activities related to radicalisation via the 
internet. In its quarterly threat assessments, the NCTb reports on ongoing developments based on 
internet monitoring. The Dutch government has introduced a reporting station on Cyber Crime 
Reporting Center (MCC). The NCTb will raise awareness of the MCC and inform the public 
regarding what kind of activities can be reported. When violations of the law are reported, a 
Notice and Take Down (NTD) procedure can be initiated. During the last year, the Dutch police 
have been involved in a large international project to counter child pornography. An extensive 
study was written by the WODC on filtering of child pornography on the internet, which 
                                                 
6
 Peters testified during the trial of Bouyeri. His analysis has been included in: Coolsaet, R. Jihadi 
terrorism and the radicalisation challenge in Europe. London: Ashgate, 2008, 195p. 
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contains important lessons for countering radical expressions on the internet. The government 
has formulated a specific memorandum on the maintenance of law and order on the internet, 
which contains a number of specific countermeasures. The government has developed a legal 
framework for the NTD procedure. The Dutch police have been involved in the so-called Check 
the Web project. This project has created an ICT-portal with EUROPOL, and has participated in 
a research project on the as-Sahab media production branch of al-Qa‘ida. The government took 
steps to ratify Article 7 of the Treaty of the Council of Europe (penalisation of documentation 
that may contribute to the preparation of a terrorist crime) and to integrate the EU framework 
decision on counterterrorism (penalisation of the training for committing a terrorist crime) in 
national legislation. Finally, the Dutch government participates in the UN working group on 
countering the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes.  
 The experiences of the internet working group of the NCTb have resulted in important 
lessons. The working group will focus its activities on the following three issues. First, it will 
work on a joint assessment and identification of the hotspots of radicalisation on the internet. 
Second, it will develop more coordinated negotiations with providers in order to promote self-
regulation and the facilitation of information on signals of radicalisation. Finally, it will initiate 
research into means other than criminal law to influence radical expressions on the Internet. 
Conclusions 
1. The threat situation in Europe is worsening and possibly shifting to new areas. During 
2008, only one Islamist attack was recorded in Europe, in the United Kingdom. During the same 
year, a total of 187 radical Muslims were arrested the majority in France, Spain, and Belgium. 
Many of them were involved in terrorist fundraising and logistical support activities. Sketchy 
information about Islamist terror cells that have been disrupted over the last years indicates that 
attack planning for new devastating attacks, including suicide attacks, continues.    
2. By looking at social-economic and demographic trends, it becomes clear that a number 
of factors are advantageous to the Muslim population in Europe. In terms of numbers, their 
position will get stronger. If governments want to reduce radicalisation, they will have to expend 
more effort on social-economic issues and on integration. Counterterrorism is much broader than 
just law enforcement, as the Dutch experience has shown. The body of knowledge that has been 
produced on radicalisation during recent years has resulted in a more nuanced and realistic Dutch 
public opinion about the situation. The level of fear has been reduced, and the general feeling of 
security has improved. The situation is still fragile and unexpected events could easily trigger a 
backlash. New provocations by rightwing politicians could be exploited by radical organisations 
and could be used by terror organisations to justify new attacks. The response to ‗Fitna‘ has 
shown an increasing level of resilience in the Dutch Muslim community.          
3. The challenge for many European governments, including the Dutch government, is to 
reconcile a more restrictive immigration policy with a more effective integration policy for the 
non-indigenous population groups, especially those that are Muslim. The Dutch authorities have 
made gradual progress in this field, although there are still many problems to be solved. A small 
cadre of hardcore Moroccan youths is still causing headaches for the authorities.    
4. For decades, the different cultural, ethnic, and religious groups in the Netherlands lived 
together peacefully and did not experience serious violent conflict. Compared with other 
European countries, the Netherlands has experienced hardly any violence between social groups 
and has had only limited experiences with violent inter-group conflict. The traumatic incidents of 
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the past years led to tensions and conflicts between Muslims and non-Muslims and eroded the 
idea of the Netherlands as a peaceful and tolerant country. The restrained response to ‗Fitna‘ 
may, however, indicate a gradual rediscovery of its traditions and the importance of adhering to 
common rules and values, as well as showing a minimal level of mutual respect and 
understanding. As Geert Wilders has announced the production of a second edition of Fitna, it 
remains to be seen if this trend can be maintained. 
5. During the past few years, the terrorist threat gradually has shifted from domestic 
home-grown groups to ad hoc coalitions of external networked groups that adhere to the 
ideology of the global jihad and are inspired by messages of the core al-Qa‘ida leadership. 
Afghanistan currently has become the main theater of the global jihad, where a decisive struggle 
is to be expected. As the coming period probably will show an increase in the level of violence, 
this may trigger retaliatory attacks against European coalition partners, including the 
Netherlands.   According to Dutch assessments, an implicit hierarchy in targets is in use by AQ 
depending on the number of military personnel involved in Afghanistan. For that reason, it is 
likely that other countries, like the United Kingdom and Germany, will be hit first. The 
upcoming elections in Germany are another reason that this country probably will be hit first 
because AQ considers it to be the weakest link in the chain. The terror network is no longer 
completely dependent on European volunteers to execute attacks in Europe. There are 
indications that it is willing to use ‗ready made‘ terrorists from among the Taliban in order to 
execute attacks in Europe. 
back to top 
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4.2. The Role of Community Services in Radicalization and 
Deradicalization:  The Potential Power of Aid to Marginalized 
Communities (Shawn Flanigan) 
Author:  Shawn Teresa Flanigan 
Organization:  San Diego State University 
Contact information:  shawn.flanigan@sdsu.edu 
It is well known that some violent organizations actively engage in education, health, and 
social service provision. While some of the most visible providers of services are organizations 
like Hamas in the Palestinian Territories (Levitt 2004 and 2006) and Hezbollah in Lebanon 
(Fawaz, 2000; Flanigan, 2008; Hamzeh, 2004; Harik, 1996; Harik, 2004; Ranstorp, 1998; Saad-
Ghorayeb, 2002; and Usher, 1997), other organizations like Sri Lanka‘s Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) are known to exert control over local nonprofit service providers in an 
effort to harness their resources and expertise (Flanigan, 2008). While there are several ways to 
conceptualize relationships between violent organizations and service provision, one important 
dynamic is the use of social service provision by terrorist organizations as a tool to gain the 
acceptance of their community (Flanigan, 2006). Education, health, and social service provision 
is an influential tool because of the power dynamics that are inherent to service provision. As 
Emerson notes in his theory of reciprocal power-dependence relations, ―the power of A over B is 
equal to, and based upon, the dependence of B upon A‖ (Emerson, 1962). Therefore, the amount 
of power a health or social service provider has over the service recipient is a direct function of 
the service recipient‘s ability to obtain aid elsewhere. In many cases, the service recipient‘s 
ability to obtain aid elsewhere is quite low, particularly in the developing world, where many 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are the sole organization operating within their service 
area. Because of the prevalence of sole service provision, the poor are often in a position where 
they must choose between seeking services from a particular provider and going without services 
entirely. This is hardly a real choice when the services one speaks of include food aid, urgent 
medical care, clothing, shelter, and other goods and services essential to meeting basic human 
needs. Therefore, poor community members in the developing world suffer a serious power 
disadvantage in comparison to a violent organization that is the sole provider of a needed service 
(Flanigan, 2009). This power can have a radicalizing effect as it is used to subtly silence 
community members who might otherwise oppose an organization‘s violent activities, to 
generate widespread favorable opinion of the organization within the community, and to recruit 
community members to actively participate in the organization‘s violent activities (Flanigan, 
2006).  
However, the power dynamics inherent to service provision also offer other actors 
opportunities to intervene in the process of radicalization and use community services as a tool to 
deradicalize community members and generate support for nonviolent entities. This can be done 
by proactively providing aid to generate community support before violent organizations gain a 
foothold in this domain, ―competing‖ with violent organizations to be a more effective service 
provider, supporting legitimate government entities to provide public goods effectively, and 
supporting service provision by alternative organizations such as local apolitical NGOs. 
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Community Services as a Radicalizing Force 
Community members do not necessarily accept or support the violent activities of terrorist 
organizations, even in situations where violent groups purport to be fighting for the community‘s 
social and political wellbeing. The degree to which communities accept the violent activities of 
political insurgents and terrorist organizations varies. The level of acceptance spans a continuum, 
ranging from a complete lack of acceptance and active resistance to terrorist organizations to the 
active participation of the community in violent movements (see Figure 1). Terrorist 
organizations can use community service provision as a tool to move community members in a 
rightward direction from a lack of acceptance to passive acceptance, genuine acceptance and 
favorable opinion, and active participation in the violent activities of the organization (Flanigan, 
2006).  
 
Figure 1. Continuum of Community Acceptance of Violent Activities by Terrorists and 
Political Insurgents (Flanigan 206) 
Community service provision can help organizations gain various levels of acceptance in 
the community. In some cases, service provision may result in passive acceptance of violent 
activities by community members who might otherwise oppose such tactics. This is particularly 
true when community members are low-income or otherwise marginalized, and when the 
services provided meet essential human needs. In this context, community service provision can 
serve as a means of silencing dissent and subtly coercing community members to accept the 
violent activities of an organization. Although clientele may not be ―coerced‖ in the most literal 
sense of the word, economic and social conditions oblige them to accept services from 
whomever provides them. Because many nonprofit agencies have a monopoly within their 
service area (Lipsky & Smith, 1989-90) and NGOs heavily supplement public functions in many 
developing countries (van Tuijl, 1999), community service provision becomes a powerful tool 
for gaining acceptance in the developing world. Many service recipients will be reluctant to 
express discontent with the organizations upon which they often depend for their very survival. 
If they have no other service options, community members desperate to meet their basic needs 
will not be overly concerned with whether or not their service provider is secular, religious, or 
engaged in political violence. The scale and immediacy of the needs of the local population mean 
that even those opposed to violent activities will be silenced and subtly coerced by the 
organizations‘ ability to provide assistance (Flanigan, 2006).  
Of course, in other contexts, there may be widespread goodwill toward violent 
organizations and genuine acceptance by community members. The violent activities of some 
terrorist organizations are merely one aspect of their broader social and political agenda. In light 
of these political and social activities, including community service provision, it is not unusual 
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for communities to view these organizations favorably in spite of—or even because of– their 
violent activities. Hezbollah in Lebanon is an excellent example: although the United States 
government regards Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, in Lebanon, the group is widely 
respected for its network of charities and social services. Hezbollah‘s investment in these 
resources has built a constituency that is beholden to its Islamic sociopolitical agenda, and 
popularity among the disadvantaged has allowed it to enter the mainstream political sphere. 
Similarly, in Palestine, ―the peaceful face of Hamas has been more visible to residents,‖ 
(Juergensmeyer, 2003) many of whom benefit from Hamas-supported health clinics, schools, and 
food aid programs, and indeed voted Hamas into political power. Community services are such a 
powerful tool for generating goodwill and political support that Sri Lanka‘s LTTE has been 
known to rebrand NGO services as coming from the LTTE itself in order to benefit from the 
subsequent positive perception in the community (Flanigan, 2008). 
Finally, some scholars argue that terrorist organizations sponsor community services 
solely for the purpose of socializing and recruiting new militants who later will become active 
participants in their violent activities. Levitt suggests that Hamas uses an array of schools, 
orphanages and summer camps as a means of socializing religious and secular children to aspire 
to die as martyrs (Levitt, 2004). The community services of terrorist organizations can encourage 
the active participation of the community by socializing community members to be sympathetic 
to their cause, supplying a pool of potential new recruits, and providing a safety net to militants 
and their families. Sometimes the additional benefits offered to militants‘ families, such as 
widows pensions, special housing, and other community services, can serve as a motivation for 
participation in violent activities. This has been evident in Lebanon, Palestine, and Sri Lanka 
(Flanigan, 2006, 2008; Levitt 2004, 2006). 
Using Community Services to Deradicalize and Gain Community Support 
The absence of state service provision and a reliance solely on services provided by non-
state actors is a key factor that makes charitable service provision such a powerful tool for 
gaining acceptance in the developing world. There are distinctive power dynamics at play in 
social service settings, especially when the community members served are poor and 
disenfranchised (Handler, 1973, 1979). Relationships between social service providers and 
service recipients are governed by the amount of power each can bring to the exchange, and the 
amount of power a social service provider has over the service recipients is a direct function of 
the client‘s ability to obtain aid elsewhere (Hasenfeld, 1987). This pattern suggests that outside 
actors not only can gain a foothold in communities by offering services that generate community 
support, but can attempt to undermine violent service providers‘ support by providing 
community members with alternative services of broader scope and higher quality.  
Proactively Providing Aid  
Perhaps the most proactive deradicalization strategy suggested by the literature on power 
in service provision is providing aid in communities where violent groups have not yet 
developed a foothold. While more research is necessary to make a conclusive statement to this 
effect, statistical evidence shows that organizations are more likely to become engaged in service 
provision when they operate openly (i.e., are not clandestine) and have a military arm, which 
suggests the organization has the logistical and financial resources for larger-scale operations 
such as community services (Asal & Flanigan, forthcoming). Targeting aid to areas where such 
organizations operate may be an effective strategy to preemptively subvert the power of terrorist 
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service provision in radicalization. By reducing overall poverty, needs will become less acute 
and service providers‘ leverage will be further reduced. While humanitarian aid supporting 
community service provision promised to be useful, aid supporting political inclusion can also 
prevent radicalization. Social and political exclusion have been show to motivate both charitable 
activity and political violence. Minority groups form separate systems of social support when 
they are excluded from mainstream social systems and, in extreme cases, desire separate states 
when they are excluded from mainstream politics. By ensuring that minority groups have access 
to services and a valid means of political expression, the impetus to resort to separate and at 
times violent tactics will be reduced (Flanigan, 2006). Proactively providing aid has the 
additional benefit of generating community support for the state providing community services, 
creating loyalty that will be more difficult for terrorist organizations to discourage. 
Supporting State Service Provision 
Another important strategy for undermining radicalization suggested by research is 
supporting legitimate state actors in effective community service provision. Judith Palmer Harik, 
an expert on Hezbollah formerly at the American University of Beirut, has stated (Prusher, 
2000): ―There‘s a continuing initiative by Hezbollah to provide more services. . . .People all over 
would love to have the state provide them because they don‘t want to be beholden politically, but 
the state doesn‘t do it.‖ The large scale of Hezbollah‘s aid efforts, and the notable absence of 
others offering assistance, has earned the group great favor in the south of Lebanon. Hezbollah‘s 
construction charity Jihad Al Bina‘a rebuilt 5,000 homes in more than 80 villages in the 
aftermath of Israel‘s bombardment of southern Lebanon, often providing aid well before the 
arrival of United Nations assistance. Such responsiveness heightens Hezbollah‘s image vis-à-vis 
the Lebanese government, and increases its popularity with the local population (Ranstorp, 
1998).  
Supporting Service Provision by ―Mainstream‖ Nonprofit Organizations 
A third strategy for undermining radicalization suggested by the literature on power in 
social service contexts is using aid to ensure that other ―mainstream‖ apolitical nonprofit 
organizations are able to provide quality services. Theory shows that sole service provision and 
an acute need for service increases the influence that nonprofit service organizations have over 
poor service recipients. If service recipients have the ability to choose between service providers, 
they will not be beholden to the single, perhaps terrorist-supported, charity that offers them 
education, food, and health care.  
―Competing‖ with Violent Organizations in Service Provision 
Theory suggests that providing competitive services is critical to the success of these 
strategies in undermining the radicalizing power of terrorist-provided community services. 
Offering multiple service choices to community members is not sufficient. As can be seen in 
countries like Lebanon, Hezbollah‘s services are broader in scope and more sophisticated than 
those offered by the state, making Hezbollah a much better choice as a service provider. For 
these strategies to be successful, aid must be used to support the services of state and NGOs to 
such an extent that, from a purely utilitarian perspective, these organizations‘ services are clearly 
superior to those offered by violent organizations. Ensuring that services are more broadly 
accessible than violent organizations‘ services by providing services in a variety of geographic 
areas and to all ethno-religious groups should also make these strategies more viable.  
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4.3. Counter-radicalization Programs:  Tackling Terrorism and Hate Crime 
in London:  A Brixton Case Study (Robert Lambert) 
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When academics and think-tanks address terrorism and organised crime from a top-down 
perspective, it is generally to locate both phenomena in the broader context of international 
politics. On the more rare occasions when academics and think-tanks address terrorism and 
organised crime from a bottom-up perspective, it is almost always to interrogate the psychology 
and dynamics of groups of participating individuals. This chapter adopts a bottom-up vantage 
point as well but is drawn instead from research that interrogates the experience of eye-witnesses 
to terrorist recruitment and street crime at close quarters in a specific community in London. As 
such, it seeks to introduce preliminary evidence concerning the authenticity and value of the eye-
witnesses‘ community experience, most especially their knowledge of a handful of young men 
who have become involved in terrorism and street crime. Crucially, this community perspective 
reveals interplay and inter-dependence between street crime and terrorism that is otherwise 
overlooked.   
For insider observers on the sometimes violent streets of Brixton in South London, it is 
axiomatic that petty drug dealers operate in the lowest and most vulnerable places within an 
intricate global network of organised crime. Their commercial relationship with the commodity 
they trade in is often compromised by their own dependency on it. According to a former 
Brixton drug dealer with five convictions for drug related crimes it was ‗stupid street kids‘ like 
him ‗who took the risks and got prison while the men in suits who kept clean and made lots of 
money‘ (interview, 3 December 2007). As such, the lives of petty drug dealers are far removed 
from the lives of the global strategists who manipulate their day-to-day livelihoods. Similarly, 
there is a growing appreciation on the Brixton street that many foot soldiers in the global 
network of al-Qaida inspired terrorism lead lives equally far removed from those of the global 
strategists who provide the propaganda and rationale for their actions. On the Brixton street, it 
has also become clear that petty drug dealers and other servants of organised crime have 
sometimes become involved in al-Qaida inspired terrorism as foot soldiers. While, from one 
standpoint, that might be seen as swapping one low status high risk occupation for another, it 
would appear that the individuals concerned see it differently – believing that al-Qaida inspired 
terrorism affords them high status and religious rewards. That, at least, is key evidence that 
emerges from the research on which this chapter is based. It is not, however, intended to suggest 
a strong link between the two types of criminal activity merely to emphasise three key points: 
that petty criminals and terrorist foot soldiers share similarly distant relationships with the 
strategists that determine their high-risk criminal activities; that circumstances exist in which the 
street skills of petty criminals are likely to be valued and deployed in terrorist scenarios (Kenney, 
2007); and that petty criminals may be attracted to terrorism in the belief that it affords status and 
dignity that their lives have otherwise lacked.  
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The purpose of this chapter is, therefore, to introduce a small police and community 
partnership project in Brixton in which the police partners have sought to make use of their 
community experience with street crime and terrorism in ways that offer tangible support to 
those individuals who have or who may become involved as foot soldiers for global terrorism or 
petty drug dealers for global organised crime. The focus is on a partnership project that operates 
as a form of counter-terrorism and counter-street crime - a community intervention that does not 
have imprisonment or punishment as its goal. While such a community based approach is 
familiar with respect to gun crime and other kinds of street crime, it is still novel in the context of 
counter-terrorism (Briggs et al, 2006). However, while the chapter gives clear indications about 
the value of the community partner‘s experience in a counter-terrorism context, it is principally 
concerned with establishing the authenticity and value of their experience as a tool to provide a 
richer understanding of terrorism and street crime from a particular community perspective. 
Given that terrorism and drug dealing take place in different communities for different reasons, it 
would, of course, be wrong to transpose experience outside the context of a specific  community. 
Equally, it follows, top-down and bottom-up outsider perspectives of terrorism and organized 
crime are likely to be deficient when they interpret relationships and motivations without the 
benefit of coherent community contexts provided by insiders. 
In January 2002, a partnership project was launched between the Muslim Contact Unit 
(MCU) in the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) in London and the managers of the Ibn 
Taymiyya Masjid (also known as the Brixton Mosque) in Gresham Road, Brixton. For ease of 
reference, the project is described as ‗the partnership‘ and the mosque managers as the ‗Brixton 
Salafis‘.1 A key aim of the partnership at the outset was to better understand how a handful of 
former worshippers at the mosque, most notably the shoe-bomber Abdul Raheem (otherwise 
known as Richard Reid), had become involved in al-Qaida terrorism. Both sides of the 
partnership (MCU and Brixton Mosque management) brought considerable experience of 
terrorism and street crime to the table and it is that experience that enriched their discussions and 
now informs this chapter.
2
 During the course of their early discussions, it became clear that street 
crime and terrorism were often inter-related issues.  For instance, in Richard Reid‘s case, his 
prior involvement on the bottom rung of organized crime activity pre-figured his defining role as 
an expendable foot soldier for al-Qaida (Lambert, 2009).     
Bombing Brixton 
Even before 1981, residents of Brixton had a very clear understanding of what terrorism 
was - bombs and bomb threats. Brixton tube station opened in 1971 and by 1981, the majority of 
Brixton residents used it regularly for journeys to work in central London or for social trips to 
the West End and across London. Like all London commuters, they had become familiar with 
the use of bombs in London as a terrorist tactic by the Provisional IRA (PIRA). Even during long 
periods in the PIRA campaign when PIRA bombs did not explode in London, Brixton 
                                                 
1
 ‗Salafi‘ is a ‗name derived from salaf, ‗pious ancestors,‘ given to a reform movement that emphasizes 
the restoration of Islamic doctrines to pure form, adherence to the Qur‘an and Sunnah, rejection of the 
authority of later interpretations, and maintenance of the unity of ummah‘ (Esposito, 2003).  
2
 This chapter draws on the author‘s experience as a Metropolitan Police officer in London from 1977 to 
2007, with a particular emphasis on his role as head of the Muslim Contact Unit (MCU) from 2002 to 
2007. In turn, the author draws on participant observation and interviews carried out in the Brixton 
Muslim community from 2006 onwards in his subsequent role as a researcher.  
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commuters were constantly reminded of the extant terrorist threat by regular anti-terrorist 
campaigns that warned them to be vigilant. More specifically, litter bins were removed from 
stations so that PIRA terrorists could not plant bombs in them; adverts on the tube highlighted 
suspicious behaviour and unclaimed luggage as potential signs of terrorist activity; heads of the 
MPS Anti-Terrorist Branch became household faces as a result of regular television appearances 
at the scenes of London bomb attacks.   
Then at 5.30pm on 17 April 1999, without warning, a bomb concealed in a rucksack 
exploded in the street just fifty yards from Brixton tube station. Thirty-nine people were injured 
by flying shrapnel, shards of glass and nails embedded in their bodies.
3
 Among the victims was a 
23-month-old boy who had two centimeters of a nail in his brain, which surgeons at Great 
Ormond Street Hospital carefully removed during a one-and-a-half-hour operation. For the 
remainder of April, Brixton residents were joined by all Londoners in a state of heightened alert 
as the ‗nail-bomber‘ carried out further bomb attacks in Brick Lane and Soho, killing three and 
injuring sixty-five in the latter attack. On 1
 
May 1999, Anti Terrorist Branch officers arrested 
David Copeland, a right wing racist, for the attacks. Copeland said he planted the bomb in 
Brixton because he hated blacks and wanted to be the spark that started a race war in Britain. 
One black Brixton resident who narrowly missed injury in the attack recalled his emotions when 
first reading Copeland‘s testimony at his trial: 
I was disgusted but not completely surprised. Copeland was not untypical in his racism. 
We had grown up with that kind of National Front thinking in London. He was just unusual 
because he took his hatred to an extreme. All the things Copeland says about killing blacks and 
white supremacy were things we knew were just below the surface (interview, 6 December 
2007).  
Copeland made it clear that he had chosen to plant his first bomb in Brixton because he 
viewed it as the heart of the black community in Britain. On that basis, his motivation was not 
unlike the PIRA who targeted the West End and the City of London because it was the symbolic 
heartland of the British Establishment. Brixton was also a venue that had come to symbolise 
what many locals regarded as a black rebellion against a racist establishment: the Brixton riots in 
1981. The same interviewee as above (interview, 6 December 2007), who had grown up in South 
London about three miles from Brixton, said: 
―After the riots, Brixton became the hub of our community. It gave us a sense of pride. 
We would talk about ourselves as ‗the brothers‘. Later on when the Stephen Lawrence 
case happened it was like we were all under attack from these racists who surrounded us 
in places like Eltham, Croydon and Morden in the outer suburbs.‖    
For four weeks, the Metropolitan Police Anti Terrorist Branch (SO13), backed by Special 
Branch (SO12), led an intensive investigation to identify and apprehend the nail-bomber. Key 
aspects of the investigation – CCTV evidence, scene examinations, forensic examinations, 
witness appeals – were conducted in the same manner as in cases where the suspects were PIRA 
bombers. The overwhelming majority of detectives involved in the investigation had experience 
                                                 
3
 On the day of writing, another isolated and poorly educated white Englishman, Nicky Reilly, was 
sentenced to life imprisonment for his failed attempt to explode a nail-bomb in a busy shopping area in 
Exeter in May 2008. Unlike Copeland, who was inspired by white supremacist racist propaganda, Reilly 
was inspired by al-Qaida propaganda. 
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in investigative and intelligence work against PIRA and dissident Irish republican terrorist 
groups. For the two detectives who subsequently launched the MCU, the experience of the 
Copeland case, combined with experience of PIRA terrorism and experience of a myriad of other 
international terrorism cases, provided a basis for assessing al-Qaida‘s influence in London.  
Becoming Muslim 
In the early 1990s, three close friends, one of them Abdul Haqq Baker, were 
contemplating giving up lifestyles typical of secular young black Londoners and becoming 
practicing Muslims. Twelve years later, when they first met the MCU in 2002, they had become 
established leaders in the Brixton Mosque and had already faced tough questioning from the Anti 
Terrorist Branch and the media about their connections to the al-Qaida shoe-bomber, Richard 
Reid. They would face similar questions about their connections to Zacarias Moussaoui, 
subsequently convicted of terrorism offences connected to 9/11. Guilt by association is a 
powerful tool in the hands of the media and especially so for the Brixton Salafis who had known 
both would-be terrorists extremely well. In essence, what they said to a skeptical media was 
accurate - they had been fighting the influence that had seduced Reid and Moussaoui to become 
terrorists - along with others in their community - for nearly the entire decade. Significantly, it 
follows, had the three close friends never embarked on parallel journeys of religious conversion 
in 1991, the impact and influence of powerfully charismatic al-Qaida propagandists based in 
London would likely have been even more pronounced.  
Moreover, it is reasonably certain that, had they not converted and become the peaceful 
Salafi leaders that they were in their neighbourhood and mosque, that the al-Qaida propagandist 
Abdullah el Faisal – not Abdul Haqq Baker – would have become the voice of Brixton Mosque, 
thereby forging a North-South London al-Qaida alliance with another extremist, Abu Hamza, 
who was in control of the Finsbury Park Mosque during the latter half of the same period. As it 
was, the extent to which a small, new Salafi community effectively challenged the authority of 
violent extremists and disrupted al-Qaida‘s UK goals was overshadowed by the terrorists‘ 
success in a handful of cases. The fact that this insider Salafi account
4
 was, and remains, 
obscured by outside commentators anxious to describe Salafism as the slippery slope that leads 
to al-Qaida terrorism provokes rich research interest in the Brixton Salafis‘ compelling 
testimony. Rather, on the evidence presented in this chapter, the replacement in 1991 of Public 
Enemy cassettes with tapes of Qu‘ranic recitation – for use while driving around London - 
symbolises a change of lifestyle and allegiance that proved wholly beneficial to the safety and 
well being of fellow Londoners. Three street-wise partygoers became street-wise Salafis and put 
their street skills at the service of their new community, at the very time it was being subverted 
by violent extremists. 
When asked to recall the compelling moments in their initial conversion process before 
this trend became established, the three Brixton Salafis suggest they responded positively to 
overtures from a handful of black Londoners who had already embraced Islam as a way of 
enhancing their self-esteem. For one of the three key Brixton Salafis, a personal introduction to 
Islam by a respected friend proved decisive. That said, it is notable that most of the fifty plus 
                                                 
4
 Abdul Haqq Baker, chairman of Brixton Mosque since 1994, and leading London Salafi, is currently 
completing his own PhD thesis, ‗Countering Terrorism in the UK: A Convert Community Perspective‘ so 
as to further reduce this deficit in community grounded research in relation to al-Qaida influence in the 
UK. 
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black London Muslim converts met or interviewed during the course of participant observation, 
my PhD - London Muslims and Muslim Londoners: Countering al-Qaida Influence 
(forthcoming, 2009) - highlighted that hearing and reading what are believed to be the actual 
words of Allah as written in the Qur‘an had a powerful impact. The appeal of this direct and 
simple connection to their creator appears crucial to the conversion process. In this respect, the 
Brixton Salafis have something in common with early modern London Protestant forebears like 
the radical Anabaptist William Gouge who rejected religious hierarchy in favour of direct 
engagement with sacred texts (Hill, 1991). Later, the Salafi converts would want to hear and 
understand the scripture of their new religion in their original Arabic – but initially it was a life 
changing experience to be connected so clearly to their creator, even in a language that was 
translated from the original.  Those with traditional religious upbringings recalled that 
Christianity could not compete with that clarity.       
Their ongoing interest in black American politics and the influence of two iconic figures, 
Mohammed Ali and Malcolm X, who had both embraced Islam was also influential. As in 
Mohammad Ali‘s case, it was not orthodox Islam, but the Nation of Islam, that had achieved a 
small but significant presence in Brixton, as elsewhere in black London. Malcolm X, on the other 
hand, is known to have moved from the Nation of Islam to an acceptance of orthodox Islam. One 
of the founding Brixton Salafis (interview, 11 December 2006) commented on the significance 
of Malcolm X in his own conversion to Islam: 
―I read Malcolm X‘s autobiography in 1991 and it made a huge impression. What 
attracted Malcolm X to Islam was absolutely crucial for me as well. It was equality and 
justice for blacks. When Malcolm X went on hajj to Mecca it was the first time he really 
experienced a fraternity of people where black, white, yellow, brown did not matter. He 
had left the racial segregation of America behind and he found true equality in Islam. We 
were still facing discrimination in London and we were attracted to Islam for some of the 
same reasons as Malcolm X. We were also curious about the Nation of Islam but we soon 
came to see that it was a deviant, false religion with no proper foundation.‖   
Nor was becoming Muslim entirely inconsistent with an established trend in the local 
black community towards fundamentalist and evangelical Christian practice. Again, interviews 
and participant observation suggest that both local evangelical approaches to Christianity and 
Salafi approaches to Islam appealed especially to sections of the black youth community who 
had become involved in and wanted to escape from the pervasive influence of street gang - 
‗gangster‘ - culture where violent crime and the risks of death, injury and imprisonment were 
high. Islam, in general, and the Salafi rendition of it, in particular, offered salvation, redemption 
and the opportunity to ‗wipe the slate clean‘ in much the same way as evangelical Christianity. 
Islam, however, had the advantage of being linked to an iconic black role model, Malcolm X. If 
Martin Luther King is remembered as a stereotypical Christian who turned the other cheek when 
faced with injustice, Malcolm X represents determined black activism that asserts itself against 
racism. That, at least, interviewees suggest, helps explain why becoming Muslim has particular 
appeal for local black youth. Thanks to the pervasive influence of black American and Jamaican 
street culture, the Atlantic gap had grown smaller. Jamaican influence also accounts for the 
strong presence in Brixton of Rastafarianism.  Here again, an iconic black figure, Bob Marley, 
blended strict religious adherence with political activism and street credibility. According to one 
local interviewee, the only drawback to becoming ‗Rasta‘ for Brixton youth wanting to escape 
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violent crime was that it did not remove them from the same street influences and tended to leave 
them at the mercy of Jamaican drug dealers (interview, 2 March 2007).    
By 1995, the Brixton Salafis had become the driving force at the Brixton mosque, by then 
a bulwark against the growing influence of al-Qaida propagandists and supporters in the area  
and also a centre of pro-active community interventions against gang violence and street crime. 
After two years spent evaluating the many competing strands of Islamic adherence prevalent 
locally, they decided to follow Salafi practice under the guidance of Salafi scholars in Saudi 
Arabia and Jordan. Such familiarity with the leading Salafi scholars of the day gave them useful 
tools with which to refute al-Qaida heavyweights like Abu Qatada who traded on their alleged 
links to key Salafi scholars. Despite a paucity of genuine English language scholarship on 
Salafism, the Brixton Salafis were quick to commend Quintan Wicktorowicz and Thomas 
Hegghammer, from the USA and Norway respectively, as two scholars‘ whose work on leading 
Saudi and Jordan based Salafi scholars they regard as being accurate and impartial (Wictorowicz, 
2006).   
Brixton is an important case study because Abdullah el Faisal regarded himself as being 
well qualified to attract black convert Muslims (like himself) to the al-Qaida flag. As we have 
already noted, he encountered effective opposition from the Brixton Salafis. However, it was not 
difficult for him to operate in the vicinity, away from the direct notice of the Brixton mosque. 
This is precisely what he did during the second half of the 1990s and right up to his arrest in 
2003, attracting black convert Muslims to wider Muslim youth audiences, many of whom had 
family backgrounds in Islam, albeit of a significantly different character. Typically, he would 
licence al-Qaida attacks that his audiences might see on the television and lesser street-level 
criminality that they might be engaged in. In the latter case, it would be commonplace to allow 
that young street robbers converting to Islam might continue their criminal activity so long as 
they only robbed non-Muslims, the kuffar. When the opportunity arose, the Brixton Salafis were 
extremely effective at countermanding this kind of advice to new converts with a background in 
street crime because they could relate to them on their own terms and putting el Fasial‘s 
erroneous analysis into its proper context. Again, in direct street level negotiations between local 
black Salafi leaders (aged in their twenties and thirties during the 1990s) and local black street 
criminals new to Islam (typically aged between fifteen and twenty), street credibility was crucial 
and readily understood. Physical presence and street credibility underscored religious authority.     
The Brixton Salafis were not always bound to win this kind of argument. The well-
documented cases of Richard Reid and Zacarias Moussaoui give ample testimony to the ability 
of al-Qaida propagandists to ‗radicalise‘ and recruit young members of the Brixton Muslim 
community during the late 1990s and early 2000s before 9/11. In an interview, one Brixton 
Salafi recalls how much effort he put into what might best be described as informal one-to-one 
counselling with Richard Reid in an attempt to help him move away from the influence of el 
Faisal and company – the ―Takfiris‖ as they became known on the streets. Significantly, that 
unsuccessful ‗counter-radicalisation‘ interview took place before Reid embarked on the 
international travels that culminated in his abortive attempt to explode a ‗shoe-bomb‘ on a 
transatlantic flight in the name of al-Qaida. Equally significantly, it took place before the Brixton 
Salafis had established a partnership relationship with the MCU. Prior to cementing that 
relationship with the MCU in January 2003, the Brixton Salafis had largely negative experiences 
of dealing with the Metropolitan Police. Indeed, in the aftermath of Reid‘s arrest in December 
2001, they were approached by both the police and media with a great deal of suspicion. This 
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was premised on the notion that they were likely to be part of a radicalising process that had 
caused or allowed Reid‘s progression to a would-be suicide bomber.  
Richard Reid 
When Abdul Haqq Baker and his close colleagues first heard the news that Abdul 
Raheem, otherwise known as Richard Reid, had been arrested for attempting to blow up a 
transatlantic flight en route to the U.S. at the end of 2001, they realised that the media would 
likely descend on the Brixton Mosque. Although Reid had disappeared from their radar over two 
years earlier, it seemed inevitable to them that his prior association with the Brixton Salafi 
community would be sufficiently well known to ensure they were implicated in the case. It was 
agreed that Abdul Haqq Baker would act as spokesman for the mosque. Within hours, the media 
arrived and Abdul Haqq Baker was kept busy dealing with their demands for information. He 
gave numerous interviews, conducting himself with dignity and provided very clear information 
that was accurate and truthful, generally while standing in the street outside the mosque in 
Gresham Road. We found it useful to review the press cuttings during interviews to prompt 
recollections of the events to which we were referring: 
―It was a cold day - as you can see from the pictures, I was wearing a thick jumper and 
gloves! I knew I would have my work cut out defending the masjid against some 
stereotyping but on the whole I was pleased with the way it went. I also knew my 
comments would be seized upon by Abu Hamza, Abu Qatada, Abullah el Faisal and 
company to say I was collaborating with the enemy (interview, 3 December 2006).‖     
Richard Reid would later be sentenced to life imprisonment in the United States after 
admitting that he tried to blow up a commercial flight using a bomb hidden in his shoe. At the 
time, it was thought that he acted alone, but it subsequently emerged that another British Muslim, 
Saajid Badat from Gloucester, had been earmarked by a ‗handler‘, Mizar Trabelsi (a former 
footballer serving a ten year prison sentence in Belgium for plotting to bomb a NATO airbase) to 
take part in the same or a similar attack (Dodd, 2006). In 2005, Saajid Badat pleaded guilty to 
charges of conspiracy to commit a terrorist act with Richard Reid, having been found to be in 
possession of an identical ‗shoe-bomb‘. While the evidence in the Badat case showed that al-
Qaida operatives had skillfully recruited two British Muslims to carry out a ‗suicide bomb‘ 
attack prior to 9/11, the initial media reports that confronted Abdul Haqq Baker on the doorstep 
of his mosque were more pre-occupied with stories about a ‗crazy loner‘ with a wild-eyed 
appearance. According to Baker (interview, 3 December 2006): 
―It was difficult to get across to the media a clear picture about Reid. They had this 
notion about him being a crazy fanatic. This was not helpful. He was not the brightest 
intellectually speaking and he was easily led but he still had good skills. What I would 
call street skills. He was a good graffiti artist for instance. So he was like a lot of young 
people in our community. He was part of a youth culture where street crime was normal 
behaviour. These are useful skills for people like Abdullah el Faisal to exploit. I‘m not 
saying el Faisal recruited Reid directly but we lost influence over Reid because of what el 
Faisal and the others were calling.‖   
The son of an English mother and Jamaican father, the so-called ‗shoe bomber‘ was born 
in 1973 in Bromley, South London. Reid attended Thomas Tallis secondary school in 
Blackheath, south-east London from 1984 to 1989. His father, Robin, told BBC News he had 
been in prison for most of Richard's childhood. "I was not there to give him the love and 
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affection he should have got," he said (BBC, 2001). This is how the key part of his story has 
been widely reported: 
―[Reid] fell into a life of petty crime and in the mid-1990s was jailed for a string of 
muggings, for which he served sentences in a number of prisons, including Feltham 
young offenders' institution in west London. It was while at Feltham that Reid is said to 
have converted to Islam. After his release, he followed the path taken by many other 
Muslim prisoners, to Brixton Mosque, in south London. The place of worship has a 
reputation for attracting converts and helping ex-offenders re-adjust to life in the outside 
world. Initially he fitted in well. Taking the name Abdel Rahim, he became known for his 
willingness to get involved in the workings of the mosque and to learn Arabic (BBC 
2001).‖ 
  ―In fairness,‖ Abdul Haqq Baker points out, ―the BBC reporting tended to be the most 
reliable and least sensationalist.‖ He confirmed that the following extract from a BBC report was 
accurate: 
―‘At some point Reid began to get involved with extremist elements,‘ says the chairman 
of Brixton Mosque, Abdul Haqq Baker. Reid was ‗tempted away‘ by ‗individuals who set 
up a few years ago away from the mosque,‘ Mr Baker says. ‗Their teachings were a lot 
more militant.‘ He says extremists worked on ‗weak characters‘ and believes Reid was 
‗very, very impressionable.‘ Reid attended external classes and started to question the 
peaceful philosophy of his teachers (BBC, 2001).‖ 
However, on examining the next extract from the same interview, Abdul Haqq Baker 
identifies ―the beginning of what has become a familiar problem,‖ the reduction of complex 
issues into sound bites. 
―[Reid‘s] appearance also changed, says Mr Baker. He went from wearing western 
clothes to the traditional Islamic robe - a loose, long-sleeved, ankle-length garment - with 
a khaki combat jacket on top (BBC, 2001).‖ 
Abdul Haqq Baker explained his concerns in interview (3 December 2006): 
―Now these two comments were separate. I was not saying that wearing traditional 
Islamic dress was in any way problematic, or an indication of Reid‘s extremism. On the 
contrary, it is more likely to be of concern when an individual switches from Islamic 
dress to western appearance – like in Zacarias Moussaoui‘s case [see below]. But what I 
was drawing attention to was Reid wearing a khaki combat jacket as an indication of the 
time when he started to get more militant. The bigger problem is that the media started to 
describe Reid‘s adoption of Salafi practice as part of his move towards extremism. This 
became the norm and was very damaging.‖ 
The next part of the BBC report makes a link to the case of Zacarias Moussaoui and 
Abdul Haqq Baker confirmed its accuracy: 
―There is speculation that at some point during his drift to a more extreme philosophy, he 
may have met Zacarias Moussaoui, who has been charged in the U.S. with conspiracy 
over the 11 September attacks. Mr Moussaoui, a Frenchman of Moroccan origin, also 
attended the Brixton Mosque during the 1990s but was expelled for his extreme views 
and his attempts to impose them on the younger, more easily influenced members. 
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Towards the end of 1998, Reid ceased worshipping at the mosque and is thought to have 
moved to Pakistan (BBC, 2001).‖ 
This same media bias/interpretation problem was identified by Abdul Haqq Baker as 
running through the rest of the report. ―Travelling to the countries that Reid travelled too is not 
necessarily the problem. Many British Muslims were travelling extensively at the same time 
without problem, what is different is Reid.‖ This was the comment he made with respect to the 
next extract to clarify how Reid‘s activities were different:   
 ―He reportedly sent several letters written in Arabic to friends in London. His mother, 
Lesley Hughes, who is separated from Reid's father, also believed he was in Pakistan. But 
mother and son eventually lost contact and in summer 2001 Ms Hughes telephoned 
Brixton Mosque seeking news. About the same time, Reid is believed to have embarked 
on an extensive travel programme, which saw him visit seven countries including some 
of the world's so-called ‗terror capitals.‘ [Reid] is thought to have spent time in Egypt, 
Israel, Turkey, Pakistan, Belgium, the Netherlands, France and possibly Afghanistan. 
Commentators have suggested he may have used some of these excursions to test the 
security arrangements on various airlines, before boarding American Airlines flight 63 
from Paris to Miami on 22 December 2001 (BBC, 2001).‖ 
In important respects, extracts from the following interview with Peter Herbert, a black 
UK lawyer, are more insightful. He visited Richard Reid in prison in the U.S. at the request of 
Reid‘s mother. He reports that Reid was perfectly sane, reflective, and self-possessed: 
 ―I am not crazy as they suggest, but I knew exactly what I was doing," [Reid] said. "Of 
course I would have been sad to have those people die, but I knew that my cause was just 
and righteous. It was the will of Allah that I did not succeed." His motivation for turning 
to violence, he said, was the foreign policy of the U.S. government, which, he said, had 
resulted in the murder of thousands of Muslims and oppressed people around the world 
from Vietnam to southern Africa to Afghanistan and Palestine (Dodd, 2006).  
Another Brixton Salafi commented that Herbert has captured an important aspect of the 
case here. ―Reid,‖ he said, ―was genuinely concerned about U.S. foreign policy. We all were. 
Just because he had not much formal education did not mean he was stupid. What he misses out 
though is that Brixton mosque always taught that British Muslims had no Islamic right to carry 
out attacks of this kind.‖ So, for this interviewee who once spent all night trying to talk Reid 
away from the teachings of Abdullah el Faisal ―and company,‖ there was a feeling of frustration 
that the report was missing the most important issues: 
―It was 1998 when I tried to talk Reid away from the extremists. We were up all night 
talking. In the end he agreed with me but in those days we had no way of following cases 
up. Our work was just spontaneous. I guess Reid must have gone back to el Faisal‘s 
erroneous teaching. Ideally, I would have followed up the meeting and kept on his case. 
But, at the time I had no time to do that kind of work. Nor did the brothers. We did the 
best we could to combat the false calls, and we worked long hours doing that (interview, 
3.9.07). 
The interviewee is representative of wider Brixton Salafi opinion when he argues that the 
Peter Herbert interview suggests that anger over foreign policy leads inexorably to terrorism. 
―This is what al-Qaida wants to suggest, so it has to be countered‖ (interview, 3.9.07).  The 
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interviewee was especially critical of the following extract of Peter Herbert‘s interview with 
Richard Reid that appears to accept the belief that Muslims are not inhibited from carrying out 
such actions: 
One issue that baffles those trying to counter al-Qaida is why young men will kill 
themselves for such a cause. Reid compared himself to the suicide bombers of Hamas. They did 
not have rockets or tanks or F16 jets to fight with, he said, and had to fight with the tools at their 
disposal. "What do you expect people to do?" he added (Dodd, 2006).  
The Brixton Salafi interviewee accepts Reid‘s observation about his political motivation 
is critically important when assessing how best to tackle the problem: 
―We don‘t disagree that this injustice exists. We do not try and apologise for U.S. or UK 
government action, but we explain how Islam tells you how to act responsibility. That 
Osama bin Laden and Richard Reid are falsifying their religion. Coming from us Salafis, 
that is a powerful message‖ (interview, 3.9.07).  
There was a lot of discussion amongst those who knew him about why Reid‘s attempt to 
ignite his bomb on the aeroplane failed. The fact that he appeared to have been so indiscrete 
about his attempt to ignite the bomb suggested to many of his former associates that he may have 
been wanting to get caught. This is more than just idle speculation and has more resonance now 
that it has emerged that his would-be accomplice Badat had recently pulled out. The main point, 
according to one interviewee, since Reid had an abundance of street-crime craft and would have 
known to prepare or prime his bomb in a way that didn‘t draw any attention – for instance in a 
toilet – had he been intent on escaping capture (personal interview, 3 September 2007). In the 
next extract the interviewee reckons Reid is being honest: 
[Reid] was fatalistic about his future. "I have to accept that what has happened is set," he 
said, a reference to the fact that sitting in a U.S. jail, having failed in his suicide mission, meant 
he would almost certainly never be released. But he missed his family, especially his mother, and 
felt remorse about what she now faced because of his notoriety. "I do feel sorry for my mum 
having to see me here. I had not wanted to see her, to protect her from all this, but [I] will see her 
if she travels to see me (Dodd, 2006).‖  
Later in Herbert‘s interview when he re-traces Reid‘s conversion, the interviewee 
comments that the issue of racism is important but notes that it was a common experience for 
scores of Brixton Salafis, so it is hardly a defining feature of radicalisation as Herbert suggests:  
―Reid had converted to Islam after his spell in Feltham. He said that in prison Islam had 
helped him to understand better the world around him. He also said that racism played a 
large part in the life he had experienced as a young person. For those wanting to 
understanding radicalisation, this is important. Reid's journey to violent jihad was not just 
fuelled by radical Islamist propaganda - he talked about the case of Stephen Lawrence 
and how that exposed discrimination in society (Dodd, 2006).‖  
The initial press portrait of Reid as a crazy man was finally laid to rest when his would-
be accomplice Saajid Badat was brought to trial. The sophistication of the conspiracy became 
clearer, as Peter Clarke explained: 
―Three years of intensive and painstaking international investigation brought us to the 
point where Saajid Badat had no option but to plead guilty to this horrendous offence. We 
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must ask how a young British man was transformed from an intelligent, articulate person 
who was well respected, into a person who has pleaded guilty to one of the most serious 
crimes that you can think of (BBC, 2005).‖ 
It seems entirely reasonable to pose the same question with respect to Reid, who may not 
have been ‗respectable‘ or ‗articulate‘ but who was almost certainly more streetwise and capable 
as a terrorist than Badat. Certainly, Reid‘s former associates think he would not have been as 
negligent as Badat in leaving a bomb at his home address for a long period of time – only to be 
found by police. Despite the speculation surrounding the circumstances of Reid‘s failed attempt, 
there have probably been sufficient examples of faulty bomb mechanisms in this field since 
December 2001 to suggest simple malfunction – a lack of expert preparation – in this case too.  
Zacarius Moussaoui 
Zacarius Moussaoui, convicted in the U.S. for al-Qaida terrorism in connection with 9/11, 
was also well known to the Brixton Salafis. Abdul Haqq Baker gave evidence on his behalf, 
principally to avoid his being sentenced to death – and thereby avoid the possibility of an 
erroneous claim that he was a martyr. Subsequently, he gave an interview to the BBC, which 
accords with the account he gave to the MCU: 
―Moussaouis‘ lawyers have called witnesses from Britain to try to show how he was 
radicalised in this country. He spent 7 years living here before he went to America. Abdul 
Haqq Baker was the main defence witness from Britain. He told the court that when he 
first met Moussaoui, he was an affable man whose behaviour changed when he started 
attending sermons by extremist preachers (BBC, 2006).‖ 
BBC reporter Nasreen Sulaman (NS) interviews him (AHB): 
 
NS Zacarius Moussaoui arrived in London in 1993 and enrolled at the South Bank University 
where he began to study for an MA in Business Studies. Moussaoui was born in Morocco 
but grew up in France where he was not known as a practicing Muslim. His interest in 
Islam began when he arrived in Britain he started to attend Brixton Mosque in South 
London. Moussaoui not only prayed at the mosque but was also to sleep there as he had 
yet to find any accommodation. It was here the chairman of the mosque Abdul Haqq 
Baker first met Moussaoui. 
 
AHB He was friendly he seemed like a very serious individual but had a sense of humour, quite 
jovial. 
 
NS How soon after he started Brixton Mosque did he start to change? 
 
AHB I‘d say it had to be about a year to eighteen months and that‘s when we were taking a 
quite firm stance against the extremists‘ propagation in the area and they moved off to 
other centres and opened or started renting other premises. I noticed that he started 
attending those premises and it was then we started seeing conflict about our ideology 
and practice and their ideology and practice. 
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Although the interview continues, it is important to highlight three points at this stage. 
The first point is that Abdul Haqq Baker‘s account is completely at odds with the account 
provided by Moussaoui‘s brother, Abd Saamad Moussaoui, in which the influence of the Brixton 
Salafis is seen as the route to al-Qaida (Moussaoui ref). This is hardly surprising because Abd 
Samaad Moussaoui had no firsthand experience of the London Muslim scene. It would be 
perfectly understandable that, from a distance, he would notice the changes to his brother‘s 
lifestyle brought about by becoming a practicing Muslim at the Brixton Mosque and then blame 
that change on his subsequent adoption of takfiri or al-Qaida ideology. It is an entirely valid 
perspective, especially for a brother, but it has negative ramifications when it is applied more 
widely. To conflate the influence of the individuals who recruited Zacarius Moussaoui into 
terrorism with the individuals who were best placed to prevent that happening is necessarily 
problematic. The second point is that Abdul Haqq Baker gave this interview in 2006 and, despite 
the fact that he had been telling the media since December 2001 that Abdullah el Faisal, Abu 
Hamza, Abu Qatada and company had never had control of Brixton Mosque or been imams 
there, sections of the media continued to repeat the opposite (see below). The third point is that 
the MCU explored these same issues with the Brixton Salafis three years earlier and had been 
able to verify them. To return to the interview:     
 
NS The increasing animosity between Moussaoui and the Mosque leaders was because they 
were against any form of violent jihad, which they regarded as an erroneous ideology. 
They had recently expelled their imam Sheikh Al Faisal who used his sermons at the 
mosque to advocate hatred and promote holy war. The radical preacher then went on to 
spread his brand of Islam in a nearby leisure centre and at Brixton Town Hall. Moussaoui 
would regularly attend these talks and Abdul Haqq Baker describes what they heard. 
AHB The type of jihad whereby you could commit suicide bombings and I‘ll give you a clear 
example. He was asked a particular question -- what should someone do if he has entered 
Islam and has AIDS? He said the best thing this individual can do for Islam is go to 
Palestine and blow himself up and kill as many Jews as possible. This was the type of 
Jihad that Faisal was propagating. 
NS Al Faisal is currently in jail after becoming the first Muslim cleric to be convicted for 
inciting racial hatred and soliciting for the murder of Jews, Americans and Hindus. 
Moussaoui continued to attend the Brixton Mosque in the mid 1990‘s. Whilst there he 
would encourage other Muslims to come with him and hear what Al Faisal had to say. 
This brought him into further conflict with those around him and, according to Abdul 
Haqq Baker, he became increasingly arrogant and disruptive. 
AHB There was one occasion when he entered the mosque in military wear and a rucksack on 
his back. He and a colleague of his, Yusuf, they went straight into the canteen. I 
remember looking at the dress and going in there and engage in dialogue as to why he 
was dressing like that? What was the purpose of this? Where he was coming from? He 
started shouting raising his voice saying he didn‘t want anything to do with me, don‘t talk 
to me about anything, go away from me leave me alone. Basically abuse. That showed 
the stage he had got to. Very proud of the way he had dressed and wanting to display that 
in the mosque as an act of defiance.  
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NS Abdul Haqq Baker is one of the few people to get close to Moussaoui and their friendship 
which lasted several years has given him an insight as to why the man who became 
known as the twentieth hijacker in the 9/11 conspiracy might have aspired to become a 
suicide bomber. 
AHB He wanted a sense of belonging and there was a sense of frustration at the atrocities being 
committed in the Muslim world. Now when you go to an extremist and listen to their 
rhetoric, which galvanises you to do something. He wanted to do something. He was 
actively seeking arenas for jihad. We had conversations about that asking me where is the 
next jihad, do you know where the next jihad is? I was saying no I don‘t and he got very 
frustrated as he believed I was withholding some information from him. So he was 
actively seeking what he could deem a battlefield. 
NS What do you think was the tipping point for Zacarius Moussaoui becoming involved in 
9/11 and the wider conspiracy? 
AHB One of the reasons I believe was that one of his friends Yusuf Xavier had died in 
Chechnya and that he was seeking similar fate. And this was the opportunity that he 
could see as such a fate.  
NS It has emerged in the court case that Zacarius Moussaoui had offered to help the 
prosecution in the case against him. Abdul Haqq Baker believes that he has deliberately 
been trying to sabotage his lawyer‘s efforts to stop him getting the death penalty.  
AHB It is my personal belief the reason he is doing this is because he wants that martyr status. 
If he receives the death sentence he believes that in the eyes of the Muslim community he 
will be seen as a martyr. If that is discredited in anyway by questioning his sanity then he 
will just be locked up in prison for a very long time and that will not give him any 
credibility at all. 
 
According to MCU officers, Abdul Haqq Baker is right to emphasise the importance of 
Abdullah el Faisal‘s ability to ‗galvanise‘ his supporters. Leadership is a crucial issue. When it 
came to giving new Muslims a sense of identity and belonging, both Abdullah el Faisal and 
Abdul Haqq Baker had outstanding leadership skills. The ability to imbue recently converted 
Muslims with recent involvement with drugs and related crime with a new sense of purpose and 
civic responsibility is well known locally. Indeed, it is worth noting that Abdullah el Faisal 
subsequently attracted significant followings in Willesden and Edmonton where, again, some 
black convert Muslims were often successfully encouraged to move away from lifestyles 
revolving around drug and alcohol abuse. One respectable Muslim leader in North London was 
full of praise for Abdullah el Faisal because of his skills in this area and found it difficult to 
accept the picture painted of Abdullah el Faisal at the Old Bailey (Lambert, 2009). According to 
MCU officers, such a blind spot towards extremists like Abdullah el Faisal was not uncommon 
in the wider Muslim community prior to 7/7 because of the extremists‘ ability to attract new 
converts to Islam and to influence them away from drugs, alcohol and ‗nightclub‘ lifestyles. For 
the MCU, the Brixton Salafis had a unique role to play in countering not only moves from 
damaging lifestyles but also protecting them from al-Qaida influence because they had a 
leadership that could match and outperform the extremists in relation to the same target audience 
(Lambert, 2009).  
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Trust Building 
Although the MCU was formed in January 2002, it was not until the end of the year that 
the unit was finally able to embark in earnest on a trust building project with the Brixton Salafi 
leadership. The reason for the delay was that the Anti Terrorist Branch had to undertake and 
complete an investigation into the Richard Reid and Zacarius Moussaoui cases and that involved 
interviews with Abdul Haqq Baker and colleagues at the Brixton Mosque. According to Abdul 
Haqq Baker, that experience did nothing to increase his confidence in the police.  Therefore, he 
left the MCU still needing to overcome his long held suspicion of this organization. The MCU 
posed at the time: which sections, if any, of London‘s diverse and burgeoning Muslim 
communities have any expertise in tackling al-Qaida influence amongst those sections of 
communities that are susceptible to it? Clearly, the Brixton Salafis had a wealth of evidence to 
demonstrate their experience and expertise in this field. What would also become clear to the 
MCU during the course of this working partnership was that the same skills that achieved results 
against terrorism were equally effective when the Brixton Salafis were tackling street crime. 
Brixton Salafi reluctance to engage with members of a police service, who had previously only 
displayed suspicion towards them, was gradually overcome by recourse to patient trust building 
and a willingness to engage as partners and an agreement – not to recruit them as  ‗informants‘, 
but as partners in protecting and building their community to resist both crime and violent 
extremism. 
back to top 
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4.4. Peacemaking Efforts by Religious Actors (Qamar Al-Huda) 
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It was common for Western social scientists and experts in the field of international 
affairs to assert confidently that religion would play a less prominent role in society at large and 
that eventually religion would play little role in national identity, politics, law, and international 
relations.  This perspective was connected to a larger ―secularization thesis,‖ which advocated 
that a secular liberal democracy would replace traditional ways of thinking, especially the place 
of religion (Stark, 1999). With the rise of modernization and post-modernity, the relationship of 
religion to society has changed in many ways; however, it remains a strong ideological source 
for identity and values, including those relating to nationalism, conflict, and peacemaking.  
Throughout the world, it is clear that religion has new resonance in contemporary times, and has 
been actively involved in promoting inter-communal violence in places like Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Egypt, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, India, Northern Ireland, and Uganda.  However, 
religion does not in fact play only a harmful role in motivating conflict and violence and in 
driving communities apart.  Religion‘s power to persuade, its resonance within communities, the 
influence of religious leaders to speak as political and spiritual voices, and religious values can 
all be used constructively to counteract radicalization and extremism and bring about resolution 
and reconciliation.  Scott Appleby (2003) has described the ―the ambivalence of the sacred‖ – the 
manner in which religion can create spiritual commitments to violence and to social activism and 
peace. 
Peace building, in general, attempts to establish sustainable peace by addressing root 
causes of conflict through dialogue, institution building, political and economic transformation, 
reconciliation, and empowering those who work on the ground.  Peace building refers to all 
actors that work toward concrete structural transformations for peace and prevent the relapse of 
conflict, while the term peacemaking refers to the actual intervention in a violent conflict to 
attempt to negotiate a peace agreement (Little & Appleby, 2004, p. 21; Lederach, 1997; Crocker, 
Hampson, & Aall, 1999, 2005).  Originally used by official diplomatic efforts in negotiating 
international conflicts, peacemaking is also applicable to anyone trying to mediate a peace 
between disputants-within families or communities.  Both peace building and peacemaking 
operate within the framework of conflict transformation, i.e., the movement from conflict with 
nonviolent means of resolving disputes, and consists of overlapping processes of conflict 
management and conflict resolution (Little & Appleby, 2004, p. 5).  Peacemaking is an all-
inclusive process that entails reducing tension, resolving conflict, managing conflict, mediating 
conflict, negotiating or advocating on behalf of a party involved in a conflict, and/or finding 
common ground for disputing parties.  With such practical areas for contribution, peace building 
includes diplomats, educators, clergy, lawyers, human rights specialists, media, and other civil 
society actors (Johnston & Samson, 1994; Moyser, 1991).  
Religious peacemaking is often distinguished from other non-religious actors, who often 
may or may not agree with the faith-based approaches and methodologies for peace building. 
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Religious actors
1
 are often the first to observe disturbing behavior and opinions on the ground 
prior to a conflict (Sampson & Ledrach, 2000; Helmich & Petersen, 2000; Smock, 2006).  
Religious actors, in particular, are very sensitive to religious intolerance, ethnic hatred, tribalism, 
and communalism because this may disrupt their communities - especially if there is a history of 
tensions and conflict in the area.  In times of crisis, religious leaders simultaneously serve in the 
capacity of mediators, observers, protectors, advocates, educators, and conflict resolution 
specialists (Steele, 2008, p. 5-41).  
 If religious peacemaking aims to structurally transform conflict peacefully and cultivate a 
culture of peace in war-torn societies, then experts dealing with conflict must take the work of 
religious actors seriously. For example, religious leaders in Zamboanga City, Philippines, were 
outspoken about the religious tensions that were growing between Muslims and Christians due to 
the Islamic extremist Abu Sayyaf. They conducted several inter-religious dialogues to forge a 
strategic plan to counteract the violence of fundamentalism in their region (Bacani, 2005).  In 
Cambodia, the renowned Buddhist monk, Maha Ghosananda, led thousands of Buddhist monks, 
nuns and laity on a daring month-long march from the northwest to the capital Phnom Penh. 
Known as the ―Pilgrimage of Truth March,‖ Ghosananda traversed through dangerous areas 
filled with land mines and active conflict.  By the end of the march, over 10,000 people had 
participated, thereby contributing to the formation of the United Nations Transitional Authority 
in Cambodia (UNTAC) and in advocating for national elections (Maat, 1995).  In Jordan, the 
Royal Hashemite Kingdom assembled over 150 leading Muslim jurists from the main eight law 
schools to discuss indiscriminate violence in the Middle East. Muslim scholars agreed to work 
together against the rise of extremism and the irresponsible and illegal act of calling other 
Muslims who disagree on certain positions apostates (takfir). The assembly compiled ―The 
Amman Message‖ which stated, ―Islam honors every human being, without distinction of color, 
race or religion.‖2  These examples reflect numerous ways in which world religious actors 
participate in peace building and conflict preventative measures in various stages of conflict. 
From mass electoral participation to improving inter-faith relations, from negotiating peace 
settlements in conflict zones to aiding refugee or internally displaced person camps, religious 
actors are active on the ground and their work usually goes unnoticed compared to the efforts of 
global non-governmental organizations (see Kraybill, 2007; Lubbe, 1994; Williams & Williams, 
1989; Niyonzima & Fendall, 2001; Jeffrey, 1998). 
 It is important to note that religious leaders, in times of crisis and in peace, offer their 
communities more than religious guidance: they possess a rich tradition of spiritual enrichment, 
of serving others, and being inter-connected during difficult times. The absence of any peace 
building work without the cooperation of religious actors may in fact lose legitimacy with the 
very people they are trying to help.  Andrea Bartoli, a leading scholar in the field of religious 
peacemaking believes that religious mediators are often more successful than recognized in 
mediation. In analyzing Saint Egidio‘s peacemaking efforts in Mozambique, Bartoli (2004, p. 
147-169) emphasizes four key reasons as to why they were able to negotiate a peace settlement 
in the civil war of Mozambique: (1) Religious actors exhibited an intimate knowledge of the 
culture and language of the peoples in conflict; (2) Leaders used firsthand information as the 
                                                 
1
 Examples of religious actors are priests, rabbis, imams, gurus, Buddhist monks, as well as international 
religious organizations like Pax Christi, Lutheran World Federation, The Mennonites, World Council of 
Churches, and Muslim World Congress etc… 
2
  For online information see www.riifs.org/nashra/Ammanmessage_e.htm 
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conflict evolved and changed on the ground; (3) Leaders had access to a wide variety political 
expertise, locally and internationally; and, (4) They developed a long-term vision of peace for 
their particular society (see also Bartoli, 1999; Bartoli, Giradet, & Carmel, 1995).  Bartoli (2004, 
p. 158) believes that ―conflicts need to be seen and read properly, especially those that have 
major cultural, ethnic, and religious components.‖ Bartoli suggests that conflicts are not 
insignificant acts of random violence committed by invisible forces, but rather these are human 
events invented by human beings themselves.  By emphasizing the human element of the 
conflict, Bartoli believes that human beings connected to the conflict need to be the very agents 
who interpret the core issues involved.  In order to better understand the root causes of any 
conflict, religious actors need to be included from the beginning and not neglected in the process. 
The efforts of the Saint Egidio community in conflict zones, such as Mozambique, Algeria, 
Nepal, and the Philippines, demonstrate that religious organizations can seriously contribute in 
mediation and conflict resolution. They were able to devise a practical long-term strategy that 
was not exclusively meant for any religious community but whose mission was to be supportive 
to anyone anywhere in need.  In this case, religious actors engaged rebel groups by listening to 
the concerns of the marginalized group without land, resources, education, health care or other 
basic necessities. This example reflects a complex and coherent approach to religious 
peacemaking and the organization‘s capacity to delegitimize violent behavior while emphasizing 
non-violent peace building. 
 The spiritual convictions of the religious communities inspire them to work holistically 
for social justice activities and directly involve them in conflict prevention, mediation, and 
conflict transformation work. Religious leaders and religious organizations involved in 
peacemaking are operating from their respective faith traditions to support personal, communal, 
relational transformations.
3
  Some common methodologies used in peacemaking are: 
forgiveness, recognition of pain, love for others, healing, trauma recovery, public confessions, 
joint prayers, use of narratives to create empathy, advocacy programs for victims, forums to 
explain misunderstandings, addressing the image of the ―other‖ in the traditions, and the use of 
arts to express mutual respect.  Interestingly enough, the bonds that are formed in these interfaith 
peacemaking activities reveal an amazing level of openness to dialogue that allow the involved 
parties to take risks to rebuild their lives. Religious peacemaking efforts are reconstructing 
broken relationships, damaged communities, reconciling conflicting parties, negotiating peace 
agreements, and recreating a common vision of peace.  
 Islamic peacemaking, conducted by Muslim religious leaders with authority in the 
community, consist of several fundamental Islamic principles of nonviolence and peace, the 
pursuit of justice, doing no harm to the other, the universality and dignity of humanity, the 
sacredness of human life, equality, the quest for peace (on the individual, interpersonal, 
communal, regional, and international levels), peacemaking via reason, knowledge, and 
understanding, creativity, forgiveness, proper deeds and actions, responsibility, patience, 
collaborative actions and solidarity, inclusivity, diversity, pluralism, and tolerance. These Islamic 
                                                 
3
 For etymological, scriptural, and theological definitions of religious peacemaking see MacQuarrie, J. 
(1973). The concept of peace. London: SCM Press Ltd.; Zehr, H. (1995). Changing lenses. Scottsdale, 
Pennsylvania: Herald Press.; Ellul, J. (1970). Violence: Reflections from a Christian perspective. London: 
SCM Press Ltd.; Appleby, S. (2003). Catholic peace building. America, 189 (6) . Retrieved from 
www.americamagazine.com.;  and Bock, J. (2001). Sharpening conflict management: Religious 
leadership and the double-edged sword. Westport: Praeger Publishers. 
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principles of nonviolence and peace building are integral to the faith tradition of Muslims and are 
crucial to Muslim peace building initiatives developed by major figures like Abdul Ghaffar 
Khan, Satha-Anand, Grand Mufti Ali Goma, Mufti Muneeb al-Rahman, etc… (Abu-Nimer, 
2003; Sachedina, 2007; Said, Funk, & Kadayifici, 2001; Paige, 1993). 
 Understanding some basic Islamic principles of peace building and leveraging these 
resources with Muslim religious leaders will be integral to counteracting radicalism and 
preventing or reducing the recruitment by radicals. Some examples of processes are: the use of a 
religious judge (qadi) to rely on Islamic law (shari‟ah), the process of reconciliation (sulh), 
presenting evidence of the dispute (bayyinah), customary practices of dispute resolution („urf), 
the use of third party members to reconcile the dispute (mukhtar), the use of an intermediary to 
represent the party (wasta), a truce or a period of mediation (hudna), providing a sum of money 
to the victim for compensation of losses (atwah), and even public offerings of forgiveness and 
apologies. Conflicting parties find representatives, not necessarily lawyers, who can best present 
their positions as clearly as possible. These processes allow space for conflict parties to have 
their interests represented and seek a proper restoration of peace or harmony in their community.  
  Based upon basic teachings of Islamic peacemaking, Sunni and Shi‘ite religious scholars 
and authorities (‗ulama) have agreed that the function of any society is to maintain healthy 
relationships:, i.e., human-to-human and human-to-divine relationships. However, when conflicts 
erupt and destroys human relationships, then it is mandated that the restoration of relationships 
are essential in retributive justice. The accountability of those in authority – political, social, 
religious, economic, and intellectual – supersedes those who do not have the power to institute 
justice. The process of consultation allows for dialogue, debate, and an exchange of views on a 
variety of subjects, but it is especially critical for authoritative bodies to ensure that they 
understand the opinions of others. Theologians, jurists, philosophers, and other scholars have 
historically promoted Islamic teachings of ethics to prevent, mediate, and resolve conflicts; 
ultimately, any level of disharmony is understood to disrupt a peaceful being. There are Qur‘anic 
verses, sayings by the Prophet Muhammad (hadith), and narratives of important companions of 
the Prophet who accentuate the proper ethical treatment of the elderly, orphans, prisoners, 
mentally challenged, neighbors, strangers, and members of different religious traditions and 
tribes, and animals. It is common for theologians to stress the need for personal transformation 
and to strive toward elevating spiritual awareness through fasting, prayer, charity, meditation, 
rituals, Qur‘anic recitation, service, love of others, adoption of orphans, and displaying 
compassion and forgiveness to oneself and to others who have done harm. This inner emphasis 
as the primary focus to cultivate peace is connected to the outer dimensions of peacemaking. The 
traditional theological thought is that once the heart and mind is gradually transformed toward 
peace (moving away from greed, egocentric desires, suffering, materialism, harming others…) 
then only can humans act peacefully in the world. 
Analysts need to examine the complex and intricate interconnections of psychological, 
religious, political, historical, and social self-understanding of victimhood or heroic savior within 
Muslim communities. Violent actors who are critical players in the region and international 
scene do not value their systems of governance, the rule of law, the judiciary, educational 
institutions, media, and political elites as sources of justice. Rather, their interpretation of the 
world is that it is structurally unjust and that the oppressive system is designed to maintain a 
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status quo of elites and non-elites.
4
 By engaging radicals on a certain level, one has already 
moved beyond the theoretical level of should we talk, ignore their existence, or just maintain the 
status quo. In reality, with either of the last two options, we are left with the possibility of 
escalating radicalization process and actually improving the ability of violent actors to operate on 
the ground.  
There are four major benefits achieved by active engagement, including dialogue, with 
radicals.  First, by engaging in a dialogue we recognize the importance of violent actors to 
express their needs, demands, means of communication, modes of operation and structure -- all 
of which encourages self-disclosure.
5
  Second, engaging the radicals with sensible approaches 
and conditions demonstrates the commitment to be involved, becoming a visible actor that can 
influence, manipulate, and manage their thinking and acting. To do nothing or to be passive 
observers would create a vacuum or weakness that radicals will most likely use to their 
advantage and propagate damaging information against our interests. Third, by engaging them 
we recognize the importance of deflating their potential damage to the region and our allies.
6
  
Engaging is built on realistic politics and on-the-ground realities.    
Fourth, within an Islamic peace-building and conflict transformation approach, most 
Muslim scholars believe, in principal, that extremists have the right to express their reservations, 
fears, uncertainties, and grievances with the state (El Fadl, 2001; Kamali, 1994). Radical actors 
are permitted to express their grievances within legal, social, and moral boundaries; however, 
public or private space must be respected according to the law. Historically, even if radicals were 
vilified and guilty of the most horrendous crimes, they still had the legal right of due process to 
represent and defend their views and/or actions. The state was interested in a just resolution and 
a transparent process. Other Muslim scholars have counter-argued that terrorism falls into 
another category where the rights of the radicals are nullified. The primary view is that the state 
must do all it can within its jurisdiction to protect civilians and the institutions of the state. These 
scholars argue that the state must vigorously eliminate or marginalize radical activities in order 
to protect public safety (Zayd, 2004; An-Naim, 1990, Arjomand, 2002). In light of this debate, 
there is a general consensus among Muslim scholars who support peace-building and conflict 
resolution on the need to use traditional Islamic processes of mediation, negotiation, 
transparency, public acknowledgement of wrong, reconciliation, resolution, and visible justice.  
With the abovementioned debates for engagement with radicals, Muslim scholars have 
expressed a wide range of possibilities and processes without a consensus on what the term 
engagement means, what the process entails, how to go about enacting an engagement, and 
which actors should serve as a mediators with the radicals.  The answers rest in the details, i.e., 
scholars rely on the specific cases of the context, assess its merits, apply several models of just-
engagement rules, and then move forward. As a result, there is no single model to follow with 
diverse radical movements such as al-Qaida, Hezbollah, Abu Sayyaf, and the Taliban – some are 
                                                 
4
 The recognizes the rigorous debate involved in engaging with terrorists as this recognizes them, their 
cause, and it could set the stage of other actors using the same method to reach their goals.  
5
 The art of engaging creates a dialogue where one strives for a more nuanced understanding of how 
actors reveal their interests and think about themselves and others.  
6
 These are the basic arguments for engagement with violent actors or any other actors hostile to any of 
our interests.  
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transnational anti-state puritanical ideologies while others are a social-political-economic party 
that aims to be a part of the formal political process. 
 The voices of nonviolent Muslim leaders are rarely heard because they are squelched by 
radical rhetoric and authoritarian systems that crush voices of dissent. It is crucial for Islamic 
peace builders to take seriously the work of Satha-Anand, Said Nursi, Sakina Yakoobi, Abdul 
Ghaffar Khan, Shaykh Ali Goma, Hakim Mohammed Said, Dr. Hossein Nasr, Farish Noor, 
Nicolish Majid, Kabir Helminski, Din Syamsuddin, Ghazi bin Muhammad, Dr. Abdal Hakim 
Murad Winter, Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Shaykh Mustafa Ceric, Shaykh Al-Habib Ali al-
Jifri, Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, Yousef Sanei, and many others (see Smock & Huda, 2009).  
If there is any crucial reason to pay attention to these names it is to recognize that there are active 
every-day leaders involved in peace building activities, who are committed to relieving suffering 
and promoting the values of tolerance and diversity.  
back to top 
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4.5. Why the Salafis are not a Terror Problem (UK Imam) 
 
Author: Anonymous
1
 
In the ―war on terror‖, the Salafi da‟wah (Salafi -- one who takes his example from these 
early righteous generations, da‟wah – an invitation) and tradition has been seen as an ideology, 
which is the main cause, thrust, and impetus for terrorism and political violence, including 
promoting such radical views. A large body of research claims that the Salafi way is, indeed, an 
extremist radical belief system which eventually manifests itself in political violence and 
terrorism (for example, see Sageman, 2004, p. 1). A number of papers have been written on this 
topic such as those by Mitchell D. Sibler and Arvin Bhatt (2007), Jocelyn Cesari (2008), Marc 
Sageman (2004), Vincenzo Oliveti (2001), Anne Sofie Roald (2004), and Juan Jose Escobar 
Stemmann (2006). Even though they aim to understand the process by which Muslim youth 
become attracted to more extreme understandings and interpretations of Islam, they tend to fall 
short of doing the subject justice and demonstrate a great lack of understanding, denoting 
normative practices within Islam as being, in some way, subversive.  
      One of the more glaring problems with such analyses is that the Salafi methodology is stated 
to be the main catalyst for terrorism, and then examples are sought that seek to validate the 
connection between terrorism and what they consider to be ‗Salafi.‘ This is erroneous as the two 
analysts, Silber and Bhatt (2007), make reference to samples which are not ‗Salafi‘ in the 
slightest but rather more accurately characterized as takfeeri (a Muslim who accuses others of 
apostasy),militant jihadi, ikhwāni (i.e.,. followers of the Muslim Brotherhood) and even at times 
Tablighi (a Muslim missionary and revival movement). Yet all of the examples are placed under 
the poorly defined rubric of ‗Salafism.‘ 
      This paper will critically assess some of the claims about Salafism found within the literature 
and explore the reality of the Salafi way in regards to issues related to terrorism, political 
violence, and extremism. We will actually quote from the leading and well-known Salafi 
scholars themselves, who the Salafis consider their reference points, in order to assess the 
assertion that adopting Salafi Islam leads to political violence and terrorism. It will be evident 
that the Salafi da‟wah and methodology is one of the main barriers to the spread of terrorism 
among Muslim believers in the world today (see, for example, the excellent study International 
Crisis Group, 2004). Indeed, the stricter and more serious the Salafi, the less likely that person 
will be likely to radicalize or engage in terrorism: 
Ironically, this means that the most “radical” of the salafis are the most 
immune to jihadist teachings, and the more “moderate” Muslims are those 
more open to other militant streams of thought, and who may provide 
slightly more fertile recruiting grounds for the militant jihadis (International 
Crisis Group, 2004, p. ii). 
                                                 
1
 The authors of this paper are Salafi imams living in the United Kingdom (UK) actively working to 
prevent and counter militant jihadi extremist thought and terrorism.  They wish to remain anonymous for 
reasons of security concerns. 
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Salafis are less likely to engage in terrorism for the following reasons: 
 Strict Salafis are primarily religious and not at all entrenched in political activity, political 
involvement, and rhetoric - let alone terrorism. Politics is not their first ―port of call,‖ 
rather their first priority is to educate and cultivate the sense of tawheed (the realization 
and affirmation of Oneness Muslims upon and adhering to the Sunnah (path, way) of the 
Prophet Muhammad (sallallāhu ‟alayhi wassallam) along with purifying the beliefs of 
Muslims.  
 Salafis frown upon forming political parties and groups based on partisan loyalties. 
 Salafis do not condone holding clandestine meetings in order to put into place a strategic 
political plan as Allāh knows that which is concealed. 
 Salafis do not pledge allegiance to authorities other than Allāh and His Messenger 
including heads of organisations, groups, and political parties. 
 Salafis deem it to be un-Islamic to stage a revolt or rebellion against the leader of a 
Muslim country regardless of how unjust and oppressive that leader is and especially if 
the Muslims do not have the ability to remove a particular leader from power.  
 Salafis take into account the benefits and harm likely to occur from any action which is 
done in the name of advancing the religion and do not endorse harming other Muslims 
nor creating chaos. 
 Salafis do not agree with the targeting of innocent people in warfare based on the 
evidences from the Qur‘ān and Sunnah.  
 Those who claimed to be Salafi and then adopted the methodology of Ikhwān ul-
Muslimeen (i.e. the Muslim Brotherhood) eventually stopped referring to themselves as 
being ‗Salafi‘ and rejected its well known principles. Unfortunately, these individuals 
then left the Salafi way and some began to support erroneous ideas of jihad which the 
Salafi scholars did not endorse whatsoever. 
The confusion arises between mainstream Salafis and the militant jihadi-takfīrī because, in 
their violent extremist narratives, they have adopted established Islamic lexicology and 
terminology in an attempt to promote themselves as acting in accordance to the most authentic 
and correct interpretation of the religion. In essence, in order to gain legitimacy, these violent 
extremists use narratives ascribing to Salafism. This is why we find references to the ‗Salaf‘ (the 
righteous predecessors) and ‗Salafi‘ (one who takes his example from these early righteous 
generations) replete within the discourse of Abu Qatada, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Abu 
Mus‘ab as-Sooree, al-Fizāzee and many others. This has been noticed by Salafi scholars 
themselves; for instance, Shaykh ‘AbdulMālik ar-Ramadani al-Jazā‘iri, a contemporary Algerian 
Salafi scholar, stated about the Algerian takfeeree group known as the „Salafi Group for Da‟wah 
and Combat‟: 
How can, all of this -- making permissible the blood of the police and killing 
them, be clean (i.e. permitted)? Then they live on stolen monies which have been 
ransacked from people by force and they destroy the souls of the Muslim 
soldiers…As a result, we should not, however, absolve ourselves from 
‗Salafiyyah‘ as it is the truth, yet we absolve ourselves, for Allāh, from the 
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‗Salafist Group for Dawah and Combat‘ and from all those who grasp weapons 
today in our country against the system or the people. I say this so that the 
creation know that the ascription of those revolutionary groups (i.e. the GSPC) to 
Salafiyyah is a distortion of Salafiyyah, just as how ascribing deviant Muslims to 
Islam is also a distortion of Islam, blocking the true path of Allāh and causing 
people to flee from the victorious ones (Firqat un-Nājiyah). However, Salafiyyah 
is Salafiyyah, just as Islām is Islām, even though it is distorted by the deviants 
(Shaykh ‗AbdulMālik bin Ahmad bin al-Mubārak Ramadānī al-Jazā‘iree, 2005).  
This theme has been highlighted by Wiktorowicz (2006) who emphasized that in ―many 
cases, scholars claiming the Salafi mantel formulate antipodal juristic positions, leading one to 
question whether they can even be considered part of the same religious tradition.‖ It is, perhaps, 
pertinent to cite Shaykh ‘Alī Hasan al-Halabī al-Atharī‘s (2008) definition of Salafism 
(Salafīyyah) in order to capture a comprehensive but concise view about the mainstream Salafi 
movement and its adherents. 
An excerpt from an unpublished translation mentions of three types of people who utilise the 
―Salafi‖ term without due rights: 
First: Whoever ascribes to Salafiyyah methodologies which oppose what the 
‘Ulama (Muslim scholars) and seniors of the Salafi da‘wah traverse, not to 
mention oppose their proofs and evidences such as some of the violent armed 
groups in Algeria and the likes. I wish to state that the reason for those (violent 
armed) people falsely ascribing themselves to Salafiyyah is only due to the fact 
that they want to distinguish themselves from other older partisan groups present, 
such as Ikhwān ul-Muslimeem [Muslim Brotherhood], Hizb ut-Tahreer and 
others. The evidence of this is: many of them changed their ascriptions and their 
―skins‖ as soon as they had the opportunity to! Another point to mention is that: 
Salafiyyah is not a hizb (partisan political group) that has a legislative structure 
which is difficult to penetrate, rather it is an academic and proselytising 
methodology which all are able to be a part of, not to mention be covered in its 
dust and hide behind its door. Therefore, the real affair of one who covers 
himself, with the gowns of Salafiyyah, is only exposed by the level of his 
agreement with the manhaj of the Salaf us-Sālih in: the Usūl of understanding and 
istidlāl (deriving rulings); and respect for the people of knowledge who have 
carried the manhaj throughout every time and place. Respect of the ‘Ulama is 
taqdeer (holding them in high estimation) and not taqdees (veneration) of them. 
As for what is inside a person, who ascribes himself to Salafiyyah, then we defer 
his case to the Lord of the Worlds as He knows better about us and him (‘Alī bin 
Hasan bin ‘Alī bin ‘Abdul-Hamīd al-Halabī al-Atharī, 2008, p. 13). 
This definition of Salafism, from an insider perspective, is in stark contrast to outside 
perspectives on the Salafi movement. When examining much of the existing material on 
Salafism, especially that which blames the Salafis for terrorism, there is clearly a paucity of 
primary evidence from the scholars of Salafism themselves (Baker, dissertation).  
Moreover, much of the academic writing constantly mention the word ‗Salafi‘ and claims 
that certain terrorists subscribe to the Salafi way, yet many researchers have neglected any 
reference whatsoever to recognized Salafi scholars. These well-known Salafi scholars who 
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Salafis take their guidance from include Imām ‘Abdul‘Azeez Bin Bāz, Imām Muhammad 
Nāsiruddīn al-Albānī, Imām Muhammad bin Sālih al-‘Uthaymeen, Imām Muqbil bin Hādee al-
Wadi‘ī and other contemporaries such as Shaykh ‘Abdul‘Azeez Āli-Shaykh,2 Shaykh 
‘AbdulMuhsin al-‘Abbād al-Badr,3 Shaykh Rabī‘ bin Hādī al-Madkhalī,4 Shaykh Sālih al-
Fawzān, Shaykh AbdulMuhsin al-‘Ubaykān,5 Shaykh AbdulMālik ar-Ramadānī,6 Shaykh 
AbdusSalām as-Sihaymī,7 Shaykh Khālid al-Anbarī,8 Shaykh Ali Hasan al-Halabī al-Atharī,9 
Shaykh Mashhoor Hasan Āl Salmān, Shaykh Saleem al-Hilālī, Shaykh Sālih Āli-Shaykh,10 
Shaykh ‘Abdul‘Azeez bin Rayyis ar-Rayyis,11 Shaykh AbdusSalām Burjis, and many others.  All 
                                                 
2
 The current Mufti of KSA. 
3
 One of the senior contemporary hadeeth scholars of Madeenah, he authored a book entitled Bi Ayyi‟Aql 
wa Deen yakunu at-Tafkeer wa‟t-Tadmeer, Jihad? [According to Which Intellect and Religion is 
Bombing and Wreaking Havoc Considered Jihād!?] – translated into English by Abu Eesa Yasir Gilani 
(London: Dārul-Itisām Publishing, 2004).  
4
 Another senior contemporary scholar of hadeeth, he is the main Salafi scholar to refute the ideas and 
writings of Sayyid Qutb.  
5
 A scholar from Riyadh, he has authored many books refuting the contemporary Khawārij and 
takfeerees, such as the book, which has been translated into English: The Khawārij and their Recurring 
Ideologies (Texas: Tarbiyyah Bookstore Publishing, 2005). He has also been outspoken regarding the Iraq 
situation and opposing those takfeerees who call themselves ―Mujāhideen‖. See: 
http://www.arabnews.com/?page=7&section=0&article=53890&d=3&m=11&y=2004. 
Also see the article wherein he unequivocally advises the Muslims to co-operate with the police if they 
are aware of terrorists in the community: http://www.al-
athariyyah.com/media/pdf/terrorism/qanda_london_bombings_1.pdf. 
6
 Author of the 460-page refutation of the statements, beliefs, and ideologies of Abu Qatada and others. 
He also wrote a book regarding the Algerian crisis entitled Madarik un-Nadhr fi's-Siyasah: Bayna't-
Tatbiqat ash-Shar'iyyah wa'l-Infia'lat al-Hamasiyyah [Perceptions of Viewing Politics: Between the 
Divinely Legislated Application and Enthusiastic Disturbances] (KSA: Dar Sabeel il-Mumineen, 1418 
AH/1997 CE, 2nd Edn).  
7
 Associate Professor at the Department of Jurisprudence, Madeenah Islamic University, KSA. He is the 
author of The Ideology of Terrorism and Violence in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Origins, causes for its 
spread and the solution (Cairo: Dar ul-Menhaj, 2006). A partial translation of this book can be accessed 
at www.salafimanhaj.com. 
8
 An assistant professor in Saudi Arabia, he was one of the first scholars to warn in the late 1990s about 
the tribulation of takfeer in his book Hukm bi-Ghayri Ma Anzala Allāh: Usool ut-Takfeer [Ruling by 
other than what Allāh has revealed: Principles of Takfeer]. He has also recently written a book 
emphasising the Islamic evidences against suicide bombing, ‟Iqra‟ Maseerak Qabl an-Tufajjir [Read 
about your end, before you blow yourself up!].   
9
 From Jordan he was one of the first to also warn throughout the 1990s about the tribulation of takfeer 
and is one of the main bulwarks against the takfīrī propagation in the world today. Among the many 
classical works that he has edited, he has also visited many countries conducting lectures, seminars, and 
teaching. He has visited the U.S. (New York in particular), the UK (Brixton and Luton), Canada, 
Indonesia, and is well-known in the Middle East.   
10
 The current Saudi Minister of Islamic Affairs, he gives many lectures within KSA. Of his relevant 
lectures to this topic is A Warning Against Extremism, which has been translated into English here: 
http://www.salafimanhaj.com/pdf/warning.pdf. Other beneficial lectures by Shaykh Sālih Āli-Shaykh, 
which have been translated into English include The Fitnah of the Khawārij, trans. Abu Az-Zubayr S. 
Harrison found here: http://www.authentictranslations.com/trans-pub/sas_fitnah-khawārij.pdf  
11
 One of the scholars of Riyadh who has also been thorough in refuting the extremist takfeerees, he is 
known for his detailed refutation of their ideas and probably the best that he has written on this topic is 
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of these Salafi scholars are regarded as the heads of the Salafi methodology and tradition and are 
all well known for their stances against terrorism, extremism, and political agitation.  We will 
include some of their statements later. Yet many academics have not referred to these Salafi 
scholars whatsoever and merely equated the Salafi tradition with terrorism and violence – this is 
inappropriate.   
      Writers should therefore be more careful in their labeling, as it is rather simplistic to merely 
say that something is ―Salafi‖ when, in fact, such an organisation does not even refer to itself as 
being ―Salafi.‖ So, for example, Silber and Bhatt (2007) refer to ―Salafi NGOs‖ when, in fact, 
such ―NGOs‖ belong to the Ikhwan ul-Muslimeen [Muslim Brotherhood]. Kumar Ramakrishna 
(2005) states in his paper Delegitimizing Global Jihadi Ideology in South-East Asia: 
A brief exposition of terminology is called for. Islamic fundamentalism (or Salafi 
Islam) is not all monolithic. Salafi Muslims, who take the injunction to emulate 
the Companions of the Prophet very seriously, may express this piety simply in 
terms of personal adherence to implementing shariah-derived standards of 
worship, ritual, dress, and overall behavioural standards. The majority of Salafi 
Muslims, in fact, may be considered as ―neo-fundamentalists‖ who possess 
―neither a systematic ideology… (nor) global political agenda‖ (Metcalf).12 
It is important for us to look at the efforts of the bona-fide Islamic scholars of the Salafi 
tradition in opposing extremist ideologies responsible for the misconceptions about Islām today. 
Back in the mid-1990s, when many people had not even heard of the likes of Bin Lādin, the 
Salafi scholars were the most vocal in their condemnations!
13
 The former Muftee of Saudi 
Arabia, Imām ‘Abdul‘Azeez ibn ‘Abdullāh ibn Bāz (raheemahullāh), one of the main Salafi 
scholars, stated in the late 1990s in regards to Usāmah Bin Lādin, Muhammad al-Mas‘ari and 
Sa‘d al-Faqeeh (2000):  
These publications from al-Faqeeh, al-Mas‘ari or other callers to evil, bātil 
(falsehood) and division must be totally destroyed, and no lenience should be 
shown to them. It is incumbent to advise and guide them to the truth and warn 
them from this bātil. It is not permissible for anyone to co-operate with them in 
this evil, they must be advised and referred back to (true) guidance. And leave this 
bātil. And my advice to al-Mas‘ari, al-Faqeeh, Ibn Lādin and all who traverse 
their way is that they leave off this dangerous path, to fear Allāh and be warned of 
His Wrath and Anger, to return back to (true) guidance, to repent to Allāh from 
they have done before. 
                                                                                                                                                             
his book al-Burhan al-Muneer fi Dahd Shubuhāt Ahl it-Takfeer wa‟t-Tafjeer [The Clear Proofs for 
Refuting the Doubts of the People of Takfeer and Bombing] – it has been translated into English here:  
http://www.salafimanhaj.com/pdf/SalafiManhaj_TakfeerAndBombing.pdf  
12
 The reference to ‗Metcalf‘ is Barbara Metcalf and her research entitled “Traditionalist Islamic 
Activism: Deoband, Tablighis and Talibs” (2001). This essay was for the Institute for the Study of Islam 
in the Modern World (ISIM) Annual Lecture, Leiden University 23 November 2001. 
13
 This is important to highlight as there is no doubt that the increased Western interest, attacks, 
accusations, investigations, reports, etc., into Islām of late has been due to the horrific 9/11 attack, which 
Bin Lādin has been accused of sanctioning and authorising, along with other attacks that have taken place 
in Europe or against Europeans abroad.  
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Imām Bin Bāz (1996) made an identical statement in the Arabic newspaper al-Muslimoon and in 
a report in ash-Sharq al-Awsat, on 9 Jumadā al-Ulā 1417 AH corresponding to 21 September 
1996 CE. It can be heard in audio,
14
 where Imām Bin Bāz further emphasises that no co-
operation should be made with the likes of Usāmah Bin Lādin due to risks related to safety and 
security. This was way before any ‗investigative report‘ or ‗think tank into global tolerance‘ even 
cared about the likes of Bin Ladin.  Imām Bin Bāz (undated) also stated: 
From that which is known to anyone who has the slightest bit of common sense, is 
that hijacking airplanes and kidnapping children and the like are extremely great 
crimes the world over. Their evil effects are far and wide, as is the great harm and 
inconvenience caused to the innocent; the total effect of which none can 
comprehend except Allāh. Likewise, from that which is known is that these 
crimes are not specific to any particular country over and above another country, 
nor any specific group over and above another group; rather, it encompasses the 
whole world. There is no doubt about the effect of these crimes; so it is obligatory 
upon the governments and those responsible from amongst the scholars and others 
to afford these issues great concern, and to exert themselves as much as possible 
in ending this evil. 
Imām Bin Bāz (undated) also stated that with regard to the terror attack in Riyadh in 1416 
AH/1995 CE that: 
There is no doubt that this incident is great evil, which is based upon causing 
major corruption, major evil and serious transgression. And there is no doubt that 
this incident can only be done by one who does not believe in Allāh or in the Last 
Day, with correct and sound faith, performing such a criminal and filthy act which 
has brought about great harms and corruption. Only those with filthy souls filled 
with hatred, envy, evil and corruption, and devoid of (sound and correct) faith, 
would do the likes of such actions. We ask Allāh for well-being and safety and to 
help the people in authority in all that will affect those people because their crime 
is severe and their corruption is huge. There is no power or movement except with 
Allāh! How can a believer or a Muslim perform such a serious crime which is 
based upon such huge transgression, corruption and destroying lives and injuring 
others without due right? 
He further stated (2000): 
I exhort all who know anything about these (terrorists) to convey that information 
to the relevant people. It is upon all who know about their condition and about 
them should convey that about them, because this is from the avenue of co-
operation in order to prevent sin and transgression and in order to secure the 
safety of the people from evil, sin and transgression; and to establish justice from 
the transgressions of those oppressors…There is no doubt that this is from the 
greatest of crimes and corruptions on the earth and those who commit such 
actions are more deserving to be killed and restrained due to the heinous crime 
that they have committed. We ask Allāh that He makes them fail and that He 
                                                 
14
 http://www.al-mobile.org/File/1163762664.ram  
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shackles them and their likes and that He saves us from their evil and the evil of 
those like them and that He totally destroys their plots, indeed He is Lofty and 
Majestic, Generous and Kind.   
Therefore, there is a clear delineation between such politically violent oriented groups 
and Salafism. As for movements such as the Ikhwān ul-Muslimeen, their declared political 
emphasis should not be considered ―Salafi-politicos‖, as Wiktorowicz (2006) had initially 
coined. In acknowledgement of this fact, McCants, Brachman, and Felter (2006) recommended a 
strategy for reducing the popularity of Jihadis amongst Salafis:  
Label the entire Jihadi Movement ―Qutbism‖ in recognition that the Jihadis cite 
Sayyid Qutb more than any modern author. Muslim opponents of the Jihadis 
(including mainstream Wahhabis) use this term to describe them, a designation 
Jihadis hate since it implies that they follow a human and are members of a 
deviant sect. Adherents of the movement consider ―Qutbi‖ to be a negative label 
and would much rather be called Jihadi or Salafi. 
To generally categorise Salafis as belonging to the same broad entity as the violent 
Jihadi-takfiris, the overly political-inspired Ikhwān ul-Muslimeen, and other similar movements 
obfuscates the clear parameters between movements that have been polemical in their opposition 
to violent extremism and those seeking to justify it.   
back to top 
4.5.A. References 
‘Alī bin Hasan bin ‘Alī bin ‘Abdul-Hamīd al-Halabī al-Atharī. (2008). as-Salafiyyatu, limādhā? 
Ma‘ādhan wa Malādhan: Abhāthun wa Maqalātun wa Haqā‘iq wa Bayyināt wa Radd ‗ala Shubuhāt – 
[Why Salafism as a Refuge and Safe-Haven? A response to the doubts (unpublished translation, p 
13)]. Amman, Jordan: Dār ul-Athariyyah. 
bin Bāz, Imam A. (1421 AH/2000 CE). Majmū‟ Fatāwā wa Māqālāt Mutanawwi‟ah. Buraydah, Saudi: 
Dār Asdā‘ al-Mujtama.Third Edition, vol.9. 
bin Baz, Imam A. (undated). Kayfa Nu'ālij Wāqi'un al-Aleem. pp. 113, 114. 
Cesari, J. (2008). Muslims in Europe and the risk of radicalisation in Rik Coolsaet (ed.), Jihadi Terrorism 
and the radicalisation challenge in Europe (97-109). Aldershot, UK and Burlington, U.S.: Ashgate, 
2008. 
International Crisis Group. (2004). Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don‟t 
Mix. International Crisis Group. Available from 
http://www.seasite.niu.edu/Indonesian/Islam/83_indonesia_backgrounder_why_salafism_and_terroris
m_don_t_mix_web.pdf  
McCants, Brachman, & Felter. (2006). Militant Ideology Atlas: Executive Report. Westpoint: Combating 
Terrorism Center (p. 10), U.S. Military Academy. 
Metcalf, B. (2001). Traditionalist Islamic activism: Deoband, Tablighis and Talibs. Institute for the Study 
of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM) Annual Lecture, Leiden University 23 November 2001. 
Oliveti, V. (2001). Terror‟s source: The ideology of Wahhabi-Salafism and its consequences. 
Birmingham, UK: Amadeus Books. 
Ramakrishna, K. (2005). Delegitimizing global Jihadi ideology in South-East Asia. Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 27 p. 350, no.3. 
Roald, A. S. (2004). New Muslims in the European context: The experience of Scandinavian converts. 
Leiden and Boston: Brill. 
Sageman, M. (2004). Understanding terror networks. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
 346 
UNCLASSIFIED 
Shaykh ‗AbdulMālik bin Ahmad bin al-Mubārak Ramadānī al-Jazā‘iree. (1426 AH/2005 CE). Fatāwā al-
‟Ulamā al-Akābir fimā Uhdira min Dimā fi‟l-Jazā‟ir [The Legal Verdicts of the Senior Scholars 
Regarding the Killings in Algeria] (p. 16-17). Cairo: Dār Imām Ahmad. 
Shaykh ‘AbdulMuhsin al-‘Abbād al-Badr. (2004). Bi Ayyi‟Aql wa Deen yakunu at-Tafkeer wa‟t-Tadmeer, 
Jihad? [According to Which Intellect and Religion is Bombing and Wreaking Havoc Considered 
Jihād!?]. Translated into English by Abu Eesa Yasir Gilani. London: Dārul-Itisām Publishing.  
Shaykh AbdulMālik ar-Ramadānī. (1418 AH/1997 CE). Madarik un-Nadhr fi's-Siyasah: Bayna't-Tatbiqat 
ash-Shar'iyyah wa'l-Infia'lat al-Hamasiyyah [Perceptions of viewing politics: Between the divinely 
legislated application and enthusiastic disturbances]. KSA: Dar Sabeel il-Mumineen, 2nd Edn 
Shaykh AbdusSalām as-Sihaymī. (2006). The ideology of terrorism and violence in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia: Origins, causes for its spread and the solution. Cairo: Dar ul-Menhaj.  
Shaykh Khālid al-Anbarī. ‟Iqra‟ Maseerak Qabl an-Tufajjir [Read about your end, before you blow 
yourself up!].   
Shaykh Khālid al-Anbarī. Hukm bi-Ghayri Ma Anzala Allāh: Usool ut-Takfeer [Ruling by other than 
what Allāh has revealed: Principles of Takfeer].  
Shaykh Rabī‘ bin Hādī al-Madkhalī. (2005). The Khawārij and their recurring ideologies. Texas: 
Tarbiyyah Bookstore Publishing.  
Silber, M. D., & Bhatt, A. (2007). Radicalization in the west: The homegrown threat. New York Police 
Department Intelligence Division. 
Stemmann, J. J. E. (2006). Middle East Salafism‟s influence and the radicalization of Muslim 
communities in Europe. The GLORIA Center, Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, vol. 10, no.3, Article 
1/10. 
Wiktorowicz, Q. (2006). Anatomy of the Salafi movement. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (p. 207), 29.  
 347 
UNCLASSIFIED 
4.6. Prison and Community Based Disengagement and De-Radicalization 
Programs for Extremists Involved in Militant Jihadi Terrorism 
Ideologies and Activities (Anne Speckhard) 
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Contact Information: Anne.Speckhard@gmail.com   
 
The last two decades have witnessed an explosive and dramatic leap in the growth of 
violent terror groups working in behalf of the global militant ―jihad.‖2  The tactics employed 
include kidnappings, beheading, assassinations, bombings in civilian areas, and the use of suicide 
missions labeled by the perpetrators as ―martyrdom missions.‖  Whereas in the past, terror 
groups were less ―religious‖ in their espoused ideology, more nationalistic in their membership, 
and local in their goals, we have seen in the past two decades that the ideology of Al Qaeda and 
related militant jihadist groups is religious, and that the groups are also global in reach and not 
limited to addressing local grievances (although they often make use of these issues to draw in 
and motivate new recruits).   
As we increasingly begin to understand the processes of, and threats from, violent 
radicalization, governments in Western, as well as Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian societies, 
we have begun to understand that it is necessary to mount an equal and as comprehensive a fight 
against violent radicalization.  This fight should include four main areas: 
1. preventing radicalization, particularly among vulnerable populations; 
2. immunizing society against violent ideologies;  
3. identifying and disengaging (by arrest, amnesty programs, or simple intimidation); and  
4. attempting deradicalization of those who are on the brink of, or already have, committed 
violent acts in behalf of the militant groups.  
Deradicalization and Disengagement from Terrorism 
To truly win against terrorism it is necessary to delegitimize it as a tactic. We must 
always keep in mind that terrorist groups exist because they have some political goal, some 
desire for power that drives them to violent action.  Some groups exist as a result of serious 
grievances, real and perceived, and should, wherever possible, be channelled into laying down 
                                                 
1
 Anne Speckhard, Ph.D.  is Adjunct Associate Professor of Psychiatry, Georgetown University Medical 
Center. 
2
 The author makes use of the term ―militant jihad‖ as a reference to terrorists groups (who are often also 
militants) who claim that they are carrying out a ―jihad‖ and acting in the name of Islam by attacking both 
civilian and military targets.  These groups heavily rely upon and promote ―martyrdom‖ (suicide) 
operations, claiming the rewards referred to in Islamic scriptures will be accorded to the person(s) who 
carries out such an act.  When referring to militant jihad, the author is fully aware of and respectful of the 
religious and completely non-terrorist related references to the greater jihad in the Koran, which refers to 
the constant and ever vigilant need for an inner struggle to master oneself and attain a moral lifestyle and 
assures her readers that in writing about those who believe in a call to militant jihadi terrorism, she has 
tried to find the best term that describes both their ideology and actions and by doing so means no 
disrespect to the Islamic faith nor to the majority of Muslims that follow Islam peacefully. 
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arms and achieving their goals through the legitimate political process.  Individuals who engage 
in terrorism do so because somehow their individual vulnerabilities and desires have meshed 
with those of a group and they become engaged in the terrorism trajectory.   
Deradicalization is a complex process and involves addressing the psychological state 
and makeup of the individuals involved in terrorism and those who are moving along the terrorist 
trajectory.  Disengagement from terrorism is also an option but unlike deradicalization, it is 
behavioural only.  Disengagement involves either the abandonment of violence or abandonment 
of a group that is advocating or actively involved in violence but entails no real and enduring 
change of mind and heart (Ashour, 2008; Horgan, 2008; Speckhard, 2007a). 
Disengagement sometimes occurs through intimidation.  For those who are afraid of law 
enforcement, the thrill of being involved in a terror cell can fade in the face of potential 
incarceration.  These individuals may disengage from the group simply as a result of intimidation 
while continuing to hold extremist views and continuing to be vulnerable to easy reactivation for 
a terrorist attack - by virtue of continued contact with, but minimal activity within, a terrorist 
cell.  For some, disengagement occurs with arrest and imprisonment, although the actors may 
still be highly extremist in their mindset and even ―infect‖ others while in prison by recruiting for 
the group and perhaps even directing terrorist activities from prison as they wait out their 
sentence.  This was the case for many Palestinian terrorists who were arrested and held for years 
in Israeli prisons.  Some smuggled in phones and directed militant activities from inside the 
prisons while others recruited new members.  Ahmed Sadat the leader of the PFLP commented 
to me in 2004, ―The prison became our best university for finding and teaching recruits.  The 
Israelis did us a favour in that regard‖ (Speckhard, 2004).   
There are ways to disengage individuals and groups from terrorism and even to de-
radicalize/change their belief that terrorism is a legitimate activity.  These include: 
1. delegitimizing the ideologies themselves;  
2. understanding and tailoring strategies to address the various conduits used for persuading 
and motivating recruits (in the case of the militant jihad these conduits are through face 
to face recruitment, media glorification, or terrorism and the Internet);  
3. disengaging recruits from active roles through intimidation, imprisonment, amnesty 
programs; 
4. providing activities that attract them away from violence and into nonviolent solutions; 
5. de-radicalizing/rehabilitating those who have been imprisoned through prison programs; 
and  
6. prevention of radicalization on a societal-wide level with special emphasis on vulnerable 
prison inmates, gangs, military members, and youth.   
Disengagement from terrorism is certainly a worthy goal.  However, without an ideological 
shift, de-radicalization does not occur and those who have disengaged from terrorism appear to 
just as easily re-engage.  Those that reengage can be the most  lethal of all actors, volunteering 
for suicide missions in order to avoid what some have termed ―another kind of death‖ meaning 
enduring imprisonment, torture, or living with extreme posttraumatic stress responses 
(Speckhard, 2004).  Disengagement is simple to assess, whereas the profound and long-term 
attitudinal, belief, and behavioural changes involved in deradicalization are both far more 
difficult to achieve and to assess. 
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 The remainder of this paper will focus on all of the above.  Two types of 
disengagement/deradicalization programs will be described.  The first deal with community 
based models, while the second set of approaches deal with prison-based programs. Since much 
has been written in this volume on the role of the media and internet in recruiting (Paz, 2009, 
etc.) the section on community based models will only focus on recruiting in the military and on 
the street.  
Countering Recruitment/Radicalization in the Military  
 One of the calls to the militant jihad includes the seeking out and recruiting of key 
individuals who are in the military or soon will be, to convert them to extremism and to use their 
training and insider position to fight against their own countries and to fight against others as 
well.  Following the identification of Zarkawi as the leader of AQ in Iraq, the Jordanian 
government understood that it needed to institute prevention programs within its military to find 
and work with those military recruits who may be influenced by, and act upon, militant jihadi 
ideologies. They developed a program for special forces recruits with psychological and 
ideological components to help detect those with doubts about being in the military, and to 
prevent their recruitment into militant jihadi groups through awareness and understanding the 
validity (or lack thereof) of the associated persuasive religious arguments.  It is run by a military 
psychologist and cleric who lecture new recruits and invites them to consider family members, 
friends, and colleagues who deem their military commitments as ―Takfir,‖ or apostate. The 
psychologist and cleric engage the military recruits to teach them their military service to the 
state is, indeed, legitimate under Islam and that militant jihadi violence is illegitimate. 
 Western Muslims as well are vulnerable to both recruitment and retaliation.  Those who 
consider or actually join the military in countries involved in missions in Iraq and Afghanistan 
may find themselves attacked by other Muslims for taking part in military missions in Islamic 
countries.  Several Muslim military members in the UK told the author in June 2008 that they do 
not admit, even to their own families, that they are in the military in order to avoid harassment 
and prevent harm to themselves and their families (Speckhard, 2008b). European militaries need 
to take these concerns seriously by appointing Muslim imams as chaplains to support and protect 
their charges from becoming radicalized or suffering from harassment.   
The Street – Community Based Models of Intervention  
 While surveillance and infiltration of terrorist groups is necessary, it is possible to use 
parallel efforts for positive intervention when authorities identify young people that are 
becoming involved in militant jihadi activities.  Youth workers (psychologists, social workers, 
imams, and education specialists) can be sent to talk with those at risk and help them with the 
problems that make turning to such groups and ideologies attractive in the first place.  Youth 
workers can be mentored and trained to work in youth centers and in the streets, engaging with 
extremists, and those vulnerable to extremism to turn them back from belief in, and engaging in, 
militant jihad. These efforts may make it possible to thwart or reverse radicalisation of young 
Muslims, who have not yet been arrested, but are known to hold extremist views or support 
violent activities and have the potential to become personally engaged in or critically supportive 
of political violence/terrorism.   
 Community based counter-radicalization programs are active in both the Netherlands and 
the UK.  The Dutch police understand that community policing is crucial and have instituted a 
program that mobilizes social services (i.e., housing, schooling, welfare benefits etc.) as a means 
 350 
UNCLASSIFIED 
of prevention for those identified by the police as dangerously close to committing themselves to 
violence in behalf of the militant jihad.  
 The UK built a program modeled after the Dutch and also developed community based 
programs for dialogue and outreach to prevent the spread of militant jihadist ideologies as well 
as to directly address extremists themselves.  In the UK initiative, when a potential extremist is 
identified by policing initiatives, they  are either marked for security surveillance, or if they have 
not gone too far down the terrorist trajectory, moved through a process in which they are warned 
that while they have not yet broken any laws, they appear to need monitoring and assistance. 
Social services are then mobilized to deal with any social needs such as housing, educational 
services, social work, etc.  
 Just as deconstructing Internet militant jihadi materials is potentially a powerful method 
for countering its power to radicalize, deconstruction of the militant jihadi ideology is also a 
useful prevention activity in schools and mosques to protect vulnerable and young populations 
who are likely viewers of such materials by helping them to see the emotional manipulation and 
to provide a better path to take in response to the call to militant jihad.  Similar to anti-AIDs 
campaigns for young people, such materials could be used in schools to inoculate youth against 
the call to militant jihad (Speckhard, 2007a). 
 It is important for countries to identify their ―hotspots‖ and communities vulnerable to 
militant jihadi ideologies and consider programs that go well beyond simple criminal 
surveillance.  The few Somali immigrant youth that went on ―jihad‖ in  Somalia after living in 
the U.S. are an example of a population that some experts, including this author, had expressed 
concerns about for years before they ever activated (Kobrin, 2008; Paz, 2008). 
Prison Rehabilitation Programs 
 Prison authorities in many countries are struggling with how to best address militant 
jihadi prisoners and those vulnerable to their aggressive recruitment tactics. Saudi Arabia, 
Singapore, Malaysia, Jordan, the United States, Egypt, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Qatar, 
Netherlands, the UK, and many other countries have all begun to address the need for prison 
rehabilitation and prevention programs to address and remediate the spread of militant jihadi 
activities within prisons.  The author designed and pilot tested one of these rehabilitation 
programs in Iraq.   
 The spectrum of extremism in prisons ranges from those who entered prison as dedicated 
militant jihadists, having been imprisoned for some terrorist related act, to those who merely 
supported such groups for opportunist reasons.  Those who have ―blood on their hands‖ or who 
are already seriously indoctrinated and committed violence on behalf of the militant jihad can be 
called ―hard core‖ extremists.  The ―hard core‖ also includes those who actively propagate the 
ideology and have been intimately involved in terror operations: as strategists, recruiters, and 
actual operatives.   
 Next to these ―hardcore‖ prisoners are those who have fallen under their influence.  
These usually include Muslims who reverted to Islam while in prison and new convert to Islam 
who were imprisoned for other reasons (i.e., non-terrorism related criminal acts).  If left under 
the influence of militant jihadi leaders inside prison, they have a strong chance of becoming 
indoctrinated by militant jihadists and leaving prison as ―hard core‖ militant jihadis.  Richard 
Reid, the infamous shoe bomber, is a good example of this group.   
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 Somewhere between the ―hard core‖ and those under their influence are the opportunists 
- a group imprisoned for security related crimes who may have served militant jihadi groups but 
who were not motivated by the militant jihadi ideology. They are the ones that will lay an IED, 
run guns, or carry out other criminal activities for money but they are not particularly interested 
in the ―cause.‖ This latter group is criminal in nature and motivated by money, involved with 
drugs, gunrunning, gang, and criminal activities.  Their motivations for assisting terrorists are 
mercenary rather than ideological, although once in prison they, too, are vulnerable to becoming 
more ideologically committed to militant jihadi ideas.  Lastly, in some countries, individuals are 
imprisoned for having militant jihadi materials in their possession. These prisoners have not 
actually been involved in terrorist acts and are often not seriously dedicated to militant jihadi 
ideologies.   
 One of the greatest challenges the author found when designing the detainee 
rehabilitation program in Iraq was sorting the prisoners and assessing the factors that served as 
catalysts for starting and staying on the terrorist trajectory, the level of commitment, and the 
motivations at each stage.  This understanding is necessary to successfully derail the person from 
engaging in terrorism.  The rehabilitation needs vary: those who are ideologically indoctrinated 
need to have their worldview addressed, whereas those for whom trauma was a primary catalyst 
for engaging in terrorism are in need of posttraumatic stress therapy.  Those with purely 
mercenary motives are unlikely to disengage from terrorism and might be drawn further into the 
militant jihad by a program that addresses only ideology.  These individuals may need skills 
training and psychological help to reorient to a different, nonviolent means of earning an income.   
 The major aspects of nine programs for countering militant jihadi extremist ideologies 
and their followers inside prisons are briefly described.  These programs are specifically 
designed as rehabilitation or ―treatment‖ programs for extremist prisoners and also function to 
prevent the spread of militant jihadist ideologies inside the prison population.  In the latter case, 
they may target prisoners who have converted or ―reverted‖ to Islam and endorse militant jihadi 
ideologies. They were developed primarily with local issues in mind to combat the militant 
jihadist threat inside their own countries.  
Saudi Arabia 
 The Saudi program is the most well known and longest standing. It was developed in 
response to increasing Saudi concern over ―jihadists‖ who received military training and were 
ideologically indoctrinated in Afghanistan and returned to the kingdom disgruntled and 
advocating for it to be overthrown.  In response to this societal challenge, a group of well-known 
clerics began a prison-based deradicalization program. These clerics visited the prisoners 
individually to engage militant jihadis in discussions about their beliefs.  
 Saudi clerics, some of the most respected Islamic scholars in the world, engage in 
respectful discussion with extremist prisoners and carefully challenge them in instances where 
the militants‘ views did not coincide with authentic teachings of Islam.  The Saudi clerics are 
often able to win these debates and move them to a more moderate stance of no longer endorsing 
terrorism. The credibility of the clerics involved is paramount in their success and may not 
translate to other locations.  In fact, when clerics from the Saudi program were invited to speak 
with Saudi prisoners in Guantanamo and Iraq they found that, when they were up against the 
―hard core‖ Al Qaeda (AQ) prisoner, their program was less effective and often had no effect at 
all.  The prisoners in Guantanamo and Iraq took the ideological stance that the clerics had been 
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co-opted by the Saudi royal family who they view as apostates (or ―Takfeer‖).  However, the 
Saudi clerics were able to reach a few less ‖hard core‖ prisoners at Guantanamo and, as a result, 
gained important intelligence from them that led to further arrests of terrorist operatives.   
 The Saudis have the resources to offer substantial incentives to their prisoners for 
positive participation in the ―reform‖ process.  These include arranging marriages for single 
disadvantaged prisoners (no small thing in Saudi where failing to find a wife can be a serious 
frustration), offering new cars and jobs upon release – all things to help ex-prisoners settle down 
and start a family - and also making financial provisions for the wives and families of the 
married extremists prisoners.  This enables the Saudi clerics to be able to offer material 
incentives as genuine expressions of their concern.  Likewise, the Saudi system is able to keep 
close tabs on prisoners who are released, monitoring their communication and movements to 
ensure they do not resume their extremist memberships and activities.  This is a disincentive for 
the groups as well, as they can be discovered and arrested for try to recruit a released militant 
inside Saudi. 
 An important point to note about the Saudi program is that it began solely with the 
involvement of clerics but, as time went on, the clerics understood that a purely ideological (in 
this case Islamic) approach was not sufficient.  As a result, they invited psychiatric and 
psychological professionals to help assess the prisoners throughout the treatment program and 
have, in the last years, added many psychological aspects to their program including art therapy 
(Bennett, 2008).  The Saudi program also has a prevention component and aftercare with a 
halfway house (that includes art therapy, play station, and religious lectures that aid in the 
transition from prison including for those released from Guantanamo (Boucek, 2008) ).  The 
head of the family members and graduates of the program also must sign a pledge renouncing 
terrorism, with the head of the family stating he will be responsible for the prisoner once released 
into their care (Mohammad, 2009).   
 At present, prisoners complete the program in eight to twelve weeks (Mohammad, 2009). 
The prison-based program started in 2004 and has graduated more than three thousand prisoners. 
The current claim made by the Saudi prison program is for 80 to 90 percent effectiveness with 
recidivism of only thirty-five of these as of 2008 (Boucek, 2008).  One must keep in mind 
however that this figure is based on a prison population that aims mainly at moderate extremists 
– that is those who were arrested for having connections to extremist militant groups or having 
militant jihadi materials in their possession and makes little to no inroads with ―hard core‖ 
operatives.  Indeed the thirty-five reported by Boucek were all for security related offences but 
another nine prisoners graduating from the program were rearrested for returning to the militant 
jihad (Mohammad, 2009).  In one infamous case, Said Ali al-Shihri (otherwise known as Abu 
Sayyaf al-Shihri) was released from Guantanamo to Saudi Arabia in 2007 and passed through the 
Saudi rehabilitation program before resurfacing in Yemen as the deputy leader of Al Qaeda‘s 
Yemeni branch, where he is suspected of involvement in the deadly bombing of the United 
States Embassy in Sana, Yemen in September 2008 (Worth, 2009).   
Singapore 
 The Singaporeans have a rehabilitation program similar to the Saudis, having modeled it 
after theirs.  It was begun in 2002 in response to thwarted suicide bombing attacks on four key 
positions inside Singapore including the U.S. embassy involving 15 Jamaya Islamyia 
Singaporeans in their mid-to-late twenties.  The existence of homegrown militant jihadis on 
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home soil came as a great shock to the Singaporean government.  Singaporean system also 
involves incentives such as providing financial provisions for the wives and families of the 
prisoners, offering the wives jobs while the prisoner was still in prison, and providing, when 
necessary, employment for prisoners upon release.  The prisoners are also strongly encouraged to 
continue meeting with the prison clerics weekly for the year after their release to ensure that they 
do not revert back to any militant jihadi ideas (Gunaratna & Ali, 2006). It also provides prisoners 
with a library and academic courses (Mohammad, 2009).  The Singaporean program also claims 
huge success, with thirty-two of fifty-five prisoners released (Mohammad, 2009); however, their 
program works only with thwarted terrorists not those who had engaged in violence.  Also, 
Singapore is a society in which it is easy to monitor prisoners (including their communications 
and movements) after their release. 
Malaysia 
 The Malaysians claim their prison program is based on the Singapore system.  The Malay 
prison system is a long-term, 2-3 year treatment program.  ―Treatment‖ in the Malay system is 
based upon group lectures, individual counseling sessions with one or multiple clerics, and 
perhaps most importantly, physical ―discipline‖ (beatings) of prisoners who do not comply with 
the state sponsored Islamic teachings against militant jihad.  The Malaysian prisoners generally 
comply with treatment, if only to simply avoid being beaten for any overt resistance to it.  It is 
unclear if the program has truly been successful. 
Indonesia 
 Indonesia‘s program, started in 2002, involves the participation of former Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI) members who work to convince suspected terrorists that Islam does not support 
terrorism in return for incentives such as reduced sentences or assistance for their families. The 
most famous of these is a former high ranking militant, Nasir Abas, allegedly involved in the 
Bali bombing and a former mujahedeen in Afghanistan who ―deradicalized‖ on his own as a 
result of his disgust with the wholesale attacks and killing of civilians that he never endorsed 
(Mohammad, 2009).  Abas et al uses three arguments to convince militant jihadis to give up their 
allegiance to the movement: that militant jihad and attacking civilians is not Islamic; that not all 
westerners are bad, and that militant jihad has given a bad face to Islam, doing it a disservice.  
He admits many militants dismiss him but that he can make an impact in some cases (Economist, 
2007).   
 The Indonesian program is based on two key tenets: that only radicals can deradicalize 
militant jihadi prisoners because they have credibility and that the state must reestablish trust and 
legitimacy (through incentives, etc.) to foster the cooperation of former militants/terrorists. For 
that reason, the program gives considerable support, medical care, and education to prisoners‘ 
family members and to the prisoners themselves.  Abas and his group of former militant jihadis 
argue against the need for an Islamic state, stating that the government is not apostate (Schulze, 
2008). According to Sidney Jones, an Indonesia-based analyst for the International Crisis Group 
only of a few of the ―hard core‖ have been reached, the rest are not responsive to this program 
(Bennett, 2008).   
Egypt 
 In 1997, leaders of the Egyptian Islamic Group (EIG) started a massive de-radicalization 
program in which they declared a unilateral ceasefire and from which sprang twenty-five 
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volumes containing Islamic arguments of why the use of violence against the state, society, and 
others was illegitimate and not based in Islam.  The Egyptian prison authorities allowed the 
leaders to organize large study groups inside prison where they could gather their followers to 
tell them that what they had been taught about the militant jihad was no longer considered 
legitimate or Islamic.  Following in the EIG footsteps, the imprisoned leaders of the al- Jihad 
organization also started a massive movement in 2007 renouncing violence (Ashour). This shook 
Al Qaeda to its core.  The recanting and subsequent writings of Sayyid Imam al-Sharif in 
particular created a furor within the global militant jihadi movement.  This was because he was 
known previously for having authored what some refer to as the ―bible‖ of jihad, and many of 
those involved in the formation of Al Qaeda previously had strong ties with the al-Jihad group.  
Indeed Zawahiri, the main current ideologue of Al Qaeda was so concerned that he wrote an 
entire volume to answer al-Sharif‘s recantation of the militant jihad, questioning the piece, and 
asking if perhaps its author was hooked up to the torture machine to have written it. 
 The Egyptians are well known for their frequent use of torture to elicit information from 
and to ―turn‖ militant jihadi prisoners.  One man, imprisoned for teaching the Salafi version of 
Islam told the author, ―I was arrested and held for five years.  They would take us in up on the 
roof and douse us with freezing cold water and leave us there in the cold, along with many other 
ways of torturing us‖ (Speckhard, 2007b).  The Islamist movement in Egypt, many whose 
members spent considerable time in prison and were tortured, spawned two distinct paths.  Those 
who were released from prison or evaded arrest fled Egypt and some of them became the basis of 
the modern day AQ movement.   
 For both of the Egyptian groups recanting from terrorism, there were two important 
reasons for giving up political violence: torture and imprisonment (strong state repression) and 
the realization, gained from extensive study in prison, that violent militant jihadi ideas were not 
only counterproductive (i.e., often resulting in torture and death) but also were not justified by 
Islam. When interviewed, leaders of the Egyptian Islamic Group recall feeling horrified as their 
followers moved from attacking political leaders, regarded as legitimate targets, to indiscriminate 
attacks against civilians, which they believed to be inconsistent with the teachings of Islam.   
 According to Egyptian authorities, this prison program has reached hundreds 
successfully.  Their success is likely due to the scholarship of the leaders and the fact that they 
are respected leaders and insiders to the movement as well as charismatic.  The success of the 
Egyptian model unfortunately highlights the potential power resulting from the coupling of 
imprisonment, torture, and heavy state repression with self-education and charismatic leaders 
dispersing their new found wisdom to their followers.  It is unlikely that any Western state would 
want to emulate all aspects of this program, especially the repression, even with the high success 
rates.  As an Egyptian ex-prisoner who was tortured in prison told this author, ―I did not believe 
in terrorism and never preached it and I still do not, it is not Islamic.‖  Asked if he continues to 
preach nonviolent Salafi views after his release he answered, ―No, I am too afraid to preach 
anything, I never want to return to prison‖ (Speckhard, 2007). We can hope most tortured 
prisoners are like him, but we know from actual research that is not the case – some become 
even more hardened and dedicate themselves to suicide missions rather than to risk recapture 
(Speckhard, 2005 #24).   
 355 
UNCLASSIFIED 
Yemen 
 Yemen boasts great success from a prison system very similar to the Saudis in that it 
engages militant jihadi prisoners in respectful dialogue with imminent clerics who, like the 
Saudis, have the authority, education, and experience to debate Islamic issues.  Yemen  has 
reported success with even the ―hard core‖ who are claimed to have reverted to a moderate 
stance of Islam (Taarnby, 2005).  However, intelligence data reveals that, in fact, many of these 
―hard core‖ militants simply left Yemen upon release and surfaced in Iraq and other jihadi 
hotspots.  It appears that the Yemeni government turned a blind eye to this, pleased to have the 
militants out of the country and engaged elsewhere.   
United Kingdom 
 The UK began its program to combat militant jihadi ideologies inside prisons in 2005-
2006.  The UK program focuses on new Islamic converts who have endorsed militant jihadi 
ideologies.  These prisoners meet individually with prison imams who ask them about their 
beliefs and present them with Salafi-based critical analysis methods to judge the authenticity of 
Islamic teachings and consistency with the Quran and the verified teachings (Hadiths) of the 
companion of the Prophets.  Likewise, militant jihadi teachings are carefully challenged by 
presenting the context in which the Quranic verses and Hadiths used by terror groups are 
appropriately applied and highlighting where they have been misapplied.  The goal is to 
empower the convert to think for himself and drop his mistaken commitment to militant jihadi 
beliefs.  The UK program imams admit they are able to identify psychosocial factors and 
vulnerabilities that create a ―hook‖ for the militant jihadi teachings but that they, themselves, do 
not address these factors other than to identify them, discuss them briefly with the prisoners and 
refer them for state sponsored social work assistance.  The UK program is completely non-
coercive and voluntary and operates for the most part as individual religious 
counseling/mentoring but also includes sermons and group discussions where appropriate. 
United States 
 In fall of 2006, the United States Department of Defense, under the initiative of General 
Garner, committed to investigate existing prison deradicalization programs and to model one for 
use with the 20,000 + security detainees in Iraq.  The U.S. program was designed by the author, 
with the help of UK imams involved in the Scotland Yard project, and pilot tested in summer 
2007.  The four to six week intensive program was the first of its kind to incorporate a 
comprehensive religious and psychological approach from the start -- combining religious 
challenge by Muslim imams with psychological counseling to inmates to help address the many 
psychological traumas and vulnerabilities that led them to involvement with terrorism and 
insurgency.  The goal of the program is to challenge and move the detainees to make a profound 
shift from embracing violence to adopting a nonviolent stance. Changes are assessed relative to 
pre-treatment assessments by both psychologists and imams. Due to the huge numbers of 
detainees involved, most sessions occur in groups of no more than ten detainees and individual 
sessions only occur on an ―as needed‖ basis. Treatment is a full day: half religious, half-
psychological.  The program is voluntary, but detainees are motivated by the potential of 
accelerated release from detention and amnesty. The program also has an economic and 
educational component designed by the military to improve detainees‘ literacy (in Arabic) and to 
train them in useful skills for employment upon release.  While the desire was to include family 
and tribal members in the treatment, the distances involved, particularly for those detainees 
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housed in Camp Bucca, precluded doing so. The challenges of designing and carrying out a 
large-scale rehabilitation program inside an active conflict zone are many.  All those released 
will be going back into an environment where the original catalysts for activating into terrorism 
and political violence may still be present.   
 Of the 20,000 + detainees held by the U.S. at that time it was estimated between five to 
fifteen percent were ―hard core‖ (i.e., dedicated to militant jihadi ideologies) and the rest were 
engaged in sectarian violence (including Shia militants) and economic opportunists.  Likewise, 
800 juveniles were among the detainees.  Thus, the program was tailored for three populations: 
hard core, moderates and juveniles.   
 The eight hundred juvenile detainees, ages 13-18, were a huge concern as they were 
separated from their family and school for a considerable period of time during a critical period 
in their development.  The program for juveniles included psychological and religious 
counseling along with continuing their education.  Classes and sports offered included math, 
science, social sciences, language, and soccer.  The juveniles were given group-counseling 
treatment by clerics.   Psychological counseling was provided to address traumas, psychosocial 
needs and vulnerabilities, sense of identity, and future purpose and plans for exiting prison.  The 
juveniles responded well to the program. 
 The program for the ―hard core‖ prisoners was similar to the juveniles including both 
Islamic lessons and psychological treatment of their traumas.  They were taken in groups through 
a series of lessons organized around themes relating to militant jihad and Islamic teachings that 
were designed to engage them in discussions, challenge militant jihadi ideologies, and turn them 
to relinquishing sectarian and militant jihadi violence.  Some of the imams that worked with 
them were respected Salafi scholars with years of Islamic study and also prior involvement in the 
militant jihad, thus they had an insider position to work from. The psychological track addressed 
the multitude of traumas that may have given rise to their willingness to commit to violence, as 
well as the traumas that occurred during arrest and incarceration, grief and loss issues, their 
desires for revenge, their sense of identity, meaningfulness, life mission, and future purpose. The 
psychology track worked to create positive identity and future alignments, to reorient them to 
nonviolent problem solving and to empower the militant jihadis to consider alternative 
nonviolent pathways to changing their society and to address injustices.   
 The ―moderate‖ prisoners were provided with a shorter program that addressed Islamic 
values and provided psychological counseling to create a sense of identity and self-
empowerment that precluded commitment to violence.  This group was given only a limited 
Islamic challenge because they were not ideologically committed to the militant jihad and there 
was no point to needlessly expose them to this ideology. 
 The program was designed to operate on the highest levels of human rights standards 
with no violence or coercion involved and full disclosure of the programs‘ goals and contents, 
voluntary participation, informed consent, and the ability to opt out at any time. Likewise, 
careful precautions were taken to warn detainees who were receiving counseling that given 
prison surveillance, admitting to crimes they had not already admitted to in previous 
interrogation sessions might be problematic for them, that it was better to work on these issues 
without directly admitting to criminal involvement. 
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 Initial results were very promising, with 6,000 detainees released nine months after 
program commencement, although most were low security risks rather than ―hard core.‖  Of the 
original group released, only 12 inmates were rearrested – much lower than the usual recidivism 
rate from previous years of close to 200. Major General Douglas Stone, commander of detention 
facilities in Iraq, reported that improved security in the areas of the country many inmates were 
returning to also helped in keeping the recidivism rate lower (Bennett, 2008).  Overall, the 
program appeared to work for releasing low security risk detainees and inside the prison also 
showed some success for reaching ―hard core.‖ 
Turkey 
 Turkey also has a prison program.  One of its distinctive features is the use of family 
members to effect changes in the prisoners.  Mothers, in particular, are brought into sessions to 
―talk sense‖ to their sons.  Since the mother-son bond is so strong in Turkish culture, a mother‘s 
strong emotional pleas to her son to give up commitment to the militant jihadi ideology can be 
quite persuasive, especially if she shows the suffering his imprisonment has caused her and their 
family.   
Features of Prison Rehabilitation Programs and Recommendations for Success 
 Prison de-radicalization programs are a great challenge and the ingredients of a 
successful prison rehabilitation program are many and varied.  There are features common to all 
programs – building rapport and challenging the ideology, but there are also distinctive features 
that can be used to increase the success of a program.  The table on the next page gives a list of 
the potential ingredients of a successful prison rehabilitation program. 
 
A prison program must first be voluntary and involve informed consent as well as give 
profound respect to human rights.  While some may argue the ―ticking bomb‖ reason for torture 
or advocate ―soft torture,‖ serious Al Qaeda participants are usually prepared for both. There is 
evidence that many Al Qaeda operatives are trained to endure interrogation and even torture and 
to organize themselves into functioning recruitment cells inside prison walls.  Physical abuse, 
isolation, and coercion may work to elicit confessions but they may also harden prisoners and 
drive them to suicide or ―martyrdom‖ roles if they return to terrorism upon release. Likewise, 
photos and video footage from Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib give clear evidence that any 
mistreatment of prisoners can easily become a lightning rod for further global radicalization.   
Detainees in Iraq who told the author about being mistreated (hit, held in stress positions, 
not allowed to clean themselves according to Islamic rules or pray, locked in small spaces, 
photographed naked among mixed gender groups, mocked while naked, etc.) made clear that 
such mistreatment can push some, but not all prisoners, into further radicalization and can do the 
same for their relatives and others who learn of it.  The same was true in our Chechen sample – a 
group of suicide bombers volunteered for their missions after either being tortured or having a 
family member tortured in prison.  Conversely, three former Al Qaeda operatives who spoke 
with the author in Iraq shared that the decency, respect, and extension of human care by their 
interrogators in prison turned them away from the movement (Speckhard, 2006). 
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Features of Deradicalization/Disengagement Prison Programs Dealing with Militant Jihadi 
Prisoners/Detainees 
 
Rapport between prisoner and cleric, psychologist, or a team 
- Charismatic leaders, former insiders, recanters, people with street credibility, Salafi scholars, and 
older maternal and paternal figures are most useful 
Religious Treatment 
- Challenged on Islamic legitimacy of militant jihad 
- Taught critical thinking and means of testing Islamic thought 
Psychological Treatment  
- Addresses the original/current motivations and  vulnerabilities that led to joining and engaging in 
terrorism; 
- Reorients prisoner to nonviolent identity and solutions for achieving goals. 
Family & Tribal Involvement 
- Family members and tribal leaders involved in the treatment and after release 
- Marriages arranged for prisoners upon release 
Economic Incentives 
- Family members supported during incarceration 
- Jobs provided upon release 
- Cars provided 
Skills Training 
- Language skills and literacy taught 
- Training in job skills 
- Basic education provided – particularly for juveniles 
Sports Program 
Incentives for Participation 
- Accelerated or early release for successful participation 
- Amnesty upon release for successful graduates 
Weekly or daily sessions 
Isolation from Other Prisoners for Safety Reasons 
After Release Mentoring Program 
- To ensure the changes occurring inside prison continue after release; 
Human Rights Aspects 
- Voluntary with Informed Consent 
- Surveillance admitted to the participant to prevent further incrimination 
- Nonviolent, noncoercive, no stress positions, solitary isolation, etc. 
Systematic Assessment  - Pre, during and post-testing for efficacy 
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 A successful program must find a way to successfully sort through and identify prisoners 
or detainees according to their level of radicalization.  This requires an assessment tool that 
should be used pre, post, and during treatment. The program must be tailored to address the 
process and level of engagement in the movement, original and current motivators, and find 
ways to activate potential motivations for disengagement or deradicalization. For the program to 
work, militant prisoners must be approached contextually, addressing issues that are important to 
them (i.e., anger over occupation, violation of sacred values, trauma, desire for revenge, search 
for meaning, need for belonging or a father figure, marginalization, discrimination, etc.).  
Motivational incentives that address their needs and motivations for becoming involved work 
best. 
 A common element of all of the programs is that they rely upon a relationship built with 
the prisoner, often by a cleric or imam brought in specifically for this purpose, but at times also 
involving a psychologist or an entire team of mentors.  These individuals first build rapport in 
group or individual sessions which takes place anywhere from daily to weekly.  Many programs 
at present are religious only and use imams solely to challenge the militant jihadi worldview. 
This is a serious limitation as the road to radicalization involves many group dynamics and 
individual vulnerabilities that are best addressed using psychological methods in conjunction 
with imam involvement.  Many psychological tools (cognitive therapy, guided imagery, etc.) can 
be used to help militant jihadi prisoners envision restoring themselves to a nonviolent stance, 
rebuilding to engage with their social environment positively.   
 A program is also only as good as the quality of the people that carry it out.  Charismatic 
persons, those with maternal or paternal streaks, and a sense of personal authority and maturity 
are also likely to have better success as prisoners are often drawn to such persons.  Respect for 
age and strong family ties are often a cultural feature of those who join the militant jihad, thus 
experience and age can be serious asset. In the case of religious challenge, it is important to 
realize that hard-core militant jihadis who know their Koran well will likely demand a very 
highly trained imam to speak with them and are unlikely to respect anyone other than a Salafi 
scholar. Likewise, when sectarian violence is a huge issue as it has been with Al Qaeda in Iraq it 
may be difficult to use Shia staff for Sunni prisoners because they may be rejected or threatened. 
 A few programs make use of family members and tribal leaders in the treatment and 
release process, requiring the tribe or family to keep watch over the released prisoner and prevent 
him from further involvement.  In Iraq, it was very clear that the prisoners were very worried 
about loved ones at home, particularly female relatives that were perhaps living without male 
protection while the inmate was imprisoned.  Making use of this concern through family 
involvement and monitored phone calls and making use of the strong desire to return home puts 
a strong motivation to good use.   
 The roles that a militant jihadi will hopefully move into once disengaged/deradicalized 
are also important to consider.  Amnesty, jobs programs, and continued mentoring upon release 
are all important considerations.  Economic incentives, such as the Saudis provide, including 
jobs and even a car help make the transition from prison. Likewise, literacy and skills training in 
computers or a trade all provide increased likelihood of being gainfully employed upon release. 
A few programs include after release mentoring programs and frequent check-ins to ensure the 
changes occurring inside prison continue after release. All of these measures are likely to secure 
long-term compliance. 
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 Lastly, a good program may not do well if the prison authorities are not behind the 
program.  Guards that are disrespectful or abusive can easily undo positive movement in 
treatment sessions.  Likewise, isolating prisoners taking part in the program, surveillance, getting 
medical care, and training for those who need extra care, getting the proper space to carry out the 
program, prison access and protection for staff, etc., all require close alliance with the prison 
authorities as does assessing who should be taking part in the program.  
 Sabotage of prisoner reform is also a serious factor to consider.  In Iraq, those who were 
suspected of turning against the other Takfiri prisoners were subjected to sharia courts and had 
their arms broken or worse.  It is wise to isolate those taking part in a program from those who 
are not in order to avoid such punishments and to keep them from being harassed and re-
indoctrinated while going through the program.  
 Assessing success in any prison program is extremely difficult.  Prisoners are highly 
motivated to lie especially if they believe that they can gain amnesty and early release.  Probably 
the best measure of a reformed jihadi is observation over time to see if there has been a real 
change of behavior, mind, and heart.  This may be easier to detect in group sessions and with 
clandestine surveillance than in individual sessions where the prisoner may learn to manipulate 
his mentor.     
 Likewise, a successful program cannot be condemned by some level of recidivism.  
 Thousands of prisoners in Iraq were released after going through the Detainee 
Rehabilitation Program; however, release alone does not signify success and release does not 
mean that they did not return to terrorism – only that they were not detected.  Previously 
incarcerated terrorists are likely to be very careful to avoid arrest again.  Detainees released from 
the Saudi and Yemen programs have been found to have returned to the militant jihad, just as 
detainees released without treatment from Guantanamo and other programs returned to their 
former roles.   
Challenges 
 The challenges to counter-radicalization programs whether they be prison or community 
based are multiple.  First of all women are rarely addressed in either venue and women are 
increasingly playing a role in militant jihad: as motivators of men (even offering themselves as 
marital/sexual prizes to those who commit to self ―martyrdom‖), trainers of children, interpreters 
and teachers of militant jihad, and as ―martyrs‖ and operatives themselves. In Iraq, arresting and 
detaining even clearly guilty women as prisoners was a highly radicalizing event and one that 
made it difficult for the women to return to society as it was assumed they had been sexually 
molested while in prison.   
 Another challenge with counter-radicalization programs is that the ideology and 
recruitment strategies that governments are confronting are highly fluid and difficult to address 
with static programs.  The programs must constantly keep up with the changeable nature of the 
threat they are addressing. The militant jihadi discourse and their tactics change by the month.  
For instance, when the Egyptian al-Sharif disavowed jihad a great debate broke out among 
militant jihadis into which even Zawahiri stepped to weigh in.  These are things that practioners 
must be aware of in order to take full advantage of them.   
 There is much concern as well among Western countries for making use of the Salafi 
clerics who are probably most able to engage seriously indoctrinated militant jihadis in 
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meaningful discourse since the Salafi stream so closely runs alongside the Takfiri ideologies that 
allow the killing of Muslims, civilians, women, and children.  While Western governments often 
fear Salafists, we may find that fear handicaps us from using our best allies in fighting militant 
jihadi ideologies.  Another concern is that no matter what the deradicalization program, if it is 
true to Islamic scriptures, there are calls to jihad when Islam, Islamic lands, and Islamic peoples 
are under attack, so it is hard to put all of these ideas to rest when dealing with truly occupied 
Muslim lands.  In these cases, the best Islamic arguments for giving up violence is that it is 
against Islamic scriptures to fight a losing battle with an overwhelming enemy when great losses 
will be sustained; in these cases Muslims are instructed to make peace until their strength is 
regained (or the issue becomes moot if the occupation is ended). 
 There are also serious concerns about the spread of militant jihadi ideologies inside 
prisons.  Often prisoners ingeniously find the means to pass tapes, lectures, phones, and other 
means of communicating their virulent ideologies within and outside of prison walls.  Prison 
officials can respond by moving prisoners although unless they are all successfully identified, 
this strategy may leave untraced ideologues in place and as a result exposes two new prisoner 
groups to experienced ideologues.  Or, they can isolate militant jihadi prisoners in cells and 
prisons dedicated only to them, but this may lead to human rights outcry by society at large as it 
did in the Netherlands.  Without active measures to counter in prison recruitment, it is likely that 
some prisoners will emerge more dangerous than they went in.   
 Certainly, there is a strong need for prevention, inoculation and deradicalization 
programs to attract and work with militant jihadis on the street, over the Internet, in prisons, in 
militaries, and wherever else they may be active in order to try to turn them back from terrorism 
and political violence.  Let us have the courage to try and the hope that we succeed in these 
efforts to protect our citizens from militant jihadi terrorism. 
back to top 
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Introduction 
The global campaign against terrorism has been dominated by an overwhelmingly kinetic 
response. The lethal and kinetic operations have temporarily disrupted terrorist operational 
infrastructures but not their ideological and intellectual infrastructures driving extremism and 
terrorism. The modus operandi of catching, killing and disrupting terrorist organisations is 
having a boomerang effect.  
The result has been an increased intention on the part of the terrorists to fight back, 
protracting the fight. In some countries, soft power has been cast by the wayside as hard powers 
are wielded. The combination – smart power – is used by only very few nations. While the use of 
operational measures should not be disregarded, an equal amount of attention should not be 
given to the strategic battle of ideas.  
Ideological infrastructures form the foundations of the terrorist movement. Flourishing in 
permissive environments, radical extremist ideology remains the lifeblood of contemporary 
terrorism. Operational terrorists and terrorist ideologues can only be de-legitimized by 
ideological and theological refutation. To safeguard the next generation of youth from terrorism 
and extremism, detainee
2
 rehabilitation and community engagement is a strategic tool. Counter 
ideology presents a positive and plausible mechanism to create an environment that is hostile to 
terrorists and unfriendly to extremists. 
The Context 
Prison de-radicalization programs ideally consist of both detainee and inmate 
rehabilitation and community re-engagement. These de-radicalization initiatives can counter the 
contemporary wave of extremism. Detainee and inmate rehabilitation is the reverse of terrorist 
indoctrination and is an essential element in the fight against terrorism. Historically, Egypt 
pioneered the very idea of religious rehabilitation: Al Azhar and other counselors as well as the 
historical leadership of al Gama al Islamiyah al Masri (Islamic Group of Egypt) began to 
influence detainees and inmates to abandon violence and build peace. After September 11, 2001, 
Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Uzbekistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia developed national 
                                                 
1
 Rohan Gunaratna is Head, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research and 
Professor of Security Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. 
Gunaratna chaired the first International Conference on Terrorist Rehabilitation, Singapore, February 24-
26, 2009. 
2
 A detainee is defined herein as a prisoner who has not been sentenced who is either awaiting sentencing 
or imprisoned under prevention laws 
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rehabilitation programs. Since then, the process of detainee and inmate rehabilitation has been 
gaining popularity worldwide.
3
  
The Battlefield of the Mind 
There are over 100,000 terrorist and extremist detainees (i.e., uncharged versus convicted 
prisoners) and inmates from Europe to the Middle East and Asia (ICRC, 2009). Although not all 
security detainees and inmates can be rehabilitated, every prison and every detention centre from 
Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and North America should adopt the practice of 
rehabilitation. No one is born an extremist or terrorist. Therefore, programs to rehabilitate 
terrorists and prevent terrorism are the intelligent approach to this phenomenon. Nonetheless, 
worldwide terrorist rehabilitation is the exception, not the norm. During the Bush presidency, the 
U.S. had a golden opportunity to start a rehabilitation program in Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. 
Instead of portraying images of chained men in orange jump suits, Gitmo should have been 
divided into two sections where detainees that cooperated received counseling, learned 
livelihood skills, played with their children, and met with their families. As it is, the detainees 
were more radicalized when released than when they were brought in. In the absence of a 
rehabilitation program, it is very seldom that detainees give up their ways. Because the 
battlefield of the mind was not addressed, nearly 100 former detainees have returned to fight 
(Morgan, 2009).
4
 President Obama has signed a decree on January 22, 2009 requiring the closure 
of the Guantanamo Bay detention centre (Priest, 2009, p. A01).  However, most countries 
receiving the Gitmo detainees have no rehabilitation programs. More than ever before, there is an 
urgent need for countries to develop rehabilitation programs.  
The contemporary wave of terrorism presents a series of new challenges. Many countries 
have developed the skill and will to fight terrorism. However, most countries have not 
adequately developed the ideological and intellectual understanding, knowledge, and structures 
to counter the terrorist conceptual infrastructures. For success, we must hunt operational 
terrorists but also correct the misconstrued ideology and reality of their world. As opposed to the 
previous generation of threat groups, al Qaeda understood the importance and placed a premium 
on using new media technologies to spread its message. Eight years after al Qaeda attacked 
America‘s most iconic landmarks on September 11, 2001, we are still best at using lethal, 
kinetic, hard power. By investing more in operational counter terrorism – catch, kill, and disrupt 
– we cannot win the fight in the long run since we have not prevented it from reoccurring in the 
first place. To reverse the current global trend, strategic capabilities should be developed that 
focus on ways to prevent terrorism through community engagement and reintegration of former 
terrorists and offenders into the community through rehabilitation.   
                                                 
3 Singapore hosted the first International Conference on Terrorist Rehabilitation (ICTR) from February 
26-26, 2009.  The 3-day international conference included 200 delegates and participants from 20 
countries with existing and aspiring rehabilitation programs. The world‘s leading practitioners and 
scholars on detainee and inmate rehabilitation presented. Security and intelligence specialists, 
psychologists, religious counselors, social workers, and other practitioners active in the process of 
rehabilitating extremists and terrorists participated. To learn from global best practice, the national 
programs shared their experience and future plans. 
4
 Pentagon spokesperson Geoff Morrell said the latest figures, current through December 24, showed an 
11 percent recidivism rate, up from 7 percent in a March 2008 report that counted 37 former detainees as 
suspected or confirmed active militants. 
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Terrorism presents the tier-one national security threat to all countries in the western 
world. No country is immune from the threat of extremism or its vicious by-product, terrorism.  
Even if we have built the most capable military, law enforcement, and national security agencies, 
we cannot guarantee total safety from terrorism. A truly transnational and a globalized threat, 
terrorism and extremism permeates territorial borders. If any single country or region is 
producing terrorists and extremists, we will all be at risk. We need to recognize that no country is 
too big to secure itself without the cooperation of others. Similarly, no country is too small that it 
is unable to contribute to global security. Currently, cooperation and collaboration is largely on 
the operational arena and not at the ideological frontier. To make rehabilitation a part of the 
solution at a global level a more concerted effort is needed.  The world needs the expertise and 
dedication of leaders and visionaries, more than ever before, to make this transition from local to 
regional, and national to international.  
Challenges 
The key to establishing a global rehabilitation regime is to build a sufficient number of 
national rehabilitation programs.  There are multiple challenges to building national programs. 
Building a partnership between government, the Muslim community, and academia is at the 
heart of a successful rehabilitation program. By assessing the lessons learned from the terrorist 
rehabilitation program in Singapore, certain principles have been identified as central to the 
success of terrorist rehabilitation. 
First, the government should seek to understand the terrorist mind. Furthermore, the 
government should understand that Islam is not the driver but that Islam has been misinterpreted 
and misrepresented to legitimize violence. As such, the role of the ulema (i.e., Muslim scholars 
trained in Islamic studies and Islamic law) is at the core of dismantling the concept of hate and 
violence harbored by operational terrorists and extremist supporters. Governments must be 
willing to bring learned and knowledgeable Islamic scholars and clerics to the frontline. There 
should be recognition that a theologian is important as a counter terrorism practitioner. That is 
why the staff of the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research
5
 is 50 
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 The International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) is a specialist 
centre within S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.  The Centre seeks to integrate academic 
theory with practical knowledge, essential for complete and comprehensive understanding of threats from 
politically motivated groups.  Its research staff comprises functional and regional analysts from South 
Asia, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, Oceania, Africa, Europe, North America and the Middle East.  The 
research staff is drawn from academia and government agencies and also includes Muslim religious 
scholars.  The Centre seeks to maintain its unique cultural and linguistic diversity.  More than fifty 
percent of ICPVTR staff is Muslim. 
Our Core Objectives 
 To conduct sustained research and analysis of terrorist, guerilla, militia, and extremist political groups 
and their support bases.  To this end, the Centre collects and analyses literature seeking to politicize, 
radicalize and mobilize the public into supporting extremism and participating in violence. 
 To identify the strengths and weaknesses of international, state, and societal responses in managing 
the threat of political violence.  
 To provide high quality instruction and training for officials and future leaders engaged in combating 
terrorism and other forms of political violence. 
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percent Muslim and 25 percent Islamic scholars and clerics.  Without Islamic scholars and 
clerics, we can fight operational terrorism but not its precursor and generator, ideological 
extremism. However, most governments treat terrorism as a mere law enforcement issue and 
extremism as a non-issue. Church and state are separate in the West. As such, there is reluctance 
in North America, Europe, and Australasia to bring in Islamic scholars and clerics to the 
forefront in matters of state. Governments often find it difficult job to identify the rightful 
scholars suitable to staff and lead the ideological fight. The Islamic scholars should lead the fight 
with the help of the government. Without being negatively predisposed towards religious leaders, 
the government must understand reality and start to work with them.  
Second, through training and education, Islamic scholars and clerics should develop a full 
understanding of the ideology and psychology of detainees and inmates. The scholars and clerics 
know about Islam and Islamic law (sharia), but they do not know what the terrorists‘ level of 
understanding of religion is. Even if the government identified scholars and clerics with the right 
attitude, they must be trained. The training should cover two principal areas: first, terrorist 
ideologies, the linkages between ideology and operations, and second, psychological counseling 
skills, especially the ability to listen patiently to the inmate or detainee. The Islamic scholars and 
clerics must relearn the Islamic concepts, especially common misinterpretations and 
misrepresentations. They should examine the writings and speeches of ideologues of hatred and 
violence, especially the ways Abu Mohamed al Maqdisi and his followers perceive Islam and 
Osama bin Laden‘s followers understand jihad as holy war. The Islamic scholar and cleric 
engaged in rehabilitation is part psychologist. In the human system, there is a link between belief 
and feelings. Although the terrorists‘ feelings of hatred, anger, and the resentment of the West 
have nothing to do with Islam, the ideology will support these feelings. Psychologists know how 
to deal with the feelings. While the heart produces the feelings, the mind controls it. It is natural 
to get angry, but a sound mind prevents a person from killing.  About 80 percent of the staff of 
Singapore‘s Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) has completed a seven-month diploma 
course in psychological counseling.  
Third, a government should be able to differentiate between terrorist leaders, members or 
operatives, and supporters and sympathizers. Different levels of extremism require different 
levels of response. As there are circles of extremism, there are multiple target audiences. Counter 
terrorism practitioners, Islamic scholars, and academic specialists should work together to 
develop a program with a syllabus that can tailor to every category: from extremists that 
advocate and support to the terrorists that kill. As not all detained are identical in their 
understanding, it is necessary to divide them into leaders, operatives, and supporters. 
Government, together with clerics, must work on a structured program and a tailored syllabus: 
otherwise, the message we want to send to the detainee will not reach them and will be wasted. 
For instance, many foot soldiers do not know ideology. But if told, ―To die as a shaheed is the 
best thing,‖ they will. Because the ideology is evolving, constant research and analysis is needed 
to both produce and update rehabilitation manuals.  
                                                                                                                                                             
 To advise government and inform societies affected by political violence on how best to manage the 
current and evolving threat. 
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Classifying Terrorists 
After a terrorist is detained, he is assessed. The detainee is categorized into high, medium 
and low risk
6
 as each of these categories requires a different approach.  
High risk: There are very few people in this category. They are mostly spiritual and 
operational leaders. They are usually the ―hard core‖ individuals. They believe in the ideology 
and they do not want to move from it, even after many counseling sessions. Often, they have had 
contact with, and received direct inspiration from, the top terrorist leadership. For example, even 
though Mullah Omar never completed his religious education and Osama bin Laden had no 
formal religious education, many terrorists have received instruction and guidance from them. 
They regarded a poorly educated Afghan or a Saudi as more important than a scholar or cleric 
from their own country. They believe their version of Islam is correct. It is necessary to use most 
prominent ulema (Islamic scholar) to talk to them and allow to them to reflect and repent. When 
released, they are the most susceptible to return to violence.  
Medium risk: The individuals in this category are the operatives and the experts that form 
the bulk of the terrorist group membership. They are active ideologically and operationally, full 
of hatred and ready to commit violence. They tend to look for justification and interpretation that 
suits their current mindset. They usually have served a long time in the organization. They know 
the ideology and accept it. In general, they can be rehabilitated. In a few cases, it is debatable if 
there has been a genuine transformation or merely an apparent change due to a strategic 
calculation. There have been cases where detainees tried to mislead the religious counselor by 
agreeing with him solely with the intention of gaining an early release (JI Case Study, 2009).  
Low risk: This category includes both active and passive supporters. They are mostly foot 
soldiers, inactive members, and not involved in crimes. They do not know or understand the 
ideology very well. They often joined thinking that their peers (relatives, colleagues, and friends) 
were fighting for Islam. They completely believe that whatever they do is justified by religion.  
Some provided money without realizing that their contributions were used for purchasing arms 
or conducting violence.  
After the assessment process, the right cleric
7
 or psychologist is assigned to counsel the 
detainee. The detainee is continuously assessed. It is essential to identify the detainee‘s problem. 
Is it their character or the fact that they believe in a dangerous ideology? Is he still sympathetic to 
jihadist ideology? What is his actual problem? The process of rehabilitation is long and 
multifaceted. Unlike in many countries, Singapore will not release a detainee unless the 
government is fully convinced they do not pose a security threat. If a detainee or inmate is 
prematurely released, he is likely to participate in terrorist and extremist activity, a mistake that 
could discredit the vital tool of rehabilitation and the program itself.   
                                                 
6
Catagorisation developed by International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research 
(ICPVTR), http://www.pvtr.org/.  
7
 ―Right cleric‖ refers to a mainstream cleric while ―right psychologist‖ is one who is formally trained to 
work with detainees. 
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Conclusion 
Terrorist rehabilitation comes with several premises and notions. First, there must be zero 
tolerance towards any promotion of hate and violence using religion as justification. We cannot 
inform the detainees that they cannot kill at home but in Iraq, it is a jihad. We should instill and 
adopt the principle of zero tolerance, a parallel from the world of drugs. The world failed to take 
action to control illicit drugs use.
8
 As a result, party drugs have become a worldwide 
phenomenon. Party drugs can be as harmful as other forms of drugs. 
Terrorist rehabilitation should not treat the symptom; it should be a cure for the 
(terrorism) disease. It should address those who are sick – those radicalized and those who are 
constantly exposed to the sickness out there. Those susceptible will fall immediately. Those who 
are regularly bombarded with propaganda will eventually fall too.  
As such, any rehabilitation program should be complemented by public education and 
public awareness. Otherwise, those who are supposed to be immune will fall prey to 
radicalization. In a few countries, they have developed programs where a community 
participation component in prison de-radicalization is absent. There should be synergy where 
government works with the community. Larger goal of rehabilitation is to prevent contamination 
of the rest of the community by former terrorists or by terrorists not exposed to rehabilitation.  
Without a vision and a strategic direction, no program that requires a long-term 
investment will succeed. For a rehabilitation program to be successful, a long-term commitment 
is a must. Rehabilitation comes with the notion that a country must gain a greater understanding 
from others and put more resources. A successful rehabilitation program requires both the 
government and community to work together. Without a dedicated, well trained, and a motivated 
staff, such a program cannot succeed. 
back to top 
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Almost eight years into what previously was known as the ‗war on terror,‘ there is an 
increasing recognition of the value of rehabilitation and disengagement programs for violent 
extremists.  Since 2003, the government of Saudi Arabia has been engaged in a sophisticated 
effort to rehabilitate Islamist militants and extremist sympathizers.  Such programs are now 
increasing in popularity and can be found in a number of countries including Singapore, Egypt, 
Algeria, Libya, Malaysia, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Jordan, and Iraq.   
The Saudi government‘s ability to engage in ‗soft‘ counter-terrorism and security 
designed to combat the ideology that supports violent Islamist extremism is a result of hard 
security, intelligence, and law enforcement successes.  The elimination of immediate terrorist 
violence provided the government with the space in which to launch a series of ‗soft‘ counter-
terrorism efforts including prevention programs, rehabilitation programs, and reintegration 
strategies.  A primary component of these efforts has been the development of a program to 
rehabilitate violent militants and their sympathizers through an innovative detainee 
disengagement program.  Known as the ‗Counseling Program‘, it is made up of religious 
discussion and debate, extensive social support, and implicit family obligation.  This program 
was initially developed in secret and is now one of the primary examples of an extremist 
rehabilitation program.   
The Saudi model is not universally applicable.  In many ways, it is very much a unique 
Saudi solution to a unique Saudi problem.  The Counseling Program incorporates many 
traditional Saudi methods of conflict resolution and conflict management, including cooptation, 
persuasion, and coercion.  This brief overview will highlight several factors central to its success, 
including the focus on extended social networks, the importance of treating families and not just 
individuals, and the use of time-honored methods of social control including notions of family 
honor and extended social hierarchies.   
Understanding the Saudi approach to extremist and militant disengagement is important 
for a number of reasons.  To date the Saudi Counseling program is the most expansive and 
successful in seeking to disengage radical violent Islamist extremists.  It is currently the longest 
continually running program and the best funded.  More people have participated in the Saudi 
program—and been released—than any other program -- approximately 1,500 of about 3,000 
detainees have been released.  In many ways, it has become a de facto model for other countries 
                                                 
1
 Based in part on Boucek, C. (2009). The counseling program: Extremist rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia. 
In T. Bjørgo & J. Horgan, (Eds.)  Leaving terrorism behind: Disengagement from political violence. 
Routledge; and Boucek, C. (2008, September). Saudi Arabia‘s ‗soft‘ counterterrorism strategy: 
Prevention, rehabilitation, and aftercare. Carnegie Paper, 97. 
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seeking to implement similar programs.  As a result, understanding the Saudi experience can be 
very instructive. 
The centerpiece of the Saudi strategy is dubbed the ‗Counseling Program,‘ which is 
intended to help individuals that have espoused takfiri
2
 beliefs ‗repent and abandon terrorist 
ideologies.‘  The program seeks to counter-radicalize extremists and extremist sympathizers by 
engaging them in intensive religious debates and psychological counseling, supplemented with 
extensive social support.  It is important to stress that the only people who have been released 
through the Counseling Program are terrorist sympathizers and support personnel, and at the 
most, individuals caught with jihadi propaganda or who have provided logistical assistance.  The 
Counseling Program aims to short-circuit the radicalization process, both with program 
participants and in their social networks.  While the program has been criticized for dealing with 
relatively low-level offenders, this should not be discounted as it can prevent sympathizers and 
supporters from developing into violent operatives.  As senior al-Qaeda leadership elements in 
the kingdom have been killed or captured by Saudi law enforcement and security personnel, they 
have not been replaced -- in part because of these efforts to derail potential successors. 
Thus far, the Saudi program has dealt with the easiest cases—those furthest from 
participating in violence within the kingdom.  This is an important point to bear in mind when 
considering the relative success of the Saudi program.  They are not individuals that have been 
active in terrorist violence in the kingdom; thus far people ‗with blood on their hands‘ are barred 
from release through the Counseling Program.  Some of these suspects have gone through 
rehabilitation but were not released as a result.  The Saudi government has announced plans to 
try approximately 990 people charged with participating in a series of terrorists attacks in Saudi 
Arabia since 2003 (Boucek, 2008).
3
 
Saudi officials are very careful to stress that not everyone who participates in the program 
will be released.  Release is contingent upon successfully completing the program and 
satisfactorily demonstrating to the Advisory Committee‘s4 doctors and psychologists that the 
rehabilitation is genuine.  Moreover, not everyone who completes the program will be released.  
According to Saudi authorities, in the event that a detainee has appeared before a judge and if 
there is still time left on a sentence, that time must first be served before a prisoner can be 
released.  Furthermore, if the Interior Ministry has information that despite having finished the 
program (or a sentence for that matter) that an individual plans to commit further acts of 
violence, then a prisoner will not be released. 
Format 
The Counseling Program is based upon a presumption of benevolence, and not vengeance 
or retribution.  It presumes that the suspects were lied to and misled by extremists into straying 
away from true Islam, and the state wants to help security detainees return to the correct path—in 
this case, to the official state version of Islam.  The vast majority of detainees that have 
                                                 
2
 The accusation of another Muslim of being an apostate. 
3
 In July 2009, 330 defendants were found guilty of security offenses in the first round of terrorist trials in 
Saudi Arabia. 
4
 The Counseling Program is run by the Advisory Committee, an organization within the Ministry of 
Interior comprised of shaikhs and religious scholars, academics, statisticians, social scientists, 
psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers. 
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participated in the program, according to research conducted Saudi officials, have been found to 
not have had a ‗successful‘ religious education during their childhood.  To be sure, all education 
in Saudi Arabia is rooted in religion.  Saudi officials argue that these individuals did not 
understand what they were taught or turned elsewhere to seek answers from questionable 
sources.   
Many of the detainees have been found by the Committee to have an incomplete 
understanding of Islam, and it is this fact, which according to Saudi officials, accounts for the 
successes of the religious rehabilitation program.  According to the Committee‘s research, most 
detainees did not complete much education (see al-Khalifah, 2008; Boucek, 2008, p.60-65; al-
Hakeem, 2009).  The majority have been radicalized through extremist books, tapes, videos, and 
more recently the internet.  The Counseling Program, therefore, seeks to ‗correct‘ this 
misunderstanding by reintroducing and reinforcing the official state version of Islam.  The 
official view is that because these individuals did not correctly learn the tenets of their faith 
originally, they were susceptible to extremist propaganda.  As a result, the program seeks to 
remove incorrect understandings of Islam and replace them with correct understandings. 
Moreover, the state is able to marshal its considerable religious authority to confer 
legitimacy to this process.  The fact that a number of former militant figures have joined the 
Advisory Committee adds further legitimacy in the view of some prisoners.  The presence of 
such figures carries credibility with a number of participants in the program as it was their da‟wa 
that originally led many on the path toward extremism. 
Another critical component of the Saudi Counseling Program is the attention given to a 
prisoner‘s social needs.  Each participant is evaluated to determine how incarceration will affect 
the detainee‘s family.  Specific strategies are then devised to offset the hardship of a loved one‘s 
detention.  For instance, once a breadwinner is incarcerated, the Committee provides the family 
with an alternate salary.  Other needs, including children‘s schooling and family healthcare are 
also provided.  This is intended to prevent or offset the radicalization of family members.  It has 
been acknowledged by officials that when the government detains someone, that memory 
lingers, and this social support is intended to short-circuit that hardship.  The government further 
recognizes that if they fail to do this, then it is likely that extremist elements will move in to 
provide this support. 
Social support continues upon release.  Detainees who have successfully completed the 
rehabilitation process and have satisfactorily renounced their previous beliefs are given 
assistance in locating jobs and other benefits, including additional government stipends, cars, and 
housing.  Assistance in getting jobs have included placement in government jobs and within the 
private sector.  Placement in government jobs is noteworthy, as previously many detainees 
would not work with what they considered to be an illegitimate government.  The Interior 
Ministry also helps those individuals that previously had government jobs before they entered 
the program to regain their previous positions.  More recently, efforts have been started with 
local chambers of commerce and other certification organizations to organize training courses for 
program participants.  This, and a government program providing start-up funds, were intended 
to empower released detainees to be qualified and equipped to start their own businesses.   
Upon release, former detainees are required to check in with authorities, and are 
encouraged to continue meeting with the scholars they had spoken with while in prison.  Some 
continue to attend their study circles at mosque after being released.  Furthermore, rehabilitated 
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prisoners are encouraged to settle down, marry, and have children, in part because it is 
understood that it is much more difficult for young men to get into trouble once they become 
obligated with family responsibilities.  Central to its success, the Counseling Program seeks to 
replace a detainee‘s social network with one that is more conducive to preventing a reoffense.  
The government has facilitated this by paying for weddings, donating dowries, and covering 
other essential pre-marriage costs such as furnishing apartments.  Senior officials from the 
Interior Ministry and the Advisory Committee frequently attend the weddings of former 
detainees. 
The successes of the program are compounded by the Advisory Committee‘s application 
of these social support programs within a prisoner‘s larger family network.  The Ministry of 
Interior augments this support by delivering the message that a prisoner‘s larger family network 
is also responsible for his behavior upon his release.
5
  Working through families can be an 
effective strategy in Saudi Arabia.  This makes use of several important Saudi cultural mores, 
including social responsibility, notions of honor, and the recognition of traditional family and 
extended family hierarchies.  For instance, when detainees are released for family events such as 
weddings or funerals, three family members must come forward to guarantee his return.  Should 
the detainee not return, then those three family members would have to take his place.
6
  As of 
this writing, no prisoner has ever used this opportunity to escape.  The use of Saudi social 
networks, familial obligations, and extended responsibilities reinforces program objectives once 
a detainee has left the committee‘s formal oversight. 
Process 
When members of the Advisory Committee initially sit with a prisoner, one of the first 
things that they stress is that they are not employees of the Ministry of Interior or associated with 
the security forces.  Rather, they explain that they are independent and righteous scholars.  
Before the government adopted this technique, it was not uncommon for families to ask clerics 
and scholars to visit their family members in jail and talk with them about their behavior.   
As word of the program began to spread, there was initially a backlash from extremists 
who would denounce the Committee.  The rehabilitation program was declared a sham, and the 
militant community accused anyone that had gone through the program of being a government 
spy (Mohammed bin Nayef, interview, 2007).  Detainees themselves, at first, thought that the 
program was merely another form of interrogation.  However, numerous officials have 
confirmed in interviews that the counseling process begins only after the interrogation and 
investigative phases have ended.   
In their first meeting, a Committee Member will simply listen to a detainee.  They ask 
them about what they did, why they did it, and the circumstances that brought them to be in 
                                                 
5
 Interestingly, this also applies to non-family members.  There have been occasions when furloughed 
Guantanamo returnees have been followed by the family members of those still remaining at Guantanamo 
Bay.  This was done to make sure that the returnees did not do anything that would jeopardize the 
repatriation program for those loved ones still yet to be repatriated.  Such collective responsibility is a 
common factor in Saudi rehabilitation and after-care programs. 
6
 So far it has only been male relatives that have signed for a detainee‘s release.  There is no restriction 
against female relatives signing for a prisoner‘s release, and according to author‘s interviews the 
Advisory Committee would like to see female family members get involved in this way.   
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prison.  Throughout the process, the scholars seek to draw out detainees in discussions about 
their beliefs and then attempt to persuade them that their religious justification for their actions is 
wrong and based upon a corrupted understanding of Islam.  This is done in part by presenting 
evidence draw from religious sources that contradict a detainee‘s beliefs or presumptions.  First, 
the Committee demonstrates how what the prisoners were tricked into believing was false, and 
then they set to teach them the proper state-approved interpretation of Islam.   
Initial sessions, especially those held in prison, are conducted one-on-one.
7
  These can be 
both formal and informal discussions, as much of the counseling process depends on the two 
individuals involved.  Later on, especially once a detainee has moved to the external residential 
facility known as the Care Rehabilitation Center, sessions do not just take the form of religious 
lectures.  Discussions and dialogues are encouraged.  While some counseling sessions take place 
in classrooms, others occur in very informal settings, oftentimes involving very subtle 
negotiations and dialogue about everyday affairs.  All the while, the Committee staff is 
evaluating program participants. 
The Advisory Committee runs two programs.  The first are short sessions, which 
typically run about two hours.  While some prisoners recant their beliefs after a single session, 
typically a prisoner would go through several of these.  These are usually individuals who are 
looking for a way out or people who unwittingly got involved with extremists.  The other 
program has been dubbed ‗Long Study Sessions‘.  These are six-week courses for up to 20 
students led by two clerics and social scientist.  Ten subjects are covered over the six weeks, 
including instruction in such topics as takfir, loyalty and allegiance, terrorism, the legal rules for 
jihad, and psychological courses on self-esteem.  Instruction is also given on the concepts of 
‗faith, leadership, and community,‘ as well as guidance on how to ‗avoid misleading, delusional 
books.‘  The important role of scholars in Islamic jurisprudence is stressed, and detainees are 
also taught about sedition and the sanctity of blood in Islam.  At the end of the course, an exam is 
given; those that pass the exam move to the next stage of the process, those that do not pass, 
repeat the course. 
Success Rate 
As of November 2007, roughly 3,000 prisoners have participated in the Counseling 
Program in custody, and about 1,500 have renounced their former beliefs and been released.  
According to program workers, some detainees have refused to participate in the program.  Saudi 
authorities have acknowledged that some detainees have sought to actively undermine the 
program.  These prisoners are individuals who know that they will not able to get out and feel 
that they can do the most good for the cause by attempting to frustrate the authorities‘ attempts to 
turn detainees.  In many respects, their desire to work against the Counseling Program from 
inside prison demonstrates, to an extent, the successes of the Advisory Committee. 
Thus far, the program has produced results, with Saudi authorities claiming an 80-90 
percent success rate.  The 20 percent failure rate described by Saudi officials includes those 
detainees that refused to participate in the program as well as those detainees who failed the 
rehabilitation program.  The 80 percent figure includes those detainees that the program staff 
believe have successfully completed the program, including those released through the 
Counseling Program, as well as those that remain in custody.  There are individuals—allegedly 
                                                 
7
 According to Committee members, some meetings did initially occur with several shaikhs present. 
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including those that have participated in violence within the kingdom, and who therefore are not 
eligible for release—who have gone through the Counseling Program.  According to program 
staff, participation in the program is possible for all security detainees;
8
 however, those that have 
been engaged in violence cannot be released through the program.  Admittedly, it is difficult to 
measure the relative success of the Counseling Program, especially only several years into 
program.  However, according to Saudi authorities, as of 1 November 2007, only 35 individuals 
have been re-arrested for security offenses since their release through the Counseling Program, 
equating to a recidivist rate of between one and two percent (see Boucek, 2009, p. 7-10).
9
  
Officials admit, however, that there could be more individuals that have been released through 
the program that have yet to be caught reoffending.  When, and if, Saudi authorities decide to put 
other more ―difficult‖ cases through the program, including detainees closer to violence, the re-
arrest and recidivism figures are sure to increase.  This is, in large part, because current research 
demonstrates that the closer someone is to participation in violence, the more difficult it is for 
him or her to disengage from violence.   
Conclusion 
In only several years, Saudi Arabia‘s Counseling Program has generated some very 
intriguing results.  The problem posed by extremism is not one that can be addressed by hard 
security measures alone, and the Counseling Program demonstrates the benefits that can come 
through critical engagement in the ‗war of ideas.‘  This understudied program, and other similar 
programs like it, clearly warrant greater attention in the West as the successes being generated 
hold applicable lessons for other nations struggling with extremism.  While responses to the 
program have varied from genuine interest to deep skepticism, it is clear that the kingdom‘s 
efforts warrant further study in order to better understand how its techniques can be applied in 
other cases and other situations.   
The Saudi program highlights the importance of several factors that will be essential in 
any disengagement program for Islamist militants, including the essential nature of the close 
involvement of an individual‘s family and extended social network.  Such programs raise the 
question of whether they are actually changing beliefs or rather engaging in behavior 
modification.  The short answer is both.  The Saudi program seeks to determine what led an 
individual to extremism—religion, criminality, etc.—and then to address those needs.  By 
understanding how someone got into this mode of behavior, officials seek to design strategies to 
move them out of it.  In some cases, through religious discussion, individuals will renounce their 
former beliefs.  In other cases, officials will attempt to explain how violence is not permitted.  
On other occasions, behavior modification and family pressure is used—both conciliation and 
coercion—to demonstrate that the benefits associated with not reoffending far outweigh the 
penalties for reoffending.  This and other programs are based on a premise that being radical is 
not a bad thing— that violence based on those beliefs is, and that is what the program seeks to 
                                                 
8
 This refers to Sunni militant extremists, and not any other detainees such as Shi‘a detainees, 
constitutional monarchists, bloggers, criminals, or other detainees. 
9
 This excludes Guantanamo returnees.  Of the 117 Saudi nationals that have been repatriated as of July 
2009, 24 are either wanted or in custody for security violations.  Fourteen have been rearrested, and ten 
remain wanted for fleeing Saudi Arabia to rejoin al-Qaeda in Yemen. Three more Saudi nationals were 
repatriated in June 2009. 
 375 
UNCLASSIFIED 
address.  It is also founded on an understanding that violent behavior is not a permanent state, 
and that there are ways to move someone out of violence.   
To be sure, approaches such as the Saudi rehabilitation program are bound to increase in 
popularity and practice. Critical to their success will be thorough monitoring and support 
programs and very detailed risk assessment tools to help measure the likelihood of re-engaging 
in terrorism.  At the present time, we do not yet have such tools.  There will always be an 
inherent risk in releasing someone from custody, and the objective of any rehabilitation program 
will be to minimize that risk to society.  
back to top 
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Appendix A:  Acronyms 
Organizations: 
AEL Arab European League 
AFRL Air Force Research Laboratory 
AIVD Netherlands‘ General Intelligence and Security Service (Algemene Inlichtingen en 
Veiligheidsdienst) 
AJAI al-Jama‘a al-Islamiya 
AQ al Qaeda 
AQC al-Qaeda Central 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
CTC Combating Terrorism Center at West Point 
DoD Department of Defense 
DTI Directed Technologies, Inc. 
ETA Euskadi Ta Askatasuna/Basque Homeland and Freedom 
EU European Union 
FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FOUO For Official Use Only 
GIA Armed Islamic Group of Algeria 
GIA Group Islamique Armé 
GIMF Global Islamic Media Front 
GON Government of Nigeria 
GSPC Salafist Group for Predication and Call 
HT -I Hizbut Tahrir - Indonesia 
HT Hizbut Tahrir 
HUM Harakat Ul-Mujahidin 
IBDA-C Islami Büyükdogu Akincilar Cephesi 
IJY Islamic Jihad in Yemen 
IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
INLA Irish National Liberation Army 
INSS Institute for National Security Studies 
IRA Irish Republican Army 
ISI Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan 
JI Jamaat-e-Islami 
JUI Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam 
KKK Ku Klux Klan 
KLA Kosovo Liberation Army 
LT Lashkar-e-Tayyiba 
LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
MCU Muslim Contact Unit (MCU) in the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) in London 
MEND Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
MNF-I Multi-National Forces - Iraq 
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MPS Metropolitan Police Service in London 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organziation 
NCTC National Counter-Terrorism Center 
NIC National Intelligence Council 
NSA National Security Agency 
NSI National Security Innovations 
NYPD New York Police Department 
PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
PIRA Provisional Irish Liberation Army 
PKK Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan or Kurdistan Worker‘s Party 
PVV Party of Freedom 
RRG Singapore Religious Rehabilitation Group 
SDSU San Diego State University 
SNCC Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee 
START National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 
TNSM Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi 
TON Proud on the Netherlands Movement 
TTP Taliban Movement of Pakistan, Tehrik-i-Taliban 
U.S. United States 
UK United Kingdom 
UN United Nations 
UNTAK United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
USAWC United States Army War College 
USN United States Navy 
WODC Research and Documentation Centre of the Dutch Ministry of Justice 
WTO World Trade Organization 
 
Other Acronyms 
ADHD Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
ANOVA Analysis of Variance 
CAD Community, autonomy, divinity 
CPDTE Crime prevention through environmental design 
CT Counterterrorism 
DCIA Director, Central Intelligence Agency 
DIME Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic 
FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GTD Global Terrorism Database 
GWOT Global War On Terror 
IED Improvised Explosive Device 
IED Improvised Explosive Device 
IKMASS Ideology, Knowledge, Management, Audience, Social distance, SymbolicValue 
ISI Islamic State in Iraq 
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MAR Minorities at Risk Project 
MAROB Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior dataset 
MIPT National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism 
MOU Memorandum of Understanding 
NCTb National Coordinator for Counterterrorism 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
NIE National Intelligence Estimate 
NSA Non-State Actor 
NTD Notice and Take Down 
OSINT Open Source Intelligence 
PCI Properly conceived 'ideology' 
PGIS Pinkerton Global Intelligence Services  
POLRAD Gallup survey on political radicals 
PTSD Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
RDD Radiological Dispersion Device 
SMA Strategic Multilayer Assessment 
SMO Social Movement Organization 
SNA Social Network Analysis 
SNF Spent Nuclear Fuel 
VNSA Violent Non-State Actor 
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 
WMV Weapons of Mass Victimization 
WWI World War I 
WWII World War II 
 
 
